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The idea of ‘popular will’, or a people’s ability to freely choose its preferred mode 
of political authority over any outside objection, forms the basis for domestic au-
thority under international law. Such an outcome is the conclusion of consistently 
adhering to international law’s presumptions of sovereign equality and noninter-
vention most iconically encapsulated in the Charter of the United Nations. However, 
while popular will theoretically allows the people of a sovereign state to pursue any 
governmental system, applying a methodology I deem ‘world-historical context’ 
reveals the limits of what can be substantively attained.  
 
Formed as an interdisciplinary synthesis of critical international legal history and 
the historical sociology of international relations, my analysis reveals how the glob-
alization of popular will, and its vesting of sovereignty in the abstraction of a terri-
tory’s underlying political community as opposed to the person of a dynastic mon-
arch, is inseparable from the expansion of capitalism. On this basis, the material 
success of achieving popular will depends on the degree to which it facilitates 
global capitalism. The construction of this arrangement places radical political lead-
ers and movements in a dilemma whereby claiming popular will is the only means 
of gaining international legal recognition, yet doing so comes at the expense of 
pursuing experimental alternatives to capitalist social relations.  
 
In this situation, ‘effective control’ has emerged as the default ‘non-ideological’ 
standard for externally evaluating international legal standing when competing do-
mestic factions are claiming sovereign authority and, therefore, the representation 
of popular will. In working from this premise that de facto ‘effective control’ is 
generally sufficient evidence of ‘popular will’, I historicize this framework as first 
appearing as a natural law counterfactual in Emer de Vattel’s 1758 treatise The Law 
of Nations. Given the contradictions that emerged with capitalism and the crises of 
legitimate authority it produced in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the world proved highly receptive to Vattel’s framework. This manifested, in com-
pounding measures, through the American Revolution, French Revolution, and for-




American states. While these formative eruptions of popular will were subject to a 
century of limitation and qualification through various legal regimes of colonialism 
and exclusion, the idea of a global legal order of absolute sovereigns representing 
popular will returned with the end of the Second World War and rise of the UN 
system. Yet, despite this achievement of a ‘world of popular will’, the marginaliza-
tion of alternative political economic models persists. Attempt to identify the place 
of international law when developing greater projects of popular emancipation can-
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Popular Will, International Law, and World-Historical Context 
 
 
1.  Why Popular Will? 
 
In this thesis, I present a critique of ‘popular will’, defined as the location of sover-
eign authority in the abstraction of ‘the people’, as opposed to any physical human 
person, dynastic lineage, or otherworldly force. Broadly stated, while popular will 
(also known as ‘popular sovereignty’ or ‘self-determination’1) is typically por-
trayed as a timeless enabler of political possibility, I argue that it is better under-
stood as a historically contingent constraint on political possibility. Adopting a ma-
terialist lens, my analysis accounts for why popular will attained its status as the 
sole basis for domestic authority under international law. Detailing this process re-
veals numerous interconnections regarding the character of legal thought, the con-
ditions of political expression, the particular features of the nation-state, and the 
expansionist reproduction of capitalism as a distinct mode of social relations. In 
sum, the belief in popular will as transcendent normative presumption amounts to 
an ideological cover for the fact that, at a material level, it is a tangled mass of 
historically-compounded contradictions upholding a deeply unequal global order. 
Exposing these dynamics is a vital step for those working to achieve popular will’s 
underlying emancipatory promises in the actually-existing world.   
 
In setting the stage for the thesis, Part 2 of this Introduction situates my argument 
within critical international legal discourse regarding the questionable division be-
tween the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international.’ Part 3 then examines the contemporary 
                                                        
1 As a matter of terminology, due to the technical meanings attached to the terms ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘self-determination’ within international legal discourse, unless otherwise noted, the term ‘popular 




presumptions of the popular will-international law relationship as they are embod-
ied in a phenomenon deemed the ‘effective control doctrine.’ Following this, Part 
4 turns to the issue of methodology where I outline my synthesis of historical soci-
ology, as developed within the field of international relations, and the unique inter-
national legal view of the past deemed ‘juridical thinking.’  Finally, Part 5 maps out 
the subsequent unfolding of my chapters. 
 
2.  Whose International, Whose Domestic? 
 
While the relationship between popular will and international law must be carefully 
deconstructed, I first situate my argument through a critical evaluation of the foun-
dational premise that ‘the domestic’ and ‘the international’ are separate and distinct 
spheres of authority.2 Traditionally understood, popular will was the sole province 
of the domestic sphere that, in its current form, is encapsulated in the sovereign 
state.3 Conversely, the international sphere is empowered and conditioned solely 
by the consent of these individual sovereign states. On this basis, international law-
yers rarely need to confront popular will at all.4 When this need does arise, popular 
will, as an international legal ideal, acts as a fundamentally empty concept whose 
                                                        
2 Such an ontology of the ‘domestic’ versus the ‘international’ is easy to conflate with a timeless 
narrative of the ‘inner’ versus the ‘outer.’ According to one prominent philosopher of history, ‘[n]o 
unit of human social activity ever comes into being without the ability to delimit itself inwardly and 
outwardly.’ Koselleck 1989, 651. 
3 According to the influential account of Martin Wight, while legal and political theory allows use 
to conceptualise the good life within the boundaries of a domestic polity, the same type of normative 
imagination cannot apply to the international. On this basis, ‘[i]nternational theory is the theory of 
survival.’ Wight 1960, 48. 
4 Most frequently, theoretical discourse on the relationship between the ‘international’ and the ‘do-
mestic’ in international law revolves around the ‘dualism’ versus ‘monism’ debate where the former 
views international and domestic law as separate systems, while the latter views them as a singular 
system. For studies, see e.g. Starke 1936; O’Connell 1960; Slaughter and Burke-White 2006. How-
ever, this analysis is fundamentally limited if we consider popular will as the expression of the 
sovereign political community that is not beholden to any particular domestic legal system and can 




substantive content can only be filled by domestic political communities unaccount-
able to outsiders within their bounded spheres of authority.5 Thus, so long as a do-
mestic order is not the product of external coercion, it is presumably justified by 
internal popular will. So long as popular will is present, the ability of a sovereign 
political community to choose its system of government is presumptively unlimited.  
 
However, according to the standard narrative, in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, increased international interdependence required a greater delegation of na-
tional authority to supranational institutions, even though this limited the sovereign 
autonomy of individual states.6 While limiting sovereignty arguably undermines 
popular will, it could also be argued that this ‘move to institutions’ was needed to 
uphold the national popular will that would otherwise be suppressed by the harsh-
ness of unconstrained interstate rivalry.7 From this premise, there emerges a dichot-
omy between traditional and progressive arguments; each can support the founda-
tional premise of popular will, while leaving the base level domestic-international 
binary largely intact.8 
                                                        
5 Perhaps the single most iconic encapsulation of this sentiment was presented in General Assembly 
Resolution 2625’s pronouncement that: ‘Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, 
economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State.’ Friendly 
Relations Declaration 1970. 
6 For an influentially account of how this post-First World War ‘move to institutions’ as a means of 
qualifying state sovereignty in the name of international order, see Kennedy 1987. 
7 According to one formulation of how international competition diminished the possibilities of do-
mestic political expression: ‘If a nation must put itself upon a totalitarian basis in order to fight a 
war, it must for that purpose surrender many of its purposes and beliefs; and if war is to continue in 
the world, then nations must remain upon a totalitarian basis in order to be prepared for the next 
war.’ Eagleton 1942, 232. 
8 This speaks to a tendency within international legal thinking where the prospect of change has the 
effect of solidifying the background structures tasked with accommodating this change. This was 
readily apparent in James Crawford’s 2000 reflection on the question of whether, and to what extent, 
the imperative of democratization was changing international law. For Crawford, ‘[t]he difficulty is 
to envision appropriate forms of change, and at the same time to hold to those aspects of international 
law which embody the stable outcomes of the interaction between peoples, societies, and their gov-





One of the most important innovations within critical international legal scholarship 
over past two decades has involved questioning standard views of the domestic-
international relationship. This has been applied to both progressive and tradition-
alist sensibilities. Regarding the critique of the progressive accounts, a landmark 
text is Susan Marks’s The Riddle of All Constitutions. Here, Marks mobilizes the 
Marxian tradition’s tools of ideology critique to evaluate post-Cold War claims that 
international law was capable of rectifying domestic deficiencies by promoting lib-
eral democratic governance as the sole legitimate measure of popular will. 9 
Through this analysis, Marks shows how, despite the genuine optimism it elicited, 
‘democracy’ in this context was both ‘low-intensity’ in its reduction of political 
participation to periodic elections between substantial similar factions, and ‘pan-
national’ in its fixation on state-centric agency and blindness to the ways interna-
tional/transnational forces shape democratic possibilities.10 Thus, rather than sup-
porting domestic systems in their quests for democratic expression, international 
legalism actively constrained the consciousness of what democracy can be.11 As 
such, Riddle delivered a serious blow to progressive accounts of a virtuous ‘inter-
national’ aiding a distressed ‘domestic’ in the advancement of popular will.12   
 
Regarding the critique of traditional accounts of the domestic-international rela-
tionship (and its situating of popular will), international law’s ‘turn to history’ pro-
vides a vast array of alternative framings. While diverse in its manifestations, a key 
                                                        
9 Marks 2000, 30-33. 
10 Ibid. 60-61, 83. 
11 Ibid. 149. 
12 In subsequent work, Marks confronts the discourse of ‘state-centrism’ in international law and 
shows how attempts to transcend the former’s pathology through the latter’s virtue reveals their 
foundational co-constitution. As a result, ‘when we treat international law as a redemptive force that 
could save the world if only it were properly respected and enforced, we obscure the possibility that 
international legal norms may themselves have contributed to creating or sustaining the ills from 




feature of this ‘turn’ has been exposing how international law’s stated mission of 
creating a just order amongst states is inseparable from its historical facilitation of 
the colonial domination by a Western ‘family of nations’ at the expense of all other 
peoples.13 Vitally, this ‘turn’ has included wide-ranging narratives from the Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement, especially Antony 
Anghie’s 2004 Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, that 
situate international law from the perspective of its marginalized and, consequently, 
dispense with any notion that popular will was historically connected to universal 
equality.14 This history seriously complicates the reigning ontology of the ‘domes-
tic’/‘international’ binary through its refashioning of the ‘international’ into a com-
plex interplay of equality amongst some and hierarchy amongst others. Here, in the 
name of transcendent standards, hierarchically differentiated localities (and their 
expressions of popular will) were subject to radically disparate sets of rules.15 Thus, 
as Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja have recently shown, the current equality-based 
order of sovereign states presumed by international law is the compounded legacy 
                                                        
13 Important illustrations of this turn include Martti Koskenniemi’s The Gentle Civilizer of Nations 
(2001) as well as Gerry Simpson’s Great Powers and Outlaw States (2004). Moreover, it should be 
noted that, in a relatively short amount of time, this acknowledgment of colonial origins and legacies 
has become a staple of mainstream knowledge in the field as demonstrated by its inclusion in prom-
inent textbooks and handbooks, Kendall 2016, 623. For an important account of colonial history’s 
exclusion from narratives of international legal origins ‘properly understood’, see Kennedy 1996.  
14 Anghie 2004. On this point, a major recent compilation of TWAIL scholarship makes the case 
that if we wish to truly locate the first moment where sovereign aspirations within the international 
system were imagined as truly universal and anti-hierarchical, our attention must turn to the 1955 
Bandung Conference that formed the first summit of newly independent Asian and African states. 
Eslava, Fakhri, and Nessiah 2017, 15-17.  
15 According to Edward Keene’s account, the origins of the modern international system is broadly 
conceivable as ‘Two Patterns of World Order.’ Within the first pattern, sovereignty was indivisible 
and only states, as opposed to individuals, were rights-holders at the international level. This was 
the foundation of the anarchic, sovereign equality-based international order. Within the second pat-
ter, sovereignty was divisible and individuals possessed rights (especially property rights) were rec-
ognized at the international level. This was the foundation of the colonial, hierarchy-based interna-
tional order. Despite centuries of diverging development, the two patterns merged in the twentieth 
century, and many ongoing issues throughout the world can be understood as the legacy of this 




of colonization and unequal encounter.16 Here, the ‘international’ fashioned the 
boundaries of the ‘domestic’ just as much as the multiplicity of ‘domestic’ orders 
gave rise to an overarching ‘international.’17 
 
When expanding critical consciousness of popular will’s place against the backdrop 
of a questionable domestic-international binary, the materialist critique of progress 
narratives and the historicist critique of traditional narratives are in no way mutually 
exclusive. Recently, Rose Parfitt’s The Process of International Legal Reproduc-
tion has masterfully demonstrated the imperative of linking these discourses.18 Ac-
cording to Parfitt, in the historical ideal of international legal personality, a hierar-
chical understanding of individuals shaped a hierarchy between sovereign states 
and non-sovereign colonies. Here free and equal individuals were contrasted 
against slaves and natives, and only collective systems that matched the ideal of the 
first category could be uncontestably recognised as sovereign, while all others could 
be legitimately colonised (i.e. subject to domination analogous to that visited upon 
slaves and natives).19 On this basis, the success of an appeal to existing sovereigns 
as an equal was largely determined by the adoption of a legal system premised on 
                                                        
16 Eslava and Pahuja forthcoming. This critical reading of the state can be located in the larger pro-
jects of both Eslava and Pahuja. For Eslava, this has been an effort to imagine international law 
‘from the bottom’ by accounting for the impact of global-level implementations on everyday life, 
Eslava 2015. For Pahuja, this has taken the form of examining how international legal projects that 
embody emancipatory hope are susceptible to being co-opted across a broad variety of contexts, 
Pahuja 2011.      
17 According to a recent formulation by Adom Getachew, the evolutionary process of international 
society should be understood not as a system of ‘exclusion’, but rather one of unequal inclusion. 
Thus many of those who resisted this process deeply recognized this quality and, as such, were not 
seeking ‘inclusion’ within this this order, but rather non-domination in the face of it. Getachew 2019. 
18 Parfitt 2019. 
19 Each of these human categories was imbricated within a larger system of capitalist social relations: 
the free and equal individuals provided the grounding for a system premised on formal market-based 
exchanges, the slaves could be commodities within these exchanges, and the rights of natives that 
were largely conditioned by their ability to facilitate the interests of their colonisers (for example 
the right to alienate their lands). In this way, a hierarchical view of the individual mediated the 




capitalism-facilitating individual rights.20 As a legacy of this history, the test for 
inclusion is the presence of a ‘government’ that ‘effectively’ guarantees the opera-
tion of a legal system that protects the equal rights of outsiders holding property 
and conducting commercial activity within the state’s jurisdiction.21  
 
Thus, in addition to the suppression of traditional practices necessitated by recog-
nition-enabling reforms, the attempt to use sovereign discretion to rectify local so-
cial ills is subordinated to fulfilling the conditions of external inclusion.22 In this 
way, the validation of sovereign equality (and its promise of the unimpeded pursuit 
of popular will) is conditioned upon the internalization of hierarchical mechanisms 
that are hostile to the pursuit of substantive equality as a legitimate political end.23  
In sum, historical experience and ongoing practices reveal that the purpose of the 
‘international’ is to reproduce formally equal ‘domestic’ entities of a very specific 
type that are limited in their ability to contest substantive inequalities both within 
and between nations. Ironically, it is the false promise of progressively escaping 
inequality that motivates the ideological internalizations essential to maintaining 
this process. 
 
Building upon this premise that international law is a unique and indispensable at-
tribute of capitalist social relations; there is great promise in an account that cen-
trally situates popular will within this ‘process of international legal reproduction.’ 
                                                        
20 Ibid. 85. 
21 For a contextual discussion on ‘effectiveness’ within the international legal doctrine, namely the 
1928 Island of Palmas Case, see Ibid. 87-90. 
22 For a contrast of the rights international law has and has not prioritized in the context of state 
creation, see Ibid. 7. 
23 In anticipating critiques of her ‘international legal reproduction’ theory, Parfitt notes that the twen-
tieth century witnessed a range of state births, particularly in the postwar context of decolonisation, 
where the traditional ‘effective’ government criteria scarcely applied. However, this receding of the 
‘effectiveness’ requirement was quickly followed a range of sovereignty-qualifying innovations 
(namely structural adjustment, ‘earned sovereignty’, and the responsibility to protect) often directed 




Beyond the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’, as this thesis shows, popular will helps 
to organize numerous other capitalism-constituting binaries including the ‘pub-
lic/private’, the ‘political/economic’, and the ‘legal/extra-legal.’24 In exposing its 
place within this reproductive process, my analysis is important given that popular 
will is a concept without a definitive history. While it is unsurprising that interna-
tional lawyers have not taken up this task, it is surprising that political theorists and 
historians of political thought who are far less equipped to avoid the centrality of 
popular will share this trepidation. Highlighting this paradoxical dearth in a recent 
collection on historical manifestations of popular will, Richard Bourke states in the 
opening line of the Introduction that: ‘Popular sovereignty is a key component of 
modern political thinking, yet a history of this concept has not previously been at-
tempted.’25 In light of this absence, while this thesis in no way purports to be the 
missing definitive history of popular will, it may very be one of the most compre-
hensive historicizations attempted thus far. 
 
Embarking upon this inquiry entails clarifying which methodologies and subject 
choices are suited to this task. While methodological justification is necessary for 
all foundational concepts (especially uncharted ones), popular will’s status as a dis-
course of normative contestation adds an additional layer of complexity. On this 
point, whatever role popular will may have in the shaping of the global order, it is 
most renowned as a basis for condemning external predation (expressed in interna-
                                                        
24 While the ‘public/private’ distinction, in one form or another, dates back to antiquity (for a ge-
nealogical study reaching back to these origins, see Agamben 2011), unless otherwise specified, 
my deployment of this dichotomy centres on the way it was absorbed into capitalist social rela-
tions whereby the ‘public’ was attached to the abstracted sovereignty of the modern state while the 
‘private’ became attached to the interests constituting economic production and exchange. For 
more on how this understanding informs by methodological understanding of the relationship be-
tween popular will and international law as indicative of capitalist social relations, see Introduc-
tion, Part 4.2.1. 




tional discourse through assertions of sovereign equality and non-intervention), typ-
ically by small states against powerful ones.26 However, just because popular will 
has proven able to confront one form of injustice, we should be sceptical of its 
ability to confront all, or even most, forms of injustice. For instance, extending the 
international legal condemnation of military and political intervention in the name 
of popular will to include unequal mechanisms of distribution is not an obvious 
conclusion.27 After all, the international legal order that has banned war, condemns 
colonial rule, and declares self-determination a fundamental human right is the 
same international legal order where, according to Oxfam’s latest report, the 
world’s twenty-six wealthiest individuals are able to maintain as much wealth as its 
poorest 3.8 billion.28 To what extent is the international legal construction of pop-
ular will, despite its emancipatory connotations, not only failing to prevent this out-
come, but also actively enabling it?29  
 
Given this rejection of popular will as discourse of limitless normative possibility, 
its contradictions can be viewed through the lens of  ‘false contingency’ that, ac-
cording to Marks, ‘…considers phenomena not in discrete, monadic or free-floating 
terms…but relationally, as elements within larger social systems.’30 Since popular 
will has become so ubiquitous, analysis of the temporal and spatial scope of the 
                                                        
26 On this basis, it can be said that by continually affirming sovereignty as anathema to intervention, 
the new states born out of Afro-Asian decolonisation were forcing old states to develop new mech-
anism of international law given that it was no longer legitimate to rely on old mechanisms (i.e. 
forcible intervention in the name of ‘self-help’) when guaranteeing interests and obligations, see 
Anand 1962, 383-406.   
27 According to one in-depth doctrinal account, while it might be highly desirable, in the actually-
existing international legal order there exists no fundamental right of a state to be free of economic 
coercion. Tzanakopoulos 2015.  
28 Elliot 2019. 
29 As will be discussed below, while effectiveness typically is its own source of legitimacy in the 
domain of political expression under international law, this same prioritization of effectiveness over 
legitimacy renders international law deeply complicit in the production of global poverty, Beckett 
2016, 990.    




‘larger social systems’ that shape its contingencies must be corresponding vast 
enough to include, in the words of Parfitt:  
 
….the transformation of the world from an expanse of land and sea in-
habited by many different species, of which humans (organized in a 
huge variety of ways) were only one, into an ‘international community’ 
of ‘sovereign states’ dedicated to subordinating the needs of the major-
ity of humans and non-human species to the needs and desires of a small 
minority of humans.31  
 
In capturing this scale and depth of this orientation, I deem my approach to be one 
of ‘world-historical context.’ 
 
By conceptualizing popular will against this backdrop, we are well-positioned to 
uncover the material conditions that shape its successes, failures, and transfor-
mations beyond the intentions of those invoking it. Such a grounding is especially 
important when considering how the very flexibility that allows popular will to ex-
press so many different political desires also renders it particularly susceptible to 
being co-opted.32 This enables a vantage point where popular will is simultaneously 
                                                        
31 Parfitt 2019, 391. 
32 To provide just one example here, there was the attempt by Asian, African, and Latin American 
states to reorder the global economy as a means of overcoming their structural disadvantage through 
a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s. While this was an attempt to achieve 
‘economic self-determination’ as a necessarily corollary to ‘political self-determination’, the NIEO 
project was derailed in a manner that preserved its ethical critique while neutralizing its political 
challenge. As Getachew has shown, the NIEO’s focus on inequality between nations led many to 
chastise it as a failure to acknowledge the problem of inequality within nations. The response by 
Western scholars was a liberal philosophical discourse whereby poverty was understood in terms of 
absolute deprivation and policies were justified by their ability to improve the ‘worst off’ as meas-
ured on a global scale. This helped to legitimize ‘technical’ policy solutions that sought to manage 
such issues in a manner removed from the realm of political contestation, Getachew 2019, 173-175. 
For an account of how these discourses are intertwined with the understandings of international 
human rights in a way that contributes to diverting attention away from international law’s complic-
ity in sustaining deprivation and inequality by virtue of its intended operation, see Marks 2009b; see 




the ability to translate localized assertions into matters of universal significance and 
the multiple mechanisms of co-optation these assertions are exposed to through this 
process of translation. By confronting popular will’s particular dynamic of hope 
and constraint in this material capacity, this thesis directly contributes to a defining 
discourse in critical international legal theory: the view that international law is 
simultaneously a system of domination and source of emancipation.33  
 
 
3.  Popular Will As We Know It 
 
3.1.  Controversy and Non-Controversy 
 
As a doctrinal matter, the relationship between popular will and domestic authority 
is simultaneously one of the least controversial and most controversial aspects of 
public international law. Regarding popular will’s non-controversy, one need only 
consider the likely failure of any international legal argument invoking a pre-mod-
ern ‘divine right of kings’ that locates sovereignty in the ‘person’ of a monarch as 
opposed to the ‘people’ of the state. Given that modern international law is rooted 
in relations between sovereign states as opposed to sovereign individuals, some 
presumption of ‘popular will’ is at work in sustaining this system.34 Thus, any claim 
                                                        
emerged in this context are fundamentally incompatible with the Marxist characterization of global 
inequality, see Davenport 2018.         
33 This has been particularly prominent in TWAIL, see e.g. Chmini 2005; Pahuja 2011; Fakhri 2018. 
Additionally, within Marxist international legal theory, while generally more pessimistic than 
TWAIL, there has been much skepticism towards sweeping dismissals of international law’s poten-
tial. This has been especially true of responses to China Mieville’s claim in Between Equal Rights 
that international law is devoid any emancipatory content, Mieville 2005, 319. For arguments that 
the character of hope in international law is deserving of more nuanced analysis than Mieville sug-
gests, see e.g. Marks 2007; Knox 2009. Regarding the frontiers of this analysis of domination and 
emancipation, for a number perspectives looking at these dynamics through the lens of queer ap-
proaches to international law, see Otto 2017.   
34 An apt summation of this ubiquitous, but deeply undertheorized, point was presented in the con-




of authority on a radically different basis would either have to somehow appropriate 
the discourse of ‘popular will’ or reject the legitimacy of the existing international 
legal order.  
 
While the centrality of popular will within international law is largely uncontrover-
sial, delineating the nature and scope of this concept produces an endless amount 
of controversy. What are the limits international law places on the expression of 
popular will? What is international law’s best method for determining who repre-
sents popular will when multiple factions are claiming recognition on this basis? 
How does popular will shape the boundaries between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘inter-
national’? Can a universal definition of popular will ever be translated into a bind-
ing international legal obligation? Such controversies pit multiple normative con-
siderations against one another, especially when they involve the violence that often 
accompany struggles over popular will through revolution, secession, civil war, and 
coup d'état. What conceptual tools are available to international legal scholars seek-
ing to make sense of all this? 
 
In approaching this situation through the lens of its world-historical context, if we 
wish to understand why international legal conceptions of popular will can be so 
controversial today, we need to first understand how international law’s core pre-
sumption of popular will became so uncontroversial in the first place. After all, the 
notion of rulership by divine and otherworldly forces has captivated the human im-
agination for millennia and its (incomplete) disavowal in modernity is very recent 
in the grand scheme of existence.35 Understanding how international law rejected 
these modes of authority and embraced the notion of popular will means theorising 
                                                        
tional liberation movements prompted a re-evaluation of core international legal principles. Accord-
ing to Wilson: ‘the acceptance of these movements by a large number of States…challenges tradi-
tional ideas about the nature of international society. It implies that ‘the authority of the prince’ is 
not synonymous with the ‘authority of a sovereign State’’, Wilson 1988, 187 (emphasis mine). 





the modern nation-state as a distinct political entity, and the capitalist political econ-
omy that sustains it as a distinct mode of social relations. Identifying this formative 
nexus between international law, the nation-state, and capitalism paves the way for 
an account of how these co-constituting structures globalised to the point where 
today nearly every human being is now the member of a sovereign political com-
munity justified by popular will.36 However, there is nothing inherently natural or 
teleological about this transformation of the world.  
 
Before a world-historical analysis can take place, we must delineate the depths of 
international law’s doctrinal engagement with popular will with some degree of 
precision. Here, one set of examples that reveals the tensions and logical endpoints 
of consistently applying relevant international legal doctrine to domestic political 
contestations concerns relatively recent events in Syria and Ukraine. In both situa-
tions, Russian President Vladimir Putin provided military intervention at the re-
quest of foreign leaders in the face of civil strife. The first situation involved Pres-
ident Victor Yanukovych of Ukraine in March 2014.37 The second situation in-
volved President Bashir al-Assad of Syria in September 2015.38 Any analysis of 
this issue invokes the reality that Putin’s involvement in the Ukraine and Syria has 
largely been viewed in the West as part of an ideological/geopolitical grand strategy 
to contest Western liberal hegemony.39  
 
However, this perceived scheme should not obscure the fact that there is a key in-
ternational legal distinction between Putin’s two affirmative responses by Yanu-
kovych and Assad respectively. The first situation was generally viewed as a clear-
                                                        
36 Jackson 2000, 14. 
37 For a variety perspectives on the legal dimensions of the Ukraine Crisis, see the contributions in 
Oklopcic 2015. 
38 For a study of Putin’s actions in the context of larger debates on humanitarianism and the use of 
force, see Averre and Davies 2015. 
39 For an account of Putin’s strategy of mobilizing alliances in a bid to disrupt Western hegemony, 




cut instance of blatant illegality even amongst committed critical theorists of inter-
national law.40 Concerning the second situation, while undeniably controversial on 
political, ethical, and humanitarian grounds, condemning it as an unequivocal in-
ternational legal violation is deeply questionable.41 Why is it that, to put it bluntly, 
Putin’s intervention in support of Yanukovych was more illegal than his interven-
tion in support of Assad? In order to explain this divergence, we must account for 
a particular international legal doctrine that makes all the difference: the effective 
control doctrine. 
 
3.2.  The Effective Control Doctrine: A Primer 
 
When confronting the tension between domestic sovereignty and international or-
der, and its ultimate relationship with popular will, the effective control doctrine is 
a foundational, yet obscure, international legal principle. Under this doctrine, as it 
applies to the creation of new states and the legitimacy of governments in existing 
states, in situations of internal contestation over sovereign authority, external actors 
are (subject to a narrow range of exceptions) generally obligated to refrain from 
acting on normative and ideological judgments.42 Thus, the outcome of local con-
testations can only be judged through objective ‘facts on the ground’ whereby in-
ternational legal standing is attributed to the local faction maintaining de facto ter-
ritorial authority relative to all local competitors as measured by the obedience of 
the local population.43 As such, the effective control doctrine’s non-interventionists 
stance highlights the international legal order’s core premise of sovereignty as ab-
solute autonomy within a territorially bounded setting. As such, it rests upon the 
                                                        
40 See e.g. Özsu 2014. 
41 See Visser 2015. 
42 Roth 2010. 




understanding that a power structure cannot exist without substantial popular sup-
port and this creates the presumption that maintaining effective control is the best 
available evidence of ‘popular will.’44  
 
When considering the violence legitimized through this doctrine, we can observe a 
harsh logic of ‘might makes right.’ After all, the violence witnessed in civil strife 
is seemingly contrary to ‘rule of law’ sensibilities whereby principle and procedure 
should resolve disputes without resorting to raw force.45 This unease is bolstered 
by the long-standing view that conflicts within bounded political communities are 
especially tragic given their hosting of violence between individuals historically 
perceived to possess the closest social bonds.46 The persistence of this violence, 
coupled with a steadfast belief in international law’s progressive ability to uplift the 
human condition, motivated efforts to remove the tolerance of violence from the 
acceptable determination of popular will under international law. In its most prom-
inent manifestation, this took the form of declaring life under a liberal democratic 
government (minimally defined as periodic, competitive, and elections) as an 
‘emerging’ human right.47 Such a development demanded a new international legal 
standard for measuring popular will whereby electoral results took priority over 
‘facts on the ground.’48   
 
While these efforts generated much enthusiasm, they also resulted in greater clari-
fication of the technical and normative parameters of the effective control doctrine. 
                                                        
44 Ibid. 396. 
45 Ibid. 395. 
46 Armitage 2017, 12. 
47 For the two more prominent works towards this end where Thomas Franck’s ‘The Emerging Right 
to Democratic Governance’ that introduced this idea, and his student Gregory Fox’s ‘The Right to 
Political Participation in International Law’ that documented the doctrinal support for this proposi-
tion. Franck 1992; Fox 1992. 
48 Amongst many other, one of Roth’s objections to this premise was its failure ‘….to appreciate the 




Here Brad Roth emerged as its leading theorist and defender. Like Marks, Roth was 
notable for being less than enthusiastic about the ways in which international law-
yers where actively invoking liberal democracy while ignoring the many critiques 
that have accompanied this discourse. However, unlike Marks who approached the 
turn to democracy in international law by critiquing its promises against its realities 
in the hopes of bringing radical democratic consciousness into international legal 
analysis, Roth questioned the very point of incorporating democracy discourse into 
the international legal cannon.49 From this premise, he offers a defence of the ex-
isting international legal order organized around the effective control doctrine. For 
Roth, irreducible disagreement over the substantive ends democracy legitimizes an 
international legal order where bounded political communities possess the sover-
eign right to define these ends on their own terms.50 This framing upholds a prag-
matic stance towards international law that, in contrast to invoking the discipline as 
pure principle or pure progress, actively confronts the deeply entrenched relevance 
of sovereignty’s typically bloody origins. According to Roth:  
 
International legal standing has traditionally been established by vic-
tory in a trial by ordeal: a region initially integral to an existing state 
successfully establishes itself as an independent sovereign unit only 
where its secession movement creates - usually by decisive victory in 
an armed struggle - facts on the ground that appear irreversible; an in-
surgent faction successfully establishes itself as a government where it 
overthrows an existing constitutional structure and secures - even if at 
bayonet-point - widespread popular acquiescence.51 
                                                        
49 Roth expressed as much in a review of Mark’s The Riddle of All Constitutions, Roth 2001, 412.  
50 Here it is noteworthy that, in addition to his defence of the effective control doctrine, has offered 
concerted defences of substantive equality of the type deeply odds with the liberalism that accom-
panied the discourse of the ‘Emerging Right to Democratic Governance.’ This included the claim 
that those advocating for human rights are well-advised to use Marxism as a means of confronting 
the contradictions that inhabit even the most egalitarian formulations of liberalism, Roth 2008, 250. 
For an attempt to develop a constitutional theory premised on substantive equality, see Roth 1993.   





However, from this harsh premise there emerges an elaborate multi-layered justifi-
cation for the effective control doctrine.  
 
At the doctrinal level, the effective control doctrine is a logical outcome of con-
sistent adherence to the Charter of the United Nations provisions regarding sover-
eign equality (Art. 2(1)), non-intervention (Art. 2(4)), and non-interference in do-
mestic affairs (Art. 2(7)).52 As clarified by the International Court of Justice’s 1986 
Nicaragua case, a sovereign state possesses an inherent right to choose its political 
system and licensing external interference would render this right devoid of sub-
stance.53 At the normative level, the effective control doctrine fills the gap between 
two foundational commitments: a) the presumption that existing arrangements of 
sovereign authority are the products of the underlying political community’s popu-
lar will and b) the toleration of ideological pluralism whereby outside observers are 
deemed ill-suited to judge foreign societies.54 As such, the maintenance, alteration, 
or overthrow of an existing sovereign order can only be legitimately decided upon 
by the local population itself. Thus, the same sovereign dynamic that legitimizes 
violence and repression correspondingly empowers the underlying political com-
munity to rectify these issues as it alone sees fit.55 Finally, at the level of interna-
tional peace and security, in conjunction with the general ban on the use of force, 
the effective control doctrine constrains ideological difference as a justification for 
war.56 Reflecting this sentiment is the UN’s opening of membership to ‘peace-lov-
ing states,’ ‘where this qualification of ‘peace-loving’ refers to the state’s (pacific) 
                                                        
52 Ibid. 396. 
53 ICJ Nicaragua Case 1986, 263.  
54 Roth 2010, 396. 
55 Cunliffe 2010, 91. 




international conduct rather than its internal politics.’57 This juridical shield from 
external intervention, at least in theory, provides a modicum of leverage for 
weak/unpopular sates and, most importantly for my analysis, regimes attempting to 
pursue experimental political projects that conflict with the interests of the power-
ful.58   
 
 
3.3.  The Effective Control Doctrine Applied  
 
In applying the effective control doctrine to the facts surrounding Yanukovych’s 
and Assad’s invitations to Putin the diverging legality of these cases is clarified. In 
Ukraine, Yanukovych had already been internally ousted from power in the wake 
of mass unrest at the time of his invitation for Putin’s intervention. This removal 
from power amounted to a lack of the de facto territorial authority needed to satisfy 
the effective control doctrine. As such, Putin’s presence in the Ukraine’s Crimea 
region, at least to the extent it relied on Yanukovych’s invitation, is exceedingly 
difficult to defend as lawful.59 Moreover, while Yanukovych’s ouster violated the 
Ukrainian Constitution, this fact is irrelevant to determining whether he possessed 
effective control. In the words of Roth, ‘[c]ontrary to what is sometimes imagined, 
the international legal order is not a legal order of legal orders; it is a legal order of 
sovereign political communities, each of which bears an “inalienable” capac-
ity….to overthrow any existing order by any means.’60 
 
Moving to the Syrian situation, very different facts were present in that Assad re-
tained his status of sovereign authority at the time of his invitation of Putin’s inter-
vention. While Assad’s authority was hotly contested, the opposition against him 
                                                        
57 Buchan, 2008, 12. 
58 Kingsbury 1998, 618. 
59 Grant 2015, 54. 




was deeply fragmented due to the generally irreconcilable goals/ideologies amongst 
the various factions challenging him. Despite external pronouncements of rebel le-
gitimacy as a political matter, when determining Syrian sovereign authority under 
international law, there was no coherent alternative to Assad.61 That said, his lead-
ership, however violent, was consistent with the effective control doctrine. This 
maintenance of de facto territorial authority had tremendous implications as to 
whether Assad was entitled to invite external forces to solidify his position. It is 
difficult to overstate the seriousness of this issue given that intervention by invita-
tion deeply complicates the effective control doctrine’s legitimizing presumption 
that local political contestations should be locally resolved.62 However, despite this 
justificatory complication, when leaders possess effective control, regardless of 
their means, they retain wide discretion when appealing to foreign assistance.63  
 
In contrasting Syria and Ukraine, the defining legal difference between these two 
cases of invitation of Putin’s intervention was that Assad maintained ‘effective con-
trol’ while Yanukovych did not. On this basis, it is easy to see just how disturbing, 
arbitrary and frustrating the effective control doctrine can be. One need look no 
further than a simple comparison of the two examples presented above. While the 
situation in Ukraine is certainly violent and destabilizing, in terms of the sheer scale 
of suffering, it is dwarfed by the Syrian Civil War. Thus, despite its logical cohesion 
as a doctrinal abstraction, on a deeper normative level, there is something pro-
foundly unsatisfying about the fact that the effective control doctrine provides a 
basis for condemning Russian action in Ukraine while also providing a basis for 
legitimizing Russian action in Syria.   
 
                                                        
61 Talmon 2013. 
62 Roth 1999, 188. 
63 It is has been argued that this persistence of intervention by invitation (justified in effective control) 
will remain until an effectively centralised system of collective security is developed. Le Mon 2003, 
792. For a analysis claiming that intervention by invitation falls outside the category of ‘use of force’, 




On this reading, the doctrine forms a quintessential case study in law’s complicity 
in human suffering whereby imposing responsibility in certain areas has the corol-
lary effect of legitimizing irresponsibility elsewhere.64 Thus, as a repository of un-
avoidable trade-offs, the effective control doctrine sits uncomfortably with the pro-
gressive ethos of international law where a universality-inclined belief in ever-in-
creasing improvement has animated the field in its modern form.65 It is perhaps for 
this reason that (Roth aside) the effective control doctrine, in and of itself, has been 
subject to little comprehensive analysis.66 Rather, it typically mentioned as second-
ary consideration to be discussed alongside one envisioned progressive develop-
ment or another.67 However, (re)locating the centrality of popular will within the 
effective control doctrine opens up new analytical pathways that move us beyond 
the competing dynamics of optimism and pessimism that reflexively manifest 
within international legal discourse.  
 
3.4.  Popular Will Revisited 
 
                                                        
64 For a multi-layered study of law and irresponsibility in this capacity, see Veitch 2007. 
65 For an elaborate discourse analysis of the status of ‘progress’ as a defining trope in modern inter-
national law, see Skouteris 2010. 
66 One of the few analyses here has been from Elizabeth Wilson. Motivated by a revulsion to both 
the violence legitimized by the effective control doctrine and the disastrous paternalism of liberal 
cosmopolitan alternatives, Wilson poses the question as to whether international law can be mobi-
lized to support non-violent social uprisings, Wilson 2015, 590 (‘A "privilege of nonviolence" might 
be given to those who engage in nonviolent conflict and successfully maintain nonviolent disci-
pline’). However, her ultimate hope in such measures remains linked to the progress within existing 
international institutions, see Ibid. 594. As such, she does not confront the contradictions regarding 
the ways in which international law’s inability to support non-violent political action is more than 
simply a flaw with the system.  
67 This includes the possibility of requiring democratic institution as a requirement for state creation, 
(see Vidmar 2013a), the clarification of standards for legitimate intervention in civil strife (see 




The defence of the effective control doctrine centres on an understanding of popular 
will as an all-important precept of legitimacy that can only be adequately defined 
in unique, specific contexts.  To quote Roth once again: 
 
the effective control doctrine can be interpreted to embody respect for 
the self-determination of diverse political communities as to which em-
pirical investigation to ascertain public opinion is most often impracti-
cable. Moreover, given that 'popular will' itself is a complex and nor-
matively-loaded concept, any imposition from abroad of procedures 
calculated to appropriately measure popular will might be seen as at 
best presumptuous, and at worst an usurpation.68 
 
As we can see in this passage, given the innate difficulties of formulating a univer-
sal standard for externally judging local political expression, this doctrine at least 
provides consistency and coherence when approaching the popular will-interna-
tional law relationship. The effective control doctrine reminds us that the intense 
passions arising abroad in response to domestic struggles do not dispense, and in 
many ways affirms, international law’s fundamental commitment to non-interven-
tion.69  But how are we to reconcile this pluralistic, non-interventionist vision with 
the fact that Assad can arguably be legitimized by Syrian popular will in a manner 
that allows him to invite external military assistance to crush the formation of any 
alternative to his rule?  Could a doctrinal international legal argument condemn this 
occurrence without threatening to erode the foundational norms of sovereign equal-
ity and non-intervention?  
 
                                                        
68 Roth 2010, 426. 
69 For a study of how the discourse of self-determination in no way undermines, and in many ways 





Answering this question is especially important in our current global moment of 
rising powers and aggressive nationalism where the possibility of major armed con-
flict between sovereign states now seems more likely than it has been in decades.70 
It is not difficult to imagine how the claim of aiding a people in pursuit of their 
‘popular will’ can serve as a pretext for powerful states and interests to undermine 
the ban on the use of force and risk escalating tensions that ultimately result in a 
major global war.71 This type of conflagration is precisely what the UN Charter 
system seeks to avoid, even if it means tolerating widespread internal violence and 
repression legitimized through a profoundly limited understanding of popular will. 
 
Caught between the Scylla of interstate conflict and Charybdis of intrastate conflict, 
my purpose in this thesis is to ask how we reached this particular juncture, one 
where we must accept the ‘lesser evil’ of two already troubling options. In address-
ing this question, as outlined in Part 1, I build on analyses that raise larger questions 
of why the view of popular will, delineated through the effective control doctrine, 
has failed to uplift conditions for so many despite offering national communities 
presumptively limitless autonomy in pursing their own destinies. In confronting this 
issue from a Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) perspective, 
James Gathii identifies the central flaw of the effective control doctrine, as pre-
sented by Roth, as a failure to account for ongoing colonial legacies.72  
 
According to Gathii, by fixating on the illegality of political and military coercion, 
Roth situates colonialism as ‘a rare and aberrational feature of international law’ 
                                                        
70 For an account of the various erosions on the ban on the use of force that could easily enable an 
outbreak of violence in this context, see Terry 2019. 
71 While this has been much remarked upon in relation to Putin’s actions undertaken in the name of 
aiding Russian speaking population of Ukraine’s Crimea region (see Roth 2015b), it has also pre-
sented itself through the Trump Administration’s bellicose rhetoric against the Maduro government 
in Venezuela where appeals to the ‘freedom’ of the Venezuelan people are commonplace. However, 
the rhetoric of US intervention has been roundly condemned by other members of the Security 
Council, see Security Council Press Release 2019.  




and this obscures other sources of inequity intimately linked to the question of in-
ternational legal standing.73 These include the coercive realities of developmental-
ist reforms facilitated by international institutions that harken back to imperial prac-
tices,74 as well as the possibility of economic interventions being just as devastating 
as military interventions despite being comparatively less illegal.75 Furthermore, 
Gathii invokes the history of the Eurocentric nation-state form, and its ‘effective 
control’ over lands, peoples and nature, being foisted upon all societies through 
violent colonization only to be retrospectively legitimized via suspect invocations 
of universal morality and ideological neutrality.76 While sympathetic to many of 
Gathii’s points, Roth’s general response has been that such critiques must be judged 
by their ability to offer a practical alternative.77 Bearing this contention in mind, I 
now shift to the question of what an account of the popular will-international law 
relationship capable of making a strong methodological intervention into this de-
bate might actually look like?  
 
4.  Methodology: Towards a World-Historical Context  
 
4.1.  Popular Will and the ‘Politics of Sovereignty-in-Anarchy’ 
 
In addressing Roth’s ‘what is your alternative?’ challenge to Gathii’s critique, I 
argue that the present relationship between popular will, international law, and the 
nation-state form must be understood in world-historical context. In articulating this 
context, my analysis is normative in the weak sense in that I acknowledge the need 
for fundamental systemic change in order to achieve greater human emancipation 
on a global scale. However, I do not present a programmatic alternative of my own. 
                                                        
73 Ibid. 2020. 
74 Ibid. 2026-2027. 
75 Ibid. 2028-2030. 
76 Ibid. 2040-2048. 




Rather my purpose is to account for an interconnected array of historically formed 
structural considerations that must inform any alternative to the current order. Thus, 
my intervention is diagnostic as opposed to prescriptive. Additionally, while such 
an important pursuit cannot be limited to any one discipline, the field of interna-
tional law forms my primary orientation in making this diagnosis. The incorpora-
tion of all other disciplinary insights are ancillary to this central focus. 
 
As an entry point, a key issue is the inadequacy of rigid doctrinal international legal 
analysis to confront the normative puzzles generated by the popular will-domestic 
authority relationship that is only now being comprehensively confronted by criti-
cal international lawyers. This inadequacy is reflected in the Roth-Gathii debate, 
which is remarkable for the sheer multitude of interdisciplinary engagements being 
invoked to resolve ostensibly ‘international legal’ issues. For Roth, the normative 
defence of a positive international legal order premised on sovereign equality, non-
intervention, and ideological pluralism is accomplished through an application of 
political theory and comparative politics.78 For Gathii, mobilizing insights from 
history, anthropology, and political economy exposes the problematic character of 
Roth’s defence. In intervening in this debate, I introduce another discipline into the 
analysis of the popular will-domestic authority-international law continuum: inter-
national relations (‘IR’). While adding yet another discipline to this already com-
plex discourse may seem superfluous, I argue that insights from IR can integrate 
many of the issues raised by the Roth-Gathii debate within a comprehensive frame-
work. Moreover, incorporating insights from this field allows for an entirely new 
means of situating the many insights generated by critical studies of international 
legal history.  
 
Of vital importance when theorising one society’s standing to judge another within 
the confines of international system, IR contributes the foundational premise that 
                                                        
78 Roth’s interdisciplinary defence of the moral standing of the positive international legal order 
stems directly from a rejection of the first principles-based methods of most international political 




the global order is anarchic in that it lacks a singular universal structure of author-
ity.79 It was the emergence of this ‘Realist’ discourse immediately following the 
Second World War, and its positing of ‘the international’ as a ‘purely political’ 
sphere of actors struggling for survival without shared legal or moral presumptions, 
that questioned the ability of international lawyers to explain ‘how the world actu-
ally works.’80 Through this rise of IR Realism, the response by many international 
lawyers was a concerted campaign to show how order and obligation do exist at the 
international level despite the lack of an overarching sovereign enforcer.81 For these 
theorists, it was possible to transcend the base impulse of survival through the pro-
gressive development of international institutions whereby states surrender portions 
of sovereignty in exchange for the mutual benefits of cooperation.82 However, this 
rigid, long-standing division between anarchy and law as mutually exclusive vi-
sions of international order has created a generalized analytical absence of the real-
ity that sovereign states are ultimately juridical forms with no inherent existence 
beyond their status as fictitious legal persons.83 According to China Mieville’s ap-
praisal: ‘[t]here is no separation of these juridical forms from 'pure politics' because 
                                                        
79 For the classical formulation of this idea, see Morgenthau 1948.  
80 See Koskenniemi 2001, 474-478. Of particular note here was the way in which many formative 
IR theorists were German-Jewish refugees from Nazism, often with law backgrounds, who often 
analogized the international legal order to the constitutional order of Weimar Germany, i.e. a fragile 
structure that promised order and justice, yet was utterly impotent in the face of raw force. Ibid. 450; 
see also Lebow 2011. One particularly interesting German-Jewish IR theorist was John Herz whose 
Realist theories stemmed from earlier work on how the Nazi conception of international law exposed 
the weakness of the existing international order, see Herz 1939.    
81 One of the leading voices was Sir Hersch Lauterpacht whose visions of the transformative power 
of international law was driven by sustained dialogue with IR Realists, see Jeffery 2006. 
82 This view has formed the basis for liberal attempts at international law-IR synthesis, see Slaughter 
1993. 
83 Interesting enough, there was a high degree of focus on the juridical character of the state by 
political scientists in the pre-Second World War era (see e.g. Willoughby 1918), that was also the 
same timeframe when the new field of International Relations, at least in its influential American 
version, was fixated on hierarchal relations between races as opposed to anarchical relations between 




there is no pure politics: there are instead the politics of sovereignty-in-anarchy, 
which are the politics of juridical units.’84  
 
Yet, if popular will is the legitimation of the domestic authority of sovereign nation-
states, then what is its role within this ‘politics of sovereignty-in-anarchy’? Here 
popular will in the context of an international legal order premised on an ideologi-
cally plural understanding of sovereign equality is an empty concept that only gains 
substantive content, as explained above, through the assertions of a local population. 
Thus, under conditions of anarchy, this local expression of popular will can theo-
retically emerge through any conceivable system. On this basis, judgments by out-
siders are exclusively restricted to determining the presence or absence of de facto 
‘effective control’ when determining who represents popular will. In this capacity, 
the possibility of a territorially-bounded political community pursuing its destiny 
in a pluralist world is protected by the legal value of sovereignty, yet, any estab-
lishment of a non-consensual hierarchy (i.e. a standard for determining sovereign 
legitimacy other than ‘effective control’) directly undermines this possibility.85 On 
this basis, the expression of popular will through the juridical nation-state form, 
understood as an empty vessel containing limitless possibilities, represents the nor-
mative dimension of international anarchy.  
 
If the possibility of popular will legitimizes anarchy, then what else does this system 
of anarchy legitimize? Is it possible that this anarchy is linked to a larger system of 
global political economy that bolsters certain formulations of popular will while 
                                                        
84 Mieville 2005, 284. 
85 What is noteworthy here is that while Realists assume that war and conquest are always possibil-
ities within the anarchic international order premised upon base survival, this theoretical framing 
only emerged as sovereign equality, non-intervention, and the outlawry of war and conquest 
emerged as core ordering international principle. According to one recent depiction that implicitly 
invokes this co-evolution between Realist discourse and the modern international law: ‘Outlawing 
war only seems ridiculous to us because ours is a world in which war has already been outlawed.’ 




being fundamentally anathema to others? If there is any truth to this, then it is pos-
sible that the very system of anarchy that allows for the possibility of a nation 
achieving any form of popular will in theory actually undermines these possibilities 
in practice. This is the position of Mieville who views the ‘sovereignty-in-anarchy’-
based order as fundamentally coercive in that the juridical abstraction of formal 
independence (and thus peoples’ right to develop popular will-expressing systems) 
legitimizes the deep substantive inequalities between sovereigns.86  
 
However, while Mieville does much to orient us towards the indispensable material 
dimensions of the international legal order, his account’s rigidity hardly does justice 
to the captivating force so many have historically ascribed to achieving popular will 
through international legal assertion.87 Thus explaining this phenomenon in world-
historical context must consider agency in addition to structure by directly confront-
ing the ‘public-cultural dimensions of international law’ that Susan Marks has iden-
tified as lacking in Mieville’s theory.88 In developing an account from this premise, 
I ask: What framework of international law and IR is up to this task? When did the 
most important historical events informing these developments take place? How 
does this contribute to addressing current gaps in international legal understanding?  
 
 
                                                        
86 Mieville 2005, 133-141. 
87 It can thus be argued that Mieville’s reduction of international law to a brutal calculus of power 
and domination is characteristic of a larger pitfall of Marxist attempts to theorise ‘the international’ 
whereby Realist presumptions regarding the timelessness of political contestation persistently man-
ifest as a default presumption. According to Andrew Davenport, this is rooted in the fact that ‘…the 
orthodox tradition of Marxism at no stage posed the existence of political multiplicity and, correla-
tively, the delimited form of the political as themselves worthy of, or demanding, theoretical reflec-
tion.’ Davenport 2011, 29. 
88 According to Marks, Mieville’s disavowal of international law as tool of political contestation is 
at odds with his overarching assertion that international law is irreducibly political in character, 




4.2.  Synthesising Parallel ‘Turns to History’ 
 
On the question of developing an international law-IR interdisciplinary approach 
capable of giving due consideration to both structure and agency, a starting point is 
to consider the way in which both fields have recently experienced ‘turns to history.’ 
While the differences between international law and IR have long been highlighted 
(with some influential scholars going as far as to explicitly disavow interdiscipli-
narity on this basis89) the motivations of these parallel ‘turns to history’ are remark-
ably similar in both fields. After all, both international law and IR are haunted by 
similar problematic origins which, in the words of Jennifer Pitts: 
 
… include aspirations to the status of a science, a dependence on styl-
ised histories populated by founding fathers and origins myths, a reli-
ance on sovereignty as a foundational principle, a tendency to regard 
empires and imperialism as historically superseded and also ‘incidental 
to the discipline proper’, and a blindness to their own participation in 
structures and discourses of racialized hierarchy.90  
 
When applying the theoretical tools that emerged through the confrontation of these 
legacies in both disciplines, my methodological framework synthesizes the turn to 
historical sociology in IR with the turn to ‘juridical thinking’ in international law. 
What historical sociology offers is an opportunity to understand the structure of 
international anarchy not as a timeless feature, but rather as a historically contingent 
                                                        
89 According to Martti Koskenniemi, the international law-IR relationship is one of counterdiscipli-
narily whereby the former’s teleological quality of envisioning a better world is fundamentally at 
odds with the latter’s attempt to ‘scientifically’ measure and evaluate the world, Koskenniemi 2011. 
Interestingly enough, while he speaks of the international legal imagination of agency as something 
damaged by interdisciplinary engagement with IR, in this same article he mentions Susan Mark’s 
‘false contingency’ concept, and its calls for a critique of ungrounded agency claims, as a missing 
feature of critical international legal analysis, Ibid. 33. This leaves open the possibility that a theory 
of IR might help serve an account of international law that takes the question of ‘false contingency’ 
seriously.    




process that emerged as a byproduct of capitalist social relations.91 What ‘juridical 
thinking’ offers is the ability to understand the unique force of phrasing popular 
will-based assertions in terms of ‘legal’ demands, especially as it concerns the abil-
ity of law to link past and present within a broader system of meaning. 
 
 
4.2.1   The Prospect of Historical Sociology 
 
In broad terms, historical sociology as an approach in IR is premised on the idea 
that the modern sovereign state is a historically contingent mode of socio-political 
organization as opposed to a temporally stable ‘unit of analysis.’ That said, it is 
analytically defective to conflate the modern state with any trans-historic definition 
of a ‘polity’ (which might encompass empires, city-states, and decentralized tribal 
formations) whose accumulated interactive patterns can be synthesized into gener-
alizable ‘scientific’ claims.92 Rather, for the theorist of historical sociology, focus 
must turn to the patterns of human interaction across time and space that gave rise 
to the assumed features of ‘the state’ and ‘the international’ as we have come to 
know them. 93 Thus, questions of technological change, natural environment, and 
social class formation are essential considerations. On this basis, the approach of 
historical sociology has proven remarkably successful at integrating the insights of 
economic history, imperial history, and global history into the explanatory narrative 
of IR.94 A particularly noteworthy aspect of this turn has been its integration of 
                                                        
91 Despite Koskenniemi’s sceptical position towards international law-IR interdisciplinary engage-
ment, in his critique of histories of international law that claim to account for political events, he 
claims that such efforts pay insufficient attention to the historical sociology of international relations 
and, on this basis, are weak in justifying their methodological choices, Koskenniemi 2012, 961-963.   
92 On this basis, the historical sociologist must be aware of the actual dynamic of global history and 
cannot retreat into the abstractions that have hitherto defined the ontologies of IR and international 
law. On the fundamental synergy of historical sociology and global history, see Osterhammel 2016.  
93 See Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg 2010. 




Marxian analysis that, due to Cold War anxiety and post-Cold War triumphalism, 
had been largely maligned by attempts to theorise the international order.95  
 
While the possibilities for new interpretations through this rubric of historical soci-
ology are vast, in this thesis I narrow my analysis to the question of international 
anarchy. As discussed above, this proposition plays a profound, yet under-theorized 
role, in shaping our understanding of popular will as it is determined through the 
‘effective control doctrine.’ This being the case, much insight is gained from Justin 
Rosenberg’s Empire of Civil Society whereby Realist theories of anarchy are cri-
tiqued for failing to historicize political economy and the distinct social relations it 
produces.96 For Rosenberg, the condition of anarchy, or formally equal absolute 
sovereigns existing without any overarching authority, is not a transhistorical phe-
nomenon applicable to all situations where a multiplicity of polities exists.97 Rather, 
it is historically contingent upon capitalism’s particular separation of a territorially-
bounded sphere of ‘public’ political authority from a territorially-transcendent 
                                                        
95 For a portrayal of the work within the Trotskyite tradition as constituting a ‘lost history’ of IR, 
see Rosenberg 1996. On the lack of rigorous engagement with the Marxist tradition as source of 
impoverishment in Western postwar thought, see Meister 1990.   
96 Rosenberg 1994, 3-5. 




sphere of ‘private’ economic interests.98 As such, ‘popular will’ legitimatises the 
former while severing it from the later.99  
 
Despite this ideological separation, these features of ‘public and private’ are none-
theless co-constituted through the structure of the modern capitalist state. This 
structure represents political authority in the name of an abstract ‘public’ while act-
ing as a necessary force for protecting private economic interests.100 According to 
Onur Ince, this structure ‘necessarily relies on the uses of politico-juridical force 
that is categorically excluded from the definition of the economy as an autonomous 
system of interdependence mediated by self-regulating markets.’101 Taking this 
particular view seriously requires a similar emphasis on the contingency of modern 
international law as the necessary regime governing relations between the deper-
sonalized state forms within this formal equality-based anarchical order.102 Thus, 
approaching ‘anarchy’ through historical sociology allows for a materially-
grounded explanation of how the modern state, and its accompanying system of 
                                                        
98 This is not say that capitalism invented the distinction between public and private in any ontolog-
ical sense. As Rosenberg notes, dating back to the Greek city-states of antiquity, there existed modes 
of order where ‘the opening of a public sphere rests upon a formal political equality among the 
citizen body…the condition of this formal equality is the exclusion from the mutual relations of the 
citizenry of political mechanisms of surplus appropriation.’ Ibid. 84-85. Under capitalism, the dif-
ference is that the accumulation of surplus is not an explicitly political activity, but rather takes place 
in an ideologically-differentiated sphere running parallel to politics. According to Rosenberg: ‘In 
capitalism the domain of formal political equality does not need to be a segregated realm of privilege 
resting upon surplus extraction elsewhere in the wider social formation. Or, at any rate, this ‘else-
where’ is but another dimension of the lives of the same individuals.’ Ibid. 85. 
99 On this basis, the attempt to rechannelled ‘private’ wealth in the name of a ‘public’ purpose is 
susceptible to critique as ‘politicisation’ of that which is ‘apolitical.’ It is for this reason that sover-
eignty as the condition of political autonomy has historically never been a guarantee of economic 
self-sufficiency, Ibid. 126-128, 131-135. 
100 For an account of how traditions of political thought frequently ignore economic dimensions, 
while theories of economic analysis, including Marxism, ignore political dimensions (and how a 
synthesis of Marx and Arendt offers the prospect of resolution), see Ince 2016a. 
101 Ince 2018a, 895. 
102 On personalized dynastic rule as a very different material basis for ‘public international law’, see 




international law, emerged in the first instance and subsequently transformed, dis-
placed, or absorbed other socio-political forms. Through this lens, while the pres-
ence of ‘effective control’ as evidence of popular will (or the potential of popular 
will) is legitimized on the basis of objectivity, this presumed ‘objectivity’ is not a 
natural truth but the culmination of a centuries-long political project that reproduces 
specific institutional forms and social relations. 
 
4.2.2.  The Prospect of ‘Juridical Thinking’ 
 
While historical sociology is uniquely adept at exposing material contingencies, the 
concept of ‘juridical thinking’ forms a vital corollary through its ability to minimize 
or exclude these same material contingencies.103 Coined by Anne Orford, the invo-
cation of ‘juridical thinking’ arose in response to claims by intellectual historians 
that critical international lawyers were methodologically misguided in their focus 
on the prejudices of the field’s formative thinkers. In the assessment of these critics, 
largely associated with the ‘Cambridge School’ and its emphasis on understanding 
ideas in context, by relating historical prejudice to current inequities, critical inter-
national lawyers were judging the past through the lens of contemporary ethical 
standards and this constituted a serious anachronistic distortion.104 According to 
Orford, however, while contextualist history is one way of interpreting prior events 
and their current significance, it is by no means the only way. Additionally, there is 
much insight to be gained from the distinct, yet undertheorized, methodology 
through which lawyers give meaning to the past.   
 
                                                        
103 Confronting this phenomenon allows us to uncover the constitutive political dimensions of the 
juridical that are missed by historical sociology. In the words of Davenport, ‘[i]t is necessary…for 
Marxism in IR to extend its reach beyond the prevailing interest in historical-sociological studies of 
processes of development and to critically with the tradition of political theory: above all, with such 
central categories of sovereignty and legal order.’ Davenport 2011, 42 (notes omitted, emphasis 
mine).   




For Orford, a unique characteristic of legal method (i.e. ‘juridical thinking’) is its 
genealogical construction of patterns of meanings that connects historical events 
through a seamless narrative regardless of the immediate understandings of the par-
ties to these events.105 As a result, while ‘juridical thinking’ may be inherently 
anachronistic,106 it must be understood as a view of the past that articulates the 
movement of meaning through time, as opposed to the contextualist historian’s task 
of articulating, or even disarticulating, change over time.107 In this sense, the force 
of ‘juridical thinking’ is its ability to assert the validity of concepts and structures 
despite their existence as pure abstractions completely ungrounded in material re-
ality. By excluding material social relations from its consideration, the great danger 
of juridical thinking is its ability to invoke timeless, abstract ideas as a means of 
legitimizing domination.108  
 
However, this danger can be rechannelled into a powerful analytical tool by con-
sciously acknowledging juridical thinking as a distinct form of historicisation. A 
first step to realizing this potential is to acknowledge that, so long as lawyers exist, 
this particular mode of approaching the past will always be relevant. As a result, no 
contextual history, however detailed and comprehensive, will ever overcome ‘ju-
ridical thinking’ as an influential producer of a distinct temporal consciousness.109 
                                                        
105 Ibid. 174-175. 
106 Ibid. 175. 
107 Orford 2012a, 9. 
108 This quality of abstraction through international law is substantially similar to Mark’s engage-
ment with concept of ideology as it manifested through the ‘Emerging Right to Democratic Gov-
ernance’, see Marks 2000, 6-7. 
109 In this way Orford’s articulation of ‘juridical thinking’ opens door to exploring earlier articula-
tions of the distinct ways lawyers and historians approach the past. One articulation of this diver-
gence was put forth in an 1888 lecture by the renown English legal historian Frederick William 
Maitland, according to whom: 
That process by which old principles and old phrases are charged with a new 
context, is from the lawyer’s point of view an evolution of the true intent and 
meaning of the old law; from the historian’s point of view it is almost of ne-




To believe otherwise carries serious drawbacks in the domains of both analytical 
precision and political praxis. In Orford’s assessment:    
 
It is not plausible to instruct a lawyer to think about a concept purely in 
the present tense. Lawyers work by invoking the history of meaning 
that has accrued to legal concepts, principles and doctrines over time. 
The legal operation of relating past and present will continue whether 
or not critical scholars engage with it….Critical work in law tries to 
recover that process and reanimate the political potential embedded in 
all legal fictions. The attack on anachronism will not shut down the 
movement of law, but it threatens to shut down the ways in which crit-
ical legal scholarship seeks to challenge that movement when it pro-
duces authoritarian or exploitative effects.110 
 
Despite this unavoidability, an analysis that acknowledges the force of ‘juridical 
thinking’ is nonetheless compatible with an engagement of parallel modes of his-
torical explanations. By acknowledging this dynamic of law being one means of 
conceptualizing the past amongst many, the theorist is forced to confront the issue 
of how multiple historical registers (and their political consequences) bear upon 
larger theoretical efforts. This opens up the door to incorporating the above-dis-
cussed insights of history sociology into international legal history/theory, despite 
the fact that their aversion to state-centrism seemingly contradicts international 
law’s foundational premise of a multiplicity of sovereign states as its analytical 
starting point.111 However, if this foundational state-centric premise is understood 
                                                        
mix up the two different logics, the logics of authority and the logic of evidence. 
What the lawyer wants is authority and the newer the better; what the historian 
wants is evidence and the older the better. 
Maitland 1911, 491. 
110 Orford 2017, 305-306. 
111 On the absence of historical sociology-based engagement with international law for this reason 
see Koskenniemi 2016a, 106. Even amongst Marxist approaches that have emerged within the field 
of international law, while methods broadly describable as ‘the commodity-form theory’, ‘ideology 




as a juridical narrative (and thus abstracted from its material foundation), this nec-
essarily raises the question of which material social relations are responsible for 
forming and sustaining this particular arrangement.112 In other words, who does the 
state-centric abstraction serve and why? 
 
In addressing this question, the explanatory forces of materiality represented by 
historical sociology and the explanatory forces of abstraction represented by ‘jurid-
ical thinking’ coexist in a relational capacity.113 After all, the initial motivations for 
juridically articulating abstractions are themselves rooted in material interests. As 
such, the identification of these interests provides profound insights into why com-
peting actors formulate their particular legal arguments.114 Through this lens, we 
can confront a problem, identified by Marks, whereby the commonplace fetishiza-
tion of international law as an autonomous, self-contained ‘thing’ distorts our con-
sciousness of how it is actually a ‘process’ grounded in a complex interplay of so-
cial and interpretive dynamics.115 
 
 
                                                        
sociology of international law has yet to be theorised in detail. Such a pursuit is highly worthwhile 
given that, as it currently stands, ‘the question of the relationship between law and social change on 
broader level—what we might dub the question of Marxist legal theory—remains unanswered.’ 
Knox 2016a, 326 (emphasis in original). However, it worth noting that there are ongoing attempts 
to theorise the historical sociology of international law from within the field of international relations. 
Of particular importance here is Maïa Pal’s theory of ‘jurisdictional accumulation’, see Pal 2013 
112 This invokes the deep connection between sovereignty and modern historical consciousness (i.e. 
the view of the future as radical possibility unlimited by any cyclical inevitability), in that both arose 
in roughly the same early modern timeframe. Here, while modern sovereignty’s spatial dimension 
of territory is almost universally assumed, what is less remarked upon (yet perhaps even more ob-
vious) is the temporality of sovereignty as a presumptively eternal claim that is inconsistent with 
future limitations as a condition of its existence Davenport 2016, 260-261.    
113 On the supplementary nature of internal and external perspectives on the political force of legal 
argument, see Werner 2010; Desautels-Stein 2016a, 213-216.  
114 On Russian and Ukrainian assertions of the ‘right to self-determination’ as extension of material 
interests regarding Crimea, see Özsu 2015. 




4.2.3.  The Historical Sociology-‘Juridical Thinking’ Interaction 
 
In combining the presumptions of historical sociology and ‘juridical thinking’ de-
tailed above, what emerges is a framework of ‘world-historical context’ uniquely 
suited to mapping the complexities of how popular will became globalized as inter-
national law’s basis for domestic authority. This framework reveals how popular 
will, despite being a justification for presumptively limitless plurality in contempo-
rary international law, originally emerged as part of a broader array of abstractions 
that upheld very specific modes of government and political economy. However, 
by virtue of its status as a juridical abstraction capable of taking any form, and thus 
fulfilling any political end, popular will has proven to be a source of captivation so 
strong that it has built a world in its image. In accomplishing this, by calling for the 
autonomy of a particular political community in a manner that affirms the overarch-
ing system of international law, popular will acts as a means of pursuing parochial 
(and materially-grounded) interests through a universalist vocabulary centred on 
the modern nation-state form. Those who claim alternative vessels for collective 
expression are incomprehensible to the international legal order as it currently is.116  
 
This uniformity of juridical assertion coexists alongside deeply entrenched systems 
of uneven material distribution. Viewed through the lens of ‘world-historical con-
text’, the seeming disjuncture between the freedom to pursue emancipation on one’s 
own terms and realities of structured inequality can be understood as entwined 
through a common meta-process. Against this formative presumption, our task is 
to explain why assertions of popular will delivered a higher degree of material suc-
cess to some populations compared to others despite their existence within a shared 
international legal order. Here we must consider how the reception, dissemination, 
                                                        
116 According to Parfitt’s account, such alternatives as they have been asserted by indigenous schol-
ars throughout the world, form perhaps the best available means of resisting the ‘process of interna-
tional legal reproduction’ and its multi-layered entrenchment of hierarchy under the veneer of equal-




and adaptation of innovations, including modes of legal argument, necessarily turns 
our attention to the greater world-system.  
 
It is through the disavowal of state-centrism that historical sociology has proven 
highly adept at theorizing such innovations, especially through the framework of 
Uneven and Combined Development pioneered by Leon Trotsky.117 Subject to nu-
merous interpretations, this framework’s core features are that: a) there is an inher-
ent multiplicity of societies, b) developments occurring within one society exert 
pressures on other societies, and c) the configurations/innovations developed 
through this process can manifest in a local contexts in a variety of ways.118 Ac-
cording to Barry Buzan and George Lawson’s account of these manifestations: 
 
Each social order that encounters…[a] new configuration has its own 
way of adapting to it…inter-societal dynamics have taken the form of 
emulation. Some societies do not take on the new configuration at all, 
either because of internal resistance to the changes it required, or be-
cause of attempts by leading-edge polities to maintain inequalities be-
tween them by denying access to elements of transformation. Others 
succeed in developing indigenous versions of the new configuration. 
These ‘late’ developers are not carbon copies of the original adopters, 
but develop their own characteristics.119 
 
                                                        
117 For Trotsky, this theory was prompted by the need to explain why anti-capitalist revolution broke 
out in the feudal-agrarian and thus relatively ‘backwards’ Tsarist Russian Empire as opposed to the 
most advanced industrial capitalist economies, namely England, as envisioned by Marx. According 
to Trotsky, this disjuncture had its explanation in the fact that ‘domestic’ political developments 
were not purely internal events reducible to developmental stages, but rather shaped by external 
pressures and adaptations on a global scale, see Trotsky 2013, 3-12. 
118 Ibid. For various accounts of Uneven and Combined Development (‘UCD’) as it has been devel-
oped in IR, see Rosenberg 2006; Anievas and Allinson 2009; Glenn 2012; Rosenberg 2013. For a 
pioneering account of how UCD is applicable in the context of legal analysis, see Brophy 2017. 




The specific interpretations of international law by actors claiming independence 
on the grounds of popular will can certainly be understood as configurations/inno-
vations according to this framework. However, viewing them in this light requires 
attention to certain issues. Here we must take seriously the way ‘juridical thinking’ 
weaves together concepts and events across a number of contexts into a transcend-
ent web of rules and principles. Given this formation, actors strategically affirming 
certain aspect of the international legal order may inadvertently commit themselves 
to additional presumptions embedded within this system that are not immediately 
visible, but can be incredibly disadvantageous in the long-term.120 That said, the 
material success or failure of those asserting popular will for any number of ends 
will, in large part, be determined by the context of the international legal order at 
the time these assertion are made.  
 
Here, actors seeking international legal subjectivity at times when the international 
legal order is open to redefinition maintain a high degree of agency in their strategic 
adaptation of its principles (which may even include translating their own parochial 
interests into universal standards). Correspondingly, actors making assertions at 
times when the international legal order is in a state of greater rigidity are far more 
constrained when it comes to the ability of the larger system to accommodate their 
localized assertions. Firmly adhering to the notion that asserting popular will in an 
anarchic, sovereignty-based order presents limitless possibilities for plural expres-
sion systematically diverts our attention away from these material considerations. 
As such, it proves all too easy to miss the structural inequality created between 
societies that were ‘standard setters’ and societies that were ‘standard takers’ when 
it came to their formative receptions and assertions of materially-consequential in-
ternational legal innovations.121 
 
                                                        
120 To give just one example, colonies that asserted independence via the right to self-determination 
in the 1960s subjected themselves to an overarching order that also contained the rules of state re-
sponsibility that obligated these new states to compensate former colonial powers for nationalizing 
old colonial assets that now fell under the rubric of ‘foreign-owned property,’ Chimni 2008, 84-85. 




4.3.  Locating a Timeframe 
 
Given the broad applicability of this historical sociology-‘juridical thinking’ syn-
thesis, narrowing the temporal scope is essential when accounting for the globali-
sation of popular will through international law. While my analytical entry point 
and endpoint is the UN Charter system, the main historical engagement presented 
as the explanation for this current system takes place in the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries. Focus on this general era as a turning point continues to 
be rare within international legal scholarship despite the critical ‘turn to history.’ 
According to Jennifer Pitt’s appraisal of this situation in Boundaries of the Interna-
tional, one of the few works to centre this timeframe: ‘[w]hile there has been much 
recent scholarship on Vitoria and Grotius, as well as on the later nineteenth century, 
the predisciplinary eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries have been relatively 
neglected.’122 In building upon this engagement, I take the position that attention to 
this timeframe is vital for overcoming serious substantive and methodological is-
sues that accompany the analysis of popular will within contemporary international 
legal scholarship. 
 
Substantively, my intervention pre-empts misconceptions that the status of popular 
will as the basis for domestic authority emerged with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia 
settlement ending the Thirty-Years Wars. Though a historical myth, this event is 
widely believed to be the origin point of the modern international order.123 Such a 
misconception is certainly understandable given that Westphalia has traditionally 
been assumed to mark the end of a hierarchical, heterogeneous order comprised of 
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123 For a historical sketch of the conflation between the peace of Westphalia and an international 




divinity-empowered actors by replacing it with a secular-anarchic order of sover-
eign states.124 According to this narrative, given that these post-Westphalian sover-
eign entities were bound to no higher authority, it is not a difficult step to assume 
that the popular will of the underlying communities animating these entities were 
the ultimate sources of political empowerment. However, while this account may 
create a coherent basis for theorizing the modern international system, the factual 
accuracy of this orthodox conception of Westphalia has been subject to sustained 
critique by historians and international relations scholars, if not international law-
yers.125 Thus, while Westphalia’s endurance as a source of normative and symbolic 
power is a grand testament to the force of ‘juridical thinking’ and its ability to en-
trench timeless narratives detached from material reality historical sociology forces 
us to rethink our approach to this event. 
 
In revisionist accounts of Westphalia, a major point made is that this event was a 
preservation of existing modalities of divinity-sourced dynastic power as opposed 
to any move to secularism. If this assertion contains even a small degree of truth, 
such an occurrence is fundamentally inconsistent with the materialist view of anar-
chy discussed above. After all, dynastic legitimacy vests sovereignty in the persons 
of rulers as opposed to the abstraction of a distinct political community expressing 
its popular will in a territorially-bounded setting. Relatedly, in contrast to the emp-
tiness of popular will, and its consequent presentation of infinite possibilities (in 
theory), dynastic legitimacy was grounded in very specific practices and tradi-
tions.126 Modification of these by any individual dynastic actor came at the risk of 
disavowing their authority. All of that said, I take the position that, while the change 
represented by Westphalia was consequential within the dynastic order, this does 
not (on its own) trigger any linear transition of these dynastic kingdoms into modern 
                                                        
124 For perhaps the most influential modern account of this narrative, see Gross 1948. 
125 For such critiques of the Westphalia narrative, see e.g. Croxton 1999; Osiander 2001; Teschke 
2003; Craven 2012b, 232-633; Kayaoglu 2010b. 
126 For an anthropological perspective on these rites of monarchic rule across numerous contexts, 




sovereign states.127 Thus, in explaining the rise of a world of sovereign states legit-
imized on the basis of poplar will, I focus on the interlinked rupturing force of the 
rise of capitalism and the outbreak, and later containment, of the Enlightenment era 
revolutions when squaring the Westphalian circle.  
 
As will be explained in greater detail, it is my premise that the modern capitalist 
state first institutionally consolidated in seventeenth century England, albeit as a 
result of a much broader pattern of inter-societal interactions.128 Yet, the social 
changes that came with this transformation were, in great part, managed through a 
process of North American settler colonization that furthered the expansion of Brit-
ish capitalism.129 This eventually led to a settler revolt in the form of the American 
Revolution where achieving de facto authority in the name of popular will ulti-
mately provided a successful basis for sovereign independence.130 This upheaval 
reached the heart of the European dynastic order in the form of the French Revolu-
tion where absolutist contradictions could no longer coexist with Enlightenment 
sensibilities and the material interests they generated.131 Following this rupture, the 
consolidation of the 1815 Concert of Europe that hosted a tense alliance between a 
liberal Britain and a reactionary dynastic Russia, Prussia, and Austria laid the foun-
dations for the Eurocentric ‘family of nations.’132 The consolidation of this new 
state-centric order was furthered by the independence of Latin American states 
where assertions of dynastic legitimacy proved unable to block external recognition 
on the basis of de facto authority.133  
 
                                                        
127 On the longstanding assumption that the order absolutist kingdoms formed a direct link to the 
modern order of sovereign states, see Rosenberg 1994, 130-131.  
128 See Chapter III, Part 3.3.2. 
129 Ibid. Part 3.4. 
130 Ibid. Part 3.5. 
131 See Chapter IV. 
132 See Chapter V. 




Through this alternative substantive account of the rise and diffusion of popular 
will, international law, and the modern nation-state, this thesis provides a multifac-
eted, materially-grounded account of why certain juridical innovations relating to 
legitimate authority became unquestioned presumptions. Against this backdrop, I 
offer insights into how larger systemic features, namely the rise of capitalist politi-
cal economy and its attendant juridical forms, provided certain actors with a vast 
degree of agency, forced others to rapidly adapt, and completely marginalized oth-
ers. Thus, I expose the ways in which the theoretically limitless range of local gov-
ernmental systems represented by the possibility of sovereign popular will was, in 
reality, deeply constrained by the demands of capital accumulation and those will-
ing to further it through violence.  
 
Given this reality of structural coercion, affirming the ultimately empty possibility 
of popular will was in many instances the only avenue for certain actors to attain a 
modicum of leverage in a rapidly transforming world-system. This was true even 
when expressing this affirmation destroyed the possibility of developing alternative 
modes of socio-political organization better suited to local conditions. By identify-
ing a series of interconnected events in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-
centuries as a confluence that ultimately entrenched a specific understanding of 
popular will on a global scale, I directly address what David Armitage has identified 
as a glaring explanatory gap whereby: 
 
the receptivity of the world to the contagion of sovereignty which al-
most universally effected it still demands explanation, especially by at-
tending to the domestic determinants and conditions of its reception and 
domestication. Only then can we fully understand the energetic copro-
duction of the national and the international around the globe in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.134 
 
Confronting these late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century events through an 
interdisciplinary (but predominantly international legal) lens presents challenges, 
                                                        




but also opportunities, when confronting entrenched methodological standards. A 
key issue is that, despite their indispensable role in turning an order of personalized 
dynastic monarchs into an order of depersonalized sovereign states, the Enlighten-
ment revolutions are rarely acknowledged as such by international lawyers. This is 
unsurprising given that, while of profound world-historical significance, these rev-
olutions produced very few materials traditionally viewed as authoritative sources 
in the international legal field. According to Stephen Neff: 
 
The striking thing was how little, rather than how much, impact the 
[revolutionary] upheavals had on the law of nations. It was one of his-
tory’s most dramatic demonstrations of how much it is that the doc-
trines and structures of international law are more deeply rooted - and 
correspondingly slower to evolve - than the surface events that claimed 
the attentions of journalists and some historians. The period produced 
no revolutionary international legal theorist comparable to William 
Godwin or Thomas Paine, no monumental treatise on ‘Revolutionary 
International Law.’135 
 
However, this paradox is eminently consistent with a persistent methodological 
shortcoming in the production of international legal history. As Rose Parfitt has 
shown, reliance on the works of classical doctrinal publicists (Vitoria, Grotius, Vat-
tel, etc.) ‘…offers the international legal historian a ready-made methodology, 
amounting in effect to an inbuilt disciplinary historiography’ that if abandoned, 
risks ‘dissolving the specifically international legal character of the historical un-
dertaking.’136 While recourse to this trope allows a scholar to claim a distinctly ‘in-
ternational legal’ approach, it also contributes to a deeply Eurocentric conception 
of what international law is and what it can be.137 The great problem this presents 
is that while international law claims legitimacy on the basis of ‘universality’, so 
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long as Eurocentric methods remains dominant, there cannot be a truly ‘global his-
tory of international law’ that includes an ever-expanding multiplicity of perspec-
tives; something that might critically confront the ideals posed by the discourse of 
‘universality.’138 While these methodological orthodoxies have long excluded the 
West’s Others as producers of international legal knowledge, the case of the En-
lightenment revolutions shows that they are also adept at preventing the West from 
coming to terms with the world-historical realities of its own objects of mythologi-
sation.  
 
Regarding political economy, while this mode of analysis has become increasingly 
prevalent across various legal regimes,139 it is not yet fully entrenched within the 
areas of international law that directly bear on popular will, namely statehood, 
recognition, and self-determination.140 As Umut Ozsu has observed, while agendas 
of resource control may trivialise normative assertions of absolute rights (and thus 
disincentive the rhetoric of political economy in these contexts), contestations over 
popular will possess unavoidable material dimensions that have yet to be compre-
hensively analysed.141 What then would a political economy of the historical rela-
tionship between popular will and domestic authority actually look like in light of 
international law’s contemporary approach to political economy?  
 
Unlike its ‘turn to history’, international law’s ‘turn to political economy’ has been 
less concerned with the interdisciplinary incorporation of new sources and method-
ologies. Rather, according to John Haskell and Akbar Rasulov’s recent assessment, 
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the later ‘turn’ has functioned as a concerted normative condemnation of ‘main-
stream’ international law’s facilitation of global capitalism and its inequities.142 De-
spite the divergences between these respective ‘turns' in international law, there is 
no reason way the normative issues raised by discourses of political economy can-
not be incorporated into the task of building a global history of international law.143 
By using the historical sociology-‘juridical thinking’ framework to materially 
ground the ways in which international law shaped and disseminated popular will, 
and the corollary abstractions that defined it, the analysis in this thesis aims to serve 
the ends of both political economy-based and history-based critical discourses 
within contemporary international law. 
 
Beyond these contemporary debates, this general interdisciplinary ethos is more 
reflective of how many individuals in this late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth cen-
tury timeframe viewed the law of nations. Although largely neglected in the narra-
tives of international lawyers, prior to the disciplinary consolidation of the field in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, the radical theorization of legal relations 
between peoples was far more common. As Jennifer Pitts has shown in the first 
major study of this forgotten phenomenon, while one should not underestimate 
longstanding presence of cultural superiority sensibilities throughout European his-
tory, the eighteenth century actually did witness an unprecedented degree of critical 
and anti-colonial formulations of the law of nations.144 It was only by later jurists 
declaring international law specific to ‘European civilization’ that these formula-
tions fell outside the appropriate scope of disciplinary analysis.145 For Pitts, critical 
                                                        
142 Haskell and Rasulov 2018. 
143 As Martin Clark has noted, the debate over historical methodology in international law has 
largely focused on assertions and critiques of the Cambridge School and its contextual emphasis on 
intellectual history. What is lost in the process is the possibility of international legal engagement 
with other modes of historiography, including those that focus on global history, economic history, 
and, for that matter, historical sociology, see Clark 2018b, 757. 
144 For a comprehensive account see Pitts 2018, 92-117. 




engagement with, and inclusive approaches towards, international law in the con-
temporary era is, in some sense, a revival of the critical ethos of the eighteenth 
century. Accordingly:   
 
the current historicising moment has brought scholars of international 
law into conversation with those of other disciplines including history, 
anthropology, international relations, and political theory. This may 
make possible something like a return to the predisciplinary status of 
the law of nations as a discourse available to a wider array of writers, 
thinkers, and publics.146 
 
In taking this revivalist prospect seriously, theorising the place of popular will 
within the law of nations is critical. As discussed above, the inability of narrow 
disciplinarily understandings of international law to produce compelling explana-
tions of the operation of popular will within the global order, has lead theorists of 
this question, including myself, to seek more comprehensive insights through inter-
disciplinary engagement. While being cognizant of the reality that disciplinarily 
rigid understandings of international law have left an irreversible legacy, an alter-
native approach is needed. Being true to the ethos of the Enlightenment’s more 
radical aspects, I embrace the methodological orientation that accounting for the 
popular will-international law relationship must proceed with a default scepticism 
towards rigid disciplinary boundaries.  
 
 
5.  The Road Ahead 
 
Chapter I provides an overview of the doctrinal and policy issues raised by ques-
tions of popular will in contemporary international law. Here I account for the ‘ef-
fective control doctrine’ within the UN Charter and its subsequent manifestation 
against the backdrop of the Cold War and decolonization. From here, I assess post-
Cold War challenges to the effective control doctrine in the realms of state creation 
                                                        




and governmental legitimacy. It was through these projects that international law’s 
traditional tolerance of varied domestic political orders was subject to critique on 
the basis that liberal democracy represented the only true measures of popular will. 
Given the failure of these projects to succeed on their own terms, the effective con-
trol doctrine remains a highly relevant feature of international law applicable to 
domestic political conflicts/contestations the world over. 
 
In locating where the component elements of the effective control doctrine first 
emerged, Chapter II argues that the great turning point was the Swiss jurist Emer 
de Vattel’s 1758 treatise The Law of Nations. Here I examine earlier classical pub-
licists (in particular Francisco de Vitoria) to show how our modern conception of 
popular will did not exist in the earliest international legal sources that are generally 
viewed as authoritative within the field. I thus showcase Vattel’s responsibility for 
this rupture, through a reading of his domestic political theory in conjunction with 
his theory of international order. This textual engagement is then coupled with a 
contextual analysis of Vattel’s position in world history. Here, I show how ‘popular 
will’ as the unifying rubric of Vattel’s theory explains how his designation of the 
various classes of actors was informed by his immediate context as it related to the 
European states system, the Ottoman Empire, indigenous peoples in the non-Euro-
pean world, and Britain/the British Empire. 
 
While Chapter II is undoubtedly rooted in history, Chapter III begins the main 
world-historical narrative by accounting for the rise of colonial capitalism and the 
modern nation-state form. Following engagements with the debates on the rise of 
Britain as the first modern state in global context, I account for the emergence of 
the US as the first new international legal subject where popular will evidenced by 
‘facts on the ground’ sufficiently repudiated a parent state’s claims of dynastic le-
gitimacy. Here I examine how the impetus to raise the justification of popular will 
in this context was taken from numerous features of British thought that where spe-
cially adapted to the material context of a slave-holding ‘settler empire’ that exem-
plified capitalist political economy both materially and ideologically. Here Vattel’s 




Revolution under the law of nations, especially when it came to appealing to out-
siders in a universalistic capacity. 
 
Chapter IV examines the transformation of ‘Ancien Regime’ in Europe between the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia and the 1815 Congress of Vienna. This entails an exam-
ination of the rise of rationalised territorial administration under consolidation of 
absolutism that generated profound contradictions regarding the legitimate author-
ity and ultimately resulted in the French Revolution. Here I examine the various 
international legal innovations that arose in the crucible of the Revolution as they 
relate to nationalist and republication challenges to dynastic legitimacy expressed 
under the banner of popular will. In this capacity, I discuss the enduring impact of 
this ‘popular will’ concept that remained even after the defeat of Napoleon when 
victorious anti-Revolutionary forces sought to restore order.  
 
Chapter V then analyses the Concert of Europe system that arose from the Congress 
of Vienna in the early-nineteenth century whereby post-Napoleonic reconstruction 
was subject to hegemonic control by great powers. Here I focus on the ideological 
and geopolitical tensions between liberal Britain and the reactionary-dynastic Holy 
Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria with each bloc harbouring very different 
visions of what ‘restoring order’ meant. Managing these tensions lead to core inter-
national legal developments including modern sovereign equality, the replacement 
of territorial conquest by belligerent occupation, and an entirely new generation of 
treaty-making. Furthermore, I show how this process was facilitated by understand-
ings of popular will that arose as critiques of Revolutionary liberalism/universalism 
and asserted formulations of racial hierarchy and ethno-nationalist particularity that 
facilitated expansion of colonial capitalism.  
 
In Chapter VI, I turn to the phenomenon of peripheral popular will through an ex-
ploration of the independence of Latin American states. Here, the region’s for-
mation through feudal dynastic colonization was very different from the British 
settlement of North America. Against this socio-historical backdrop, I examine how 
commitments by Europe’s dynastic powers to deny recognition to Latin American 




based arguments that de facto authority constitutes international legal standing over 
a parent state’s objection. This process further enmeshed Latin America deeply 
within the structures of global capitalism. The resulting pressures led to robust ar-
guments concerning sovereign equality, nonintervention, and absolute independ-
ence as a necessary to protecting the popular will of weak/marginalized states hop-
ing to improve through ‘development.’    
 
Finally, in Chapter VII, I return to the context of the formation of the United Na-
tions that gives rise to the ‘effective control doctrine’ by virtue of its entrenchment 
of commitments to sovereign equality, non-intervention, and ideological pluralism. 
In rereading this transformative event in light of the historical analysis presented in 
this thesis, it is my argument that following countless projects to limit or qualify 
sovereign autonomy through various colonial rationales, by 1945 such efforts could 
no longer be justified. After all, fascism had demonstrated the genocidal (and spa-
tially uncontainable) potentiality of racialized colonial violence, while Soviet and 
anticolonial challenges to the legal architecture of Western empires were now una-
voidable forces in world politics. Thus, while colonialism still existed throughout 
the world, the UN Charter provided the seeds of a vision where popular will was 
applicable on a global scale and every human being should be a member of a sov-
ereign political community. This development mobilized numerous lineages of the 
Enlightenment revolutions amongst a diverse array of actors who navigated the in-
herited structures of popular will, international law, and the nation-state as both 
vessels of hope and sources of constraint. In the Conclusion, I return to the forma-
tive vision presented in Vattel’s The Law of Nations and restate how this thesis has 
exposed the process through which an abstract theory produced by a peripheral ac-






The Contemporary International Law of Popular Will: The Effec-




1.1.  Introduction 
      
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of popular will’s status within 
the contemporary international legal order. Here I focus upon the ongoing debates 
over the effective control doctrine as deeply flawed, but nonetheless most com-
monly accepted means of determining popular will under international law in most 
situations. In addition to accounting for the doctrine’s origins and function, this 
analysis also highlights attempts at devising alternative means of determining pop-
ular will and the limits of those proposed alternatives. While resolving the effective 
control doctrine’s difficulties remains elusive, this foundational analysis sets the 
stage for a ‘turn to history’ whereby excavating the past resituates the intractabili-
ties of the present.  
 
In undertaking this foundational analysis, Part 1.2. provides a high-altitude over-
view of how the effective control doctrine exists at the intersection of varied and 
contradictory normative and doctrinal considerations present within international 
legal discourse. This provides grounding for Part 1.3.’s account of the effective 
control doctrine’s development within the UN system where the acceptance of vi-
olence within states acted as the price to be paid for limiting violence between states 
against the tumultuous ideological backdrop of decolonization and the Cold War. 
Building directly on this, Part 1.4. recounts the proposed alternatives to the effective 
control doctrine that arose in the immediate wake of the Cold War. Here, the per-
ceived post-Cold War triumph of liberal democracy lead many international law-
yers to question the field’s longstanding agnosticism towards domestic systems of 




were subject to liberal democratic critique when applied to international legal ques-
tions concerning both the creation of new states and the legitimacy of governments 
within existing states. However, in evaluating the success of these proposed alter-
natives, and their focus on liberal conceptions of democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law, Part 1.5. shows how core features of the effective control doctrine none-
theless persisted at a structural level. Coupled with recent political realities, the 
failure of alternatives to displace these structural features has resulted in an over-
arching situation where the ‘effective control doctrine’, and the limited understand-
ing of popular will it embodies, continues to be a core reality of the international 
legal order.  
 
Having established the presence of deeply embedded flaws within contemporary 
international legal doctrine, Chapter II’s begins historicizing the present moment. 
Here I show how transformed understandings of popular will within the classical 
law of nations gave rise to the core, structuring features of the ‘effective control 
doctrine’ as its logical by-products. On this grounding, the analyses presented in 
Chapters III-VI show, through a series of interlinked historical events, why key 
influential actors throughout the world were receptive to the particular vision of 
popular will intertwined with the nation-state form detailed in Chapter II. With this 
record established, Chapter VII returns to this chapter’s problem of the effective 
control doctrine within the postwar order. Here I offer an account of why the pop-
ular will-embodying state was able to attain a monopoly over political subjectivity 
on a global level through the rise of the United Nations system. 
 
 
1.2.  The Effective Control Doctrine as Anchor 
 
In showing why a world-historical excavation of popular will’s emergence as the 
universal international legal standard for evaluating domestic authority is worth-
while, the purpose of this first chapter is to provide an overview of the contempo-
rary doctrinal and policy landscape surrounding these issues. Here, my primary fo-
cus is on the phenomenon deemed the effective control doctrine outlined in the 




in response to the harsh outcomes this doctrine is capable of legitimizing. Such an 
exercise is important given that, despite its many flaws, the effective control doc-
trine stands for a pluralist formulation of popular will that has produced a higher 
degree of consensus than any other formulation produced thus far. After all, at-
tempts to overcome the effective control doctrine’s harshness only ended up 
demonstrating just how central a pluralist conception of popular will is within our 
current understanding of international law. Accounting for these contemporary doc-
trinal and policy issues highlights the particular way this specific configuration of 
popular will shapes the relationship between international law and domestic le-
gal/political orders. This presents a vital compass for orienting our exploration of 
how these overarching structures arose in world-historical context.  
 
Given that international law is premised on both universality and the sovereign au-
tonomy of it subjects, attempts by international lawyers to set precise, timeless 
standards for membership in this system have, at least traditionally, been minimal. 
Even the 1932 Montevideo Convention’s reigning definition of a state as consisting 
of the four elements of i) territory, ii) permanent population, iii) government, and 
iv) foreign relations capacity,1 is a product of the specific setting in which it was 
promulgated and faces limitations as a criteria when applied to fundamentally dif-
ferent international circumstances.2 There are compelling reasons for not pursuing 
a project of rigidly defining such standards, namely that flexibility allows both local 
and external actors to develop creative and appropriately tailored solutions to com-
plex disputes. 
 
However, my purpose here is to account for situations of contested international 
legal standing where peaceful means of negotiation and resolution fail to provide 
an answer and the broader international community must take a decisive position 
                                                        
1 Monteviedo Convention 1933.  
2 See Grant 1998. Yet, despite this context, the Montevideo Convention has nonetheless produced 




on whether a self-proclaimed sovereign authority actually exists as a new state or 
the legitimate government of an existing state. In particular, I focus on the effective 
control doctrine and its default standard that objective, de facto, and presumptively 
durable territorial authority evidenced by an obedient population is the benchmark 
for recognizing international legal standing.3 While this effective control doctrine 
can be understood in a narrow-procedural sense applicable to a limited range of 
situations, any attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon 
must also approach it at a broad-substantive level as well.  
 
In its narrow-procedural sense, the effective control doctrine is most prominently 
applicable to situations of secession from an existing state and extra-constitutional 
governmental change through force (revolutions, civil wars, coups, etc.). Against 
this backdrop, while directly answering questions of state creation and governmen-
tal legitimacy typically exceeds the jurisdictional capacity of courts, lawyers are 
faced with numerous potential catalysts that trigger the question of ‘who possesses 
effective control?’ After all, a blindingly vast array of legal controversies can result 
in dramatically different outcomes depending on which proclaimed sovereign au-
thority is internationally recognized. According to Sean Murphy: 
 
It is through those legal relations that the State can lawfully request military 
support from other States; can lawfully refuse entry to foreign military forces; 
can lawfully negotiate and conclude international agreements; can avail itself 
of other rights accorded to sovereigns under international law and vindicate 
those rights before international fora; and can demand respect by other States 
of sovereign acts exercised within its territory, including the enactment and 
enforcement of civil and criminal laws.4  
 
However, while the effective control doctrine provides a default criterion for ad-
dressing the contested sovereignty that may arise in a number of situations, it has 
                                                        
3 Lauterpacht 1947, 28-29, 98-102. 




not gone unchallenged. This is primarily due to the violent realities that have his-
torically accompanied struggles to establish a state or governmental order deviating 
from the internationally recognized status quo.  
 
On this reading, the great problem with the effective control doctrine is its bolster-
ing of a state-centric morality where violence within a territorially setting, whether 
it involves contesting or maintaining sovereign authority, is beyond the substantive 
judgment of the international community. The persistence of this justification has 
been deemed inconsistent with postwar changes in the international legal order 
where the emergence of universal human rights presented an alternative to the com-
placent tolerance of localized cruelty and suffering.5 From this premise, according 
to Anne Peters, state sovereignty is nothing more than an abstraction that only gains 
its substance from the human communities it serves.6 It would therefore be perverse 
to allow abusive regimes to invoke the shield of sovereignty to continue in their 
abuse of the very populations that sovereignty is itself contingent upon.7 Further-
more, in contrast to early views that tolerated internal discretion in the name of 
preventing interstate strife, this particular interpretation of international legal trans-
formation characterized locally executed gross human rights violations as threats to 
international peace and security. Under this justification, especially as depicted by 
Michael Reisman, breeches of UN Charter rules on the use of force to uphold de-
mocracy or prevent abuse might be justified as a fulfilment of the Charter’s ideals 
                                                        
5 According to Ruti Teitel, this core view, buttressed by intertwined institutional developments in 
the fields of human rights, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law, has led to 
an integrated order of ‘humanity law’ poses a serious normative challenge to the state-centric legal 
order, Teitel 2011. 
6 Peters 2009. 
7 In anticipating this humanitarian configuration’s potential conflict with the doctrine of sovereign 
equality, Peters claims that ‘…states’ entitlement to formally legal treatment may be curtailed by 
countervailing considerations and must be balanced against other concerns. A state’s respect for the 
most basic human rights is a legitimate criterion for legal distinctions between states which would 




and, relatedly, a safeguard for ‘world order.’8 Viewing these developments in the 
aggregate, a defining theme of international legal discourse fixated upon the legiti-
mate restriction of traditional sovereign power in the name of human rights and/or 
democratic ‘popular will.’ 
 
It is in the face of such challenges that the broad-substantive conception of the ef-
fective control doctrine is prompted to assert itself. Here the doctrine is presented 
as tool for preserving the self-rule of sovereign territories and their underlying po-
litical communities against well-intended, but short-sighted or overly optimistic, 
progressive ambitions.9 At a structural level, in an international legal order prem-
ised upon the trust, faith, and voluntary consent of diverse members acting without 
an overarching enforcement mechanism, the normative value of a standard seeking 
to maximize domestic autonomy and minimize interference cannot be causally dis-
missed.10 Thus, it can be said that solidifying this base level of agreement is essen-
tial if incremental cooperation in a diverse and unequal world is ever going to be 
possible.11  
 
However, this in turn raises the question of how exactly do we locate the threshold 
for tolerating domestically-constituted violence given that the international legal 
order is also premised on some degree of shared values?12 Turning away from the 
‘sovereignty’ vs. ‘humanity’ debate in its abstract form, my purpose is to address 
the question of how did the international legal order arrive at this particular juncture. 
                                                        
8 See especially Reisman 1990. 
9 Roth 1999, 420-428. 
10 See generally Roth 2011. 
11 The reality of this arrangement creates a conundrum for reformers. As Jure Vidmar notes, while 
governmental abuses against their populations may be patently inconsistent with many of the under-
lying rationales of international law, the system’s juridical architecture nonetheless remains highly 
protective of state sovereignty, Vidmar 2014.  




This means asking the questions of how and why the effective control doctrine be-
came a uniform standard that has attained global applicability despite the particu-
larity of its origins.  
 
 
1.3.  Effective Control in the UN Charter System   
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the formation of the UN Charter system 
directly confronted the contradictory meanings of sovereignty that historically in-
cluded both the prerogative to wage war and the assertion of freedom from external 
interference.13 Through this confrontation, the former aspect was deeply subordi-
nated to the later through the novel elevation of sovereignty to a protected status 
that ‘once achieved is entrenched.’14 This emphasis is made clear in Article 2(1)’s 
commitment to sovereign equality as fundamental precept, Article 2(4)’s prohibi-
tion on the use or threat of force against a state’s territorial integrity or political 
independence, and Article 2(7)’s pronouncement of non-interference by the United 
Nations in domestic affairs.  
 
In accounting for the spaces between these core provisions, ‘[t]he [effective control] 
doctrine fills a void inherent in a decentralized legal order founded on arbitrarily-
drawn territorial boundaries and beset by continuing clashes of interests and val-
ues.’15 On this account, it forms a point of reconciliation between the Charter’s dual 
commitment to 1) a presumption that existing states and governments are the legit-
imate manifestations of their peoples’ popular sovereignty, and 2) a system that 
respects pluralism among different political, economic, and cultural ideals as means 
                                                        
13 For an account of this shift as originating in campaigns to outlaw war during the interwar period, 
see Hathaway and Shapiro 2017. 
14 Crawford 2012, 120. 




of achieving peaceful coexistence.16 This is unsurprising given that the formation 
of the United Nations was far from a harmonious affair and represented a diverse 
array of interests, ideologies, and visions of world order.17 Thus, if curtailing the 
scourge of interstate violence formed the common denominator amongst the new 
system’s disagreement-prone architects, then acceptance of potential intrastate vi-
olence was a necessary concession.18  
 
These principles of sovereign equality, nonintervention, and ideological pluralism 
became entrenched through the Cold War and decolonization. Here, such interna-
tional legal ideals became a medium of coexistence between a Western bloc seeking 
to contain the advantages of global capitalism, an Eastern bloc seeking to build a 
socialist alternative, and the Nonaligned Movement, amongst other Third World 
formations, seeking to carve independent paths for colonial/postcolonial peoples.19 
While symmetrical attempts were made by the superpowers to justify intervention 
in domestic affairs in support of allied leadership via the respective Brezhnev and 
Johnson/Reagan Doctrines, such justifications cannot be said to have achieved in-
ternational legal validity.20  
 
This environment of contestation, coupled with the massive infusion of new states 
emerging from decolonization within international organizations, lead to the prom-
ulgation of commitments to nonintervention and national autonomy over political, 
                                                        
16 Ibid. 395-396. 
17 See Mazower 2009. 
18 See Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 366-368. 
19 See Roth 2012, 29. 
20 Roth 1999, 136. For studies of the Brezhnev and Johnson/Reagan Doctrines, see e.g. Franck and 




economic, social and cultural systems under the 1970 Friendly Relations Declara-
tion.21 Furthermore, this commitment to ideological pluralism was strongly reiter-
ated in 1986 by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case where, in 
rejecting the legality of US claim of suppressing the emergence of a ‘totalitarian 
Communist dictatorship’, the Court stated that: ‘adherence by a State to any partic-
ular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law; to hold 
otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, 
on which the whole of international law rests…’22 
 
Yet, for this system to be premised under a rationale of ‘effective control’ the plain 
meaning of this term must be qualified by other considerations so that international 
law can operate in conformity with its core ideals. These considerations, including 
the Stimson Doctrine; the rule against ‘premature’ recognition; and the self-deter-
mination of peoples, circumscribe effective control by guaranteeing the independ-
ence of ‘…territorially-based political communit[ies] that existing states collec-
tively decide ought to be self-governing, whether based on existing, remembered, 
or foreseen patterns of governance within [them]….’23 Announced in 1932 by US 
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, this doctrine was a refusal to recognise the 
‘State of Manchukuo’ created as a result of Japan’s conquest of China’s Manchuria 
region.24 Upon acquiring a high degree of both state practice and opinion juris, it 
stands for proposition that forceful annexation does not grant valid title and ‘puppet’ 
states created through the unlawful interference of an external power cannot be rec-
ognized as valid international legal subjects.25 Furthermore, this understanding that 
                                                        
21 Friendly Relations Declaration 1970. 
22 ICJ Nicaragua 1986, p. 263. 
23 Roth 2010, 400. 
24 For early scholarly reactions to the Stimson Doctrine as it was developing, see Williams 1932; 
McNair 1933; Yokota 1935; Wright 1935.  
25 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter’s protection of territorial integrity and political independence can 
be viewed as a codification of this, Turns 2003, 130. On the Stimson’s Doctrine’s grounding in the 




wrongdoers should not be able to enjoy the rewards of their unlawful conduct has 
been applied to situations of complete territorial conquest where afflicted states’ 
‘governments in exile’ retained international legal standing despite lacking de facto 
authority.26 
 
In a similar vein, the rule against ‘premature’ recognition declares that the external 
recognition of a secessionist and/or insurgent movement amounts to an undue in-
tervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state and such a recognition can 
only be made once it is highly likely that the opposition will prevail against the 
sovereign.27 While speculations regarding the likelihood of success in such circum-
stances are typically open to a wide-range of interpretations, one relatively settled 
matter is that established authorities receive a high degree of deference. Here, the 
presumption of effective control by an incumbent can appear fictitious in that it 
often coexists alongside a substantial lack of actual territorial authority. On this 
basis, the general understanding is that an established sovereign loses the ability to 
invoke the rule against premature recognition only when it is unable or unwilling 
to reassert control over lost territories.28 According to Roth’s assessment of when 
control cannot reasonably be regained, while legally insignificant in and of itself, 
                                                        
Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 166-171. For a detailed documentation of state practice relating to the 
effect of the Stimson Doctrine in the lead up to, conduct of, and aftermath of the Second World War, 
see Langer 1947.   
26 For an in-depth study of the law and practice surrounding ‘governments in exile’, see Talmon 
1995. 
27 See Lauterpacht 1947, 9-12, 93-95. 
28 In Hersch Lauterpacht’s assessment: ‘When the struggle for independence has reached a tangible 
measure of success accompanied by reasonable prospect of permanency, international law author-
izes third States to declare by means of recognition of the nascent community that the sovereignty 
of the parent State is extinct.’ Lauterpacht 1944, 395. For observations on how this traditional rule 
against premature recognition was challenged in some ways, and affirmed in others, in the context 





as a factual matter the faction that can almost always claim sovereign authority via 
effective control is the one that holds the capital city.29  
 
The third qualification occurred with the advent of decolonization via the principle 
of national self-determination as promulgated by the UN General Assembly’s 1960 
Anti-Colonial Declaration.30 This established an entirely new category of inde-
pendent statehood where effective control in and of itself was no longer presump-
tively valid.31 This presented Europe’s ‘saltwater colonies’ with the options of in-
dependent statehood, free association with an independent state, or integration with 
an independent state.32 Following a decade of state practice on this basis, the scope 
of self-determination was extended to include situations of settler minority rule as 
made explicit in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration’s mandate for ‘…govern-
ment[s] representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction 
as to race, creed or colour.’33 Thus, after a unilateral declaration of independence 
in 1965 the racially discriminatory Republic of Rhodesia failed to gain international 
                                                        
29 Roth 1999, 183-184. This is certainly consistent with the view that, as the typical hub of infra-
structure, communications and diplomatic activity, the capital city can be understood as the link 
between a state’s internal structure and the international order, Jackson 1992, 8. However, at least 
traditionally, this continued standing of a weak sovereign authority was qualified by the recognition 
of a state of belligerency. Here an opposition force’s attainment of a high degree of de facto territo-
rial authority would: raise civil strife to the level of international armed conflict, invoke the laws of 
neutrality, and relieve the host state of its international obligations in relation to activities taking 
place in opposition-held territory, Lauterpacht 1947, 175-176.  In this way the issue of belligerency 
was fundamentally entwined with effective control in that showcased how internally constituted 
‘facts on the ground’ compromised the standing of an existing sovereign and impose specially obli-
gations on outsiders to respect the outcomes of localized contestation, Roth 1999, 177. However, it 
is highly doubtful that the doctrine of belligerency continued to exist after the formation of the UN 
Charter in 1945. This being the case, the presumption in favour of an established government cannot 
be overcome on this basis, Le Mon 2003, 753-754.  
30 Anticolonial Declaration 1960. 
31 Roth 1999, 198-199. For a comprehensive doctrinal study on the relationship between the law of 
self-determination and the law of statehood, see Raic 2002.  
32 GA Res 1541 1960, Principle VI. 




recognition despite exercising a high degree of effective control, and apartheid 
South Africa was subject to international condemnation for its purely domestic 
practices.34  
 
However, while the right to self-determination may have carved out an important 
exception to the effective control, it was nonetheless accompanied by other con-
straints from the state-centric international legal order. This was particularly true of 
the uti possidetis juris doctrine whereby pre-existing colonial frontiers where in-
flexibly solidified as the borders of newly decolonized states.35 Justified as a meas-
ure for preventing disorder, fragmentation, and potentially violent territorial dis-
putes, this principle deeply entrenched arbitrary colonial-era divisions typically 
made with minimal regard for the conditions of colonized populations.36 The rigid 
entrenchment of these divisions coupled with the general irrelevance of effective 
control as prerequisite to independence37 has led some to comment that many post-
colonial nations, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, are de facto ‘quasi-states’ exist-
ing exclusively through the ongoing efforts of the international community.38 As 
                                                        
34 On the unprecedented condemnation of South Africa, see Simpson 2003, 300. On Rhodesia’s 
consistency with the traditionally understood view that ‘facts on the ground’, even when contrary to 
the existing order, validate lawful authority, see Kumar 2016. According to Roth, the situation of 
Southern Africa’s white minority regimes form an important exception to the general rule that de 
facto authority is evidence of popular. In situations of racialized minority rule over an overwhelming 
majority there is no way this could be legitimized by even the most pluralistic interpretation of 
popular will regardless of the degree to which the regime maintains effective control, see Roth 1999, 
234-251. For an important analyses of the international legal standing of Rhodesia and apartheid 
South Africa, see McDougal and Reisman 1968; Richardson 1978; Dugard 1980; Richardson 1987. 
35 For an illustration of this, see ICJ Burkina Faso v. Mali 1986; see also Shaw 1997. 
36 For an important critique of uti posideitis juris in relation to its colonial context and legacies, see 
Mutua 1995. 
37 This can be viewed as a necessarily absolutist rejection of the League of Nations Mandate System 
and the UN Trustee schemes where ‘unpreparedness’ was always an available pretext for denying 
independence, see Anticolonial Declaration 1960, § 3 (‘Inadequacy of political, economic, social or 
educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.’). 




such, a build-in contestation of sovereignty is readily available to those seeking to 
legitimize interventions in these nations.39             
 
1.4.  Post-Cold War Challenges to Effective Control 
 
The conclusion of the Cold War in 1989, and the ‘end’ of ideological contestation 
with liberal democracy its proclaimed victor,40 presented an opportunity for re-
thinking the underlying justifications of the effective control doctrine. After all, 
much of Cold War international legal doctrine was produced in the name of pre-
venting nuclear war between the superpowers. Therefore, condemning ideologi-
cally-based interventions in domestic political contestations served to eliminate 
pretexts for potentially apocalyptic military escalations.41 With the post-1989 de-
cline of this dreaded outcome, there was no longer the same imperative to tolerate 
revolutionary violence within recognized boundaries in the name of allowing polit-
ical communities to resolve their issues and develop their national identities.  
 
Rather, unquestionably accepting internal strife on this basis became increasing 
seen as fuelling ongoing cycles of violent resentment. This necessitated a move 
beyond the old ideological agnosticism towards a values-laden ‘human rights dis-
course’ aimed at breaking these violent cycles.42 With this, a new influential strand 
of international legal thinking sought to suppress the noninterventionist ‘Charter 
liberalism’ animating the effective control doctrine and replace it with a new ‘lib-
eral antipluralism’ that was clear in its rejection of an ideological neutrality as a 
virtue of international law.43 For this later group, the hope was that recourse to 
                                                        
39 According to one influential formulation, sovereignty in this context is nothing more than ‘organ-
ised hypocrisy’, Krasner 2000. On the justification for intervention and divided sovereignty in the 
name of building democracy on this basis, see Krasner 2005. 
40 Fukuyama, 2012 [1992]). 
41 Martineau 2016, 108-109. 
42 Meister 2011, 69-70. 




shared values could provide peaceful alternatives to situations that would otherwise 
be determined through force, even if this meant new means of legitimising force to 
further these values.       
 
1.3.1.  States 
 
In applying this newfound sensibility to the law of statehood, by this point, virtually 
all territories entitled to an independent state under the principle of self-determina-
tion, and acted upon this entitlement, had achieved this result. As such, there were 
only a handful of notable anomalies including East Timor, which became independ-
ent in 2002,44 as well as Western Sahara and Palestine, which remain unresolved to 
this day.45 This being the case, any secessionist movement aimed at attaining a sov-
ereign state must do so against the virtually irrefutable presumption of the host 
state’s entitlement to its territorial integrity.46 Furthermore, some have speculated 
that a right to ‘remedial secession’ by a subnational population subject to grave 
human rights abuses may actually exist based the Friendly Relations Declaration’s 
pronouncement that a government must represent the whole of its population with-
out distinction.47 In addition to these issues, the international community witnessed 
a large-scale infusion of new states with the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and 
                                                        
44 On the ICJ’s acknowledgment of East Timor’s right to self-determination, see ICJ East Timor 
1990. For an account of East Timor’s independence and the questions it raised surrounding the na-
ture and content of self-determination under international law, see Drew 2001. 
45 See ICJ Western Sahara 1975; ICJ Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
2004. On other locations where more legally controversial questions of self-determination persist, 
see Trinidad 2018.  
46 It should be noted that secession itself is not illegal (as a result, states that emerged in violation of 
the parent state’s territorial integrity are afforded all the international legal privileges and protections 
that accompany the status of sovereign statehood). However, while a would-be secessionist ‘….en-
tity may or may not become a State,…it is not a State if the parent State's counterclaim to territorial 
integrity continues to apply and is not internationally disregarded.’ Vidmar 2012a, 709. 




Yugoslavia.48 Against this backdrop, various nationalities, ethnicities, and minority 
groups no longer accommodated and managed by socialist institutions articulated 
claims to autonomy and independence in the language of the right to self-determi-
nation. 49  In this context, self-determination, as an international legal issue, is 
acknowledged to exist beyond the decolonization context in some form. However, 
due to the foundational status of territorial integrity, for groups asserting self-deter-
mination, independent statehood, or even regional autonomy, was in no way guar-
anteed. As such, the processes for realizing this right are of a fundamentally inde-
terminate and ad hoc character.50   
 
Reflecting on everything discussed thus far, in the immediate post-Cold War mo-
ment, two major intertwined issues defined the law of statehood, and by extension 
the effective control doctrine. On the one hand, there was a massive surge in the 
desire for independence accompanied by claims of self-determination that fell out-
side the scope of this doctrine’s category of eligible statehood claimants.51 As such, 
the effective control doctrine’s emphasis on ‘facts on the ground’ as the source of 
sovereign autonomy reasserted itself as international law’s default standard for non-
consensual state creation.52 Simultaneously, the validity of alleged states created on 
                                                        
48 For an analysis of whether the new states created on this basis were solidifying a new international 
legal norm of ‘democratic statehood’ see Vidmar 2013a. 
49 For a wide-ranging overview of nationalist political assertions in the former Soviet sphere, see 
Bremmer and Taras 1993.  
50 See Koskenniemi 1994, 260-264. 
51 For an argument that larger system changes in the post-1945 incentivized assertions of independ-
ent statehood, regardless of whether or not the claimants possessed a recognized right to self-deter-
mination, see Fazal and Griffiths 2014. 
52 In the 2006 second edition of his extensive treatise on state creation in international law, James 
Crawford shows how, while state creation on the basis of unilateral secession has little support, there 
remains the distinct question of state dissolution. Here: ‘If it becomes clear that the process of dis-
solution of the State as a whole is irreversible, the consent of the government of the predecessor 
State may cease to be required for the separation of its constituent parts. In such a case that govern-
ment will itself be in the process of dissolution, and may have ceased to represent the former State.’ 
Crawford 2006, 418. When assessing state creation on this basis, nothing about this process suggests 




the basis of effective control could be challenged by parent states’ assertions of 
territorial integrity, a principle that solidified immensely in the postwar era.53 Inte-
grating these understandings of effective control and territorial integrity, the logical 
outcome is that, in order to succeed, a secessionist movement has to force the parent 
state to relinquish its sovereign claims. Thus, at a structural level, the reigning law 
of statehood incentivizes both secessionist movements and parent states to behave 
as ruthlessly as possible in their respective agendas for state creation and state 
preservation.       
 
On the other hand, following the end of the Cold War, triumphant liberal humani-
tarian critics of the effective control doctrine viewed lingering statehood questions 
as a profound opportunity to implement their preferred solutions. Given the violent 
nature of secessionist conflict, coupled with the contradictory effective control-ter-
ritorial integrity interplay, these proposals found a receptive audience. From this 
perspective, an international legal order no longer bound by the robust conceptions 
of ideological pluralism needed to manage Cold War tensions was now free to pur-
sue explicitly normative solutions.54 At an institutional level, a key understanding 
was that a newfound freedom from Cold War-era gridlock would allow interna-
tional organizations to settle issues of disputed state creation in conformity with the 
evolving values of the international community, as opposed to the narrow interests 
of the great powers.55  
 
                                                        
existence under international law, see Ibid 37-95. This logics speaks to a larger international legal 
issue where, as an ontological matter, it is arguable that state existence is ultimately a matter of ‘fact’ 
as opposed to ‘right’, see Vidmar 2015.  
53 On the entrenchment of the territorial integrity norm through the rejection of acquisition of valid 
title by conquest after 1945, see Korman 1996, 249-308; see also Zacher 2001. 
54 For a depiction of the changing international law of recognition representative of this ethos, see 
Grant 1999. 




At a theoretical level, a discourse emerged whereby ‘earned sovereignty’ would be 
the new normative grounding for determining which claims of statehood were le-
gitimate. According to this idea, factions engaged in independence struggles could 
be incentivized though a potential grant of recognition as a reward for acting in 
conformity with liberal principles of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights.’56 It was only 
through the dismissal of international law’s longstanding commitment to ideologi-
cal pluralism that such a discourse gained traction.57 A test site for this new ap-
proach to statehood occurred with the non-consensual dissolution of the former Yu-
goslavia. Here the Badinter Arbitration Commission called for creation of new sov-
ereign states on the basis of Yugoslavia’s federal divisions and this provided an 
example as to how self-determination might be managed in the new international 
order.58                
 
1.3.2.  Governments 
 
On the question of governments and their legitimacy, perhaps the most significant 
challenge to the effective control doctrine was the proposed ‘emerging right to dem-
ocratic governance’ whereby life under a liberal democratic system was consolidat-
ing into a fundamental human right. From this premise, international law should no 
longer be rigidly bound to respect ideological pluralism and actively promote lib-
                                                        
56 See Scharf 2003; Williams and Pecci 2004. 
57 An early attempt at enforcing these types of commitments could be found in admission to regional 
organizations as exemplified by the European Commission’s 1992 declaration that membership 
amongst the new states created from the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was condi-
tional upon fulfilling specified liberal requirements relating to law and governance, see Guidelines 
on the Recognition of New States 1991. 
58 Badinter Arbitration Commission’s actions regarding the partition of Yugoslavia, for a highly 
influential account, see Pellet 1992; For an in-depth analysis, see Craven 1996. For a study of how 





eral  democracy, defined as minimally consisting of periodic, competitive multi-
party elections preferably subject to international monitoring.59 According to this 
line of reasoning, which dates back to the early twentieth century60 and was made 
prominent by influential international lawyers (especially those associated with the 
‘Manhattan School),’61 popular will can be made ascertainable in a way that avoids 
the effective control doctrine’s legitimation of violence. Such an idea comported 
with the larger post-Cold War emphasis on the ‘liberal democratic peace hypothesis’ 
where it was asserted that liberal democracies do not wage war against one another. 
By this logic, transforming ‘illiberal’ regimes into liberal democracies possessed 
the power to eliminate the threat of ‘rouge states’ and thus construct a peaceful law-
governed world order.62  
 
                                                        
59 Franck 1992; Fox 1992. 
60 On the democratic legitimation of governments through periodic elections as the ideal telos of 
Hersch Lauterpacht’s views on recognition under international law, see Lauterpacht 1945, 862-863. 
An even earlier line of advocacy for the democratic legitimation of international law can be traced 
to the American international lawyer Jackson Harvey Ralston, according to whom: 
In the present condition of the world's progress in the science of government, we have 
accepted the democratic principle as, for the present at least, the last word in govern-
ment. We point out how it benefits the common man. Up till now, however, the prin-
ciples of democracy have not been applied to the international field. Nations are au-
tocratic, brooking no superior. The result has vitiated largely the good we had a right 
to expect to come from the growth of the democratic principle. If we would progress, 
therefore, internationally, conditions must be reversed. Instead of allowing aristo-
cratic and autocratic law to vitiate democracy, democracy must be given its clear 
chance to purify the domain of what erroneously today is called International Law. 
Democracy can only accomplish this purification by sternly thrusting aside the sug-
gestions of the old International Law and forming its own Law of Nations based upon 
those fundamental principles of right and wrong which democracy recognizes as ex-
isting and as appropriate between man and man. 
Ralston 1922, 164-165  
61 See Kennedy 2003, 433-435. 




These proposals for ‘democratic legitimacy’ were frequently accompanied by ar-
guments for expanding the exceptions to the UN Charter’s principles regarding 
nonintervention and the ban on the use of force. This has included promoting mul-
tilateral, and for some unilateral, military actions against regimes for purely domes-
tic activities, including large-scale human rights abuses or the seizure of power 
through coup d’états.63  Even Roth, despite his concerted defence of sovereign 
equality/nonintervention and scepticism towards ‘democratic legitimacy,’64 none-
theless asserted the existence of a category of ‘governmental illegitimacy’ in cir-
cumstances where the entity exercising effective control is clearly unsupported by 
the popular will of the political community it rules.65  
 
Moreover, while it does not make explicit reference to any particular form of gov-
ernment, another category of ‘governmental illegitimacy,’ purportedly capable of 
overcoming the nonintervention presumption, concerns the ‘emerging norm’ of the 
Responsibility to Protect (‘R2P’).66 In Anne Orford’s assessment of this ‘emerging 
norm’, ‘the legitimacy of authority is determinable by reference to the fact of pro-
tection.’67 Such a factual reduction separates questions of territorial authority from 
                                                        
63 See e.g. Reisman 1995. 
64 Roth 1999, 361-362. 
65 Here Roth points to the 1992 Security Council intervention to Haiti to uphold the government of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. According to Roth, given that the coup took place in the clear 
disregard of an electoral result, it was not plausible to claim that the holders of de facto control who 
executed the coup were supported by Haiti’s popular will, even on the generous interpretation, Ibid. 
383-387. 
66 According to the dictates of its three part structure, as detailed by International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, R2P: 1) places a duty on states to prevent humanitarian crises, 
2) calls for international capacity building efforts, and 3) licenses external intervention by the inter-
national community if a host state is unable or unwilling to rectify localized crises, Evans and 
Sohnoun 2001. 




the normative questions of self-determination and popular sovereignty.68 With this 
standard, we can observe a reversal of the normative underpinnings of effective 
control, at least in its pre-end of Cold War version. For under the effective control 
doctrine the more a situation of domestic authority deteriorates the stronger the pre-
sumption of nonintervention becomes. After all, by the effective control doctrine’s 
logic, such factual circumstances reveal a shifting of localized authority that can 
only be legitimately settled by the will of the bounded political community itself.69 
By contrast, through the lens of R2P, the greater a domestic situation deteriorates 
the more likely the fact of protection is unfulfilled by local actors. The longer this 
remains unrectified, the greater the legitimacy of external intervention by forces 
claiming to be humanitarian agents.70  
 
However, the development marked by R2P should be viewed as a departure from 
the 1990s debates on ‘humanitarian intervention’ (that often accompanied ‘use 
force to restore democracy’ arguments) which were marked by their invocation of 
an ‘exceptionalism’ determined by ethics that nonetheless preserved the existing 
international legal order.71 In contrast to attempt at purely ethical framing, R2P 
foregrounds issues of lawful authority in a distinctly political way through it posing 
of comprehensive questions relating to prevention, rebuilding, and the justification 
                                                        
68 For Orford’s further development of this basic premise into an extensive narrative, see Orford 
2011. 
69 Mullerson 1991, 133. 
70 The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya illustrated the intimate relationship be-tween R2P’s com-
mitments and governmental (il)legitimacy as a contested interna-tional legal issue. Here, the nar-
row mandate of providing protection via Security Council Resolution 1973 quickly raised broader 
questions of whether Libyan Pres-ident Mumar Qadaffi’s government should be allowed to con-
tinue exercising power. On the relationship between this action and traditional rules of internation-
al legal standing, see Talmon 2011. On the R2P’s usage as tool for furthering the geopolitical/geo-
economic interests of the interveners in this context see, Acharya 2013, 961-968. 




of international presence in ‘zones of protection.’72 In this way, many of the politi-
cal questions regarding the legitimate authority that the effective control doctrine 
locates within territorially-bounded political communities are displaced into a neb-
ulous realm of ‘international authority’ that echoes the transcendent forms of do-
minion that pre-existed modern state sovereignty.73   
    
1.5.  The Continued Relevance of Effective Control 
 
1.5.1.  The Statehood Riddle 
Despite these challenges to the effective control doctrine on moral and humanitar-
ian grounds, the myriad of proposed solutions are fundamentally ad hoc in nature. 
In other words, no comprehensive alternative to effective control has yet emerged.74 
In the realm of state formation, we need only consider how the approach of the 
Badinter Commission to the former Yugoslavia has limited replication potential 
and is jurisprudentially problematic in nature. This is especially true regarding its 
usage of decolonisation-era principle of uti possidetis to declare that the old federal 
borders of Yugoslavia’s constituent republics should continue as the new interna-
tional borders of resulting sovereign states.75 As Roth has observed, by applying uti 
possidetis in this way, the Commission drew a distinction between federal and uni-
tary states that is without international legal significance, explicitly rejected by the 
Montevideo Convention, and conflates a domestic constitutional structure with the 
underlying will of the people of a sovereign state who are empowered to change 
this structure by any means.76 Such an outcome exposes how post-Cold War trium-
phalism’s lofty rhetoric on settling disputed issues of state creation faced major 
                                                        
72 Ibid. 267. 
73 See Orford 2009. 
74 Roth 2010, 440. 
75 Ibid. 411; See Radan 1999. 




limits when delivering the novel, comprehensive solutions it promised. According 
to Scott Newton’s assessment of this situation: ‘[a]t one stroke, international law 
found itself hamstrung in responding flexibly and creatively to vexing post-socialist 
self-determination claims and conflicts and accorded posthumous honour to social-
ist federalism, which had been derided in life.’77  
 
A related situation of contested state creation in this context is Kosovo, a special 
status Serbian region placed under UN trusteeship in 1999 following a sectarian 
conflict that ended with a NATO intervention in Serbia. In 2008 Kosovo announced 
a unilateral declaration of independence in opposition to its parent state despite no 
plausible claim of having established effective control.78 This being the case, Ko-
sovo garnered much speculation as whether it would act as a precedent for ‘reme-
dial secession’ whereby a subnational group’s experience of violence and repres-
sion justifies its independence.79 Faced with this situation, the International Court 
of Justice ultimately rendered a (non-)decision ruling that both the legality of Ko-
sovo’s declaration of independence and Kosovo’s status as a sovereign state ex-
ceeded the Court’s jurisdiction.80 Thus, the ICJ finds itself within the ranks of those 
whose anxious treatment of the ‘remedial secession’ question suggested by the 
Friendly Relations Declaration avoids taking a position on either the presence or 
absence of this alleged right.81  
 
Additional issues falling within this ambit of contestation include situations in so-
called ‘failed’ and/or ‘fragile’ states deemed to be without functional authority. Here 
                                                        
77 Newton 2011, 111. 
78 ‘Since the Security Council has disabled Serbia’s forcible response, thereby relieving the Kosovo 
authorities of that risk, one cannot argue that Kosovo has established statehood in accordance with 
the effective control doctrine.’ Roth 2010, 419. 
79 On speculative analyses regarding the potential impact of Kosovo, see e.g. Muharremi 2008; 
Kemoklidze 2009; Hilpold 2009. 
80 ICJ Kosovo 2010, p. 84. 




the fear is that recognizing the independence of sub-regions within these states that 
attained effective control may dissolve the entire structure of their parent state and 
create a precedent for fragmentation with potential dire consequences.82 By show-
casing the international law’s interest in upholding state existing regardless of in-
ternal conditions, this dynamic once again reveals the deep tension between claims 
of effective control and the maintenance of territorial integrity. However, despite 
this difficulty, nothing has fundamentally supplanted the assertion of a coherent and 
internally formulated political order for groups seeking international legal stand-
ing.83 On this point, while de facto territorial authority may not be sufficient to 
achieve independence, there remains a strong argument that it is necessary. Thus, 
effective control remains a relevant, yet elusive, consideration regarding the ques-
tion of statehood.        
 
1.5.2.  Governmental Woes 
 
While questions of effective control’s relation to contested statehood remain pro-
foundly confused in practice, questions of governmental legitimacy can viewed as 
more certain, if not less troubling. As a starting point, the ‘emerging right to demo-
cratic governance,’ at least as it was intended a criterion for determining interna-
tional legal standing, has failed to bring about the transformation many had hoped.84 
A wide-range of explanations have been offered on this point. According to Jean 
d’Aspremont, this ‘emerging right’ was short-sighted in that it failed to distinguish 
                                                        
82 Somaliland represents the quintessential example of this phenomenon. Roth 2010, 421. For stud-
ies on the question of Somaliland’s independence, see e.g. Carrol and Rajagopal 1992; Adam 1994; 
Pijovic 2014. 
83 Fabry 2010, 12-14. 
84 However, it can be said that the ‘emerging right to democratic governance’ nevertheless has en-
joyed a successful afterlife as a discourse of international legalistic morality apparent in the domains 





between democratic ‘legitimacy in origin’ and ‘legitimacy in exercise’ thus empow-
ering illiberal democracies who undermined its core values.85 According to Susan 
Marks, by only providing a ‘low-intensity’ and ‘pan-national’ version of democracy 
this ‘emerging right’ could not provide meaningful change for the people it was 
ostensibly intended to empower.86 According to Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 
defining ‘democracy’ in this context, especially as it applied to the ‘liberal demo-
cratic peace hypothesis,’ required the actual structures of power in the world to be 
fundamentally misrepresented and thus could not succeed on its own terms.87 While 
there is much to be said for all of these explanations, one doctrinal point remains 
largely uncontroversial: the ‘emerging right to democratic government’ failed to 
displace, or even substantially qualify, the effective control doctrine.88 
 
In observing contemporary (and politically consequential) situations where effec-
tive control remains the determining rationale the examples are numerous. One ex-
ample would be the ongoing civil war in Syria where, despite widespread condem-
nation of the violence committed by the Assad Regime, any attempt to recognise an 
insurgent group as the rightful authority is open to substantial international legal 
challenge because Assad maintained a degree of effective control unmatched by 
any opposing faction.89 Moving over to Egypt, another example is the 2013 coup 
                                                        
85 d’Aspremont 2006. 
86 On respective analyses of ‘low-intensity’ and ‘pan-national’ democracy, see Marks 2000, Chap-
ters 3 & 4. 
87 Barkawi and Laffey 1999. 
88 However, this general failure of the ‘democratic legitimacy’ project should not be seen as a com-
plete reversion to the effective control standard at its most traditional. Here it can be argued that a 
new class of cases is emerging where multiple factors that have gained attention within the ’inter-
national community’ including repression of democratic process, systematic human rights abuses 
and support for ‘terrorism’ reduce a sitting government’s generally broad, and often fictitious, claim 
to maintaining effective control when its de facto territorial authority is under actual contestation. 
On the Taliban and Qaddafi in this context, see Vidamar 2013b, 362-366. 
89 On failure of any opposition group to achieve international legal recognition in the Syrian Civil 





against Muhammad Morsi, a leader democratically elected in the aftermath of the 
popular uprising against Hosni Mubarak. Similar issues were raised by the 2014 
ouster of the Ukraine’s President Victor Yanukovych in violation of the national 
constitution. As discussed above, given the absence of effective control by Yanu-
kovych, his post-ouster invitation for Russian intervention likely lacked any inter-
national legal validity.90 Turning to Sub-Saharan Africa, an expanding regional or-
ganisation-based system of intervention by invitation has sought to promote democ-
racy, protect human rights, and oppose coup regimes.91 However, in actual practice, 
effective control remains the overarching standard for such interventions despite 
these aspirations.92 This tension between principle and practice as it relates to re-
gional governance and domestic popular will in Africa was recently illustrated by 
the 2017 overthrow of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe.93 While there have been epi-
sodes, such as the Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire, where regional organizations have 
removed rulers exercising effective control in violation of local constitutions, it can 
be argued that these were exceptional cases in that said rulers lacked widespread 
support.94 As such, they can be deemed the exceptions proving the rule that in a 
pluralist international legal order, effective control doctrine remains the best avail-
able mechanism for determining popular will in the vast majority of cases.95  
 
This continued relevance of the effective control doctrine is further demonstrated 
by the reality of recent political events in the nations that would have seemingly 
been the most dedicated to disseminating the ‘emerging right to democratic gov-
                                                        
90 On the illegality of Russian intervention on this basis, see Grant 2015, 54. 
91 On these innovations, and their lack of attention from the West, see Levitt 2006. 
92 De Wet 2015, 998. 
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ernance.’ While just part of a much larger turn to right-wing authoritarian through-
out the world broadly (and problematically) labelled ‘populism’, the UK’s 2015 
popular referenda to exit the European Union and the 2016 US Presidential election 
of Donald Trump represent a stark rejection of earlier cosmopolitan visions in the 
very heartlands of Western liberalism.96 In light of this turn, the more pressing task 
for the defenders of the norms/institutions of international law and human rights 
that became prominent in the 1990s is basic survival, not the grandiose universali-
zation of a political system.97 Ironically enough, many of those challenging liberal 
internationalist norms throughout the world are doing so by consciously depicting 
the democratic will of the people as that which is under assault from the corrosive 
forces of cosmopolitanism.98 This stands in stark contrast to the view held by many 
liberal international lawyers that they are the would-be guardians of democracy 
against local despots who flout popular yearnings from behind the shield of sover-
eignty.99  
                                                        
96 Amidst widespread concerns over election tampering (especially in the latter case), in retrospect, 
perhaps Tom Franck’s suggestion that, in a showing of good faith, established Western democracies 
open their own electoral procedures to international observers was not the worst idea anyone has 
ever had, Franck 1992, 90 (‘…the older democracies should be among the first to volunteer to be 
monitored in the hope that this will lead the way to near-universal voluntary compliance, thus grad-
ually transforming a sovereign option into a customary legal obligation.’) 
97 For an example of the rhetoric of ‘survival’ being invoked in this context, see Helfer forthcoming.  
98 According to one assessment: 
The greatest paradox of the current populist wave is that democracy is being 
subverted by leaders promising more, not less, democracy—but it is a democ-
racy of a different kind. Populists embrace the “form” of democracy and claim 
to speak for the people themselves. At the same time, however, by undermin-
ing its liberal constitutional foundations, they erode the substance of democ-
racy, and gradually transform it into various forms of illiberal and authoritarian 
regimes. 
Bugarič 2018, 79 
99 While the current ‘populist’ moment has led to a concerted defence of existing norms and institu-
tions by many international lawyers, other have viewed it as an exposure of the existing order’s 
contradictions. This cannot be solved by international lawyers doubling-down on familiar attitudes 





Relatedly, a very real concern is the ways in which the turn to aggressive nationalist 
rhetoric may ultimately result in the degradation of international law’s general ban 
on the use of force. This is a particular concern in relation to the US, the world’s 
greatest military power, where open resentment of numerous international legal 
norms has included the return of devise individuals, namely John Bolton, with a 
long history of justifying unilateral policies.100 Responding to this trend (and in 
stark contrast to earlier interventionist arguments) a new liberal internationalist pro-
ject is now placing the ban on war within a law-based progress narrative.101 With 
this turn, scholars once open to the idea of external intervention as a guarantor of 
local popular will have implicitly embraced the effective control doctrine, and its 
furnishing of sovereign legitimacy to the holder of de facto authority during internal 
strife, out of a commitment to condemning interstate war as the greater evil.102 At 
this particular juncture, it may be realistically asked what exactly the various post-
Cold War liberal cosmopolitan legal innovations amounted to given the persistence 
of the ‘Charter liberalism’ animating the effective control doctrine; at least for now. 
  
1.6.  Conclusion  
 
                                                        
100 For a Bush Administration-era analysis of how the influence John Bolton represented a dramatic 
reconfiguration of the US’s relationship to its international legal obligations that is more relevant 
now than ever, see Mansell and Haslam 2005. 
101 The key representative of this trend is Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro’s The Internationalists 
that claims efforts by American activists to outlaw war through the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the 1920s 
lead to a series of cascading legal innovations (including the Stimson Doctrine, the Atlantic Charter, 
the UN Charter, and the Nuremberg Judgment), that built the current world order premised on the 
general ban on war as a matter of national policy. This system is situated as under assault in the 
contemporary global moment, and according to this narrative, must be defended, Hathaway and 
Shapiro 2017. For critiques of this work as failing to confront the way in which this progressive 
narrative on the outlawing of war legitimizes uncritical attitudes towards deeply problematic prac-
tices and institutions beyond interstate war, including: economic sanctions, free trade, and the global 
dominance of the US, see Peevers 2018; Barkawi 2018; Wertheim 2018; Mulder 2019. 
102 For instance The Internationalists co-author Oona Hathaway was previously much more open to 





Through the high-altitude overview presented above, we observed how the effec-
tive control doctrine provides an ordering principle for a world where popular will 
forms the basis for domestic authority within an anarchic system of formally equal 
sovereigns. In light of both present disappointment and future uncertainty, the re-
mainder of this thesis excavates the past as a means of explaining how we reached 
this present junction. Considering this thesis’s methodology, if we are to take ‘ju-
ridical thinking’ as the force ascribed to law’s production of transcendent abstrac-
tions, then the effective control doctrine acts as a lynchpin allowing its component 
juridical ideals of sovereign equality, non-intervention, and, most importantly, pop-
ular will to coexist within a coherent structure. However, this production of abstrac-
tion remains rooted in material conditions. Thus, the effective control doctrine, 
through its emphasis on ‘facts on the ground’, exists as an umbilicus between the 
abstract and the material.  
 
It is certainly possible to analyse how the material nexus between international law, 
models of domestic government, and global political economy shaped the effective 
control doctrine’s consolidation, critique, and reconsolidation during the postwar 
era. 103 However, my purpose is to delve deeper. Towards this end, the next chapter 
will trace the emergence of the modern effective control doctrine’s core-constitut-
ing features of sovereign equality, non-intervention, and ideological pluralism 
within the cannons of the classical law of nations. This sets the stage for this thesis’s 
historical analysis of why this argumentative formulation held so much appeal 
across numerous contexts in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. 
The culmination of this variegated process is the present configuration of doctrinal 
and normative justifications detailed in this chapter as the ‘effective control doc-
trine.’ Performing such a task allows us to observe how juridical thinking was not 
only a direct product of material conditions, but also how juridical thinking was 
also a direct producer of these conditions. 
 
 
                                                        
103 For an important study of the political economy of the shifting rhetoric of ‘democracy’-promo-
























Popular Will and the Classical Law of Nations: The Force of Emer 




2.1.  Introduction  
 
Chapter I provided an overview of how the contemporary nexus between popular 
will, domestic authority, and international law is anchored through the ‘effective 
control doctrine.’ In tracing the lineage of this doctrine, Chapter II accounts for the 
emergence of its constituent parts within the classical law of nations. The great fig-
ure of interest here is the Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) whose 1758 trea-
tise The Law of Nations: Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Con-
duct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns comprehensively introduced the modern 
framing of the modern standard. He did so through a pluralist critique of the premise 
that teleological global unity was a demand of the natural law. Here, by challenging 
prevailing naturalist theories that all states were under an ultimate duty to unify as 
one, Vattel stressed that states’ had no higher duty than their own individual self-
perfection. He thus presented a universal legal theory that, in contrast to his for-
bearers, enhanced the diversity of (and popular access to) legitimate claims for po-
litical autonomy. However, access to this argumentative mode was limited by Vat-
tel’s construction of ‘Others.’ Viewing these innovations in the aggregate, his trea-
tise was well suited to an international order where pluralism was intensified within 
Europe (and settler offshoots), yet reduced, when applied to Non-European peoples. 
 
Establishing the foundations of Vattel’s argument is crucial to this thesis’s subse-
quent account of the material conditions that lead to its reception, its modification, 
and, ultimately, its globalization. In Chapter III, I show how the proponents of the 




for legitimatizing an independence movement by a settler colony seeking to simul-
taneously affirm its similarities to and differences from the European colonial 
metropole. Chapter IV then shows how the transformation of Europe that lead to 
the French Revolution exposed a deep ambiguity in Vattel’s theory regarding the 
promotion of natural rights as a justification for war and intervention. In detailing 
the resolution of this ambiguity, Chapter V explains how this interventionist justi-
fication was curbed by the post-Napoleonic merger of Vattel’s universalist vision 
of the state and government with particularistic theories of organic community that 
rendered popular will as irreducibly local in character. Returning to the Western 
Hemisphere, Chapter VI reveals the parochial character of the Vattelian framework 
by explaining how the nation-state as popular will’s sole expressive vessel stunted 
the possibility of alternative social relations in Latin America that were better 
adapted to local conditions. This sets the stage for Chapter VII’s account how var-
ious aspects rooted in these historical episodes detailed in Chapters III-VI all 
merged in the mid-twentieth century to produce the world order depicted in Chapter 
I. 
 
Establishing the foundation for this broader account requires consciousness of just 
how powerful the rupture of Vattel’s formulation actually was. In Part 2.2. I provide 
a broad overview of Vattel’s conceptualization of the international states-system 
with the aim of pre-empting common mischaracterizations of his work. Part 2.3. 
then examines how earlier conceptions of the law of nations presented a very dif-
ferent view of the relationship between local political community and transcendent 
authority. In showcasing the weight of Vattel’s contribution, the purpose of this 
section is illustrative as opposed to comprehensive in its engagement with the 
broader cannon of thinkers who shaped the classical law of nations. Towards this 
end, the primary theorist I detail as a contrast to Vattel is Francisco de Vitoria.1 In 
turning to Vattel’s text, Part 2.4. provides an account of his domestic political the-
ory and its depiction of duty and authority within individual nations as separate, 
bounded entities within the larger global system. Part 2.5. then shows how Vattel’s 
                                                        
1 My justification for choosing Vitoria stems from the fact that he is largely considered ‘the first 




particular view of nation-based popular will informed his well-known pronounce-
ments regarding sovereign equality and non-intervention under the law of nations. 
By viewing this relationship between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ com-
prehensively, we can observe how the ‘effective control doctrine’ is the logical out-
come of Vattel’s theory. Finally Part 2.6. offers an explanation for the material con-
text that lead Vattel to formulate this particular theory. Such an exercise provides 
us with insight into the forces he respectively venerated, feared, and excluded in his 
understanding of the world. These formative presumptions carried profound conse-
quences for both those invoking Vattel’s theories and those who were on the re-
ceiving end of them. 
 
 
2.2.  Pre-empting Vattellian Misconceptions  
 
Vattel’s treatise presented the first mutually-reinforcing configuration of sovereign 
equality, nonintervention, and a people’s right to choose its preferred system of 
authority; the base components animating today’s ‘effective control doctrine.’ Thus, 
to locate the contemporary relationship between popular will and international law 
within the classical law of nations we must look to Vattel. However, before under-
taking the textual analysis in support of this proposition, it is important to highlight 
key features of Vattel’s place within the development of international legal and po-
litical thought. Such an exercise allows us to appreciate the force of Vattel’s trans-
formative impact.  
 
A first step in this analysis is acknowledging Vattel’s pivotal role in shaping our 
modern conceptual divide between international and domestic spheres of authority. 
Such a delineation is highly consequential to our contemporary understanding of 
what constitutes a binding legal source of obligation. For Vattel, the world was 
organized according to an ontology of self-contained sovereign states, each being 
bound by a ‘necessary law’ to develop in accordance with its own unique character.2 
                                                        




Outside this rarefied domain of ‘necessary law’, relations between these self-inter-
ested sovereign entities only amounted to a ‘voluntary law’ that could be further 
parsed into consensual interactions, convention-based agreements, and adherence 
to customary practices.3 Here Vattel weaved together previous natural law concepts 
resulting in a theory of decentralized, law-defined relations amongst self-interested, 
yet socialization-prone, sovereign entities.4 While not the first publicist to identify 
states as inherently self-interested, conceive of inter-sovereign relations as occur-
ring in some ‘society,’ or define voluntary agreement as the basis for international 
order, ‘…Vattel was the first author systematically to combine all three perspectives 
within the ambit of a single book.’5  
 
In light of this particular formulation of the law of nations, Vattel has been depicted 
as a forerunner to international legal positivism whereby the morally-neutral pro-
cess of ascertaining state consent replaced the articulation of transcendent morality 
as the grounding of lawful authority.6 This depiction appears consistent with the 
reality that unlike earlier naturalists, Vattel was more interested in providing prac-
tical advice to statesmen and diplomats than systematically developing a universal 
theory as a justification in and of itself.7 This notion is further supported by Vattel’s 
method of illustrating the principles of the law of nations through examples from 
modern European statecraft rather than primarily drawing on examples from my-
thology, antiquity, or religious scripture as was the case with earlier publicists.8 On 
this basis, it is easy to conflate his efforts with the documenting of state practice 
that international legal positivists use to proclaim what the law ‘actually is.’  
                                                        
3 Onuf 1994, 300. 
4 This general premise would be reflected centuries later in Hedley Bull’s proclamation of the inter-
national states-system as an ‘Anarchical Society,’ Bull 2012. 
5 Holland 2011, 445. 
6 See e.g. Chesterman 2002, 18-19.  
7 Onuf 1994, 296. 





However, if we take historical context seriously, it is exceedingly difficult to situate 
Vattel as a link between the classical law of nature and nations and international 
legal positivism. While he portrayed a sovereign equality-based anarchical order 
(that ultimately formed the baseline presumption for the modern fields of interna-
tional law and international relations), imperial relations of hierarchy rather than 
equality defined Vattel’s actual world.9 Thus, it is a serious distortion to claim that 
Vattel simply documented sovereign practice in a manner divorced from, or even 
moving away from, the normative demands of the natural law. Rather, Vattel’s de-
piction of sovereign equality in a world beset by juridical inequalities was very 
much within the natural law tradition and its belief that, like individuals, collective 
political entities enjoyed inherent rights independent of fact.10 As Part 2.6. shows, 
Vattel was very much aware of the inequalities and vulnerabilities that defined his 
historical backdrop. As a result, his fear for the survival of small states (namely his 
own), resulted in a defensive manoeuvre via the particular juridical narrative that 
asserted sovereign equality, non-intervention, and an ideologically plural concep-
tion of popular will as mutually-reinforcing first principles of a legitimate interna-
tional legal order. 
 
Connected to his position within the natural law-legal positivism divide, another 
important issue is how to situate Vattel within the evolution of Western political 
thought. When placing Vattel, we find that his proclamations were rooted in both 
medieval scholasticism and liberal social contract theory.11 On this accord, he em-
phasized the teleological process of entities perfecting themselves, while simulta-
neously assuming that individual and collective (i.e. state) persons are complete, 
                                                        
9 Pitts 2017, 285-289. 
10 Here, by claiming the inherent equality of all nations as autonomous sovereign communities, Vat-
tel posited counterfactual reading of the existing order rooted in an analogy to the natural law first 
principle that all individuals possessed an inherent right of self-defence, Stirk 2011, 648. 




equal units capable of providing valid consent in relation to one another.12 The co-
existence of these two theoretical modalities in Vattel thus complicates the common 
view that the hierarchical premise of scholastic teleology was progressively super-
seded by anti-teleological liberal equality.13 Accounting for the coexistence of these 
two presumptions within a common theoretical framing produces some puzzling 
discontinuities.  
 
On the one hand, Vattel’s view of states as persons invokes medieval organic anal-
ogies of collective human associations (i.e. ‘bodies politic’) that have been repeat-
edly ignored, disavowed, or neglected by modernist theorists.14 On the other hand, 
Vattel’s modernist liberal ethos vests ultimate sovereign ownership in a nation’s 
underlying political community and this could never be fully alienated to a ruler.15 
Consequently, this denial of absolute ownership beyond the nation’s popular will 
rejected the view of dynastic authority that legitimized the foundational medieval 
organic analogy of the ‘King’s Two Bodies’ whereby the territory of a realm was 
owned by a ruler as an extension of his physical person.16 Thus, while Vattel can 
be interpreted as either a medieval critic of modernity or a modern critic of medie-
valism, to view him as a conclusive proponent of one view over the other is to miss 
the point of his theory’s distinctly hybrid character.17 Rather this ambiguity was a 
                                                        
12 Thus, Vattel’s hybrid framing did not account for entities whose proclaimed lower position im-
paired their ability to provide valid sovereign consent thus rendering them ‘semi-sovereigns.’ How-
ever, this logic of compromised consent found its way into later international legal practice where 
relations, particularly between Europeans and Non-Europeans, began on the presumption of legal 
equality gave way to impositions of hierarchy, see e.g. Benton 2008; Keene 2007, 323-329.   
13 On teleology’s suppression by liberal equality within the modern structure of international legal 
argument, see Desuatels-Stein 2016b, 690-691. 
14 Whelan 1989, 77. 
15 Ibid. 71-75. 
16 Ibid. 70; see also Kantorowicz 2016.  
17 In this way, Vattel’s hybridity highlights how the intellectual transition from medieval to modern 
cannot be characterised by any straightforward narrative of linear progress. Rather, ‘[t]he more one 




source of durability within his theory in that it could pre-empt the shortcomings of 
medievalism through an invocation of modernity, and vice-versa, thus precluding 
any definitive resolution. 
 
In light of this chimera of medievalism and modernity, the coexistence of these 
seemingly incompatible premises proves indispensable when understanding Vat-
tel’s delineation of domestic versus international spheres of authority. On this basis, 
Vattel’s pluralist notion that individual states were bounded, self-perfecting politi-
cal communities through a medieval organic-analogy lead him to reject the premise 
that teleological consolidation at a higher level than the sovereign state was a nec-
essary demand of the natural law.18 This being the case, since integration at a level 
higher than the nation-state could disrupt a given community’s unique character, 
such an integration (even if minor) would have to be exclusively voluntary. While 
this view of the ‘international’ may have posited a domain of liberal equality in a 
manner that paradoxically preserved domestic political authority as a vestige of 
scholastic teleology,19 for Vattel, this did not render liberal modernist considera-
tions irrelevant to the characterization of domestic political expression.  
 
Rather, liberalism filled an important gap in Vattel’s theory given that his pluralism 
rendered it impossible to substantively judge the teleological perfection process of 
a foreign political community.20 Thus, Vattel’s best option was to presume that 
                                                        
political community, the more it resembles the ‘tangle’ of different and overlapping forms of polit-
ical community that so many commentators observe in the Middle Ages.’ Keene 2005, 106. For a 
wide-ranging account of the multi-layered shaping of the medieval/modern divide in the develop-
ment of European political thought, see Nederman 2013. 
18 See Part 2.4.1. 
19 On the presumption of perfected teleological statehood as an overlooked feature within numerous 
‘anti-teleological’ political theories, see Levy 2017.  
20 In this way Vattel’s premise of ideological premise of ideological pluralism made a major inter-
vention in the disputes over the nature of legitimacy in legal and political authority that existed in 
the early modern era. As Rose Parfitt has recently shown, formative attempts to define the relation-
ship between the individual and the collective sovereign state entity led to fundamental different 




‘facts on the ground’ are expressions of local popular will expressed through con-
sent to an existing authority and determined by an obedient population.21 This is 
precisely what the present ‘effective control doctrine’ presumes. Yet, this raises the 
question of what existed before Vattel and how did his particular approach represent 
both a novel rupture and a reconciliation of earlier views of popular will within the 
classical law of nations.22 
 
 
2.3.  Before Vattel 
 
2.3.1.  Francisco de Vitoria’s Pre-Popular Will 
 
In highlighting the novelty of Vattel’s popular will-international law formulation, I 
turn back two centuries to the sixteenth century Spanish theologian Francisco de 
Vitoria, arguably the first ‘international lawyer.’23 This characterization of Vitoria 
                                                        
tradition. While the former viewed the preservation of liberties as a legitimizing condition of state 
power, the latter viewed individual submission to the sovereign as a legitimizing condition for state 
power. On these differencing theories and their tensions, see Parfitt 2019, 91-104. The brilliance of 
Vattel’s theory is that it vitiated the need for these conflicting theories to confront each other at any 
level beyond the bounded state itself. Under this framing, the question of whether a bounded politi-
cal community should be theoretically justified on republican or natural law grounds could only be 
legitimately determined by the political community itself.  
21 This formed a major point of Vattel’s critique of his Swiss contemporary Jean-Jacque Rousseau 
who viewed popular sovereignty as compromised if authority were delegated in a manner that un-
dermined the general will. For Vattel, in contrast to Rousseau’s substantive formulation, since pop-
ular will could be expressed in a plurality of ways, delegation of governmental functions was per-
fectly acceptable in any form so long as it could command mass obedience. On Vattel’s engagement 
with Rousseau, see Christov 2013. 
22 For a more general account of the coevolution of political thought and the law of nations, see 
Covell 2009. 
23 For an early explication of Vitoria occupying this status, see Scott 1932. For a critical account of 
Scott’s invocation of Vitoria, see Orford 2012a. For more on the reception of Vitoria in modern 
international legal scholarship, see De La Rasilla Del Moral 2013. Moreover, it must be noted that 




is largely attributed to his view that the requirements of the natural law, universally 
applicable as the ‘law of nations’, were discoverable through the exercise of human 
reason alone, and, as such, not parochially confined to any particular faith. While 
frequently celebrated for this innovation, the many hagiographic readings of Vitoria 
have been subject to concerted critique by contemporary international legal theo-
rists. A key point of focus within these critical readings concerns Vitoria’s procla-
mation that different human communities were obliged to engage in peaceful trade 
relationships.24 By applying this obligation to the encounter between the Spaniards 
and the indigenous inhabitants of the ‘New World’ that the latter’s nonfulfillment 
of this ‘universal’ duty to trade gave the former grounds for waging a just war of 
conquest.25 However, in approaching Vitoria, while his contribution to modern in-
ternational law is a vocabulary for claiming rights of property; commerce and ac-
commodation that transcend boundaries,26 it must be remembered that Vitoria was 
writing before modern conceptions of territorial sovereignty was solidified.27 Thus, 
as will be discussed below, the contradictions present in Vitoria’s handling of the 
                                                        
methodological priorities of international lawyers and intellectual historians. For a careful examina-
tion on how it is that lawyers and historians generate radically different interpretations of Vitoria, 
see Desautels-Stein 2016a, 225-227.   
24 Vitoria 1991 [1539a], 279-280. 
25 Ibid. 283. For a highly influential critique of Vitoria on this point, see Anghie 1996. For a recent 
contextualisation of Vitoria’s justification of Spanish presence in the New World, see Pagden 2018. 
26 According to Martti Koskenniemi’s account of why these formative justifications centred on ‘pri-
vate’ rights as opposed to ‘public’ authority: 
Wherever authority was being exercised, it could now be assessed in light of 
universal rights of property, self-defence, travel, trade, taking of possession of 
ownerless things, and so on. This was an inevitable consequence of the fact 
that Vitoria and Soto dealt with dominium in the context of commutative and 
not distributive justice; that is, relationships among subjects themselves, ex-
cluding ideas about the intervention of public power.  
Koskenniemi 2011, 28 (emphasis in original). 
27 On this basis, while Vitoria is typically associated with colonialism in contemporary critical, given 
the modes of political authority that existed in his day, it is difficult to characterise his actions taking 




relationship between transcendent legal principles and localised authority are fa-
miliar in some measures, yet fundamentally alien in others. On this point, compar-
ing Vitoria’s account of sovereign authority to Vattel’s exposes just how much the 
latter’s treatise represented a monumental departure reading the conceptualization 
of popular will amongst the canonical publicists of the classical law of nations. 
 
2.3.2.  Commonwealth as Universal Authority  
         
While most remembered for his theological writings, his application of (pre-)inter-
national law to the Spanish-New World encounter, and his contributions to the just 
war tradition, Vitoria also produced an elaborate theory of public authority. Thus, 
in the interests of contextualizing the modern international law-domestic relation-
ship in light of its authoritative articulators, it is worth revisiting his 1528 lecture 
‘On Civil Power.’ While Vitoria’s insights here were certainly influenced by his 
view of the Catholic Church and its legitimization of princely authority, his broader 
account of civil power was not reducible to the Church as the all-encompassing 
source of authority. This is made clear by his pronouncement that non-believers 
‘…have legitimate rulers and masters…’ and ‘…neither Christian sovereigns nor 
the Church may deprive non-Christians of their kinship or power on the grounds of 
their unbelief, unless they have committed some other injustice.’28  
 
Having disavowed ecclesiastical parochialism, in his application of the natural law 
tradition (where truth is discoverable solely through reason), Vitoria located the 
basis for civil power in mankind’s innate reason and sociability that obliges it ‘…to 
give up the solitary nomadic life of animals and to live life in partnerships…’29 For 
Vitoria, this meant that idealized form of society must revolve around life in cities 
for, given humans’ social character, this is ‘…the most natural community, the one 
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which is most comfortable to nature.’30 It is from this premise that authority is le-
gitimate, for:  
 
…[i]f assemblies and associations of men are necessary for the safety 
of mankind, it is equally true that such partnerships cannot exist without 
some overseeing power or governing force. Hence, the purpose and util-
ity of public power are identical to those of human society itself. If all 
members of society were equal and subject to no higher power, each 
man would pull in his own direction as opinion or whim, dictated, and 
the commonwealth would necessarily be torn apart.31 
 
Against this backdrop, Vitoria asserts that the power to make positive law is vested 
in the commonwealth itself whose law-making function must exist a priori by vir-
tue of an all-encompassing system of natural law.32 Correspondingly, in the inter-
ests of the orderly functioning of the society, material power must held by a gov-
ernment.33 From this basic premise, Vitoria draws upon the natural law principle of 
self-defence to make the argument that this government must preserve itself 
‘…against violent attack from its enemies, either within or from without…’34 Here 
Vitoria provides a far-reaching extrapolation detailing the extent of this analogy 
where, even if the entire populace of the commonwealth were to rise up against 
rulers who were empowered by the natural right of self-defence,  ‘…their argument 
would be null and void as contrary to natural law, which the commonwealth itself 
cannot abolish.’35  
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32 Ibid. 12. 
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In practice, this amounts to a denial of any right of revolution. This complete lack 
of consideration for the circumstances of the populace, alongside an absolute right 
of the rulers to use force to defend their position, reveals the force of dynastic le-
gitimacy, and its location of sovereign authority in royal bloodlines as opposed to 
underlying political communities. Such a view is supported by Vitoria’s claim that 
monarchy was superior to all other forms of government. While it may be coercive, 
monarchy preserves peace unlike rule by the masses, which presented the dangers 
of chaos in addition to coercion.36    
 
This narrative is vastly complicated by another pronouncement Vitoria makes re-
garding the status of rulers in relation to their subjects. On the question of whether 
or not a populace may be collectively punished for the sins of its monarch (i.e. said 
monarch has waged war without just cause, etc), Vitoria answers in the affirmative 
and provides supporting justification that seemingly reverses his prior reasoning 
regarding the nature of public authority. Here Vitoria defends collective punish-
ment in instances of a ruler’s transgressions:  
 
….for once a sovereign has been duly constituted by the commonwealth, 
if he permits any injustice in the exercise of his office the blames lies 
with the commonwealth, since the commonwealth is held responsible 
for entrusting its power only to a man who will justly exercise any au-
thority or executive power he may be given; in other words, it delegates 
power at its own risk…anyone may lawfully be condemned for the 
wrong doings of his appointed agent.37  
 
This passage is extraordinary in that it recognizes the populace as the fundamental 
source of public power, yet, as previously discussed, this recognition is devoid of 
any corresponding right to revolution. In other words, the very populace that sup-
plies the basis for civil power is without any agency regarding its governing author-
ity. Herein lies the great contradiction of Vitoria’s theory of popular will. After all, 
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how is it possible for a political community that is utterly passive to engage in any 
affirmative act of entrustment, delegation, or appointment that would impute liabil-
ity for the misdeeds of the empowered authority to the people? Moreover, if Vitoria 
were to retreat into the particularism of divine sanction to justify this contradiction, 
he would sacrifice the ability of his natural law scheme to include the pagans whose 
authority he previously recognized. This would undo the ability of his framework 
to proclaim universal law through reason alone. 
 
2.3.3.  The Question of Tyranny  
 
Despite his overarching view, Vitoria does make a concession to the shortcomings 
of his natural law theory. On the issue of the laws of a ‘tyrant’ he states that: ‘it 
seems clear that the laws which serves the commonwealth’s purpose are binding, 
even when passed by a tyrant; not…because they are passed by the tyrant, but be-
cause they have the commonwealth’s consent, since utility and respect are better 
served by obedience to a tyrant’s law than by disobedience to all law.’38 From here, 
Vitoria goes on to describe the various civic functions that would cease to exist if 
this ‘tyrant’s law’ was not binding on society.39 For without legal efficiency, Vito-
ria’s presumptions about life organised around cities as the highest form of rational 
human existence cannot be sustained. In other words, civilizational regression 
would be the price to pay for sacrificing law’s hyper-rigidity.  
 
Yet who exactly who would fall under the category of ‘tyrant?’ Would this be the 
term for the leadership of the popular uprising against the monarch that Vitoria 
explicitly denied a right to revolution? While this passage certainly justifies actions 
done in opposition to an established scheme of legitimacy, we should not go too far 
in viewing this as some forerunner to the ‘effective control doctrine.’ For within the 
                                                        





logic of ‘effective control’, the touchstone is the reality that an existing constitu-
tional order can be completely replaced by a new one through an internal exertion 
of popular will. However, under Vitoria’s scheme, there was the law of nations (ius 
gentium) which, in this time before the crystallisation of the modern sovereign state, 
the entire world was an imagined as a commonwealth of sorts.40 Here it is said 
‘…that those who break the law of nations…are committing mortal crimes…No 
kingdom may choose to ignore this law of nations, because it has the sanction of 
the whole world.’41  
 
If this is the case, it is difficult to imagine the ‘tyrant’ who emerged from a success-
ful popular revolt being able to assert any rights against external intervention in-
tended to restore the monarchical order. Such an interpretation is supported by Vi-
toria’s just war principles where he states that ‘[t]he commonwealth…has the au-
thority to not only to defend itself, but also to avenge and punish the injuries done 
to its members…’42 With ‘the commonwealth’ being the entire world bound to-
gether under the law of nations,43 there is no shortage of ways in which just war 
might be invoked to provide a basis for intervening to restore a popularly deposed 
monarch. Since revolution is outlawed, then any successful overthrow of a monarch 
would likely qualify as an injury to be avenged in the name of the commonwealth. 
Correspondingly, since the entire world fell under this ‘commonwealth’ designa-
tion, then to uphold the universal legal order a just intervention, presumptively, 
could be mounted from anywhere.44  
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Despite everything, this scheme should not be seen as some simplified account of 
dynastic legitimacy given that considerations of ‘the people’ remained an ever-pre-
sent qualification of monarchical action for Vitoria. One notable qualification that 
links back to the question of the populace’s role is the pronouncement that personal 
glory and/or convenience did not provide cause for just war since such an under-
taken can only be done for the good of the commonwealth.45 Yet, if the localised 
populaces are responsible for constituting monarchical authority, how is external 
intervention in the name of universal duty a furtherance of the local will? This  
raises the issue of where exactly is the line to be drawn between internal and exter-
nal in determining what exactly are the boundaries of the  ‘commonwealth’ or ‘com-
monwealths.’                 
    
Taken as whole, Vitoria presents a number of conundrums regarding territorial au-
thority as it relates to a universal system of natural law. First and foremost, ‘the 
people’ formed the basis for localized exertions of civic power, yet, were without 
agency when it came to changing the system through which this power was exer-
cised. Furthermore, while there is a recognition of the efficiency of ‘facts on the 
ground’ being their own source of validity, there is also a mechanism for preventing 
the crystallization of purely fact-based power via just war-based intervention. This 
matter of interventions links back to the issue of who are the ‘people’ and this in 
turn raises the questions of scale when locating the authority to enforce universal 
standards. The presence of such ambiguities, and the divergent interpretive paths 
they open, only furthers Vitoria’s status as a figure that some celebrated and others 
by some condemn when accounting for his influence in the contemporary era.       
 
2.3.4.  Hobbes as Vitorian Continuity  
 
Vitoria was a theologian seeking to expand the universal membership of Christen-
dom in the context of the Spanish-New World colonial encounter. It is thus unsur-
prising that he presented a theory of a boundary-transcending commonwealth that 
                                                        




gave Spaniards a ‘universal’ basis for justifying parochial interests. However, what 
is surprising is that a similar mode of theoretical justification exists within the work 
of a figure synonymous with a rigid and absolute understanding of state sovereignty: 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). As is well, known Hobbes’s infamous theory pre-
sented in his landmark 1651 text Leviathan is that the original ‘state of nature’ is a 
‘war of all against all’ where life is ‘nasty, brutish, and short.’46 Against this foun-
dational backdrop, the only escape from the ‘state of nature’, and consequently the 
only means of enabling of civil interaction beyond base survival, is the empower-
ment of an absolute sovereignty authority for whom no act, no matter how harsh, is 
illegal.47  
 
In other words, the tolerance for supreme accountable power is the price to be paid 
for the order that enables higher human endeavours. While such unreviewable au-
thority has long-been conceived as the opposite of a rule of law-based system that 
safeguards popular will, following Kinch Hoekstra’s observations, Hobbes’s very 
premise of indivisible sovereignty deeply informs the modern tradition of liberal 
constitutionalism.48 However, while Hobbes is a foundational figure in our under-
standing of popular will, his theory is generally associated with the realm of do-
mestic politics. This creates challenges for an analytical agenda such as mine that 
positions the division between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ as a historically con-
tingent formulation susceptible to being mischaracterized as a timeless truth.     
 
Reifying a rigid ‘domestic’ versus ‘international’ binary, the traditional approach 
to Hobbes in international theory has been to invoke the ‘domestic analogy’ where 
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stract from such contingent features a universal political philosophy that proceeded from logical 




the anarchical status of individuals existing in the ‘state of nature’ is mirrored by 
sovereign states existing under similar conditions of anarchy.49 Importantly, such 
‘domestic analogy’ inquiries have rested on the assumption that creating a unified 
order under the authority of a sovereign, while possible on the domestic level, is 
impossible at the international level.50 However, according to recent scholarship, 
imputing this framework of international anarchy is anachronistic and, correspond-
ingly, there is nothing within Hobbes’s theory that prevented sovereign power from 
gradually expanding to the point that it creates a global commonwealth.51 On this 
reading, the logical conclusion of Hobbes’s theory is remarkably similar to Vito-
ria’s regarding the universal commonwealth as a mechanism for ordering public 
authority in the context of flexible boundaries between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘in-
ternational.’ Thus, on the issue of popular will, arguably, the great difference be-
tween Vitoria and Hobbes on this point was not so much the substance of their 
theories, but the historically delineated purposes they arose in response to. Vitoria 
was concerned with imperial expansion and Hobbes was concerned with preventing 
civil war.52  
                                                        
49 See Boucher 1998, 145-162; As a historical matter, much of this can be attributed to invocations 
of Hobbes in the nineteenth-century where theories of absolute dominion in the domestic sphere 
were placed against the backdrop of a geopolitical order premised on the irreducibility of sovereign 
will, see Francis 1980.  
50 Amongst critical accounts of international law, by far the most iconic Hobbesian engagement 
occurs through Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia where the Hobbesian ontology of 
the ‘state of nature’ where no one has a right to anything. This premise informs the anarchic order 
of sovereign states (Apology) that international legal argument must accept as a base premise, but 
cannot fully surrender to, thus motivating an impetus to conceive of a more harmonious global com-
munity (Utopia), see Koskenniemi 2006, 80-86. 
51 On the invocation of Hobbes within the tradition of Realism, see Covell 2006. For recent alterna-
tive theorizations of Hobbes and his purpose, see Christov 2015; Grewall 2016. For a particularly 
interesting reading of Hobbes, based on Hobbes’s own methodology, that views his agenda as a 
radically democratic one, see Martel 2007.  
52 On civil war prevention as Hobbes animating purpose, see Armitage 2017, 106-109. For many 
subsequent theorists of Hobbesian civil war, namely Carl Schmitt, the boundary between ‘the do-
mestic’ and ‘the international’ was far more stark than in Hobbes time. On the instability of this civil 
vs. international war categorization, see Bartelsen 2017. Additionally, it has been argued that, while 
it was not his key area of focus, Hobbes was deeply influenced by the emerging context of extra-





On an intimately related note, for Hobbes (like Vitoria before him), local popular 
will was not an inherent barrier against incorporating multiple communities under 
an expanding domain of sovereignty. According to Hobbes’s theory, the ultimate 
premium was on a sovereign’s ability to protect its subjects. Therefore a sovereign 
ousted by an invading force that was objectively better able to provide this fact of 
protection furnished no grounds for the displaced sovereign to lodge a legitimate 
grievance.53 It is for this reason that contemporary projects such as the ‘Responsi-
bility to Protect’ seeking to qualify the sovereignty of those failing to meet standard 
of humanitarian protection can be easily understood in Hobbesian terms.54 Yet, this 
leaves open the question of why reducing sovereignty to protection is controversial 
at all as an international legal matter. In other words, what changed the Hobbesian 
premise? When an answering this question, it is difficult to overstate the importance 
of Vattel’s post-Hobbes location of local popular will within the international order. 
Through the Vattelian theory, flexible boundaries of authority became rigid and 
sovereignty became more than the fact of protection. 
 
2.4.  Vattel’s Domestic  
 
2.4.1  Rejecting Global Teleology     
 
Accounting for the magnitude of Vattel’s contribution to modern international law 
requires a close examination of his re-imagination of the ‘local’ versus the ‘global.’ 
As an entry point, Vattel presented a fundamental critique of Hobbes regarding the 
differential application of the law of nature. Specifically, he takes issue with 
Hobbes’s claim that the same order of natural law applies to both sovereigns and 
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individuals, albeit in a different capacity in light of the former’s extraordinary task 
of providing protection.55 For Vattel, the nature of sovereigns and individuals dif-
fered to such a degree that entirely different bodies of law applied to these respec-
tive classes of actors.56  
 
While this premise opens up space for juridically distinguishing domestic orders 
from the international order, Vattel’s great deployment in this capacity came not 
through Hobbes, but Christian Wolf. In this capacity, Vattel's The Law of Nations 
was largely an adaptation of Wolf’s monumental treatise, Jus Gentium Methodo 
Scientifica Pertractatum.57 When appreciating the divergences made by this refor-
mulation, we must remembered that Vattel was practically minded diplomat, not a 
systematic philosopher/theologian like Wolf.58 It is for this reason Vattel lamented 
the loss of practical utility generated by the deep complexity of Wolf’s exposition 
and sought to streamline his principles into a practical guide for statesmen.59  
 
Since almost all of Wolf’s substantive provisions were accepted by Vattel,60 the 
true significance of the latter’s contribution came not from rewriting the rules, but 
re-framing the meta-context the rules operated within. This re-framing took the 
form of an outright rejection of the principle of civitas maxima, ‘…the idea of a 
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great republic…instituted by nature herself, and of which all nations of the world 
are members.’61 This formed Wolf’s basis for deducing ‘…the voluntary law of 
nations…as….the civil law of that great republic.’62 Through this organizational 
framework, Wolf preserved the ontological primacy of the necessary law while ac-
knowledging the origins of law ‘…in the will of nations and states.’63 From this 
premise, the resulting regime of voluntary law was ultimately a product of the nec-
essary law. As such, the process of voluntary association between peoples was 
rooted in a necessary imperative.64 Thus, through positing civitas maxima as a 
worldwide republic to come, Wolf presented a teleological theory of eventual 
global unity as the ultimate end of the natural law.     
 
In rejecting civitas maxima, Vattel states that ‘[t]his idea does not satisfy me; nor 
do I think the fiction of such a republic either admissible in itself, or capable of 
affording sufficiently solid grounds on which to build the rules of the universal law 
of nations, which shall necessarily claim the obedient acquiesce of sovereign 
states.’65 For Vattel, independent sovereign states are universally bound by nothing 
but the law of nature (i.e. the necessary law) and have no inherent duty to form any 
voluntary union with one another. In this way, states in the international order relate 
to one another as individuals do in the ‘state of nature.’ While escaping the ‘state 
of nature’ was an imperative for individuals that gave rise to an elaborate regime of 
natural law obligations, the same logic did not apply to states. Put simply, the reason 
for this divergence was that states are self-sufficient entities whereas individuals 
are not. In detailing this distinction, while nonetheless acknowledging the funda-
mentally intertwined relationship between individuals and states, Vattel proclaimed 
that: 




64 Covell, 2006, 127. 





[i]ndividuals…are capable of doing so little by themselves, that they 
can scarcely subsist without the aid and the laws of the civil society. 
But as soon as a considerable number of them have united under the 
same government, they become able to supply most of their wants; and 
the assistance of other political societies is not so necessary to them as 
that of the individual to individuals.66  
 
Moreover, this distinction between individuals and states contains important nor-
mative, as well as an empirical, dimensions. Here, according to Vattel, ‘…inde-
pendence is even necessary to each state, in order to enable her properly to dis-
charge the duties she owes to herself and to her citizens, and to govern herself in a 
manner best suited to her circumstances.’67 From this pluralist understanding, Vat-
tel proclaims his theory of the sovereign equality encapsulated in his famous quote 
that ‘A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign 
state than the most powerful kingdom.’68 Thus, by rejecting civitas maxima and 
emphasizing voluntary sovereign discretion as the basis of the global legal order, 
Vattel makes great advancements when resolving Vitoria’s contradictions sur-
rounding territorial authority, constituent power, and the ‘international’ as sphere 
of infinite enforcement. This resolution was the formation of what we today call the 
‘effective control doctrine’ that emerged as a by-product of Vattel’s reformulation 
of the local-international relationship. In order to account for this development, we 
must detail how exactly Vattel conceptualised the ‘sovereign state.’      
 
2.4.2.  Locating the Sovereign  
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Book I of the Law of Nations, entitled ‘Of Nations Considered in Themselves,’ is 
dedicated to setting the parameters of the state, the nation, and the means of deter-
mining governmental legitimacy. In Vattel’s definition: ‘[a] nation or a state is….a 
body politic, or a society of men united to promote their safety and advantage by 
means of their union.’69 This necessarily entails establishing a Public Authority that 
is Sovereignty ‘…and he or they who are invested with it are the Sovereign.’70 Re-
garding the source of this Sovereignty: 
 
by the very act of the civil or political association, each citizen subjects 
himself to the authority of the entire body. The authority of each mem-
ber, therefore essentially belongs to the body politic, or states; but the 
exercise of that authority may be placed in different hands, according 
as the society may have ordained.71  
 
This understanding provides the premise that ‘the body of the nation’ forms the 
basis of popular will and is vested with the authority to choose its particular form 
of government.72 Here Vattel refrains from any specific discussion of differing gov-
ernmental forms by stating that ‘this subject belongs to the public universal law.’73  
 
In setting the requirements of sovereignty, he states that a nation must be ‘without 
any dependence on foreign power’ and ‘must govern itself by its own authority and 
laws.’74 Keeping to his view that even small states existing alongside powerful ones 
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maintain their sovereign status, Vattel is highly generous in proclaiming that sub-
stantial burdens do not necessarily render a state ‘dependent on foreign power.’ 
Thus states presumptively maintain their sovereignty even when: partners in an un-
equal alliance,75 subject to protection treaties,76 in a tributary relationship with a 
foreign power,77 paying homage as part of a feudatory relationship with a foreign 
power,78 are two states under the same prince,79 or when they ‘unite themselves 
together by perpetual confederacy.’80 In defining those who lack sovereignty, Vat-
tel claims that even when a people controls its own internal legal order, it cannot be 
sovereign if conquest or alliance leaves it without the ability to engage in external 
relations.81 Vattel thus highlights the crucial distinction between internal and exter-
nal sovereignty. 
 
Regarding the purpose of a nation, Vattel explains in Chapter II of Book I that this 
consists of the ‘end’ of civil society which, through the duty of ‘perfection,’ it pro-
cures ‘…for the citizens whatever their necessities require…with the peaceful pos-
session of property, a method of obtaining justice with security; and, in short, a 
mutual defence against violence from without.’82 The precise means of attaining 
this perfection are particular to every individual nation83, and this may even include 
the nation dissolving itself (but only for ‘…just and weighty reasons.’)84 Moreover, 
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while Vattel conflates the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ in Chapter I of Book I, here he 
differentiates between the two entities, only to intertwine them again by proclaim-
ing that ‘the second general duty of a nation towards itself is to endeavour after its 
perfection and that of the state. It is this double perfection that renders a nation 
capable of attaining the end of civil society.’85  
 
On this basis, while the nation consists of the body of citizens united in common 
interest, the state forms the administrative structure tasked with implementing these 
interests in a manner that renders it indispensable for the nation. This necessitates 
the need for a public authority grounded in a constitutional order to take the form 
that is appropriate to its particular society.86 Regarding changes to the constitutional 
order itself, this cannot be undertaken by just any governmental authority empow-
ered by the existing system order and, while Vattel warns that these decisions 
should not be taken lightly,87 the power to render change ultimately rests with the 
nation itself.88 As to how these changes actually occur, ‘all these affairs being solely 
a national concern, no foreign power has a right to interfere in them…’89 
 
Yet, what happens if the nation seeks to change a constitutional order, but the gov-
ernmental authority has no interest in being deposed? Here Vattel makes clear that 
while sovereignty remains with the populace even when delegated to a ruling 
body,90 the actual power held by this ruling body should never be underestimated. 
The possibility of political contestations devolving into protracted inter-communal 
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violence is the implied consequence of this arrangement. On the one hand, if a sov-
ereign acts as ‘…an insupportable tyrant…’ then the nation is justified in withdraw-
ing its obedience to him. Here Vattel states that any delegation, even to an absolute 
ruler, necessarily includes ‘…a tacit reserve, that the sovereign should use….[its 
power] for the safety of the people, and not for their ruin.’91 In the interests of fur-
thering the nation and the state’s duty of ‘double perfection’ this right of resistance 
‘…flows from the end of political society, the safety of the nation, which is the 
supreme law.’92 However, one the other hand, this possibility of justified resistance 
coexists alongside a recognition of the vital role of the ruler in preserving social 
order for:  
 
The nature of sovereignty, and the welfare of the state, will not permit 
citizens to oppose a prince whenever his commands appear to them un-
just or prejudicial. This would be to fall again into the state of nature, 
and to render government impossible. A subject out to suffer with pa-
tience, from the prince, acts of injury that are doubtful and supporta-
ble.93  
 
Connected to this imperative of preserving stability, the ruler’s entitlement to the 
benefit of the doubt when controversially exerting authority is buttressed by the 
acknowledgment that, as a practical matter, resistance is likely to be an extremely 
violent affair. After all, princes nearly always have the backing of influential actors 
within a society and, on this basis, ‘…[i]t is therefore always difficult for a nation 
to resist a prince…without exposing the state to dangerous troubles.’94 Coupled 
with the virtue of maintaining order, this risk solidifies a general duty of obedience 
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to the sovereign by the populace.95 However, if the actions of the sovereign would 
severely violate the nations’ natural right of self-preservation, he ‘…divests himself 
of his character, and is no longer to be considered any other than that of an unjust 
and outrageous enemy, against whom his people are allowed to defend them-
selves.’96 Taken as a whole, the legitimacy of resistance hinges on whether a sov-
ereign’s actions are ‘supportable’ or ‘insupportable.’ The answer to this question 
can only be determined by the nation itself.    
 
2.5.  Vattel’s International 
 
2.5.1.  Proto-Effective Control 
 
When examining the international legal system Vattel detailed in Book II, it be-
comes apparent that his well-known proclamations on sovereign equality and non-
intervention are fundamentally rooted his theory of the popular will-based nation-
state discussed above. According to Vattel, like individuals, nations inherently pur-
sue mutually beneficial interactions which one each, yet, as discussed above, since 
nations are exceedingly more self-reliant than individuals, their duties to one an-
other are far less demanding.97 Thus, a nation’s primary concern must be its own 
preservation/perfection and, while any obligation a nation may have towards an-
other that compromises this fundamental duty cannot be valid.98 However, it is also 
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possible that a nation’s assistance to another can bolster its own security (and by 
extension its perfection).99 Furthermore, while a nation may assist others in their 
own perfection, this cannot be used as a justification for the use military force for 
this would violate the natural liberty of the people of the victim nation.100 On these 
grounds, Vattel condemns the Spanish missionary justifications for the conquest of 
the New World as well as the right to punish foreign transgressor of the law of 
nature (as advocated by Hugo Grotius) for it ‘…opens a door to all ravages of en-
thusiasm and fanaticism, and furnishes ambition with numberless pretexts…’101  
 
Furthermore, in Book III on War, Vattel consistently extends this principle to cover 
non-intervention in a nation’s civil war given that, from an outsider’s perspective, 
both belligerent parties are ‘…equally foreigners to them, and equally independent 
of their authority.’102 This non-interventionist position finds its corollary in the con-
cept of sovereign equality whereby ‘…none can naturally lay claim to any superior 
prerogative: for, whatever privileges any one of them derives from freedom and 
sovereignty, the others equally derive from the same source.’103  This presumption 
of equality renders a nation’s internal governmental order irrelevant to its conduct 
of international relations.104 Undergirding this is Vattel’s general pronouncement 
‘…that no state has the smallest right to interfere in the government of another.’105  
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While Vattel acknowledges the normative desirability of the world as a unified po-
litical entity, he expresses resignation for ‘…disorderly passions, private and mis-
taken interest, will never allow this reality.’106 Given this absence of utopian possi-
bility, preserving autonomous spaces for nation to express popular will, even when 
unpopular elsewhere within the global community, was essential for the law of na-
tions to maintain itself. Thus, when applying this theory of international law to the 
previously discussed question of internal political contestation we are left with all 
the elements of today’s effective control doctrine. To summarize Vattel’s frame-
work:  
 
- domestic autonomous perfection requires both a nation and its state 
acting in concert,  
- when there is widespread domestic consensus, a nation is empowered 
to change the fundamental legal order from which the state’s ruler de-
rives its power,  
- if there is no other agreement, the seated ruler will likely violently 
defend its position, and, 
- while this violence may offend sensibilities of justice held by outside 
observers,  licensing of external intervention could lead to instability 
that may undermine the very foundation of a system premised on di-
verse, yet formally, equal sovereign states each pursuing their own 
unique conception of the good life. 
 
Against this presumption, there was only one standard outsiders could apply with-
out imposing their own particular values on a political community distinct from 
their own, whether or not the claimant of sovereignty possessed objective de facto 
authority, i.e. effective control.  
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In appreciating the deviation Vattel’s framework in relation to earlier theories of 
the law of nations, a return to Vitoria is in order. Recalling Part 2.3.1. of this chapter, 
we observed a very different understanding of public authority where, while popu-
lar will was implied on some level,  only one form of government (monarchy) was 
acceptable. Relatedly, in the event it was deposed, a legitimate external intervention 
to bring about restoration could be staged from anywhere. The logical consequence 
of this arrangement was that the people were the source of authority presumptively 
served by the sovereign monarch, yet, where unable to change this mode of ordering, 
even when expressing the highest degree of discontent. Viewing Hobbes as a Vito-
rian continuity, we observed how an analogous, albeit more popular will-based, 
rationale for external intervention could have been justified given his pronounce-
ment of civil war was the supreme evil. Thus, a competent outsider could legiti-
mately replace a sovereign failing to provide adequate protection.107 All of that said, 
Vattel’s theory can be interpreted as emerging through a crack in Vitoria’s argu-
ment whereby a tyrant wielding effective power must nonetheless be obeyed (with 
the people presumably being made to sit patient until a restoration could be staged 
from without).  
 
Under Vattel’s scheme, the underlying power of the people was expanded to a place 
unanticipated by Vitoria; the idea that one people’s tyrant could be another people’s 
rightful sovereign. Only those directly impacted could legitimately make this judg-
ment. Dissatisfied outsiders had to accept the higher normativity represented by 
non-intervention. As such, Vattel rejected the organizing principle of Civitas Max-
ima prosed by his direct influence Christian Wolf which, analogous to Vitoria’s 
(and possibly Hobbes's) organizing frame, was a vision of a global commonwealth. 
The necessary by-product of this re-imagination was the understanding that ‘facts 
on the ground’ are an outsider’s best available evidence of local popular will, if we 
are to assume a meaningful separation between domestic and international spheres 
as Vattel delineated them. 
 
                                                        




2.5.2.  Popular Intervention? 
 
However, there was a tension in Vattel’s argument regarding the mutually-reinforc-
ing relationship between popular will, the bounded nation-state, and noninterven-
tion. This concerned whether or not an outsider could support a people rebelling 
against a tyrant in the name of popular will? On this point, Vattel gives the example 
of 1688 Glorious Revolution where he declares that the Dutch Prince William of 
Orange was justified in affirmatively responding to a request for support by Eng-
lishmen in their rebellion against King James II.108 According to Vattel, ‘when a 
people, from good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of 
justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties. Whenever, 
therefore, matters are carried so far as to produce a civil war, foreign powers may 
assist the party which appears to have justice on its side.’109 While this passage from 
Book II plainly appears to contradict Book III’s pronouncement on nonintervention 
in civil wars, it must be read in conjunction with the caveat that seemingly affirms 
Vattel’s overall theory on local popular will within the international order. Here 
Vattel claims that ‘…we ought not to abuse this maxim, and make a handle of it to 
authorize odious machinations against the internal tranquility of states. It is a vio-
lation of the law of nations to invite those subjects to revolt who actually pay obe-
dience to their sovereign, though they complain of his government.’110 
 
In considering Vattel’s example of the Glorious Revolution, a serious ambiguity 
presents itself. As a contextual matter, King James II was a Scottish monarch who 
assumed the thrones of both Scotland and England through dynastic inheritance in 
an era before the merger of the two kingdoms under a common parliamentary sov-
ereignty via the 1707 Act of Union. On this basis, could he have been declared a 
                                                        






foreign invader once his English subjects expressly withdrew their obedience?111 
Had the ruler been unquestionable local in origin, there would be serious doubts as 
to whether this justification for intervention would have been legitimate. This es-
pecially is true if we are to consider Vattel’s immediate caveat, his pronouncement 
on nonintervention in civil wars made elsewhere, and his general view that only a 
local population could truly determine its system of government in accordance with 
the national duty of self-perfection. As discussed in Chapter VI, the outbreak of the 
French Revolution would severely test this question of intervention in the name of 
popular will. 
 
2.6.  Vattel’s World 
 
2.6.1.  The Place of Small European States  
 
In contextualizing Vattel, three considerations are vital: increased geopolitical ac-
cumulation in continental Europe, new patterns of European exclusion of non-Eu-
ropeans, and the rise of Britain as a new type of power. On the first point, changes 
in European feudalism lead to an increasing intensive modes of absolutist consoli-
dation. This turn of events was rooted in a major class conflict pitting the decen-
tralized feudal nobility against increasingly centralizing modes of absolutist author-
ity supported by complex bureaucratic structures.112 This entailed endless wars for 
the direct geopolitical appropriation of feudal holdings to finance increasingly cen-
tralised states.113 Against this backdrop, heterogeneous formations of social organ-
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ization/political authority developed in medieval Europe where gradually being ex-
tinguished by the overwhelming military force of absolutism.114  This transfor-
mation added a new dimension to longstanding realities of survival-focused diplo-
macy in Europe’s small kingdoms in their relations with its powerful ones.115  
 
In the face of these challenges, the Swiss canton system that provided Vattel’s form-
ative context was one of the political formations seeking to preserve traditional in-
stitutions against the insatiable forces of absolutist geopolitical accumulation. 
Given their limited ability to compete militarily, small Swiss polities became highly 
skilled in the survival tactic of articulating arguments that opposed war and chan-
nelled competition into the realms of commerce and diplomacy.116 While the idea 
that such moralistic arguments could successfully divert war and conquest is at odds 
with contemporary Realist sensibilities regarding survival within the international 
system, it must be remembered that early modern European warfare was not reduc-
ible to brute force and cloaked in elaborate discourses of custom and legality, par-
ticularly as it related to interests and obligations in property.117 However, as Rich-
ard Whatmore has shown, simply aligning with the forces of commerce was not 
enough for a small state. On a long enough timescale, commercial openness ulti-
mately invited the devastating impact of commercial downturn.118 Thus, a stronger 
line of argument asserting the legitimacy of small sate independence was required. 
That said, we could observe the strategic value of Vattel’s arguments that a large 
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kingdom forcibly undermining the popular will of a small one was a gross violation 
of the law of nations.119 
 
2.6.2.  Two Concepts of Otherness 
    
However, while highlighting Vattel’s context may explain his views on the height-
ened tolerance of ideological pluralism amongst Europeans, there remains the issue 
of how Europe’s Others were excluded from these purported universal standards. 
Here, perhaps Vattel’s most infamous statement regarding non-European societies 
came from his proclamation that the cultivation of land was a primary obligation 
under the law of nature. Towards this end, Vattel characterizes two broad forms of 
human society that are in violation of this fundamental duty; plunderers and hunter-
gatherers. Accordingly: 
 
The cultivation of the soil deserves the attention of the government, not 
only on account of the invaluable advantages that flow from it, but from 
its being an obligation imposed by the nature of mankind. The whole 
earth is destined to feed its inhabitants; but this would be incapable of 
doing if it were uncultivated. Every nation is then obliged by the law of 
nature to cultivate the land that has fallen to its share….Those na-
tions….who inhabit fertile countries, but disdain to cultivate their lands, 
and choose rather to live by plunder, are wanting to themselves, are 
injurious to all their neighbours, and deserve to be extirpated as savage 
and pernicious beasts.’ 
 
There are, others, who, to avoid labour, chose to live only by hunting, 
and their flocks…Those who still pursue this idle mode of life, usurp 
more extensive territory than, with a reasonable share of labour, they 
would have occasion for, and have, therefore, no reason to complain, if 
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other nations, more industrious and too closely confined, come to take 
possession of a part of these lands.120 
 
Through this passage on cultivation, we can discern two varieties of Other within 
Vattel’s theory: the former were illegitimate because they were conquerors, the later 
could legitimately be conquered. 
 
While critical international lawyers often understand this proclamation as a quin-
tessential example of colonial justification under the classical law of nations,121 this 
position has been challenged by contextualist historians. For Ian Hunter, unlike 
nineteenth century international lawyers, Vattel was far more concerned with pre-
serving peace between Europeans than justifying colonialism.122 Here he points to 
the fact that, for Vattel, violation of the duty to cultivate also applied to certain 
Europeans, including Catholics monks.123 Yet, the problem with Hunter’s charac-
terization is the implicit assumption that there was minimal co-evolution between 
the project of promoting peace between Europeans and project of proclaiming su-
periority over non-Europeans. He thus characterises the Vattelian justifications for 
violence against non-Europeans to simply be an application of practices already 
developed in Europe.124  
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However, considering Vattel’s vision of popular will and the international order 
that upheld it provides us with a new understanding of how his justifications for 
violence and domination applied more harshly to those (non-Europeans) that did 
not conform to his ideal. Here, by viewing the collective body of the nation-state 
(justified by popular will) as the lynchpin of Vattel’s entire theory, it possible to 
draw a distinction between discrete groups within an otherwise ‘well-ordered’ so-
ciety that violated the natural law and entire societies that violated the natural law 
collectively. On this reading, Hunter’s claim that Vattel’s condemnation of non-
European practices also applied to Europeans loses much of its persuasive edge. To 
support this assertion, we must consider the text and context surrounding the two 
particular non-Europeans groups discussed in The Law of Nations, the Ottomans 
and the indigenous peoples of the New World.   
 
2.6.2.1.  The Ottoman Empire 
 
In beginning with the Ottomans, Vattel stated that ‘when the Turks were success-
fully pursuing their victorious career….all Christian nations ought, independent of 
every bigoted consideration, to have considered them as them as enemies’, and all 
‘…would have been justifiable in breaking off all commerce with a people who 
made it their profession to subdue by force of arms all who would not acknowledge 
the authority of their prophet.’125 This characterization of Islam as a pathology also 
coloured Vattel’s condemnation of using force in the name of vindicating moral 
offences on the grounds that such conduct ‘opens a door to all the ravages of enthu-
siasm and fanaticism, and furnishes ambition with numberless pretexts…’126 In de-
parting from the rationale of the School of Salamanca and Hugo Grotius, for Vattel, 
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engaging in such punitive practices would render Europeans no better than Mus-
lims.127  Such a warning was rooted in a characterization of the Islamic world 
whereby: ‘Mohammed and his successors have desolated and subdued Asia, to 
avenge the indignity done to the unity of the Godhead; all whom they termed asso-
ciators or idolators fell victims to their devout fury.’128  
 
Such statements are deeply consistent with the notion that Europe, imagined as a 
family of connected yet unique sovereign nation-states, arose in self-defined con-
trast to a distinct Other in the form of a rapacious, all-consuming Ottoman Em-
pire.129 Here an emerging belief was that, unlike the European system where mili-
tary confrontation was consigned to resolving the limited disputes of sovereigns, 
war between Muslims and non-Muslims risked a fanatical unification of the entirety 
of Islam with catastrophically violent results.130 Thus, Vattel’s counterfactual of a 
normative European order rooted in sovereign equality can be read as a stark con-
trast to the menacing Ottomans. That said, given both the statements in his text and 
his immediate backdrop of real and imagined geopolitics, it is hard to accept that 
Vattel’s condemnation of those who ‘live by plunder’ was primarily directed to-
wards his fellow Europeans given the presence of contemporary Ottomans. 
 
2.6.2.2.  The Non-Cultivators  
 
Vattel’s characterization of the Ottomans, and Islam more broadly, certainly reveals 
the consistency between envisioning peaceful relations between Europeans while 
pathologising non-Europeans. However, there is an additional layer complexity 
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when we consider indigenous peoples within this frame. Regarding the second part 
of his passage on cultivation, through raising the question of hunter-gathers, his 
reference to the New World is explicit. Here, while Vattel lamented the Spanish 
conquest of Andean and Mesoamerican empires as a ‘notorious usurpation’, he 
qualifies this position by stating that ‘the establishment of many colonies on the 
continent of North America might, on their confining themselves within just bounds, 
be extremely lawful.’131 When thinking through this mode of justification, contrary 
to any overly broad claim that Vattel was merely applying the morality of day, it is 
noteworthy that the Vattelian denial of indigenous land rights was far more brutal 
than many of his contemporaries, including Christian Wolff.132  
 
In accounting for this enhanced brutality, an important shard of context can found 
in the observations of Jean-Pierre Purry (1675-1736), an affiliate of the Dutch East 
India Company from Vattel’s home canton of Neuchâtel who devised elaborate 
plans for the settler colonization of Australia, Southern Africa, and South Caro-
lina.133 What is exceptionally striking about Purry was that his moral justifications 
for these colonial projects were virtually identical to Vattel’s proclamation that dis-
possessing hunter-gatherers is in perfect accord with the natural law. For Purry, 
who eventually served as the director of the French East India Company,134 the mo-
rality of colonialism was not obvious course of action but demanded an elaborate 
line of justification.  
 
According to Purry’s anticipation of counter-claims by hypothetical opponents: ‘It 
will be objected that….justice and equality will bar us from setting ourselves up in 
[Western Australia]…and lording it over those who have been there, father and son, 
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for as long as several thousand years, and will also bar us from evicting from their 
land people who have never done us any harm.’135 In responding to this, in a manner 
directly echoing John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, Purry claims that in 
God’s ownership of the Earth, ‘he does not assign a portion [of land] to each, but 
rather that which each fairly seizes for himself belongs to him.’136 That said, ‘it 
does not seem reasonable that the simple state of possession, albeit thousands of 
years old, should privilege the claims of any individual over the others, without 
their consent.’137 However, Purry does not finish here and asserts an additional jus-
tification for colonization on the grounds that:  
 
savage and rustic people love above all things a lazy existence 
and.…the countries inhabited by these sorts of savage and lazy 
people are never very populous. Thus one has every reason to 
believe that far from harming the inhabitants of [these 
lands]…the establishment of a good European colony would pro-
vide for them all sorts of benefits and advantages, as much be-
cause theirs would be a civilized life as because of the arts and 
sciences they would be taught.138 
 
In turning back to Vattel’s passage on cultivation, these elements of native idleness, 
sparse populations, and productive land usage as a common good for all mankind 
are all manifest in Vattel’s denial of the legitimacy of hunter-gather societies.139 
Moreover, in complete consistency with Vattel’s condemnations of the conquest of 
Latin America, Purry’s formulation of colonisation was intended to be far more 
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benevolent than the practices of the Spaniards and the Portuguese.140 While forging 
a direct between Purry and Vattel would require archival research that exceeds the 
scope of this thesis, in this particular instance, fact that Purry and Vattel were such 
close contemporaries complicates the contextualist critique, at least as it applies to 
this situation, that critical international legal histories anachronistically impose al-
ien ethics on historical figures. After all, Purry, and by extension Vattel, were cer-
tainly in a position to understand the normative counter-arguments to the colonial 
justifications they embraced.141 On a broader scale, this treatment of indigenous 
land rights held vast implications for Vattel’s theory of popular will as the legiti-
mation of domestic sovereignty and, by extension, international order. Through 
denying sovereign personality to those who breached the necessary duty of cultiva-
tion, the ‘popular will’ that allowed a society to denounce the illegitimacy of exter-
nal intervention was not a quality possessed by all human communities.    
 
 
2.6.3.  Britian as Saviour and Exemplar  
 
In reviewing Vattel’s depiction of the world, centring his theory of popular will as 
the basis for sovereignty exposes a stratified range of actors that constitute his vi-
sion of global order. As detailed above, there was the (counterfactual) European 
state-system where all sovereign polities great and small were formally equal enti-
ties legitimized by popular will, there was the Ottoman Empire that stood out as the 
archetypal destroyer of popular will, and there were ‘primitive’ communities pre-
cluded from claiming popular will. However, there was another actor that Vattel 
idolized as a guarantor of the independence of Europe’s small states who feared 
extinguishment by absolutist monarchies, especially France where the excesses of 
dynastic accumulation vastly expanded under the reign of King Louis XIV. Against 
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this backdrop, Vattel placed a great deal of hope in Britain, for his ‘…significant 
claim with respect to the balance of power was that Britain was the only state capa-
ble of playing the role of peacekeeper, aligning with other powers when necessary 
to combat France.’142   
 
Contrary to any notion that placing hope in Britain embodied timeless truths re-
garding ‘the international’ as a sphere of struggle beyond domestic political differ-
ence, Vattel’s geopolitical formulations were deeply informed by the way Britain 
approached popular will. In Book I of The Law of Nations Britain is described as 
an exemplary model of domestic government. According to Vattel: 
 
That illustrious nation distinguishes itself in a glorious manner by its 
application to everything that can render a state more flourishing. An 
admirable constitution there places every citizen in a position that ena-
bles him to contribute to this great end, and everywhere diffuses the 
spirit of genuine patriotism which zealously asserts itself for the public 
welfare. We there see private citizens form considerable enterprises, in 
order to promote the glory and welfare of the nation. And while a bad 
prince would find his hands tied up, a wise and moderate king finds the 
most powerful aids to give success to his glorious designs. The nobles 
and the representatives of the people form a link of confidence between 
the monarch and the nation, and concurring with him in every thing that 
tends to promote the public welfare, partly ease him of the burdens of 
government, give stability to his power, and procure him an obedience 
the more perfect, as it is voluntary. Every good citizen sees that the 
strength of the state is really the advantage of all, and not that of a single 
person.143  
 
                                                        
142 Whatmore 2010, 100. 




While Vattel is clear that achieving this harmonious order historically ‘…cost rivers 
of blood’,144 and his overly sanguine view is difficult to reconcile with continued 
civil strife in Britain,145 a distinct set of interests motivated his faith. 
 
From Vattel’s perspective, Britain constituted a system whose interests in foreign 
commerce provided it with little incentive to interfere in the governments of Eu-
rope’s same small states, who often functioned as the type of commercial partner 
Britain desired.146 Moreover, it presented a Protestant counterweight to the practice 
of Catholic imperialism whereby kingdoms such as France viewed the authoritative 
powers of their monarchies as the proper inheritors of the universal church.147 As 
such, for Vattel, according to Richard Whatmore, ‘[t]he combination of the struc-
ture of Britain’s government and its interest in commerce made it the kind of state 
that would fulfil its duties towards fellow states.’148 
 
While Vattel was correct that Britain was a different kind of empire that was cer-
tainly more conducive to the continued sovereign autonomy of Europe’s small com-
merce-oriented states, this occurred largely because Britain’s endeavours primarily 
entailed colonising the non-European world. For Vattel, this could be viewed, not 
as undermining hypocrisy, but yet another example of British virtue. That is if we 
consider his advocacy of cultivating the world’s uncultivated spaces as a universal 
human good, even if this entailed dispossessing indigenous populations. This was 
strangely consistent with Vattel’s condemnation of those who conquer Europe’s 
small polities. Here the emerging view of ‘primitive’ populations was their lack of 
                                                        
144 Ibid. 
145 According to one important early-twentieth century commentary on the Vattelian influence: ‘one 
has only to turn a dozen pages of the history of the reform movement in England to find how far 
[Vattel’s characterizations]…. were from describing the real state of things.’ Fenwick 1913, 400. 
146 Whatmore 2010, 101. 
147 On the centrality of Protestantism for Vattel, see Hunter 2010. 




productive land usage, judged by European standards, meant that their lands could 
not be ‘conquered’ in the strict sense because they never owned them in the first 
instance.149  
 
Against this backdrop, various strands of Vattel’s theory reached their logical con-
clusion within a group of English-speaking settlers on the continent of North Amer-
ica. This population developed a conception of liberty based on dispossession and 
asserted their sovereign independence from a British metropole they charged with 
‘insupportable tyranny', to use the Vattelian terminology150 As will be discussed in 
the next chapter, Vattel’s The Law of Nations was the ideal playbook for those 
seeking independence through the American Revolution. The result was the first 
new international legal subject where popular will would be validated through 
‘facts on the ground’ in direct repudiation of dynastic legitimacy claims. Thus, Vat-
tel’s work was invoked to validate a harmonious merger of three meta-phenomenon 
he personally venerated: settler colonialism, an Anglocentric conception of political 
legitimacy, and an international legal order premised on popular will as the basis 
for domestic authority. This began a process where Vattel’s counterfactual assertion 




2.7.  Conclusion  
 
The foundational emergence of Vattel’s theory of the popular will-international law 
relationship demonstrates what is possible if we merge the insights of ‘juridical 
thinking’ with historical sociology. Juridical thinking is the ability to weave strands 
of meaning into an overarching abstract narrative that travels across time and space, 
and this is precisely what Vattel accomplished. This was demonstrated by the ab-
sence of any need to account for actual material conditions in the process of lodging 
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his critique of global consolidation as a fundamental demand of the natural law. 
However, material context should in no way be excluded from the account of why 
Vattel presented his juridical fiction of a horizontal world of sovereign states where 
each member expressed the unique self-perfecting will of its underlying political 
community. Delineating the interests at play in this context is aided immensely by 
the way historical sociology de-fetishizes the modern sovereign nation-state 
through situating it as one contingent political formation amongst many. When con-
sidering Vattel as the patriotic representative of a small Swiss Canton at the risk of 
annihilation by expanding land empires, we can observe his material interest in 
lodging the juridical assertion of a pluralist order of inviolable sovereign states as 
a demand of natural law. Thus, while a particular formulation of juridical thinking 
was the outcome, a distinct historical-sociological content motivated this assertion 
in the first place. 
 
Despite its parochial origins, this juridical ontology of a world of formally-equal, 
popular will-based sovereign states bore consequences that Vattel himself would 
likely never have imagined. What made Vattel’s theory so useful for certain actors 
was its accommodation of a vast range of political possibilities for societies orga-
nized around the ideal of the nation-state form, while simultaneously excluding 
those that did not adhere to this form. As the next chapter will show, this dynamic 
was exemplified through the American Revolution where Vattel’s treatise embold-
ened a settler population seeking sovereign independence from an imperial 
metropole aligned with indigenous communities. Here, a particular historical soci-
ological configuration gave rise to a juridical narrative profoundly supplemented 
by Vattel’s juridical narrative despite the fact that it arose an ocean away to explain 
very different material circumstances. However, while they may have manifested 
in unique ways, the differing contexts that shaped the formation of Vattel’s treatise 
and its pivotal influence elsewhere were very much a part of the same expanding 
order of global capitalism. Understanding this multi-faceted transformation of so-
cial relations in the longue duree of Vattel’s reception is crucial for telling the story 
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3.1.  Introduction  
 
While Chapter I detailed the contemporary relationship between popular will and 
international law, and Chapter II traced this general formulation back to Emer de 
Vattel’s 1758 treatise The Law of Nations, the present Chapter begins this thesis’s 
world-historical account of how these two moments are materially connected. My 
central argument here is that the American Revolution, resulting in US independ-
ence from the British Empire, formed a watershed moment in the rise of popular 
will as international law’s basis for domestic authority. It did so by demonstrating 
that it was possible for a popular will-based political movement to attain independ-
ence against the wishes of an established sovereign. Here the de facto authority 
asserted by the American colonists was recognized as superior to any de jure claim 
by the British imperial monarchy. Yet, if dynastic legitimacy was the dominant 
mode of international legal standing during this timeframe, what material and ide-
ological circumstances allowed for this reigning standard to be successfully chal-
lenged by a ‘people’ who deliberately refused the authority of a crown? 
 
In this Chapter, I situate this outcome as the culmination of compounded contradic-
tions that manifested through the intertwined expansions of European overseas co-
lonialism and the rise of capitalism. Positioned amongst an array of colonial pro-
jects, a unified American settler political imaginary arose as the by-product of the 
British imperial metropole’s efforts at expanding capital accumulation while man-
aging its resulting surplus population. This ultimately produced popular will-based 




it was fundamentally different from its Old World rulers. However, in a rather coun-
terintuitive capacity, this separation in the name of difference was justified because 
America was similar enough to the Old World to fall within the ambit of its rules 
regarding sovereign autonomy.  
 
Given this quandary, Vattel’s treatise and its emphasis on ideological pluralism as 
the legitimation of popular will proved invaluable in navigating the balancing act 
of difference and similarity that was the forceful American assertion of sovereign 
independence. The consequence of American inclusion as a sovereign equal was 
the international legal entrenchment of an exception to dynastic legitimacy. Put 
broadly, rebellious anti-dynastic assertions of popular will could be recognized 
through a demonstration of overwhelming de facto authority, despite the objections 
of an incumbent (dynastic) sovereign. Moreover ‘de facto authority’ in this context 
was substantively geared towards reproducing capitalist social relations at an ideo-
logical level. Paradoxically, this parochial de facto authority became universalised 
as ‘objectivity/ideologically-neutrality.’ As a result, the concealed entrenchment of 
capitalist-reproduction under the banner of ‘objectivity’ carried broad implications 
for subsequent claimants of independence in the name of popular will. 
 
In relation to the thesis’s overall structure, this chapter shows how extra-European 
expansion resulted in a legitimacy crisis that changed the very character of sover-
eignty under international law. Through detailing this meta-development, I set the 
stage for an account of a quasi-parallel transformation that happened within Europe. 
This takes the form of Chapter IV’s account of how the French Revolution was the 
result of feudal absolutism’s attempt to navigate contradictions produced by the 
subtle, yet pervasive, pressures of capitalist encroachment on an increasingly global 
scale. With this ensuing rupture, analogous assertions of popular will raised addi-
tional questions of international legal order. However, unlike the peripheral Amer-
ican Revolution, French assertions occurred within the very heartlands of European 
dynastic power. The aftermath of this rupture forms the subject matter of Chapter 
V. Here I show how the modern European state-system emerged through a synthe-
sis of the radical challenge of popular will with the notion that organic identity 




proved pivotal in justifying international legal arguments that separated Europe 
(and its settler offshoots) from the rest of the world while legitimizing its dominion 
over non-European societies.  
 
Chapter VI returns us to the Western Hemisphere where, in stark contrast to the US, 
Latin America independence demonstrated how even inclusion as sovereign equals 
proved limited to those marginalized by global capitalism, regardless of their crea-
tivity in making assertions of popular will suited to their local conditions. Finally, 
Chapter VII shows how the impact of the American Revolution, particularly the 
reconfiguration of the independent settler state-British metropole relationship, be-
came universalized as the liberal baseline for a UN Charter-based world order that 
consolidated in the mid-twentieth century. With this occurrence, all territories were 
presumed to (ideally) embody the popular will of their underlying populations in a 
manner juridically, but by no means materially, analogous to the American justifi-
cation for independence from the British Crown. 
 
In moving forward, Part 3.2. confronts the challenges of accounting for the Ameri-
can Revolution through a critical interpretation of international law given the per-
vasive, intertwined mythos of the Peace of Westphalia and American Exceptional-
ism. In staging this confrontation, I argue for a materialist interpretation of the rise 
of American sovereignty that accounts for settler colonialism, capital accumulation, 
and their placement within the overarching rubric of colonial capitalism. Following 
this, Part 3.3. situates these considerations through engagement with key works of 
international historical sociology that provide comprehensive materialist accounts 
of the modern international order that can deeply enrich the insights of international 
lawyers. Part 3.4. then builds on the previous section through a material exploration 
of the emergence of an English-speaking settler society in what is now the United 
States, and attainment of a freedom and affluence at the expense of enslaved Afri-
cans and dispossessed indigenous peoples. After showcasing the threats to contin-
uous settler privilege, Part 3.5. turns to the construction of an American argument 
for independence premised on the novel view that de facto authority vindicates the 




Finally, Part 3.6. examines the material-juridical consolidation of the early Ameri-
can republic and shows how the ‘facts on the ground’-popular will-international 
law continuum that justified American sovereignty in a parochial context was trans-
lated into a universal precept. 
     
 
3.2.  American Revolutionary Popular Will in Context 
 
3.2.1.  From ‘American Exceptionalism’ to ‘Settler Empire’ 
 
While the global impact of the American assertion of popular will via its July 4th, 
1776 Declaration of Independence, is well documented,1 its influence has yet to be 
comprehensively addressed within international legal scholarship despite the field’s 
‘turn to history.’ A possible reason for this relative absence is the contested status 
of declarations of independences within contemporary international law. 2  Yet, 
when accounting for the international legal impact of the American Revolution, 
beyond the ease of entanglement with intractable doctrinal questions of statehood, 
recognition, and self-determination attached to ‘declarations of independence’, a 
larger historiographic barrier is present. This barrier is constructed through the way 
a mythic narrative of the Peace of Westphalia is compounded by another myth, 
American Exceptionalism.  
 
While subject to numerous interpretations, the core of ‘American Exceptionalism’, 
at least in relation to international law, is that the US’s unique character, destiny, 
                                                        
1 For the leading study of the global impact of the Declaration of Independence, see Armitage 2007. 
2 Here the strong presumption in favor of upholding territorial integrity renders attempts to declare 
independence far from sufficient for attaining international legal standing. For confrontations of this 




and mission of exporting ‘freedom’ globally translates into a differentiated relation-
ship with the rules of the Westphalian international order.3 From this basis, argu-
ments emerge that there is a distinctly ‘American approach to international law’ 
whereby the US Constitution, i.e. the ‘supreme law of the land’, triumphs over any 
conflicting international legal interpretation.4 Such a view has been invoked as jus-
tifications for American international legal breaches whereby Constitutional su-
premacy is coupled with assertions of US power as an indispensable enforcer of 
global order and any legal constraint perceived to empower America’s enemies is 
illegitimate.5 However, these breaches, particularly as they relate to the use of force 
and the law of armed conflict, have also be contested within the same confines of 
American Exceptionalism by those invoking longstanding traditions of US interna-
tional legal commitments that portray recent departures (especially during the Cold 
War and later the post-9/11 ‘War on Terror’) as tragic betrayals.6 There is a great 
deal of history such a challenger can draw upon given that, in the words of Mark 
Janis, ‘[p]robably the most exceptional aspect of American international law is the 
belief long held by many Americans that the discipline embraces a utopian mission 
to substitute law and the courtroom for war and the battlefield.’7 Moreover, this 
legalist antiwar tradition is accompanied by numerous, and frequently overlapping, 
assertions of anti-imperialism as a deeply American value.8 
 
Through its many variations, American Exceptionalism acts as a quintessential case 
study in ‘juridical thinking’ in that it lodges its central argument through a highly 
                                                        
3 On the self-perception of the US as being a ‘civilisational’ tier above the Westphalian ‘family of 
nations’, see Cha 2015, 759.  
4 For such an account of ‘American international law’, see Cohen 2003. 
5 See e.g. Rabkin 2004. 
6 Witt 2012, 897-898. 
7 Janis 2012, 533. 
8 On the manifestations of ‘anti-imperial’ discourse within the history of American foreign policy, 




discretionary assemblage of historical events in the name of constructing a compel-
ling narrative. While ‘juridical thinking’ is an indispensable connector of otherwise 
disparate strands of meaning, as this thesis argues, it is limited in that it abstracts 
historical events from their material contexts while nonetheless generating material 
effects that it cannot explain outside the confines of its narrow projects of political 
justification. This is especially problematic when American Exceptionalist narra-
tives make sweeping historical claims about international law while failing to 
acknowledge how their political myopias expose them to critique through a contex-
tual expansion of the histories they purport to ‘neutrally’ describe.9 Thus, in line 
with this thesis’s methodology, the limits of this approach are tempered with the 
insights of historical sociology as means of materially situating the origins, appeals, 
receptions, and adaptations of the narratives constructed through the distinct tech-
nique of ‘juridical thinking.’ 
 
Against this presumption, when facing the distorting rubric of ‘American Excep-
tionalism’ (regardless of the political purpose it serves), a first step is to confront 
its naturalization of the anti-materialist Westphalia myth. This naturalization is ac-
complished by positioning the US as the virtuous other to the European state-system 
that was allegedly formed according to this myth, leaving the myth intact as a base 
presumption. Thus, claiming that the US is either unbound by external norms or 
                                                        
9 This is rife in both Neoconservative and liberal American Exceptionalist histories of international 
law. An example from the former is the claim that the United Nations’ ‘terrorism-enabling’ com-
mitments to sovereign equality and non-intervention necessitates a return to the early nineteenth-
century Concert of Europe model of great power interventionism, see Yoo 2014. (For an application 
of international legal structuralism to expose the fallacious, and, nature of this narrative, see De-
sautels-Stein 2016b.) Another Neoconservative example is the critique of condemnations of US 
breaches of the law of armed conflict, monolithically understood, by pointing to histories of differing 
Anglo-American vs. continental interpretations to show there is no singular ‘law of war,’ see Rabkin 
2014. (However, this fails to account for the ways in which the law of armed conflict in its current 
manifestation was, in great part, shaped to directly serve American interests, see Barsalou 2018.) 
On the liberal end, a prominent example is Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro’s claim that the suc-
cessful ban on aggression and conquest emerged through the distinctly American creation of the 
1928 Paris Peace Pact (aka the Kellogg-Briand Pact) that lead to series of legal innovations resulting 
in a ‘New World Order,’ Hathaway and Shaprio, 2017. However, this narrative both ignores alter-
native agencies that contributed to this result, namely the Third World (see Barkawi 2018) and is 




represents an unparalleled perfection of those same norms, presumes it was 
spawned from a Westphalian world order where sovereign equality, non-interven-
tion, and the toleration of ideological pluralism were well-established principles. In 
other words, ‘American Exceptionalism’ in international legal discourse only re-
ceives its animating impetus by reference to an ahistorical presumption regarding 
the origins of the international states-system.  
 
My alternative approach is to view the US’s emergence not as an exceptional sov-
ereign state within a world of ordinary sovereign states, but to highlight the contin-
gent nature of the ‘sovereign state.’  This allows me to depict the US as a novel 
political form generated through the contradictory interactions of variegated hier-
archical empires on a global scale. Against this backdrop, the foundational Ameri-
can assertion of popular will as a basis for sovereign authority challenged some 
forms of colonial domination, while simultaneously venerated others. This realiza-
tion provides grounding for a materialist account that can explain why both West-
phalia and American Exceptionalism ultimately gained their purchase as standard 
abstractions despite the greater explanatory potential of a more materialist account. 
Thus, while popular will exists at the heart of American Exceptionalist discourse, 
uncovering the true impact of how American popular will transformed the interna-
tional legal order means abandoning (or at minimum deeply provincializing) Amer-
ican Exceptionalism as a useful analytical category.  
 
As an entry point into a more materially grounded explanation of the American 
Revolution and its international legal impact, we must confront the ways in which 
this event challenges our definition of ‘revolution’ conventionally understood. This 
is especially pronounced when considering how a colony seeking independence 
from a metropole via a war of liberation differs from a revolution against an internal 
social order. Comparing the American Revolution and the French Revolution 
starkly highlights this comparison in that, according to Thomas Barrow: 
 
A French Revolution is the product of unbearable tension within a so-




or at least destroy its most objectionable aspects, and to replace some-
thing old with something new. In contrast, a colonial “revolution” or 
war of liberation has as its purpose the achievement of self-determina-
tion, the “completion” or fulfilment of an existing society, rather than 
its destruction.10 
 
However, this distinction raises the question of what social ends American settlers 
were aiming to fulfil through their recourse to armed struggle against the colonial 
metropole. Confronting this question presents an opportunity to take seriously the 
reality that American revolutionary ‘anti-colonialism’ was inseparable from its un-
impeded pursuit of another form of colonialism. 
 
A dynamic of overwhelming relevance towards this end is the distinction between 
‘colonialism’ and ‘settler colonialism.’ While the former is concerned with estab-
lishing relations of domination and exploitation over a discrete population to further 
external interests, the latter functions according to a logic of replacement whereby 
an external population/social order systematically extinguishes the previous one.11 
In other words, the creation of a new settler society is premised on the elimination 
of the native society.12 Although settler colonialism is often part of larger colonial 
schemes, it is entirely possible that a settler society breaks away from the metropole 
and persists as an independent entity while retaining its animating structural logic.13 
On this basis, while attaining formal independence is often depicted as the advent 
of ‘decolonization’, this narrative hardly accounts for remaining indigenous popu-
lations within a settler colony whose experience of conquest persists as long as the 
                                                        
10 Barrow 1968, 463. 
11 ‘…settler colonialism has both negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, it strives for the 
dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land 
base.’ Wolfe 2006, 388. 
12 Ibid.  
13 On the differentiation between colonialism as a general phenomenon and settler colonialism as 




settler society does.14 In Patrick Wolfe’s iconic depiction, ‘invasion is a structure 
not an event.’15 
 
In grounding my analysis in the chapter, much insight draws from Aziz Rana’s Two 
Faces of American Freedom where the settler colonialism paradigm provides a 
striking revision of American legal and political development. When expounding 
upon this notion of ‘two faces’, Rana argues that the liberty of a foundational egal-
itarian American political community of white male Protestant property-owners 
was premised on the suppression of those falling outside of this ideal.16 By viewing 
these two features, not as an aberration, but as a mutually-reinforcing structure, a 
link is forged between ‘…the emancipatory and oppressive features of the Ameri-
can experience.’17 Here ‘[s]ettler society’s ethnic basis flattens internal inequalities 
while justifying the construction of dependent external communities.’18 This focus 
on the US as a ‘settler empire’ delivers a serious blow to ‘American Exceptionalism’ 
narratives for ‘American commentators and citizens often view aspects of national 
history to be uniquely homegrown, when in fact they are present to a degree in 
numerous settler societies.’19 From this premise, Rana historicizes ‘American Ex-
ceptionalism’ as a discursive ethos that arose in the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth 
                                                        
14 The need for this particular explanatory frame stems from the fact that many formative theories 
of anti-colonialism, particularly those of Franz Fanon and Amilicar Cabral, appealed to the injustice 
of a vast colonial majority being ruled by a small minority of colonisers. Such a rallying call scarcely 
applied to the plights of indigenous peoples who were rendered minorities in their ancestral home-
lands, Wolf 1999, 1-3.  
15 Wolfe 2006, 388. 
16 This is especially true of the indigenous societies whose disappearance was a precondition to this 
ideal community. As such, their treatment became the template for dealings with a wide array of 
excluded populations including Catholics, African Americans, Mexican Americans, and ‘non-white’ 
immigrants. Rana 2010. 
17 Ibid. 10. 
18 Ibid. 




centuries and was anachronistically conflated with the eighteenth century American 
founding.20 
 
3.2.2.  The Political Economy of Juridical Dispossession  
 
Although, the settler colonial framework dismantles ‘exceptionalism’ narratives, 
there remains the connected issue of how American independence as a settler em-
pire resulted in an impossible standard for judging future independence movements. 
On this basis, while the American Revolution furthered de facto authority as an 
‘objective’ barometer of popular will, the settler colonization-based material con-
ditions that enabled these ‘facts on the ground’ were by no means present in all, or 
even most, societies. Thus, although the US technically emerged through an ‘anti-
colonial war of liberation’ that would serve as a template for the Global South, this 
in no way eliminates its deep similarities with other settler colonial societies such 
as those of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.21 Acknowledging this raises 
extensive questions of how to explain the world-historical formation and influence 
of the American settler empire as milestone in the globalization of popular will as 
international law’s exclusive basis for domestic authority. My purpose in this chap-
ter is to account for the intertwined features of global political economy and inter-
national legal argument as a means of expanding upon Rana’s path-breaking ac-
count. 
 
On the general framework of settler colonialism, one issue has been that while it 
aspires to explaining social relations across a vast array of temporal and spatial 
contexts, according to Rachel Busbridge ‘in practice there is a particularly strong 
emphasis on white European settler colonialisms in Australia and the America 
where the logic of elimination – as opposed to the logic of exploitation – features 
                                                        
20 Rana 2015, 273-277. 




most heavily.’22 This raises the question of whether or not settler colonial studies 
forms a universal or limited analytical vantage point.23 In taking this contextual 
point seriously (while also limiting my methodological engagement with the settler 
colonial studies paradigm), my purpose is to examine the phenomena of Anglo-
American settler colonization as a localized manifestation of globally-constituted 
material and ideological forces. From this premise, I follow The Two Faces of 
American Freedom’s usage of settler colonial studies to introduce critical transna-
tionally-focused historical considerations that confront the limitations of a ‘meth-
odological nationalism’ deeply complicit in the production of simplified, moralistic 
narratives of American institutional development.24 As the next logical next step in 
building this transnational contextualization, I incorporating the influences of 
global political economy (and its attendant mechanisms of juridical ordering) into 
the narrative. This is especially important given that the emergence of the American 
settler state was only part of a broader phenomenon of white English-speaking co-
lonial settlement that was foundational in shaping of the modern capitalist global 
system.25 
 
However, in viewing the emergence of this system as the (re)production of contin-
gent regimes of social relations, as opposed to the fulfilment of any ‘natural order’, 
the insights of Karl Marx’s Capital provides an invaluable starting point. As Marx 
famously concluded in his account of capitalism as a mode of economic production 
premised on free exchange between formally equal juridical persons, this system is 
                                                        
22 Busbridge 2018, 97. 
23 As Bushbridge notes, despite the broad ambitions of theorists of settler colonialism, the only set-
ting the framework has been applied to in any great depth beyond North America and Australasia 
has been Israel-Palestine. For Busbridge, while it shares certain features with other accounts of set-
tler colonization, there are also aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian situation that are incredibly different 
from this framework, at least to the extent North America and Australasia form the template for 
comparison, see Ibid. 106-110.    
24 For an account of how the narratives of exceptionalism and expansionism are deeply rooted in 
American history, see Chaplin 2003. 




ultimately rooted some source of coercion whereby value is extracted without com-
pensation.26 Deeming this phenomenon ‘primitive accumulation’ in that it repre-
sents an essential pre-condition for capital accumulation, Marx turns our attention 
to the forcible destruction of the English peasantry’s modes of self-sufficiency as 
landowners invoked private property rights to exclude access to traditionally com-
munal sources of sustenance.27 With this loss of sustenance, these peasant popula-
tions had no choice but to sell their labour power as formally equal individual sub-
jects within a competitive labour market thus providing the necessary labour com-
ponent of capitalist industrialization.28 
 
However, the concept of privative accumulation has raised substantial questions for 
those seeking to apply it beyond the context of capitalism’s emergence in Europe 
and meaningfully account for colonial, postcolonial, and settler colonial situa-
tions.29 One set of challenges revolves around the temporal question of whether 
direct coercion exists as an embedded feature of capitalism even after the initial 
conditions of capitalist reproduction have already been established through an ear-
lier episode of primitive accumulation.30 Another set of challenges concerns the 
Eurocentric character of the ‘primitive accumulation’ narrative that implies a ‘nor-
mative developmentalism’ whereby white male workers gaining agency through 
                                                        
26 For Marx, theorizing primitive accumulation was the way out of accepting capitalist social rela-
tions as a timeless or inevitable phenomenon. On his account: ‘The whole movement…seems to 
turn in a vicious circle out of which we can only get by supposing…an accumulation not the result 
of the capitalist mode of production, but its starting point.’ Marx 1970, 667. 
27 Ibid. 671-685. 
28 Ibid. 668-669. 
29 While Marx does speak of the colonial dimensions of primitive accumulation, his depiction is 
Capital can hardly be said to centre the perspective of those on the receiving end of colonialism. In 
concluding Volume I of Capital he states that: ‘we are not concerned here with the condition of the 
colonies. The only thing that interests us is the secret discovered in the new world by the Political 
Economy of the old world…that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation…the expropri-
ation of the labourer.’ Ibid. 724  




industrial transformation.31 This raises questions what such a theory offers to those 
outside of this mould. While contemporary scholars, in varying measures, have ad-
dressed these challenges, the situating of these ‘primitive accumulation’ debates 
within a grand synthesis has only recently emerged through the efforts of Onur Ulas 
Ince.32 
 
According to Ince, primitive accumulation must be conceived as necessarily entail-
ing a) the imposition of ‘politco-juridical force’, and b) the need to go beyond the 
nation-state centrism and comprehensively account for colonialism within the 
broader process of capitalism’s emergence.33 Under this formulation, ‘politico-ju-
ridical force’ is the presence of coercive impositions ‘…categorically excluded 
from the determination of the economy as an autonomous system of interdepend-
ence mediated by self-regulating markets’ that can manifest in a vast variety of 
ways.34 Such force is necessary for while ‘primitive accumulation’ separates indi-
viduals from their means of sustenance and conscripts them into the capital accu-
mulation process, ‘this separation-mediation relationship involves not only the as-
similation (i.e., destruction and reconstitution) of non-capitalist relations of social 
reproduction but also their subordinate articulation to circuits of capital.’35 How-
ever, while the deployment of capitalism’s formative violence may have led to the 
creation of a formally equal labor force in the Europe, this manifestation is only a 
small part of a larger process given that capitalism entails ‘the subsumption of labor 
and land on a planetary scale.’36  
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In adopting this global lens, we must ‘…detect the networks of commodity and 
capital that link what seems to be local, diverse, and disconnected articulations of 
land and labor’ and this means turning attention to the formally unequal practices.37 
When viewed in the aggregate, ‘the political-constitutive position and the global-
colonial expanse of primitive accumulation…enable one to grasp coercive colonial 
structures, such as slavery, commercial imperialism, and settler colonialism, as 
properly belonging to the history of capital.’38 Moreover, Ince also resolves ‘prim-
itive accumulation’s’ temporality issue through his delineation of ‘capital-positing 
violence’ (the original destruction of non-capitalist social relations) versus ‘capital-
preserving violence’ (the force needed to maintain these new social relations) as 
two distinguishable moments that are nonetheless inseparable features of a larger 
systemic logic.39 
 
While interlinked episodes from this broad expanse of colonial capitalism will be 
visited throughout this chapter, in framing the American Revolution as a watershed 
in the ultimate globalization of popular will, it is worth articulating how settler co-
lonialism and primitive accumulation are fused in this context. As Patrick Wolfe 
has made clear, settler colonialism is not simply the replacement of one set of land-
owners with another, but the replacement of an entire system of landownership with 
another.40 What is particularly relevant here is the precise nature of the commonly 
invoked, but rarely theorized, assertion of ‘dispossession’ in this context. Accord-
ing to Robert Nichol’s confrontation of this concept, ‘dispossession’ operates ac-
cording to a recursive logic where, under capital social relations, any alleged dep-
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rivation of property can only be contested, and remedied, through invoking the cat-
egories that capitalism is willing to recognize.41 Against this presumption, for in-
digenous peoples challenging dispossession, the very act of seeking redress means 
sacrificing the ability to maintain alternative conceptions of the human relationship 
with lands and nature.42 That said, dispossession is not simply the disruption of 
property relations, but generative of a very specific understanding of what property 
rights are, and what they can never be.43 This is a distinct technology of power 
whereby concrete practices are reduced to juridical abstraction that, in turn, legiti-
mize violence against those failing to conform to the dictates of this abstraction.44   
 
As will be discussed in detail below, the settler community that ultimately gained 
independence through the American Revolution did so in the name of an individu-
alistic conception of property geared towards capital accumulation. While numer-
ous acts of settler acquisition were undertaken under quasi-legal/extra-legal circum-
stances, the very fact that adjudication was undertaken to rectify such dubious sit-
uations ultimately empowered settler modes of ownership while denigrating indig-
enous modes.45 To apply Ince’s categories, while an initial act of forcible appropri-
ation of land by a settler would be ‘capital-positing violence’, defining the rights 
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and wrongs of this occurrence through categories of settler legality would be ‘cap-
ital-preserving violence.’46 
 
 It is at this juncture that the broad international legal dimension of this settler co-
lonialism-capital accumulation continuum can be identified. After all, the fact that 
the socio-political reality they created on this basis attained independence on the 
grounds of de facto authority is deeply revealing of the types of property-based 
social relations international law would view as objectively ‘effective’ and thus 
worthy of sovereignty (despite the presumption that sovereignty and property are 
two distinct spheres). In this formative context, the emptiness of popular will that 
could, in theory, support any ‘effective’ system of authority was an abstraction from 
the material reality that here ‘effective control’ was premised on American ‘…na-
tional (constitutional) identity…[being] practically indistinguishable from the pur-
est ideological expression of capitalist relations of production.’47 When considering 
the universalization of this particular understanding of popular will, the American 
Revolution was truly a milestone in building our current international order where 
formally equal states under anarchy is a corollary to formally equal individuals un-
der capitalism.48 
 
3.2.3.  The Vattelian Umbilicus to ‘Old Europe’ 
 
By centring settler colonialism and primitive accumulation, we can now see why 
Vattel’s treatise was so uniquely beneficial in making an international legal case 
for American revolutionary popular will. Vattel’s influence on the American 
Founders is well documented, with the latest study dating his treatise’s reception 
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back to 1762 (only four years after its first publication).49 Such influence is iconi-
cally encapsulated in the much-quoted remark of Benjamin Franklin who, upon re-
ceiving the most recent copy of The Law of Nations from a friend in Amsterdam 
stated that: ‘I am much obliged by the kind present you have made of us of your 
new edition of Vattel. It came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a 
rising state made it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations.’50 While Vat-
tel’s impact was in no way limited to colonial America, its veneration there stood 
in contrast to the scepticism it invoked amongst various Europeans.51 In the words 
of Vincent Chetail: ‘one can assert without too much exaggeration that the praise 
for his work in the United States was inversely proportioned to the criticism it re-
ceived in Europe.’52 Moreover, Vattel’s American reception was not simply a mat-
ter of random availability. The American founders were certainly familiar with 
other canonical publicists, especially Grotius and Pufendorf.53       
 
When accounting for Vattel’s reception in the American colonies, one set of expla-
nations focuses on how The Law of Nations was both intended as a practical guide 
for statesmen and presented a pluralistic view of popular will that was deeply com-
patible with the ideals of the American founders.54 On the first point, the many pos-
sible applications rooted in the sheer ambiguity of Vattel’s treatise allowed the 
American founders to render their iconoclastic republican agenda more or less leg-
ible to existing sovereigns who continued to adhere to dynastic legitimacy.55 On the 
second point, unlike other publicists, Vattel explicitly claimed that ‘the people’ 
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were the ultimate source of sovereign authority.56 Thus, by disavowing any remnant 
of dynastic legitimacy, Vattel’s ideologically plural, popular will-based law of na-
tions allowed for procedural intercourse amongst those who nevertheless main-
tained substantively opposing views on the nature of legal and political authority.57 
On this basis, it played an indispensable role in allowing the novel American ex-
periment in republican self-rule to assume its place ‘among the powers of the 
earth.’58 Applied to the American Revolution’s long-term transformative impact on 
international legal order’s approach to domestic authority, The Law of Nations can 
be viewed as the umbilicus between ‘Old Europe’ and a grand reconstruction of the 
world in the image of the United States. 
 
While there is a great deal of truth to this line of explanation, failure to account for 
the deeper material realities surrounding it reproduces the ahistorical ‘American 
Exceptionalism’ narrative. This in turn distorts the American Revolution’s role in 
materially entrenching popular will as the international legal basis for domestic au-
thority. In recalling how the interlinked phenomena of settler colonialism and prim-
itive accumulation expand our analytical horizons, we find a new framework for 
understanding Vattel’s treatise as the ideal manual for those asserting a conception 
of revolutionary liberty inseparable from colonial capitalism. As discussed in Chap-
ter 2, Vattel was notable for denying land rights to those who did not engage in his 
preferred mode of agriculture. Far from simply being a ‘product of its time,’ The 
Law of Nations was unapologetic in its delivery of a definitive answer to questions 
of colonial ownership, despite the moral struggles of many of Vattel’s contempo-
raries regarding the justice of these practices.59 Given the imperative of indigenous 
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dispossession in the political economy of American settler expansion, Vattel’s trea-
tise was consistent with the material aims of the American founders in a manner 
unshared by other canonical texts. Most importantly, while Vattel was not the only 
normative theorist of settler colonialization to influence the American revolutionary 
context (John Locke was preeminent in this capacity), he was able to uniquely sit-
uate these particular social relations within a pragmatic theory of international legal 
justification.60 
 
In working from the premise that colonial capitalism was integral to emergence of 
modern popular will, and a major milestone was the American reception of Vattel’s 
treatise, questions are raised regarding the world-historical context of this develop-
ment. After all, the material processes discussed above were constituted on a spatial 
and temporal scale that far-exceeded the immediate scope of the American Revo-
lution. Coming to term with this requires nothing short of an account of the longue 
durée of European overseas expansion where rival modes of political economy 
clashed, new opportunities for colonization emerged, and shifting international le-
gal justifications were present at every step of the way. The popular will-based 
transformation of the international legal order through the American revolutionary 
invocation of Vattel did not emerge in a void. It erupted as the resolution to numer-
ous contradictions of legal and political authority that were interconnected by-prod-
ucts of colonial capitalism. Understanding this dynamic requires us to account for 
the intertwined material contexts of the pre-existing order of dynastic feudalism 
that the American Revolution challenged, as well as the emerging colonial capitalist 
order the American Revolution helped to fulfil. 
 
 
3.3.  The Insights of International Historical Sociology 
 
                                                        




3.3.1  Provincializing ‘the International’ 
 
Working from the premise that then Peace of Westphalia narrative is a historical 
myth enabled by compounded misreadings of Vattel, an alternative explanation is 
required. 61  In undertaking this task, we are aided immensely by two materialist 
articulations of the historical sociology of the modern international order, Benno 
Teschke’s The Myth of 1648 and Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nicancioglu’s How 
the West Came to Rule. Beginning with the first work, Teschke argues that the in-
ternal development of England capitalism resulted in the birth of the modern sov-
ereign state as a unique entity that generated geopolitical pressures so great that 
other systems had to either adapt or perished.62 However, Anievas and Nicancioglu 
critique the notion that this transformation was purely internal to England, and de-
clare such accounts to be methodological nationalist and Eurocentric distortions.63 
From this premise, How the West Came to Rule details the inter-societal connec-
tions that shaped the modern capitalist order through the global trans-historic dy-
namic of Uneven and Combined Development.64 However, the sheer grandiosity of 
this effort has opened Anievas and Nicancioglu to the critique that their totalizing 
scale limits our ability to understand the significance and agency of small-scale 
social practices.65  
 
In confronting popular will’s emergence as international law’s basis for domestic 
authority in the context of capitalist expansion, I propose a synthesis of Teschke’s 
emphasis on English uniqueness with Anievas and Nicancioglu’s emphasis on in-
ter-societal interaction. On the matter of English uniqueness, while other societies 
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with capitalist features may have independently developed, it was England that first 
experienced the complete institutional consolidation of the modern sovereign state 
that forms the base unit of the present anarchic international order. As will be dis-
cussed further, this was a key adaptation when it came to allowing capitalist socie-
ties to break free of premodern modes of dynastic authority.66  
 
However, in underscoring the importance of Anievas and Niscancioglu’s contribu-
tion, the material conditions that enabled England to develop in this way were in-
separable from inter-societal interactions occurring at an increasingly global level. 
This point is illustrated by the success of the American Revolution where English 
efforts to continuously control patterns of global connection eventually led to a uni-
fying revolt in a number of its North Atlantic settler colonies. Through this revolt, 
the key institutional and ideological features of English political authority were re-
adapted in the name of achieving sovereign autonomy based on popular will vindi-
cated by the overarching legal order of inter-sovereign relations. The successful end 
product was the independent United States, whose birth revealed that the will of a 
dynastic sovereign could be overcome by the will of a ‘people’ who achieved ‘facts 
on the ground.’  
 
On this basis, the American Revolution proved that the capitalist nation-state was 
not simply an English anomaly but could be spontaneously reproduced under a dis-
tinct array of circumstances. Consequently, international law’s criteria for member-
ship had to adapt to accommodate this reproduction process. The weight of this 
development is inseparable from its deeply-rooted material and juridical origins. In 
tracing this genesis, what is revealed is the way modern England’s formation was 
inseparable from its extra-territorial conditions of social reproduction through set-
tler colonialization. It was against this backdrop that these colonists could present 
the case that they were different enough to warrant separation from the mother 
country, yet, similar enough to warrant equality with this same mother country. 
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When thinking through this process, we cannot overstated the role of variable ju-
ridical narratives in constructing English settler-metropolitan relations in their 
broader contexts. It was through these narratives that the linkages, analogies, dis-
tinctions, and ruptures ultimately justified American separation from the British 
metropole and ultimately formed a universal standard for modern international le-
gal subjectivity. 
 
3.3.2.  Westphalia Otherwise 
 
In beginning with Teschke, the core of his argument is that while the shift from a 
concentration of power in a decentralized nobility to a centralized absolutist state 
is typically associated with international modernity, this was in reality a continua-
tion of mediaeval feudalism.67 Here the rise of absolutism in Western Europe, with 
France as the key exemplar, created a class of administrators personally connected 
to monarchs with class interests aligned against those the old feudal nobility.68 In 
furtherance of these interests, this administrator class aligned with the peasantry 
through centralized tax regimes that replaced the feudal tributary system and 
granted peasants a reliable means of subsistence.69 Within this particular social 
property configuration, relationships between dynastic monarchs centred upon a 
land-/heredity-based system of geopolitical accumulation where contested claims 
of territorial inheritance triggered perpetual military competition via wars of suc-
cession.70 Furthermore, this system had a highly detrimental effect on the territorial 
authority of the old feudal nobility whose lands were susceptible to partition by 
allied dynastic monarchies when they refused to consent to projects of absolutist 
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centralisation.71 Moreover, the rights and obligations incurred in the wake of these 
territorial reconfigurations were accounted for through an elaborate practice of dy-
nastic peace agreements of which the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, together 
constituting the ‘Peace of Westphalia,’ exemplified rather than ruptured.72  
 
However, a competitor to this system emerged through England’s seventeenth cen-
tury transition to capitalism that resulted in it becoming the first ‘modern state’ with 
an administrative apparatus stripped of personalised authority. According to this 
theory, the transition occurred through a new formation of class alliances between 
feudal lords and the monarchy-linked administrator class against the peasantry.73 
This alliance between the two ruling classes resulted in the assertion of direct pro-
ductive ownership over land (the infamous enclosures) which eliminated peasants’ 
traditional subsistence practices and forced them to reproduce themselves by selling 
their labour in the market as wage-earners.74 This social transformation precipitated 
a move to modernity whereby the division between ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres 
of activity characterized a constitutional-parliamentary state. What operated this 
state was a rational bureaucracy with administrators pledged to an abstracted gov-
ernmental entity rather than bound to an absolute monarch or feudal lord through 
personal loyalty and debt.75 Freed of such burdens and instabilities, this state could 
guarantee public debts through a central banking system that was absent in absolut-
ist systems where debts were held by monarchs in their personal capacity.76 More-
over, this allowed for the public financing of a unified professional military instead 
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of one held together though precarious bonds of personal loyalty.77 Taken together, 
Britain’s novel achievement of modern statehood produced an unparalleled geopo-
litical competitiveness that other actors either imitated or were conquered by. 78 
What ultimately resulted was a world of legally equal entities more or less approx-
imating this modern state form.                           
 
In explaining the American Revolution within this frame, we must first engage sub-
stantial critiques of this ‘Myth of 1648’ theory of international modernity. First and 
foremost, the above raised issue of Eurocentrism is certainly applicable to the Bren-
ner hypothesis informing Teschke’s theory in that it imagines the development of 
capitalism as purely internal to rural England.79 In addressing this issue, through a 
deliberately anti-Eurocentric account of the origins of Western dominance Anievas 
and Nisancioglu’s How the West Came to Rule confronts much that The Myth of 
1648 leaves out.80 In contrast to Teschke, Anievas and Nisancioglu theorize the or-
igins of capitalist modernity by linking numerous developmental strands inside and 
outside Europe that imposed pressures to adapt but also transmitted opportunities 
for innovation.81 From this view, the specific configuration of class conflict and 
social property relations in seventeenth-century England emphasized by Bren-
ner/Teschke is only one developmental strand amongst many that contributed to the 
transition to capitalist modernity.  
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However, a notable gap in Anievas and Nisancioglu’s account is the American Rev-
olution. This must be rectified for the significance of this event is difficult to over-
state when theorizing the origins of modern sovereignty in the systemic context of 
inter-sovereign relations. As the ‘first new nation’, the US provided a template for 
modern state creation made in deliberate rejection of the old regime of dynastic 
rights and customs that governed territorial authority amongst its European fore-
bears.82 It is this very ideal of popular will-based international legal standing that 
allows modern actors to raise sovereign equality, nonintervention, and territorial 
integrity as a means of resisting the impositions that defined medieval forms of 
territorial authority. Thus, explaining the transition to the modern international sys-
tem of formally equal sovereign states necessitates an understanding of what stand-
ards are applicable when determining membership within this system. Relatedly, 
this requires attention to the fact that the advent of the American Revolution was 
precipitated by a long process of defining identity/ideology in relations between the 
British metropole and its privileged settler colonial subjects. This raises the ques-
tions as to how England’s transition to ‘modern statehood’ can be attributed to its 
process of overseas expansion and, consequently, how the American case for sov-
ereign independence was an outgrowth of this process. 
 
3.3.3.  The Weight of the Atlantic Vector 
 
In addressing this question, I shall focus on two levels of material and ideological 
connection that formed the preconditions for the ultimate independence of the 
United States. The first level account for the larger global context of European ex-
pansion and its accompanying international legal developments. In particular, I fo-
cus on the ‘Atlantic Vector’ (i.e. the patterns of socio-economic connection be-
tween Europe, Africa, and the Americas) and ways in which it prompted change on 
a global scale. The second level narrows the analytical scope by focus on the shift-
ing and contested legal relationships between the English metropole and the North 
                                                        




American settler populations. I argue that it was through this process that the sub-
stantive concept of American freedom and the conditions of its possibility were 
consolidated. Furthermore, while deeply co-constitutive, these two operational lev-
els ultimately produced a contradiction in the legitimacy of political authority as 
understood between the settlers and the metropole that was ultimately resolved 
through an assertion of independence under the law of nations. It was under these 
conditions that Vattel’s The Law of Nations, and its ideological pluralist, settler 
colonialism-friendly orientation provided an unparalleled guide for doing so.   
 
The common narrative is that the origin of the law of nations is traceable to the 
sixteenth century ‘School of Salamanca’ theologians, including Francisco de Vito-
ria and Federico Suarez, whose theories of a universal natural law extending beyond 
Christian subjects became hallmarks of the Spanish-‘New World’ encounter.83 Alt-
hough the imperative of missionary conversion was certainly present, in detailing 
the imperialist nature of this encounter, Martti Koskenniemi famously observed that 
this ‘Real Spanish Contribution’ counterintuitively revolved around discourses of 
private rights of trade, property, and access as opposed to the right of conquest 
typically associated with empire-building.84 However, while Koskenniemi is cor-
rect in his observation that such justifications for colonization certainly resemble 
contemporary private rights claims far more than sovereignty-invoking impositions, 
this raises the question as to what extent the modern ‘public’/‘private’ distinction, 
and its separation of political and economic power, even existed in the minds of 
sixteenth century Spanish colonisers. As detailed in the previous chapter, Vitoria 
portrays a world of hierarchical political formations completely incompatible with 
the norms of exclusive authority and bounded territoriality that constitute interna-
tional law in its modern form.85  
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Approaching this problem through a historical sociological lens forces the question 
of what type of territorial authority was actually being exercised in this context? 
Here, Anievas and Nisancioglu point to the implementation of the encomienda sys-
tem where conquering Spaniards claimed land on behalf of the crown, yet individ-
ual conquistadores did not gain direct control of the land. Rather, they were as-
signed as trustees tasked with extracting resources produced through indigenous 
tributary practices only in a more exploitative capacity. 86  To grant the enco-
mienderos direct territorial authority would have been an extension of feudal land 
ownership and this would have undermined the interests of the Spanish Monarchy 
given the ongoing class conflict between feudal aristocracy and the consolidating 
forces of absolutism that defined Europe during this period.87 Instead, ‘the feudal 
institutions that the Spaniards brought with them were superimposed and grafted 
onto existing indigenous social relations of production, leading to a combination of 
feudal and Amerindian modes of production.’88 However, the encomienda system 
proved highly unstable for the indigenous labour supply it depended upon was sub-
ject to large-scale depletion due to wars, massacres, introduced diseases, and es-
cape.89 This need to constantly adapt for crisis conditions, which included the re-
placement of indigenous labour with enslaved Africans, subjected the system to 
severe indebtedness.90 To manage this burden, the Spaniards engaged in an increas-
ingly intensifying plunder of the New World’s mineral resources to satisfy their 
creditors.91                       
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However, the instability and indebtedness experienced by feudal-absolutist Spain 
visa-as-vie its New World expansion produced profound opportunities for compar-
atively underdeveloped actors in Northwestern Europe, primarily the Dutch and 
later the English.92 In the process of developing their overseas trading systems, the 
precious metals forcibly extracted by the Spaniards provided an exchange medium 
for commercial activity in the Far East.93 Furthermore, in addition to these tangible 
resources there also emerged a body of theoretical resources. This mode of innova-
tion centred on the ways in which encounters between Europe and the rest of the 
world, especially the Americas, necessitated the understanding of territorial sover-
eignty as an abstract concept.94 Here territorial authority could not be specifically 
determined through recourse to recognized dynastic and customary rights, some-
thing more or less possible in Europe. This opened questions as to what principles 
should dictate the acquisition, loss, or claim of territory, and under what conditions 
should they apply.95 On this basis, principles concerning territorial sovereignty 
were simultaneously of vital importance on the one hand, yet radically indetermi-
nate on the other.  
 
Given the existence of flexible juridical discourses emphasizing the sanctity of 
trade and property rights, creative opportunists had tremendous latitude when artic-
ulating arguments aligned with accumulation-based interests. This was especially 
important in that this was the context where the distinction between modern ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ spheres was still entrenching itself. In connecting this scheme to the 
Dutch merchants and officials taking advantage of their ‘privilege of backwardness’, 
one only need consider how the onetime Dutch East India Company legal counsel 
Hugo Grotius was influenced by the legal arguments developed in the crucible of 
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Spain’s imperial expansion.96 This reception is of grave importance given that Gro-
tius’s theoretical formulations proved exceedingly efficient in justifying colonial 
expansion.97 To give just one example, Grotius’s rebuttal of Portuguese ‘high seas 
sovereignty’ claims in the name of maintaining open trade channels for the ‘com-
mon good of mankind.’ Here we can observe the strategic logic of proclaiming a 
public/private distinction given its furthering Dutch commercial endeavours in the 
East Indies by rebuking Portuguese attempts to establish exclusive rights over wa-
terways.98       
 
Turning to England (which in 1707 became ‘Britain’ through the Act of Union with 
Scotland); this inter-societal lens expands the explanation for its transition to mo-
dernity that the Brenner hypothesis views as an internalized process. In this context, 
the peasantry’s loss of subsistence created a surplus of wage labour that migrated 
to urban areas.99 However, this concentration of disposed individuals produced rad-
ical movements, namely the Diggers and the Levellers, who challenged the ruling 
class structures responsible for their dispossession.100  
 
In the face of this challenge from below, the Atlantic Vector offered a dual means 
of absorbing this surplus wage labour and, as a result, diverting its accompanying 
social unrest. This took the form of a) employment in the shipbuilding/maritime 
industry that fuelled commercial/colonial expansion and b) opportunities for this 
new precarious class of wage-seeking dispossessed peasants in overseas colonies 
as settlers and/or indentured servants.101 Furthermore, applying these expansionist 
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solutions to the problem of dispossession as a precondition to capital accumulation 
triggered the need for continued international legal innovation given its operation 
within a sphere of territorial rights and obligations still in the process of being de-
fined.102 The various confluences of identity and ideology that emerged from this 
matrix of dispossession, servitude, and settlement proved immensely consequential 
in co-generating the material conditions and normative arguments that led to Amer-
ican separation from the British Empire.103 
 
Yet, this ultimate result cannot be reduced to European-New World interactions 
and must account for Africa and the transatlantic slave trade. In entering this trade, 
the British were engaging with pre-existing structures, yet they maintained a high 
degree of latitude in developing new methods.104 The result was the novel slave 
plantation system that hybridized different productive forms. On the one hand, 
slave responsibility for producing their own subsistence (a ‘pre-modern’ practice 
compared to the wage labour) allowed the system to better withstand market dis-
ruptions.105 On the other hand, specialist integration within the rapidly developing 
capitalist market provided the system with highly reliable channels for replenishing 
its labour supply and disseminating its products.106 Furthermore, this specialist pro-
duction of commodities such as sugar, coffee, and tobacco created both reliable 
consumer demand and increased labour productivity in Britain, and this helped set 
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the conditions for the Industrial Revolution.107 While this turn to industrialization 
periodically produced labour surpluses during economic downturns, the attendant 
social tensions could be resolved by overseas migration, which in turn furthered the 
colonial production of raw materials that could be exported back to the industrial 
metropole, thus repeating the cycle.108  
 
Moreover, the practice of slavery provided a process of racialisation that gave set-
tlers a basis for continual identification with the European metropole and by exten-
sion superiority over all peoples in the region.109 However, as will be discussed in 
greater detail below, the differences in settler-native and settler-slave relations that 
ultimately resulted in diverging assimilationist and segregationist polices.110 Given 
that Europeans were reluctant to categorically deny indigenous land rights in the 
Americas, the figure of the enslaved African provided a basis for binary opposition 
revolving around the poles of ‘black’ and ‘white’ through which settlers popula-
tions could define their freedom.111 As such, according to Robbie Shilliam: 
 
A Creole identity that would successfully justify political auton-
omy from the Old World by reference to its New World nativity 
and distinguish its singular claim to such freedom from other ‘na-
tives’ by reference to its Old World cultural heritage only suc-
ceeded definitively when the ‘white’ Creole was placed in racial 
categorical opposition, culturally and politically, to the black 
slave.112 
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In conceptualizing the Atlantic Vector as a vast productive sphere of social identity 
and social relations, we gain access to the deeper material and ideological connec-
tions that lead to formation of modern international legal argument and conscious-
ness. Having confronted this vastness, we are now in a position to observe how 
these forces consolidated on a small scale in a manner that lead to a major systemic 
development. It is through this lens that we can account for how Britain’s settler 
colonization of North America erupted into the American Revolution, an event that 
transformed international law by legitimizing forceful assertions of popular will as 
a validation of local sovereign autonomy.  
 
3.4.  The Great Socio-Juridical Settler Experiment   
 
3.4.1.  England’s Empire of Property 
 
Moving from the vast ‘Atlantic Vector’ and its role in stimulating international legal 
developments, I now turn to a much narrower ‘sub-vector’ concerning legal rela-
tions between the British metropole and its settler subjects who ultimately formed 
the sovereign United States of America. As a contextual matter, England found it-
self advantaged by a ‘privilege of backwardness’ whereby innovations (including 
legal interpretations) developed elsewhere could inform its own practices, yet could 
also bypass the need for consistency with the traditions of the society that produced 
the original innovation. This was demonstrated through the ways in which English-
men were able to legitimize their own colonial venture through invoking arguments 
formulated by Spaniards in the New World. However, when it came to the material 
social-relations that shaped colonial ventures, using Spanish arguments did not bind 
the British to Spanish practices, and the limitations that accompanied them. As dis-
cussed above, the Spanish mode of colonial authority was highly centralized in that 
the King maintained ultimate title over New World lands due to fears that governors 
becoming feudal lords would undermine absolutist authority. The result was an 
ever-increasing need for direct extraction of mineral resources that stifled other 





By stark contrast, England’s New World colonization was more decentralized and 
principally enabled through the issuance of a diverse array of company charters 
where the monarch granted the charter-holder authority over a claimed territory for 
the purpose of fulfilling the charter’s terms.113 While issuance was rooted in a 
source of dynastic authority, the actual process of colonial administration was the 
responsibility of the named charter-holder resulting in a flexible hybrid synthesis 
of public and private authority.114 Within this plurality of colonial projects, decen-
tralization allowed for multiple sites of innovation, the results of which were trans-
ferable to other sites of colonisation. This culminated in an aggregate process of 
innovative circulation unavailable in centralized colonial projects. However, any 
effort to account for innovation in this context must confront the deeper social re-
alities that enabled it. Considering England’s above discussed capitalist consolida-
tion, and its production of high (and potentially redistribution-oriented) concentra-
tions of dispossessed peasants, the question of manpower provision for these over-
seas ventures was largely settled.115 This is to say nothing of how assertions by the 
indigenous peoples impacted by these colonial projects were consistently under-
mined. 
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To understand these colonial structures and their consequences, our attention must 
turn to a mode of English property ownership that was absent in the Spanish colo-
nial context. While the Spanish colonial dilemma centred on the threat of feudal 
land ownership potentially extending beyond Europe, this complication was side-
stepped in England through an innovation deemed ‘allodial title.’116 Developed to 
determine the status of vacant English (and Dutch) wetlands made amenable to ag-
riculture and habitation by deliberate efforts, the label ‘allodial title’ characterized 
these lands as belonging to those who exerted the labour that transformed them.117 
Moreover, title attained in this capacity was free and clear of feudal encumbrances 
or obligations due to a lack of any prior ownership.118  
 
On this basis, analogies were drawn between the results of land reclamation projects 
in Europe and lands transformed through colonial settlements outside Europe on 
the grounds that the latter also existed outside the accumulated body of interests 
and obligations in land that defined feudalism (and its attendant social relations).119 
Through this means of determining rights to colonial land, the English avoided the 
king versus lord ownership debate that was an extension of the late-feudal intra-
ruling conflict between centralizing absolutism and the decentralized nobility so 
prominent in continental Europe. Linked to this broader transition from feudalism 
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to capitalism (especially in its colonial contexts), allodial title is particularly note-
worthy in two respects, both of which were tremendously consequential in bringing 
about the American Revolution.  
 
Firstly, lands not subject to feudal encumbrances could have their ownership trans-
ferred with a substantially greater degree of ease since there were no interests vested 
in feudal stakeholders able to contest alienation.120 Thus, allodial title, and its colo-
nial applications, immensely contributed to the capitalist ideal of free property 
transactions between juridically equal parties conducted in a rational, legible man-
ner unbound by adherence to pre-existing hierarchies and traditions.121 Such influ-
ence was readily apparent in the broader context of extra-European acquisition 
where post-feudal practices of centrally registering enclosed property occurred in 
England’s colonies long before they were comprehensively entrenched in England 
itself.122 This process, and its situating of virtuous property-ownership in contrast 
to racialized notions of savagery, necessitated a substantial amount of theoretical 
justification. Amongst the most influential of these formulations was John Locke’s 
1689 Second Treatise on Government and its grounds for dispossessing indigenous 
peoples.123 Through invoking this text’s moral ontology of land improvement as 
essential for the satisfaction of human needs, absolute property rights could be 
claimed by those who productively exerted their labour over land at the expense of 
those who occupied the same land, yet did not ‘improve’ it.124  
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to be possible, both in material practice and conceptually.’ Jones 2019, 202. 
122 Ibid. 190-191.  
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Turning to how English colonialization was able to draw upon earlier Spanish jus-
tifications, a synergistic link can be forged between Locke’s theories and those of 
the famed ‘School of Salamanca’ jurist Francisco de Vitoria.125 By invoking Vito-
ria’s claim that all peoples were under a universal duty to permit entry to those 
seeking the establishment of peaceful commercial relations, the English could le-
gitimize their presence in the New World.126 Building on this initial justification of 
physical presence, they could then invoke Locke’s theory of property to deny that 
indigenous peoples actually owned the lands they inhabited.127 Through this Vito-
ria-Locke framing, the English could situate their parochial material interests within 
the presumptively universal sphere of the law of nations. At the same time, they 
escaped Vitorian discourse’s feudal backdrop by invoking a capitalism-friendly no-
tion of land acquisition through actual occupation that fit within a progressive con-
ception of history alien to earlier medieval reasoning.128 This stood in stark contrast 
to the earlier justifications of discovery and conquest relied upon by the Spaniards 
in their colonization of the New World.129  
                                                        
the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something 
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men. 
Locke 1764 [1689], 216-217 (emphasis in original). On the inability of an idle individual to com-
plain of this arrangement, see Ibid, 221. On the application of this frame to the uncultivated spaces 
of America, see Ibid. 226.  
125 For analysis of Vitoria’s thought, see Chapter II, Part 2.3. 
126 On the influence of Vitoria and the School of Salamanca in England, see Fitzmaurice 2014, 59-
84. 
127 See Arneil 1996; On the way in which Locke’s theory of property was uniquely edifying of cap-
italist expansion through commodification of land via his theory of money, see Ince 2018b, 38-73. 
128 On the progressive historiography of occupation in contrast to other modes of territorial acquisi-
tion (and thus differentiating Locke from Vitoria), see Fitzmaurice 2012, 853. 
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Secondly, allodial title contributed to affirming capitalism’s foundational ideologi-
cal distinction between political sovereignty and private economic rights. This was 
readily observable in seventeenth century England where the individualistic, enclo-
sure-focused exercise of land rights coincided with the demilitarization of the old 
feudal aristocracy and consequent transfer of property-protection responsibility to 
a depersonalized constitutional-parliamentary state that maintained the monopoly 
on legitimate coercive force.130 Furthermore, this dynamic was strongly imbricated 
in the process of colonial expansion. Here the consolidating doctrine of public sov-
ereign prerogative over foreign relations was tempered by the need to resolve ques-
tions of private rights emerging at common law as they related to individual claim-
ants involved in colonial endeavours.131  
 
While contradictory at one level, addressing the issues of state authority versus in-
dividual rights raised by the intertwined processes of capitalist transition and over-
seas colonization was a source of innovation in and of itself. Relatedly, the modes 
of colonial legality that proliferated in this context, when viewed through a modern 
lens, constituted a variable hybrid of the regime of legal relations between inde-
pendent sovereigns (i.e. the laws of nations) and the extraterritorial extension of 
domestic law.132 It was through the production of these innovations that the ideo-
logical fault lines between public-private, political-economic, and national-interna-
tional began consolidating into their modern forms. 
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3.4.2.  Boundaries of Belonging   
 
The English ‘privilege of backwardness’ certainly generated a vast array of legal 
innovations that shaped an empire more resilient than its Continental European 
competitors. However, they became victims of their own success regarding the thir-
teen colonies (Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, and Virginia) that ultimately formed the United States of America. 
In this context, self-asserted political communities created out of English settler 
projects proved that they too could lodge arguments that merged ‘venerable tradi-
tion’ with ‘timeless principle’ as a means of advancing core material interests. Up-
rooted from their formative contexts, these settler populations maintained a vast 
degree of interpretive latitude when readapting legal, political, and cultural con-
cepts without the fear of contradicting longstanding social traditions.133  
 
As such, the settler community formed out of a wide array of backgrounds was 
bestowed with a ‘privilege of backwardness’ that far exceeded the English 
metropole. Through forcefully asserting these intertwined settler innovations, the 
colonies ultimately broke from their parent sovereign to form an independent US. 
While varied in its lineage, this result hinged upon a unifying rubric that would 
fundamentally reshape the world. This was none other than the premise that de facto 
authority as a demonstration of popular will justifies sovereign independence under 
international law. Accounting for this outcome raises numerous questions as to 
what material conditions were relevant and how their impact was managed, and 
generated, through juridical formulations.  
 
In grounding this inquiry, a matter of profound importance is Lord Edward Coke’s 
1608 decision in Calvin’s Case. Narrowly concerned with whether Robert Calvin, 
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a Scotsman born after the 1603 monarchical union of England and Scotland under 
James I, could bring suit in English courts to claim inherited property located in 
England, this case bore great impact concerning the boundaries of inclusion within 
the greater British imperial sphere.134 Ruling that Calvin could sue given that his 
place of birth connected his allegiance to the King (and thus was not an alien), Coke 
went on elucidate the distinction between the ‘alien friend’ and the ‘alien’ along 
with their corresponding rights within the realm of England.135 While an ‘alien 
friend’ had the rights to acquire and bring suit in relation to moveable property (but 
not land beyond that which is necessary for habitation), should they become an 
‘alien enemy’ through a state of war they are ‘…utterly disabled to maintain any 
action, or get anything within this realm.’136 However, beyond this variable divide, 
there existed a more permeant category in the form of the ‘perpetual enemy.’ Ac-
cording to Coke’s delineation of this status and those falling within it: 
 
…a perpetual enemy (though there be no wars by fire and sword be-
tween them) cannot maintain any action, or get anything within this 
realm. All infidels are in law….perpetual enemies….for between them, 
as with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is 
hostility, and can be no…peace.137 
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Coke extended this ‘Christian’ and ‘infidel’ distinction into the domain of conquest 
and declared that in the former category existing laws were maintained, albeit sub-
ject to discretionary transformation, yet in the latter category ‘the laws of the infidel 
are abrogated’ as violations of the law of nature.138  
 
When considering the force of Calvin’s Case in relation to what later became the 
popular will-based American Revolution the significance is twofold, yet ultimately 
intertwined. On the one hand, a strong argument can be made that Coke’s pro-
nouncement on the absolute subjugation of infidels through conquest was directly 
made to legitimize colonization, in particular regarding the Virginia Company that 
had just established the first permeant English settlement at Jamestown in 1604.139 
On the other hand, there is the way in which Calvin’s Case, despite its overwhelm-
ing reference to kingly allegiance, furthered the notion of rights based on free citi-
zenship that could be applicable far beyond the immediate subject matter of the 
case. For the earliest American settlers, such abstract arguments was a matter of 
basic material interest. As Aziz Rana has shown ‘[e]arly Anglo settlers did not nec-
essarily enjoy a unique plethora of ancestral rights and privileges; rather, they were 
often treated legally and politically as no different than any other conquered popu-
lation, confronted by martial law and coercive forms of labor discipline.’140 Thus, 
while the first dimension can be read as serving both metropolitan and settler inter-
ests, the second dimension planted the seeds for the settlers to challenge the 
metropole as the true inheritors of its ideals. 
 
Regarding the second dimension, while Calvin’s Case supported the harsh treat-
ment of colonial labour because settlers were outside the protective jurisdictional 
bounds of England and its common law, key points of dicta ultimately transformed 
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this entire scheme. According to Rana’s analysis, a consequential crack in Calvin’s 
Case was that in establishing the parameters of the English subject, it left open the 
question of what rights accompanied the Englishman when he travelled and, on this 
point, the right to property held a place of prominence.141 This mobility of English 
rights worked in conjunction with the erasure of the laws of conquered infidels pro-
claimed in Calvin’s Case and thus resulting in a two-track system whereby ‘Anglo 
settlers enjoyed the core liberties and common law protections, while indigenous 
subjects were governed by whatever means the Crown viewed as necessary for 
maintaining authority and gaining native tribute.’142 On a broader scale, the bound-
aries juridically organized on the basis of Calvin’s Case are deeply consistent with 
the distinction between bounded political sovereignty and transcendent private 
rights that is a hallmark of the capitalist social relations consolidating in this context 
of Anglo-American settler colonization. Through these intertwined material, racial, 
and juridical processes, the stage was set for settler expressions of a property-ven-
erating conceptions of popular will that condemned both metropolitan authority and 
the political subjectivity of indigenous peoples. 
 
Beyond, the singular juridical artefact that is Calvin’s Case, there remains the issue 
of how the presumptions guiding Coke’s reasoning in this decision provided an 
enduring well-spring of legal innovation for American settlers. Beyond its utility in 
indigenous dispossession, the discourse of conquest in Coke’s context was strongly 
informed by the King James I’s attempt to impose a continental type absolutism in 
England, which for many of his critics was tantamount to a ‘conquest.’143 A prom-
inent voice in this capacity, Coke took a proactive role in asserting the principles of 
common law as a means of frustrating monarchical invocations of absolutist pre-
rogative and Calvin’s Case was deeply consistent with this line of strategy.144 In 
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grounding these efforts within a broader scheme of legal meaning, Coke was a 
strong proponent of the idea that England possessed an ‘Ancient Constitution’ 
whereby the Anglo-Saxons’ customary rights and liberties survived the imposition 
of feudalism following the 1066 Norman Conquest.145 Thus, through embodying of 
these customs, the common law remained a source of resistance to absolutism.146  
 
As Daniel Hulsebosch has shown, such a strategy held great appeal amongst Amer-
ican settlers, for: ‘Coke’s notion of dynamic custom offered early modern English 
speakers a way to resist new ideas of unitary sovereignty. If nothing else, Anglo-
American lawyers learned from him that legal complexity was itself a barrier not 
just against absolutism but against any distant government.’147 With this colonial 
adaptation, the common law maintained its symbolic force, yet was substantively 
transformed from a paternalist body of jurisdictional proclamations to a discourse 
of jurisprudential proclamations of popular liberty.148 While the latter justified sub-
mission to an existing political order, the former established the basis for justifying 
a new political order. 
 
3.4.3.  A Settler Law of Slavery  
 
Form a materialist perspective, this ‘jurisdictional to jurisprudential’ transformation 
of the common law is deeply interesting in the way it allowed for legal manoeuvres 
in the American colonies that were previously unknown in England. On this basis, 
we can observe how novel justifications developed in response to very specific ma-
terial conditions, yet proved remarkably able to draw upon existing common law 
vocabularies in doing so. An incredibly important illustration of this was the bour-
geoning colonial society’s embrace of race-based chattel slavery as a successor to 
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indentured servitude when satisfying its demands for coerced labour. Accounting 
for the material grounding of this phenomenon is deeply important given the way 
slavery highlights how the formative American experiment in popular will was 
deeply contradictory as an unprecedented experiment in human liberty that toler-
ated, and even celebrated, exceptionally harsh institutions of human bondage. 
 
Regarding the American law of slavery, according to George Frederickson’s ac-
count, in projects of concentrated accumulation, coerced labour is more efficient 
than formally equal wage-labour in circumstances where labour is scarce and land 
is plentiful.149 Here, if nothing restricts wage-labourers from acquiring cheap land, 
this provides them with an independent base of sustenance that functions as a pow-
erful bargaining chip when negotiating the sale of their labour-power.150 Thus, from 
the perspective of capitalism’s beneficiaries, metropolitan England was highly suc-
cessful with its wage-labour model given the scarcity of land resulting from enclo-
sures and the surplus of labour resulting from the peasant dispossession accompa-
nying said enclosures.151 However, these same conditions were fundamentally ab-
sent in the American colonies. 
 
 While indentured servitude was the immediate mechanism for confronting this co-
lonial labour problem, its sustainability was limited. Once indentured servants 
(many of whom were of African origin) were released from their obligations they 
formed a landless mass of surplus labour prone to lodging claims of wealth redis-
tribution.152 Such an arrangement, threatened elite interests with the prospect of a 
trans-racial alliance between indentured labour and free, yet landless, labour.153 
Thus by converting temporary, race-neutral indentured servitude into permeant, 
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race-based, and intergenerational chattel slavery, popular challenges to elite inter-
ests were divided along racial lines. Through this turn to immutability, chattel slav-
ery later provided a durable solution to the colonial labour problem thus enabling 
high profit ventures in the form of cash crop plantations that enriched the larger 
sphere of empire.154 
 
Yet what exactly was the legal justification for this? In the earlier sites of British 
plantation slavery, namely the Caribbean, such practices were legitimized based on 
sovereign prerogative over conquered territories.155 However, very different jurid-
ical circumstances were presented by the American settler colonies where, in the 
name of resisting the metropolitan prerogative defended in Calvin’s Case, an array 
of ‘ancient’ common law liberties were being progressively asserted as the basis 
for lawful authority.156 For those seeking to implement slavery, the problem was 
that not only was slavery unrecognized within the English common law, but this 
system’s mode of reasoning was fundamentally adverse to owning human beings 
as chattel property.157 In overcoming this barrier, while playing fidelity to pro-
claimed legal tradition, the American law of slavery pieced together various diverse 
common law provisions along with discourses from within the law of nature and 
nations.158  
 
According to Christopher Tomlins this resulting legal regime was ‘…consistent 
with the whole intellectual thrust of English colonizing —the law of nature and 
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nations served precisely to explain and justify the larger colonizing enterprise of 
which mainland slavery regimes were subsystems.’159 With this distinct justifica-
tion, the law of slavery forms a case study of the way in which settler colonial 
adaption of the common law removed it from the sphere of England’s jurisdictional 
paternalism and placed it within the jurisprudential sphere of America as a unique 
experiment in liberty. Here, American colonies were released from communal tra-
ditions whereby permitting slavery would directly undermine the communal foun-
dations of patriarchy and paternalism constituting the English common law.160 Di-
rectly linking the development of American popular will with the expansion of cap-
italism, what emerged was an absolute freedom defined by the presence of absolute 
servitude that materially contributed to capital accumulation through its ability to 
commodify and profit from the trade of human beings. 
 
As racialized chattel slavery operated as a distinct means of stratifying the demands 
of colonial labour (and by extension social order), a corresponding racialization 
took place in relation to acquiring the lands of indigenous peoples. Here, the ‘black-
ness’ that legally attached to slavery was considered so highly transmissible 
through heredity that ‘one drop’ of African blood rendered an individual ‘black.’161 
By contrast, indigenous ancestry was deemed exceptionally prone to dilution.162 As 
Patrick Wolfe has shown, the logic here was that increasing the pool of slave-based 
wealth provided incentive to label as many individuals ‘black’ as possible, while 
the desire for indigenous land incentivized the denial of indigenous ancestry 
amongst those claiming ancestral land rights.163 While these two modes of raciali-
zation operated very differently, at a broader contextual level, it is easy to see how 
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their conjunctive operation bolstered an overarching expansion of colonial capital-
ism whereby the forceful appropriation of land and labour created a system osten-
sibly premised on formal equality and self-regulating market exchange. 
 
3.4.4.  A Settler Law of Expansion 
 
In using this frame to further analyse juridical consolidation of this ‘settler empire’ 
what deserves deep attention is the nexus between the right to acquire property and 
the ideology of substantive liberty that sparked the American Revolution. Within 
this context, ownership of property emerged as tantamount to self-sufficiency and 
self-rule in a manner that was being justified by an increasing array of theories and 
theorists. This included further explications of the common law (especially William 
Blackstone’s 1756 Commentaries on the Law of England), Protestant theology, the 
republican political theory of John Harrington and Algernon Sydney, and, perhaps 
most prominently, John Locke on property acquisition through labour-based im-
provement.164 However, this model of the independent individual deriving suste-
nance from his own property holding was far more an ideal than a reality. As Rich-
ard Drayton has shown, the success of these small estate-holders depended upon 
selling the proceeds of their lands to slave plantations in the Caribbean, thus ren-
dering their ‘self-sufficiency’ contingent upon the broader sphere of imperial rela-
tions.165 Despite its fictitious nature, this ideology of American settler freedom car-
ried tremendous material impact in that it was dependent on presumptively endless 
frontier expansion that necessarily entailed the dispossession of indigenous com-
munities.166 
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Much like slavery, this land-accumulation process drew upon the common law as 
a discourse of legitimation while simultaneously applying it in ways never before 
witnessed in England. As a preliminary matter, these extra-European lands argua-
bly fell under the category of ‘allodial title’ and, as such, existed outside the regime 
of feudal encumbrance. This link between feudal absence and the right to property 
as an inherent liberty attached to free English subjects was evident in the ways 
American colonists successfully resisted the impositions of property burdens that 
would bind them to the metropole.167 From this foundation, the colonies hosted an 
unprecedented number of legal mechanisms enabling the alienability of land.168 
Prominent amongst these innovations was the use of land as a loan collateral in the 
form of a mortgage that could compel sale through foreclosure in the event of a 
borrower’s default on a loan repayment.169 
 
Although long described as a means of allowing land to essentially function as 
money in the American colonies, most scholarship on this topic has focused on 
intra-settler relations and thus neglected the role of mortgages as a tool as indige-
nous dispossession.170 According to K-Sue Park’s rectification of this gap, settlers-
indigenous interaction in this context constituted a ‘contact economy’ where, alt-
hough settlers adopted indigenous currency mediums, culturally disparate under-
standing of money and land resulted in deeply unequal exchanges orchestrated 
through settler exploitation of this epistemic asymmetry.171 In turning to Park’s ex-
planation of these practices:  
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Colonists extended credit to indigenous people to draw them into debt, 
inducing them to take out ‘mortgages’ on which they would later fore-
close. However, when colonists used the imported mortgage to fore-
close, they not only insisted on the English conception of land, ignoring 
understandings of belonging to a place, but they widened the existing 
breach between English and indigenous conceptions of land by aban-
doning age-old English hesitation about treating land in the manner of 
chattel, thus creating a brand-new American commodity.172 
 
These practices of deception and misdirection further expose capital accumula-
tion’s structural dependence on extra-economic means of coercion. The contradic-
tions here are particularly sharp when uncovered within societies such as the Amer-
ican settlers who placed such a high ideological premium on free, informed trans-
actions and certainty in ownership rights. However, while there is much to be said 
for colonialization as accomplished through the ‘possessive individualism’ of set-
tler claims to property in land, from a materialist perspective, there is more to this 
story. As Allan Greer has shown, in contrast to the strict Lockean view of ‘individ-
ualistic’ settler rights versus ‘communal’ indigenous traditions, the outcome of dis-
possession was simultaneously effected by European practices of common property 
being applied in the New World.173 Such practices were especially prevalent in the 
ranging and pasturing of livestock, including hogs and cattle, where property rights 
attached to individual animals, yet, the lands they were set upon fell under the rubric 
of common usage.174 Counterintuitively, these common property practices of open-
ranging actually overcame some traditional common law principles that rigidly pro-
tected individuals’ exclusive use and enjoyment of their land. For instance, ‘the new 
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colonies quickly passed legislation that overthrew a longstanding English legal tra-
dition governing liability for crop damage due to livestock depredation.’175 
 
As a matter of profound importance, these common land-based livestock practices 
severely disrupted indigenous cultures, and thus furthered the structure of settler 
colonization. This impact included the disruption of indigenous agricultural prac-
tices, not to mention the ways in which livestock acted as vectors for infectious Old 
World microbes that indigenous populations, and the native wildlife they depended 
upon, were without immunity.176 Furthermore, these common property practices 
directly enabled private property accumulation in that the release of livestock and 
the transformation of nature it entailed made North American lands amenable to 
European practices and thus rendered them prime subjects of enclosure claims.177 
While some indigenous people did undertake settler agricultural practices, the pro-
cess of doing so necessitated entry into a wide array of legal relations that exposed 
them to exploitation.178 Taking all of this into account, we can see how the settler 
ideology of private property ownership was inseparable from its direct material im-
pact on the indigenous communities it sought to replace.  
 
3.4.5.  The Empire Strikes Back 
 
While common law-centred settler adaptations proved highly success in transform-
ing North America into a space of great freedom and affluence (for an elect popu-
lation), the events of 1763 reminded these colonists of just how closely their fate 
was tied to the greater British imperial order. In this year Britain decisively defeated 
France in the transcontinental conflict deemed the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) 
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and vastly increased its empire through a new array of territorial gains.179 Through 
this mass infusion of new subjects from so many cultural, linguistic, and religious 
backgrounds, white American settlers faced questions of how their privileged posi-
tion might be undermined in light of Britain’s need to accommodate its multi-ethic 
empire.180 Britain had already been moving towards this type of pluralism as shown 
by the gradual abandonment of its harsh position of abrogation regarding the laws 
of conquered territories expressed in Calvin’s Case.181 This can be taken as evi-
dence that the British had learned that preserving local laws, albeit in a deeply pa-
ternalist fashion, had tremendous potential in governing subject populations.182 
From this premise, a corollary question arose as to whether the adaptions that gave 
rise to the distinct phenomenon of American freedom might be limited, either de 
jure or de facto, by the British imperial attempt to accommodate peoples the Amer-
ican settlers considered fundamentally inferior.183 
 
The 1763 Royal Proclamation the settlers’ worst fears. Prompted by efforts to es-
tablish good relations with indigenous communities in territories newly acquired 
from France, this edict forbad frontier settlement west of the Appalachian Moun-
tains without express permission from British authorities.184 Thus, the Royal Proc-
lamation cut off the presumptively unlimited ability to acquire property in land 
through expansion and, as such, threatened the material basis of American settler 
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liberty.185 To make matters even more dire, this limitation of frontier accumulation 
was coupled with a limitation on overseas trade in the form of British restrictions 
on the continental European trade in goods with the North American consumer mar-
ket.186 Additionally, the strengthening of the ‘red race’ at the expense of settler in-
terests was coupled with another threat to settler supremacy emanating from the 
‘black race.’ Here, if Anglo settlers would no longer provide the loyalty and support 
needed to advance British imperial interests in North America, a fear existed that 
Britain’s black subjects might be called upon as enforcers of order.187 The ultimate 
result of this was a widespread ‘black scare’ whereby colonists feared a British 
invasion of North America with an army of African and Caribbean troops would 
instigate a general slave revolt and enact vengeance upon white society.188 
 
While the immediate impact of the Seven Years’ War was perceived as a disaster 
for the proponents of American settler liberty, when viewed on a broader scale, this 
event can be understood as the source of their ultimate success. As Richard Devetak 
and Emily Tannock have recently shown, this war was a milestone in the evolution 
of the modern international system by demonstrating the ability of inter-imperial 
rivalry to link previously autonomous, if not isolated, regional sub-systems into 
more globally integrated regimes.189 While this conflict began with skirmishes be-
tween British and French North American settler projects in the Ohio Valley, it 
expanded to the Caribbean, South America, West Africa, India, and Europe.190 This 
included clashes amongst continental Europe’s great powers whereby a British-
backed Prussia squared off against an unprecedented ‘triple alliance’ of France, 
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Austria, and Russia.191 Importantly, ‘[u]nlike the wars of succession that dominated 
[European] diplomacy and international relations of the eighteenth century, the 
Seven Years’ War was comparatively bereft of religious and dynastic interests.’192 
 
In assessing the legacies of this first truly global conflict, British victory vastly en-
hanced the importance of its imperial model of global trade and this necessitated 
far greater European interest in the rest of the world.193 Furthermore, it played a 
profound role in the development of the modern military-fiscal state, especially in 
the conservative dynastic kingdoms of continental Europe who now realized that 
their seemingly localized interests could be impacted by events in far-flung colo-
nies.194 Moreover, as a matter of particular interest for this chapter (and thesis more 
broadly) there was the way in which these changing concepts of trade, statehood, 
and overseas expansion prompted by this war directly impacted the transformation 
of what constituted legitimate political authority. With traditional conceptions of 
empire being questioned (in both its European dynastic and non-European variants), 
the stage was set for new forms of assertion where: ‘[t]he novelty lay not just in the 
emergence of popular sovereignty as a legitimate rival to dynastic sovereignty, but 
in the equally significant idea that sovereign states are free independent and 
equal.’195 Given this context of reception, what was the exact nature of the Ameri-
can case for sovereign independence and how did it translate the above-detailed 
parochial interests of a private property-based settler empire into a universal stand-
ard? It is to these questions that this thesis now turns. 
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3.5.  An American Case for International Legal Standing 
 
3.5.1.  Justifying a Lockean Republic 
 
          With the advent of the 1763 Royal Proclamation, and the unravelling of bonds that 
ensued, the only way to maintain the uniquely American conception of property-
based liberty premised on endless territorial expansion was establishing absolute 
sovereign autonomy. While this dynamic was not conclusively apparent at the mo-
ment this proclamation was made, subsequent efforts to reconcile this fundamental 
contradiction of settler-metropole interests ultimately failed. The point of no return 
was made unambiguous clear with the British Parliament’s 1775 Prohibitory Act 
that placed the American colonies outside the protection of the British Crown.196 In 
the face of this unavoidable pressure, formulations of freedom, legal order, political 
community, and human hierarchy spawned by the uneven and combined maelstrom 
of colonial capitalism meshed together to form a multi-layered juridical framework 
that perfectly served the American cause. This was none other than the proposition 
that the production and maintenance of incontestable ‘facts on the ground’ demon-
strated popular will and this consequently legitimized sovereign independence. This 
is the same vanishing point between ‘might’ and ‘right’ that exists at the heart of 
the contemporary ‘effective control doctrine.’ 
 
On the question of what constituted ‘facts on the ground’ in this context, our atten-
tion must turn to a specific understanding of how the literal ‘ground’ was the grand 
arbiter of relevant ‘facts.’ This took the form of private property-protection as a 
first principle that determined the shape the second-order consideration of sover-
eignty needed to take. On this basis, the character of sovereignty was imputed from 
the profoundly influential Lockean premise that protecting property interests was 
                                                        




the sole legitimate end of government. Through this lens, for American colonists, 
alternative claims to ownership, be they royal or indigenous, undermined this prem-
ise and could be justifiably resisted.197 In staging this resistance, the foundational 
conception of purity in property-ownership formulated a necessary corollary 
through an equally pure conception of sovereignty derived directly from the will of 
the underlying political community. While there was certainly much disagreement 
on which legal-institutional configuration best encapsulated this abstraction of pop-
ular will-derived sovereignty, the sanctity of property as a base presumption was 
largely beyond contestation. The general shape of legal evolution in the American 
Revolutionary context demonstrated this dynamic. Here the rules of public law 
were subject to a broad array of controversies, yet, the underlying private law rules 
concerning property rights and commercial interests remained almost entirely in-
tact.198  
 
Taking all of this account, if popular will was a necessary articulation for those 
safeguarding a property-based conception of liberty, this necessarily raises the 
question of who were subjects that supplied this popular will? As discussed above, 
this was the white male property-owning subject whose maintenance of liberty was 
premised upon the suppression of those outside of this category as a fundamental 
condition of possibility. Such a logic fed back into the justification that this partic-
ular stratum of individuals should maintain a monopoly on representative authority. 
After all, to include those without property would mean including those who faced 
no direct consequences from collectively-made distributional decisions and thus 
had no stake in the system.199 This configuration implicated both the abstraction-
based and materiality-based character of capitalist social relations in that it funda-
mentally intertwined the idealized quality of the property-worthy subject (white-
ness and masculinity) and the persistence of concrete patterns of domination (the 
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actual possession of property and its exclusion from others). The former legitimized 
the later, and vice versa, in a circular capacity. 
 
3.5.2.  Thomas Jefferson, International Legal Publicist  
 
While it is not difficult to see how this particular property-sovereignty continuum 
functioned as a rallying cry for many American settlers, there remained the question 
of how outsiders might be convinced of the legitimacy the American cause. In as-
sessing how this parochial case for independence could be promoted in universal 
terms under the aegis of the ‘law of nations’, a profoundly important individual is 
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the American Declaration of Independence. While 
Jefferson’s sophisticated knowledge of the law of nations is well-documented, most 
studies have focused on his handling of discrete legal issues in his official service 
as a statesman within the early American republic.200 What has yet to be confronted 
is how his political theory of the American cause shaped the modern popular will-
international law relationship whereby ‘facts on the ground’ produce a default pre-
sumption that a sovereign political community is legitimate. In undertaking such a 
confrontation, it becomes clear that Jefferson’s theory collapses the distinction be-
tween right and might as a justification for sovereign authority, the key feature of 
today’s ‘effective control doctrine.’  
 
In offering this interpretation of Jefferson, a few inter-related points are of great 
significance. First of all, he is often remembered as deeply contradictory figure due 
to the fact that he owned one of America’s largest slave plantations and wrote elo-
quently of the natural liberty of all men.201 However, taken as a matter of context, 
such a position was eminently consistent with the particular property-sovereignty 
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continuum discussed above. Through this lens, it makes a great deal of sense that, 
despite many apparent paradoxes, the right to property is nevertheless identifiable 
as the irreducible core of legal, political, and ethical thought in the Jeffersonian 
cannon.202  
 
Secondly, when justifying this ultimate position, his masterful synthesis of a vast 
array of texts into incredibly concise prose exemplified the phenomenon of ‘juridi-
cal thinking’ whereby the lawyer’s task is to genealogically connect disparate 
points as an articulation of timeless principle.203 However, Jefferson’s abilities in 
this capacity should not be overly attributed to individual genius independent of 
context. As discussed above, the lack compounded, long-term social practices in 
the American settler colonial context provided this population a vast array of inter-
pretative discretion in rejecting, adapting, or inventing traditions when expounding 
the parameters of legal and political justification. Thus, Jefferson was arguably the 
single greatest practitioner of ‘juridical thinking’ against the backdrop of material 
conditions that actively cultivated this skill. Given that these material conditions 
where inexorably shaped by capitalist social-relations, it is unsurprising that the 
right to property occupied the core of Jefferson’s normative ontology. 
 
Through grounding this right to property, Jefferson can be understood as position-
ing the externally-focused case for American independence by first locating Amer-
ican uniqueness in its global context. According to Andrew Fitzmaurice’s reading, 
this took the form of delineating two different situations where diametrically-op-
posed approaches to lawful order could each be social destructive in the own dis-
tinct ways. On the one hand, there were situations where the deficiency of law lead 
to anarchic ‘savagery’ whereby no orderly social foundations were secure.204 On 
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the other hand, there were situations of excessive law whereby tyranny persisted in 
that all freedom was subject to unaccountable authority.205 While the former de-
picted non-European societies and later depicted Europe’s absolutist regimes (and 
even its commercial societies), the American colonies occupied a virtuous middle-
ground.206 In Jefferson’s ideal of America, the excesses of both chaos and despot-
ism were avoided through the consignment of law to the delineated spheres of prop-
erty acquisition, maintenance, and alienation, as a well as a limited government that 
protected these rights.207 
 
However, situating American uniqueness still left open the question of why outsid-
ers should recognize American independence. When answering to this question in 
light of Jefferson’s overarching contributions, we can acquire much insight from 
mapping the international legal implications of his famous 1774 pamphlet ‘A Sum-
mary View of the Rights of British America.’ Through this text, Jefferson combines 
a depiction of the legal basis for American independence with an account of how 
British improprieties in relation to American property-based interests forced an om-
inous clarification of the nature of American sovereignty. Here he claimed that 
American lands were ‘allodial’ (held free and clear of any feudal encumbrances) in 
a manner characteristic of the pre-Norman Conquest Anglo-Saxons who were the 
ancestors of the current American settler community.208 Since ‘America was not 
conquered by William the Norman, nor its lands surrendered to any of his succes-
sors’, the allodial character of its lands held firm.209 Thus, it was only through mis-
representing the truths of property law that the colonists had ever believed that the 
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British Crown held any valid interests in their lands.210 Under the ubiquitous rubric 
of common law authority, Jefferson seamlessly connected the discourse of an An-
glo-Saxon ‘Ancient Constitution’ that resisted absolutism with the discourse of ‘al-
lodial title’ that enabled colonialism capitalism 
 
This grounding of rights can be connected back to the text’s previous claim that 
British interference in the colonies’ trade-based property interests, and their at-
tendant consequences, were unjustifiable legal breach as opposed to an acceptable 
exercise of Britain’s imperial political discretion.211 In a recital of grievances, Jef-
ferson condemned British depredations against ‘…the exercise of free trade with 
all parts of the world, possessed by the American colonists, as of natural right, and 
which no law of their own had taken away or abridged.’212 For Jefferson, such ac-
tions were sufficient to raise the point that the settlement of America and its for-
mation of a unique society made it just as much a nation as Britain which was 
formed through the analogous pattern of Anglo-Saxon settlement centuries be-
fore.213 That said, while the metropole-settler ties were an acknowledged source of 
mutual benefit, as a fundamental reality, the Americans exercised control over their 
society to a greater extent than the British ever could, and if this was not respected, 
these ties could be severed as a matter of right.214 
 
‘Summary’ was thus a masterwork of ‘juridical thinking’ whereby America’s 
unique property-sovereignty continuum was invoked to support the general pre-
sumption that objective ‘facts on the ground’ warranted sovereign independence, 
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even for an entity whose emphasis on popular will led it to reject dynastic sover-
eignty. Popular will here was inseparable from a trans-temporal narrative of prop-
erty rights where upholding distinct social relations in the present legitimized a my-
thologized narrative of past that could be mobilized to make claims upon the future. 
Through this tapestry of meaning, the veneration of a pure, apolitical conception of 
property politically justified the autonomy of a popular will-based sovereign entity. 
If this entity suffered an unjustifiable interference with its foundationally important 
property rights/interests, an appropriate remedy was to dissolve all bonds with those 
responsible for the interference and this warranted the entire world’s recognition. 
Thus, as a matter of universally applicable logic, the British could not deny this 
dynamic without denying their own legitimacy as a nation. In this way, Jefferson 
passionately depicted the uniqueness of the American experiment, but did so in by 
situating its case for independence as deserving outside support, even from those 
unable or unwilling to understand its plight on a substantive level. This hinged on 
the implication that if sovereignty was lacking in the America colonies, it was ques-
tionable whether sovereignty could be truly present anywhere. 
  
3.5.3.  Bringing Vattel Back In 
 
While Jefferson’s formulation provides insight into how a case for sovereign inde-
pendence was formulated as an extension of American settler interests, we must not 
forget the place of Vattel’s treatise in this process. It bears recalling that The Law 
of Nations is a deeply indeterminate text and, thus, its contextual interpretations 
reveal much about the material realities that animated its reception. Two inter-
linked considerations are key in this capacity: Vattel’s facilitation of the founda-
tional Lockean conception of the property-sovereignty continuum and Vattel’s 
translation of the American cause into the language of European war and diplomacy. 
Highlighting these considerations allows us to grasp the larger context of Jeffer-
son’s Declaration of Independence and its broader impact on the law of nations. 
 
On Vattel’s facilitation of Lockean ideals, as an initial matter, the two theorists are 
often compared. Both demanded cultivation as an essential precondition for land 




agrarian colonizers).215  However, this overlap should not obscure the fact that 
Locke dealt with the rights of individuals against sovereigns while Vattel dealt with 
the rights of sovereigns that maintained ultimate discretion over the rights of indi-
viduals.216 This difference nonetheless allowed a space for harmonization in that 
Locke and Vattel could be invoked on distinct, yet inter-connected, levels. Accord-
ing to William Ossipow and Dominik Gerber’s assessment of the founders’ mutu-
ally reinforcing usage of these two figures:  
 
In Locke’s work they found a powerful set of political argu-
ments….In Vattel’s law of Nations they found a remarkable ar-
ticulation of those very same arguments, transposed from the lan-
guage of philosophy into the concise, fluent, and clear language 
of law. With the Swiss jurist, Locke’s Whig political philosophy 
migrated into another textual genre: a treatise on the law of na-
tions.217  
 
In other words, Vattel offered the necessary externally-focused juridical infrastruc-
ture for supporting a Lockean mode of internally-focused political justification. At 
a material level, it was the settler expansionist project of reproducing a property-
based conception of liberty that forged an essential unification of the two thinkers. 
 
A point of vital importance here is that Vattel’s theory did not simply transpose 
Locke onto the international level. Such a ‘domestic analogy’-based association of 
interactions between individuals in a domestic society with interactions between 
states within an international society directly contradicted Vattel’s unprecedented 
view that states, as entities that facilitate the perfection of collectives of individuals, 
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are fundamentally different from individuals.218 On this premise, the ‘domestic 
analogy’ was far more supportive of the prevailing dynastic view that sovereignty 
was vested in the bodies of individual monarchs, a formulation the American revo-
lutionaries explicitly rejected.219 Thus Vattel represented an alternative legitimation 
of state personality aligned to the interests of American settlers at the level of form 
(the law of nations could support the legitimacy of a political project that premised 
popular sovereignty on private property ownership) in addition to substance (pri-
vate property-based settler accumulation was a moral act in and of itself).  
 
Moreover, this Vattelian view of the subject of the law of nations as a collective of 
individuals based on popular will could support acts of secession in a manner una-
vailable to international legal personality theories depicting the sovereign as an in-
divisible body directly analogous to an individual. This provides a great of expla-
nation as to why Vattel was amongst the first theorists to proclaim that the creation 
of an entirely new international legal entity was an acceptable outcome in the event 
of an internal conflict where the de facto reality demonstrated no possibility of po-
litical reconciliation.220 This stood in contrast to previous thinkers, such as Hobbes, 
whose adherence to the ‘domestic analogy’ lead them to portray political dismem-
berment as the death of a sovereign that must be avoided at all cost.221 An illustra-
tion of a more Vattelian line of thought in the American revolutionary context can 
be located in the writings of James Wilson (1742-1798), one of the most knowl-
edgeable jurists amongst the founding fathers.222 According to Wilson’s view that 
a nation’s secession in the name of popular will was not analogous to human death:   
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A Nation has a right to assign to its existence a voluntary termination: 
a man has not….By the voluntary act of the individuals forming the 
nation, the nation was called in existence; they who bind can also untie; 
by the voluntary act, therefore, of the individuals forming the nation, 
the nation may be reduced to its original nothing. But it was not by his 
own voluntary act that the man made his appearance upon the theatre 
of life; he cannot, therefore, plead the right of the nation by his own 
voluntary act to make his exist. He did not make; therefore, he has no 
right to destroy himself.223 
 
While Vattel’s theory of popular will-based sovereignty furthered the American 
revolutionaries’ political project by articulating a basis for secession whereby ‘facts 
on the ground’ vindicated popular will, questions of external legitimation persisted. 
After all, since the powers of the world remained overwhelmingly committed to 
dynastic legitimacy, an entity claiming sovereign autonomy based on popular will 
(even if supported by de facto territory) might profoundly undermine the authority 
claims of dynastic actors. While Vattel’s treatise reconciled this conundrum, it did 
so not through its theory of sovereign legitimacy, but rather through its pronounce-
ments on war. On this point, while Ossipow and Gerber are correct in their claim 
that the founders’ revolutionary strategy included efforts to act ‘…in accord with 
the classical theory of Just War formulated by Gentili, Grotius, and Vattel’, these 
figures must be disaggregated. 224  In contrast to earlier thinks, Vattel (largely 
through adaptations from his chief influence Christian Wolf) represented a dramatic 
transformation of the Just War tradition. 
 
While scholars dating back to St. Augustine depicted Just War as the resort to force 
in the name of a ‘just cause’, this justification could only have one true possessor.225 
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This dynamic infamously enabled the prolonging of violent conflict when two or 
more parties each claimed to have justice on their side and thus had no incentive to 
relinquish their claims. By contrast, Vattel marked a turning away from the dog-
matic character of Just War by replacing it with the more pluralist doctrine of ‘reg-
ular war’, whereby more than one party could possess ‘just cause’ to use force (or 
at least be sincere in the belief that they did).226 This ethos of pluralism was refined 
through the Vattelian ontology of multiple nation-states, where each possessed the 
final sovereign discretion on questions of justice and morality in relation to its dis-
tinct self-perfecting political community. Such an ordering premise can be linked 
to Vattel’s emphasis on furthering practical diplomacy more concerned with self-
preservation than articulating universal values for a world where moral consensus 
was presumptively unachievable.227  
 
Through the Vattelian discourse of regular war and its pluralization of ‘just cause’, 
the American agenda of solidifying a popular will-based sovereign entity could re-
but claims that its recourse to force breached the Just War tradition by undermining 
dynastic legitimacy. Such a legitimation of war deeply resonated with the Jefferso-
nian view that de facto authority justified American independence. This sentiment 
featured prominently in Jefferson’s ‘Declaration (…) Setting Forth the Causes and 
Necessity of Their Taking Up Arms’, a Vattel-influenced argument for waging war 
against the British adopted by the Second Continental Congress on July 6th, 1775.228 
To quote Ossipow and Gerber once again: ‘[t]his document represents a significant 
turning point in Vattel’s reception in the American colonies since, for the first time, 
his authority is no longer confined to theoretical debates or pamphlets, but came to 
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influence a political message issued by the highest body of the colonies.’229 In ex-
emplifying ‘facts on the ground’ as the justification of sovereign autonomy in the 
name of popular will, Jefferson’s proclaimed that: 
 
Our cause is just. Our union is perfect. Our internal Resources great, 
and, if necessary, foreign Assistance is undoubtedly attainable. We 
gratefully acknowledge, as signal Instances of the Divine Favour to-
wards us, that his Providence would not permit us to call into this severe 
Controversy, until we were grown up to our present strength, had pre-
viously exercised in warlike Preparation, and possessed the means of 
defending ourselves.230 
 
Through this passage, Jefferson, aided immensely by Vattel, conflated might with 
right within the confines of coherent theory where an experimental political asser-
tion nonetheless affirmed the rules of the existing international order.   
 
3.5.4.  A Material Declaration  
 
Against this backdrop, we can uncover a more materially-grounded understanding 
of the fabled July 4th, 1776 American Declaration of Independence (‘Declaration’), 
that accounts for Jefferson’s strategic logic in authoring this document. This entails 
reconfiguring the view that the Declaration, as a demand for sovereign independ-
ence via natural right, was fundamentally contradictory. This contradiction being 
its assertion that a non-existent entity can declare itself into existence.231 As identi-
fied by David Armitage, the international legal dimension of this conundrum 
stemmed from the fact that the Declaration was a grievance claim that could not be 
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effective unless the US already possessed the positive international legal recogni-
tion that granted it standing to make such claims.232 This logical shortfall was not 
lost on the British opponents of the American case for sovereign independence. 
Prominent among them was Jeremy Bentham, renowned natural rights critic and 
coiner of the very term ‘international law,’ whose ‘Short Review of the Declaration’ 
‘…exposed the logical fallacies of the principles on which the Americans claimed 
their independence, judged them to be tautologous, redundant, inconsistent, and 
hypocritical.’233 
 
In taking the view that material reality (not abstract consistency) is the touchstone 
for historicizing the popular will-international law relationship, Jefferson’s larger 
contextual situating of the Declaration turned Bentham’s logic against itself. On 
this reading, to presume that the Declaration was intended as a self-executing vin-
dication of natural rights meant falling directly into Jefferson’s trap. As his earlier 
writings have shown, he was confident in the ability of the American colonies to 
maintain de facto authority in the face of any attempted suppression by the British 
metropole. Thus, in a move that was inseparable from his material backdrop, Jef-
ferson cast a gauntlet whereby British failure to deny the assertions of American 
settlers would vindicate the sovereignty of American popular will once and for all. 
By positioning the Declaration’s claim as ‘Facts…submitted to a candid world’, 
and encasing them in the universalist language of natural rights, the successful bid 
for independence linked the internal legitimation of the American Revolution to the 
broader law of nations; itself transformed by acknowledging a new entity whose 
sovereignty derived exclusively from ‘the people.’234 In an intimately related ca-
pacity, many of the Declaration’s natural rights-based grievances involved the very 
material conditions of American settler liberty’s private property-based mode of 
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reproduction. Specific offences in this capacity included Britain’s King George 
III’s: interference with global trade,235 discontinuation of unrestricted settler expan-
sion on the frontier,236 and alliances with indigenous nations against settler inter-
ests.237 Recalling Part 3.4. of this chapter, it was the threatened compromise of these 
conditions that motivated the American Revolution in the first instance. 
 
Emphasis on the American settlers’ de facto authority as triumphing over any Brit-
ish claim as incumbent sovereign formed the crux of the American revolutionary 
campaign for support from abroad. The success of this effort is perhaps best demon-
strated by the case of France that in 1778 entered into a treaty of alliance with the 
self-declared American republic.238 This development followed the decisive Amer-
ican victory at the 1777 Battle of Saratoga, an event that proved the irreversibility 
of ‘facts on the ground’, and thus warranted alliance against a common British en-
emy (despite the fundamental ideological difference between the republican US and 
absolutist monarchical France).239 On one level, this Franco-American alliance ex-
emplified the Vattelian view that ideological difference held limited relevance in 
the actual practices of diplomacy and statecraft. 
 
However, there exists an additional layer to this if we take seriously the Jeffersonian 
strategy of invoking natural rights as a means of vindicating material reality. Here, 
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while the British may have claimed that supporting the Declaration-based Ameri-
can cause was an illegitimate embrace of the absurd proposition that abstract natu-
ralist claims had binding force, identifying the source of these claims forced an 
observer to consider the material capabilities of those asserting them.240 Through 
this turn, positions shifted in that the British claim became an abstract invocation 
of sovereign rights while American settlers revealed themselves as capable of actu-
ally holding their territory in the face of forcible deployments by the invokers of 
abstraction.241 In the face of this reinforcing structure of legitimacy correlated to 
material success, the militarily and diplomatically defeated British eventually relin-
quished their sovereign claims and recognized an independent US through the 
Treaty of Paris signed in the September of 1783.242 
 
3.6.  Trials of the Early American Republic  
 
3.6.1.  Postcolonial Tensions, Frontier Diffusion  
 
While the argumentative linkage of de facto authority, sovereign autonomy, and 
popular will may have secured the US as an independent international legal entity, 
the story does not end here. We must also consider the consolidation of the early 
American republic if we are to truly understand this event’s place in the intertwined 
globalization of international law, the nation-state form, and capitalist political 
economy. Since ‘popular will’ grounds this thesis’s understanding of this particular 
intersection, numerous insights can be gained through exploring the formative trials 
and tribulations of this first sovereign born under the justification of popular will 
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effected through a forceful separation from its parent. Against a backdrop of mul-
tiple tensions, the nascent US continually balanced adhering to the customs and 
practices of established sovereigns with asserting polices derived from its unique 
identity as an experiment in republican self-rule.243 In this capacity, the law of na-
tions formed a key discursive medium of navigating these contradictions.244 As 
such, creative applications of Vattel’s highly flexible treatise maintained their po-
sition of paramount importance.245 
 
While accounts of these formative engagements are extensive, what is less re-
marked upon are the ways in which the law of nations was supremely important in 
relation to the questions of internal class consolidation and social identity construc-
tion that allow for a substantive analysis of ‘popular will’ in this context. Such con-
siderations are of great importance as a matter of contemporary international law; 
for if, popular will is the basis for domestic authority within this system, then we 
must understand the presumptions of popular will through their formative context. 
After all, through the trans-temporal abstraction-generating quality of juridical 
thinking, this formative context was subject to universalization and thus made ap-
plicable to situations hosting fundamentally different material conditions. By un-
covering the material conditions that made assertions of popular will successful on 
their own terms in the American context, we gain a newfound understanding of 
‘failures’ involving popular will’s application to situations lacking the material 
foundations of American success. Paradoxically, delineating the material success 
of American popular will entails comparing the early American republic with later 
situations where similarly passionate assertions were subject to far greater degrees 
of frustration. 
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According to Aziz Rana, the social upheaval of postcolonial America bore many 
striking similarities to the general socio-political landscape of post-independence 
Asia and Africa nearly two centuries later.246 This took the form of assertions by 
‘small farmers, artisans, and Western yeomen [who] found themselves embolden 
by a discourse of republicanism and the liberating potential of popular poli-
tics…[that] contradicted the basic tenants of republicanism understood by colonial 
elites.’247 These movements garnered a substantial degree of intellectual support 
through arguments that presented the possibility of applying the ethos of anti-tyr-
anny to the rectification of social inequalities in the post-independence era.248 In-
terestingly enough, this line of argument had a substantial degree of support in Jef-
ferson’s thinking. 
 
Although much of his theory bent towards a Lockean interpretation of the property-
sovereignty relationship (to the extent he formulated an international legal case for 
independence on this basis), in some important respects, his theory of American 
society was deeply at odds with Locke. While Locke placed foundational emphasis 
on the consolidation of a civil society that forms a government for the mutual de-
fence of property, Jefferson was deeply concerned with the ways in which such a 
concerted association of interests could produce a tyrannical outcome of its own.249 
Taking this view seriously, while the original American conception of republican 
liberty centred on the limitless acquisition and maintenance of property, might a 
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renewed conception of republican liberty actively call for the equitable redistribu-
tion of property?250 Such an outcome would be consistent with Jefferson’s procla-
mation that each successive generation must define the meaning of liberty for its 
own time and place lest ruling authorities become decadent and complacent.251 
 
When it came to addressing this popular challenge, postcolonial American elites 
possessed an option unavailable to their later counterparts in post-independence 
Asia and Africa (and to a certain extent Latin America), frontier settlement.252 Here, 
by facilitating property-based accumulation as a promise of accessible material sus-
tenance, elites could draw upon the ideological legitimation of the original revolu-
tion while simultaneously diffusing new post-revolutionary tensions. However, the 
newfound absence of the British imperial authority administering this process 
raised questions as to how the emerging Federal Union-based constitutional order 
might handle these issues.253 Motivated by fears of frontier settlers falling under 
foreign influence, the federal government took a proactive role in asserting its sov-
ereign prerogative over the frontier while placing indigenous communities under 
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protective regimes of qualified autonomy strikingly similar to later practices of ‘in-
direct rule.’254 
 
In this context, a peculiar balance was struck between federal authority over frontier 
expansion and the role of frontier property acquisition as a technology of redirecting 
popular energies away from more direct political representation and possible wealth 
distribution. This took the form of a generalized scheme of ‘quasi-legality’ whereby 
the federal government’s authoritative positioning as protector of indigenous pop-
ulations was frequently undermined by varied settler acquisitions of indigenous 
land, by consensual agreement or otherwise.255 Although illegal on its face, these 
transfers of land were often subsequently recognized as having legal effect despite 
the dubious circumstances of their formation.256 Though this would appear a direct 
contradiction, if considered in relation to the idea of the American frontier as a site 
of capital accumulation, this arrangement is highly logical. makes a great deal of 
sense. Recalling Ince’s frame, we find an exemplification of how the original im-
positions of capitalist social relations is never ‘purely economic’, but rather neces-
sarily rooted in a particular configuration of jurido-political force that quells re-
sistance against non-capitalist ways of being.257  
 
3.6.2.  American Integration versus American Uniqueness  
 
While these processes certainly raised numerous questions surrounding the nature 
of the new American constitutional order, scholars often miss their profound inter-
national legal significance. This significance can be located in debates over the na-
ture of the new American nation between those calling for consolidation within its 
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current range of territorial settlement, most prominently represented by Alexander 
Hamilton, and those calling for greater expansion, most prominently represented 
by Jefferson. Although documenting the full extent of this divergence exceeds the 
scope of the present analysis, a vital encapsulation is the way Hamilton and Jeffer-
son’s differing approaches to international legality were deeply relevant to the ques-
tion of frontier settlement. As a matter of foundational difference, while the former 
position placed great emphasis on American conformity and integration within a 
Europe-focused legal-diplomatic order, the later emphasized the new US as a 
unique and exceptional entity whose presence in the world must be correspondingly 
unique and exceptional.258  
 
When it came to the frontier, Hamilton was content to sell vast tracts of land to 
foreign interests as a means of repaying debts incurred by the Revolution.259 Jeffer-
son, by contrast, was steadfast in his emphasis that frontier lands be settled as a 
means of further building a national political community premised on liberty 
through property ownership.260 In relating this contention back to the logic of cap-
ital accumulation, Hamilton’s approach offered the prospect of a short-term solu-
tion to a narrow problem; on the other hand, Jefferson’s approach was far more 
long-term when it came to entrenching a particular mode of social relations. That 
said, much of the success of the US as a capitalist power can be attributed to the 
Jeffersonian (and latter Jacksonian) emphasis on continuing presumptively endless 
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frontier settlement in the name of popular will.261 It thus furthered the nexus be-
tween popular will, indigenous dispossession, and the limitless accumulation of 
property as a condition of liberty in the American cannon. 
 
However, despite the apparent divergences between these two approaches, their 
material manifestations in the continuation of American frontier settlement was one 
of synthesis. A pivotal development here was the 1823 US Supreme Court case of 
Johnson v. M’Intosh where Chief Justice John Marshall declared that American 
authority over indigenous communities stemmed from the law of nations’ ‘doctrine 
of discovery.’262 Under this ruling, with the independence of the US, the British 
Empire’s juridical capacity in this domain of indigenous relations passed to the US 
federal government.263 While this decision enabled continuing frontier expansion, 
it did so in a centralized manner. Thus, as an intervention into ongoing post-Revo-
lution controversies, it represented a direct blow to the Revolution-motivating 
Lockean view that property rights generate sovereignty and affirmed the counter-
vailing Vattelian view that sovereignty generates property rights.264 Moreover, in a 
manner emblematic of Hamilton’s foreign policy strategy, the case’s reasoning can 
be read as an effort to further link American practices with the European law of 
nations as opposed to furthering a uniquely American jurisprudence.265 As Jedidiah 
Purdy has observed, M’Intosh turned on a highly European discourse of indigenous 
peoples as ‘semi-sovereigns’ that had minimal authority in leading American proc-
lamations on the law of nations existing at this time.266 
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However, while the standard set in M’Intosh might seem a triumph of the Hamilto-
nian emphasis on enhanced federal power and integration within the European 
‘family of nations’, its scope of operation was nonetheless conditioned by a Jeffer-
sonian/Jacksonian expansionist ethos centred on limited federal power and Ameri-
can uniqueness. A foundational point in this development is the Supreme Court 
case of Worcester v. Georgia, the third foundational case in the ‘Marshall Trilogy’ 
that began with M’Intosh.267 Here the Court denied any jurisdictional claims of state 
governments over indigenous communities and declared these relations to be the 
sole domain of the federal government.268 While this might appear consistent with 
the attempted federal centralization of the American expansionist project, it impli-
cated core controversies over the apportioning of powers between the federal gov-
ernment and individual states that questioned the unique American experiment in 
popular will.269 These controversies were especially sharp in relation to the frontier 
territories that sought admission into the Federal Union as states. In remarking on 
how resolving these questions exemplified European-American difference, Edward 
Keene has depicted this process as:  
 
an egalitarian rejection of the European practice of colonialism: Con-
gress was to assume responsibility for and authority over the territories; 
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not exploit the territory as a colony but to oversee the process of state-
formation, determining the moment at which the territory could be ac-
cepted into the Union as an equal state.270 
 
However, this ‘anti-colonial’ accommodation of settler interests through transform-
ing territories into states came at the expense of indigenous peoples. Here, enabling 
settler pursuit of property-based liberty fundamentally conflicted with the mandate 
of protecting indigenous populations from more localized units of governments, a 
point explicit raised through the Worcester decision. However, the management of 
this contradiction came through enhanced federal impositions in indigenous com-
munities justified under the banner of providing protection from local settlers.271 In 
the process of doing so, federal actions had the effect of expanding the frontier by 
opening ever-increasing spaces to settler colonization. With this enhanced opening 
came the quasi-legal acquisition of land frequently ratified in favour of settlers, 
even when this was in breach of treaties concluded between indigenous nations and 
the federal government.272 While largely decentralized matters of small-scale ap-
plication, these actions nevertheless culminated in a broader cultural and political 
phenomenon deemed ‘Manifest Destiny’ whereby continuous frontier settlement to 
the Pacific Ocean became a dominant animating ethos of the early American repub-
lic.273 In sum, these juridical contradictions laid the foundations for a phenomenon 
that was deeply consistent in its unifying purpose: the elimination the indigenous 
nations as the fundamental precondition of American popular will and the mode of 
property-based capital accumulation it relied upon. 
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3.6.3.  Jefferson Universalized  
 
Yet, what do these formative grounding of the early American republic mean for 
this thesis’s larger point regarding the consolidation of popular will as the universal 
basis for domestic authority under international law? In answering this question, a 
return to the words of Jefferson is in order. While he lodged his formulation of the 
de facto authority-popular will-international legal standing relationship for the ex-
plicit purpose of American independence, the question of its universal applicability 
remained wide open. In his role as the first American Secretary of State under the 
Presidential Administration of George Washington, Jefferson possessed a platform 
to set the parameters of its application.274 A vital opportunity for clarification in this 
domain came with the 1789 outbreak of the French Revolution and its far reaching 
repercussions. In articulating a position conforming to his earlier justification for 
American independence, in 1793 Jefferson delivered the following message to his 
minister in France:  
 
We surely can not deny to any nation that right whereon our own gov-
ernment is founded — that everyone may govern itself according to 
whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and 
that it may transact business with foreign nations through whatever or-
gans it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, 
president, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the 
only thing to be regarded.275 
 
While there may certainly have been great practical benefit in taking such an ap-
proach to recognition in an age of revolutions, this should not obscure the normative 
dimensions of this position, something we can assume Jefferson was very much 
aware. As this section has shown, while shared presumptions did exist, the process 
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of determining the precise meaning and institutional facilitation of American pop-
ular will was deeply controversial and invited all manner of contestation.276 On this 
basis, what gave the US any right to make legitimate judgements on issues of na-
tional identity formation as they manifested in foreign political communities? 
Within the US experience, the process of consolidating its unique experiment in 
popular will was enabled by an understanding that objectively incontestable de 
facto authority was ultimately the sole legitimate determinate of sovereignty. This 
was beyond the ability of outside observers to interfere with.277 All of that said, 
when it came to the articulation of an American position on these matters, on what 
grounds could this same opportunity be legitimately denied to others? 
 
While a compelling narrative, a great price was to be paid for the universalizing the 
US as the formative template for the modern relationship between international law, 
de facto authority, and popular will. As this chapter has shown, when accounting 
for the emergence and consolidation of the US, even a cursory exploration of ‘pop-
ular will’s’ material conditions of possibility reveals inseparable complicity with 
modes of violent dispossession in the service of capitalist social relations. However, 
rigorously uncovering these material and ideological realities is arguably incon-
sistent with contemporary international law’s ‘effective control doctrine.’ After all, 
this doctrine stresses ideological neutrality in the assessment of whether or not a 
would-be sovereign objectively possesses the greatest claim of de facto authority 
relative to all local competitors. Consequently, analyses of material conditions, es-
pecially through a lens that is critical of the very concept of ‘ideological neutrality’, 
can be construed (and contested) as undue interference by outsiders in localized 
situations they are fundamentally ill-suited to judge. 
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 By casting substantive evaluation as illegitimate judgment in the domain of sover-
eign political communities, the links between assertions of popular will and the 
material realities that animate these assertions can be concealed forever. Thus, the 
great American contribution to the modern international legal construction of do-
mestic political communities amounted to a veneration of popular will that gener-
ated a universalized standard for evaluating claims of contested sovereignty. Yet, 
through emphasizing ‘de facto authority’ and ‘ideological neutrality’ as objective 
metrics of analysis (and thus not complicit in the political project of legitimizing 
capitalist social relations), this standard is structurally averse to uncovering the ma-
terial conditions of this formative American manifestation of ‘popular will’.  
 
In this chapter, I sought to undercover the American Revolutionary contribution to 
the premise of popular will as international law’s basis for domestic authority by 
resituating it in the contexts of colonial capitalism. A fitting endpoint is to show 
how denying the link between colonial domination and American popular will is 
traceable to the very first analysis of international law made in the independent US, 
William John Duane’s 1809 The Law of Nations, Investigated in a Popular Manner 
Addressed to the Farmers of the United States. This account is notable for pos-
sessing acute awareness of the colonial origins and applications of international law 
that (absent its archaic spelling and grammar) would not be out of place in the con-
temporary Third World Approaches to International Law movement.278 In a pas-
sage worth quoting at length, he states that:  
 
In the discovery of new and immeasurable seas and continents [sic] 
might have been anticipated, the extinction of wars for maritime do-
minion; that almost boundless cupidity would now be satiated, and 
force give way to the dictates of justice and sound policy. The reverse, 
however, has, in every view, been deplorably experienced: the colonial 
system arose upon a spirit of monopoly in proportion to the magnitude 
of the objects presented; the greediness for ships, commerce, and colo-
nies encreased; contests for supremacy in the petty seas known to the 
                                                        




ancients, and those between the Italian states for the monopoly of the 
Levant trade, were abandoned for the more daring purpose of usurping 
the sovereignty of the Atlantic, the Pacific, and Indian oceans. Avarice 
here too assumed the cloak of religion, to cover the foulest murders and 
robberies, the enslavement and plunder of millions of innocent Indians, 
in the East and West; while fanaticism rewarded the infuriate zeal of its 
emissaries, by confirming by Papal Bulls, the sovereignty of territories 
wrested from the rightful owners by the perpetration of every 
crime…279 
 
However, in describing these depredations as emerging with overseas expansion 
and facilitated through the law of nations he posed a contrasting vision of law as it 
governs territorial settings. What amounted was an unmistakably Lockean depic-
tion of the property-based origins of government and political economy that moti-
vated the assertion of American independence and, by extension, its accompanying 
case for sovereignty under the law of nations. According to Duane, in direct contrast 
to law’s applicability to the seas, and the modes of human interaction it furthered:   
 
Property in land originated in the necessities of man; before lands were 
parceled out for cultivation they did not furnish adequate sustenance; 
since the distribution, they have not only furnished abundance but su-
perfluity, creating the calls for barter and exchange. Dominion on land 
originated in the necessities of society, men, for their safety, giving a 
control to government over their lives and fortunes.280 
 
This chapter showed how the depiction in Duane’s second quote would have been 
fundamentally inconceivable without the material conditions aptly depicted in the 
first quote from his book. However, this link is obscured by the fact that Duane was 
followed by a long line of writers and theorists who reproduced his depiction of a 
                                                        
279 Duane 1809, 10. 




virtuous ideal of American nationhood as outside, and above, the violence that ac-
companied European overseas expansion. My purpose has been to reforge this dis-
avowed connection by showing how the international legal order emerged in its 
modern form as a result of both new colonial hierarchies and the emergence of the 
US as a new species of international legal subject. Historicizing the material origins 
of popular will and its structuring presumptions allows this connective account to 
make sense. 
 
3.6.  Conclusion   
 
In showing how European overseas colonization gave rise to the American Revo-
lution, and transformed the relationship between international law and domestic 
authority in the process, this chapter exemplified my methodological merging of  
‘juridical thinking’ with historical sociology. This began by approaching the issue 
of ‘American exceptionalism’, which I identified as a distinct array of ‘juridical 
thinking’ exercises that link disparate historical events and concepts to affirm a 
mythologized narrative. In confronting the distorting effects of this phenomenon, I 
turned attention to social considerations largely disavowed by American exception-
alism in order to materially ground my account of the evolution of the independent 
US as a distinct legal entity. I then situated these considerations in the broader 
scheme of historical-sociological accounts of the material formation of the modern 
international order. 
 
It was from this grounding that I accounted for the generative force of the juridical 
narratives that served the material interests of the American settler society born 
from early modern European colonial capitalist expansion. In these settler colonies, 
great wealth and autonomy emerged as a retooled English common law justified 
practices of enslavement and dispossession anathema in England itself. From this 
premise, there emerged an ideology of substantive liberty rooted in the presump-
tively endless accumulation of property. When this mode of life was threatened, 
American settlers launched an armed uprising against the British Empire backed by 
a Vattelian juridical argument for independence claiming that the settlers’ de facto 




American republic consolidated through frontier expansion, it continued to position 
its original argument for independence as a universal principle under the law of 
nations that implicitly set its own experience as the criteria for external judgment. 
Thus, the juridical narrative of de facto authority justifying popular will under in-
ternational law was completely abstracted from its formative context of material 
social relations. It was this lack of firm grounding that allowed other groups to ap-























The Rupture of Popular Will: The Contradictions of Absolutism, 




4.1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a parallel historicizing of events depicted in Chapter III. 
While I previous dealt with developments that emerged through the process of Eu-
ropean overseas expansion, here I shift my focus to the events occurring within 
Europe during this same early modern timeframe. Thus, in conjunction with Chap-
ter III, I provide a globally contextualized analysis of the protracted crises of Euro-
pean absolutism as it manifested itself on intersecting material and ideological lev-
els. This process culminated in the French Revolution that sparked numerous crises 
of legal and political authority and entrenched a popular will-based challenge from 
which Europe’s dynastic powers never fully recovered. As such, this world-histor-
ical episode forges a pivotal link between the earliest formulations of modern pop-
ular will within the classical law of nations (detailed in Chapters II & III) and the 
current international legal order (detailed in Chapter I) where this particular under-
standing of popular will is the sole basis for domestic authority.   
 
Part 4.2. situates the French Revolution within contemporary international legal 
thought and shows how this event’s significance is distorted by a fixation on ‘state 
sovereignty’ versus ‘individual human rights’ as a point of foundational opposition. 
I use this impasse as an opportunity to advance a materially grounded view of in-
ternational law by shifting attention to the protracted contradictions of absolutist 
authority that shaped the backdrop of the French Revolution. On the one hand, the 
rise of rationalized territorial authority progressively undermined the modes of per-




gence of capitalist non-absolutist juridico-political forms that placed external pres-
sure on the absolutist Ancien Regime. Part 4.3. confronts the first issue by situating 
it within the changing global context of knowledge production, namely the impact 
of the ‘discovery’ of New World, and traces its broad effects in the domains of 
bureaucracy, war, and lawful authority. Correspondingly, Part 4.4. accounts for the 
provincialisation of dynastic power with the rise of capitalist social relations in the 
Netherlands and England. 
 
Part 4.5. explores the multifaceted juridical transformation that placed tremendous 
amounts of geopolitical and social pressure on France, the most powerful actor 
within Europe’s dynastic order. These pressures resulted in compounding contra-
dictions that ultimately sparked the French Revolution. With this occurrence, ex-
pansionist assertions of popular will by French revolutionary proponents, and the 
responses to them, uprooted existing legal understandings regarding justifications 
for war, political community, and sovereign authority. Part 4.6. then examines the 
aftermath of the French Revolution and the impossibility of any comprehensive 
return to the pre-existing dynastic order. In addition to absolute contradictions 
reaching their breaking point, the assertions of popular will that fuelled the Revo-
lution could not be extinguished. Thus, the stage was set for a new synthesis in 
configuring the relationship between popular will, international law, and the nation-
state form. 
 
From this foundation, Chapter V’s accounts for how, following the end of the 
French revolutionary wars in 1815, the shards of revolutionary popular will merged 
with anti-revolutionist conservatism to create Europe’s bounded system of nation-
states. This formed the base presumption of international law as it emerged as a 
self-aware disciplinary project. From here, Chapter VI returns to the Western Hem-
isphere to show how the emergence of new states in Latin America showcased both 
the global forces that gave rise to the French Revolution and its consequential af-
termath. Finally, Chapter VII considers the French revolutionary legacy in relation 
to later attempts to radically challenge existing systems and what this means for the 
relationship between popular will and international law. Here I turn away from 




through structural transformation. However, as a matter of material distinction, the 
popular will-based legal order the Marxists revolutionaries revolted against proved 




4.2.  Rupturing the Ancien Regime 
 
As Eric Hobsbawm famously noted in The Age of Revolutions, the 1789 overthrow 
of the Bourbon monarchy in France became the model for political transformation 
universalized across numerous historical and cultural contexts far different from its 
original setting.1 Ironically, the profound and complicated nature of this event has 
received minimal systemic treatment within international legal theory.2 This con-
ceptual deficiency is largely attributable to the narrative of a secular international 
modernity arising through the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Under this reigning nar-
rative, the French Revolution is easily conceivable as a domestic political shift 
within a bounded sovereign state that only generated international legal issues when 
borders were crossed as a result of expansionist/interventionist activities.3 Moreo-
ver, when the French Revolution is viewed as an event of international legal signif-
icance it is typically in reference to international human rights where the 1793 Dec-
laration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen serves as a key formative source.4 
Thus, theorizing French Revolution’s role concerning international law’s founda-
tional premises of sovereign statehood can easily invite a response from the human 
                                                        
1 See Hobsbawm 1975, 74-75. 
2 For a rare exception, albeit from the perspective of a historian as opposed to a lawyer, see Kolla, 
2017. 
3 Even then such activities were well within the sovereign prerogative to wage war given their oc-
currence prior to the UN Charter’s general ban on the use of force in international relations. 




rights narrative where the extension of individual liberty correlates to the decline 
of state sovereignty.5     
 
However, in continuing with the premise that Westphalia dealt with the dynastic 
sovereignty of individual monarchs as opposed to popular sovereignty of underly-
ing political communities, a more nuanced account of the French Revolution and 
its aftermath is needed. After all, while the reigning image of ‘liberal messianic’ 
international legal consciousness involves the steadfast adherence to an ‘anti-sov-
ereign’ worldview,6 an uncritical acceptance of this dichotomy fails to account for 
the more complex reality whereby the ‘liberal messianic’ actions and motivations 
of the French revolutionaries played a fundamental role in constructing our modern 
imagination of the sovereign state. A starting point for theoretically reconciling that 
which contemporary international legal discourse has labelled contradictory is the 
account of this event in Wilhelm Grewe’s vast international legal history, according 
to which: 
 
[t]he [French] Revolution shook the foundations of the international le-
gal community, anchored as they were in the European-Christian com-
munitarian consciousness and the dynastic solidarity of princes. It 
sought to replace the particular community of Christian Europe with the 
abstract idea of mankind…The most important result of the Revolution 
in terms of the law of nations was the full emancipation of the sovereign 
nation state, which occurred over this process of dissolution. It 
amounted to a sharpening and extension of the concept of sovereignty 
to include the principle of nationality.7    
 
                                                        
5 See e.g., Donnelley 1998; Franck 1999; Peters 2009. On the challenge of these assertions to tradi-
tional international legal theory, see Simpson 2001.   
6 On this characterization within contemporary discourses, see Roth 2003. 




The important point here is that the absolutist realm justified by personalized dy-
nastic power and the modern nation-state justified by depersonalized ‘popular will’ 
are two distinct species of political authority. It was through the French Revolu-
tionary crucible that these two irreconcilable forms of authority clashed head-on. 
This is especially relevant when accounting for the development of modern inter-
national legal standing, its universalizing trajectory, and its equation of ‘sovereignty’ 
with ‘popular sovereignty.’8 To account for this development, we must first demys-
tify any notion that socially transformative assertions of popular will in Europe 
were unique to France. Additionally, we also must account for the unique material 
conditions that caused the French Revolution to shatter the foundations of the same 
international legal order that certain previous popular sovereignty expressions were 
more or less incorporated into.9 The French Revolution thus challenged the reign-
ing assumption that only small actors, such as Swiss Cantons and Italian city-states, 
could possess a republican or otherwise popular will-based, form of government.10 
According to prevailing views, such an arrangement was inappropriate for the dy-
nastic great powers whose monarchic institutions were deemed vital to maintaining 
order within the systemic context of absolutist military competition.11   
 
In providing such an account, we must consider the factors that made the European 
dynastic balance of power system so weak as to allow the rupture of the French 
Revolution to occur. It was because of these weaknesses that the victorious archi-
tects of the Concert of Europe could not simply return to the pre-Revolutionary 
                                                        
8 Gathii 1996, 2006-2007. The profound character of this universalization can be observed by the 
reality that even avowedly non/anti-liberal regimes are nonetheless presumed to be empowered by 
the will of their people, see Roth 2012. 
9 While a comprehensive analysis of these revolutionary movements exceeds the scope of this argu-
ment, for an in-depth account, see Palmer 2014.  





order despite occupying positions of hegemonic political authority.12 As such, un-
derstanding them is crucial for theorizing the overall evolution of the modern inter-
national legal order where de facto authority legitimizes sovereignty in the name of 
popular will. According to Edward Keene, the two main factors that progressively 
generated these points of vulnerability within the old European system were the 
development of: 1) rationalistic modes territorial authority/administration and 2) 
the emergence of new governmental forms that challenged the methods of labelling 
so crucial to a system premised on inter-dynastic rights and privileges.13  
 
With the first factor, the rise of statistical quantification of ‘…the populations, ter-
ritory, military forces, and commercial activity of various states…’ emerged as a 
rival form of political knowledge that competed with earlier practices of dynastic 
statecraft and diplomacy (especially the discourse of compounded dynastic rivalry 
and alliance deemed the ‘balance of power’).14 Such methods augmented the ra-
tionalistic modes of liberal Enlightenment thinking while deeply challenging the 
conservative worldview that formed the core of balance of power-oriented dis-
courses.15 As for the second factor, the emergence of new and hybrid forms of po-
litical authority reflected the deeper transformations occurring within the global 
system whereby existing modalities of power became stagnant while new political 
formations were provided with unparalleled opportunities.16  
  
 
4.3.  Origins of Rationalized Territorial Authority  
 
                                                        
12 See Keene 2013a, 1087. 
13 Ibid. 1087-1089. 
14 Ibid. 1088-1089. For a study of early modern European competition based on these pre-
sumptions, see Nexon 2009. 
15 Vagts and Vagts 1979, 565. 




4.3.1.  What Westphalia Actually Did 
 
To theorize the ‘rationalized turn,’ we must account for the conditions that made 
the rational administration of European territory an imperative in the first instance. 
In addressing this point, we can articulate a link between the material transfor-
mations spurred by the European-New World encounter detailed in the previous 
chapter and the ideological transformation of Europe itself. According to Jennifer 
Beard’s genealogy of the Christian theological origins of ‘development,’ the disci-
plinary functions of confessing sin in exchange for redemptive membership within 
a universal scheme of divinity was inexorably altered by this encounter.17 For in 
defining the ‘New World’ as a space of unredeemed souls in need of salvation, 
European Christendom was able to fashion itself as an ‘Old World’ discharged from 
the debt of original sin and tasked with its infamous ‘civilizing mission.’18 The need 
to accumulate knowledge in furtherance of this mission paved the way for a greater 
rationalistic turn in Christian theology.19  
 
However, this conceptual reorientation lead to the schisms of the Protestant Refor-
mation and the ensuing spiritual crisis, characterized by religious wars of unprece-
dented violence, brought about by the Catholic Church's loss of its monopoly on 
truth.20 Against this backdrop of a hierarchical church faltering in its provision of 
an ever-expanding source of universally legitimate order perfecting all in its wake, 
the concept of the nation-state emerged as an alternative structure of authority 
where the achievement of perfection was already presumed.21 These issues of vio-
lence, political organization, and missionary civilization reached their apex  through 
the conclusion of the Thirty-Years War via the 1648 Peace of Westphalia whereby 
                                                        
17 Beard 2007. 
18 Ibid. 55-57. 
19 Ibid. 77. 
20 Ibid. 38-39. 




a plurality of perfect, inviolable sovereigns were tasked with the divine (anti-plu-
ralist) mandate of ‘developing’ the rest of the world.22 Thus, in the words of Peter 
Fitzpatrick, ‘[e]ven as that rupture serves to found a diversity of sites of power, 
these operate as an imperium attuned to uniform effect. The dictates of ‘develop-
ment’…are not attuned to diversity.’23 
 
While deeply conceptual, Beard’s account nonetheless possesses a high degree of 
synergy with materialist theories. For in a capacity analogous to Benno Teschke’s 
above-discussed portrayal of the Westphalian origins of secular international mo-
dernity as a myth, Beard shows how the settlement of 1648 was in no way an aban-
donment of divinity as a basis for authority but rather its reconfiguration into the 
territorialized form of the sovereign nation-state embodied in the person of its 
ruler.24 After all, the notion of ‘religious freedom’ celebrated as progress by the 
articulators of the orthodox Westphalian narrative concerned the religious expres-
sion of monarchs existing in an established order of dynastic legitimacy as opposed 
to individual subjects.25 Here the inadmissibility of divergent Christian practices as 
a basis for waging war may have limited the scope of geopolitical accumulation on 
the basis of dynastic rights, but it in no way transcended them.26 As such, despite 
repeated conflations, Westphalian sovereignty was readily distinct from secular lib-
eral notions of equality as they applied to both subjects within a sovereign entity 
and sovereign entities within an international system.  
 
                                                        
22 Ibid. 125-126. 
23 Fitzpatrick 2016, 14. 
24 This scheme was the ‘King’s Two Bodies’ whereby the physical person of the monarch and the 
physical space of the realm construct one co-extensive mode of territorial authority, see Kantorowicz 
1998. 
25 Teschke 2003, 240-241. 




Furthermore, by emphasizing the ‘New World’ as a catalyst for this ideological 
transformation, Beard’s account addresses the critique of theories that locate inter-
national modernity’s emerging internally and exclusively within Europe.27 Her,e in 
manner very much in line with Beard’s argument that the European-New World 
encounter radically necessitated new forms of knowledge while maintaining its 
self-centring claims to truth, Alex Anievas and Kerem Nisacioglu have shown that 
this encounter lead to the modern concept of bounded territorial sovereignty as a 
means of colonizers to strengthen their claims.28 Given the ever-shifting boundaries 
of Europe’s territorial polities due to the vindication of dynastic right via wars of 
geopolitical accumulation, the novelty of territorial coherence is difficult to over-
state.29 As such, while revisionist theological concepts of perfected order provided 
substance to the ideology of the nation-state, territoriality provided its form.30 This 
revisionist account of Westphalia as a reconfiguration of existing systems, as op-
posed to a rupturing transformation, necessarily raises the question as to how this 
changed relationships of territorial authority on the ground.     
 
Through it limited transcendent justifications as a basis for action by dynastic 
princes, the legal science linking authority, territoriality, and divinity took an in-
                                                        
27 See Anievas and Nisancioglu 2015, 30-32. 
28 Ibid. 134-139. 
29 See Ibid. 137-140. 
30 However it is important to note that here ‘territoriality’ should not be conflated with ‘bounded 
territoriality’ through rigidly delineated borders. According to one apt description of this context: 
Political units were constituted based both on personal feudal bonds between 
actors and on territorial notions of control. Yet the form of territoriality in this 
system was very different from the exclusive, linearly bounded territorial au-
thority of the modern world. Instead, territory was understood as a series of 
places, with authority radiating outward from centers rather than inward from 
linear boundaries. 




ward turn that corresponded to the Westphalian reconfiguration. This became evi-
dent in the German principalities of the Holy Roman Empire where the need to 
develop juridical arguments viewed as mutually legitimate amongst princes of dif-
ferent faiths lead to the institutional enunciation of natural law principles univer-
sally determinable through the exercise of reason.31 In this context, a key develop-
ment was the revival of Roman law in Western Europe.32 Through this merger of 
the natural law and Roman law ethos, knowledge of ‘nature’ became linked to a 
prince’s political authority and this methodologically entailed ‘…reading Roman 
law historically and using its scientific form and vocabulary to organize indigenous 
laws for the purpose of effective territorial government.’33  
 
However, this Roman law revival was in no way a full-scale displacement of theo-
logical influence. After all, the very concepts of Roman law invoked by these nat-
ural jurists bore the ingrained influence of the Christian scholastic legacy.34 Ac-
cording to Randall Lesaffer: ‘[t]he merging of Roman law and canon law in medi-
eval jurisprudence had above all served to liberate Roman law of its casuistic tech-
nicalities by imbedding them in the more general precepts and principles that radi-
ated from moral theology and canon law.’35 As such, Roman law in the immediate 
post-Westphalian context was essentially a ‘gap-filler’ mechanism that allowed le-
gal innovations to facilitate the shift from the conception of a unified and expanding 
Christendom to a plurality of bounded sovereigns that nonetheless affirmed Chris-
tian notions of perfection, under the banner of jus publicum Europeaum.36 Thus, 
the Roman law revival forged the synthesis identified by Perry Anderson whereby 
                                                        
31 Koskenniemi 2009, 48. 
32 For a broader contextual study of the Roman law in the context of European history, see Stein 
1999. 
33 Ibid. 50. 
34 See Lesaffer 2005, 35-37. 
35 Ibid. 37. 




the modes of supreme juridical authority that defined the ancient world were remo-




4.3.2.  Territorial Knowledge as Princely Obligation 
 
In accounting for the ways in which this shift in legal justification contributed to 
the re-imagination of territorial authority, a useful endeavour is to historicize 
Michel Foucault’s critique of sovereign power. According to this critique, the fixa-
tion upon a ruling authority embodied in the person of the sovereign obscures the 
larger structures that construct identity and direct life-functions through categories 
such as ‘territory,’ ‘population,’ and ‘security.’38 As such, to view power and con-
trol as attributable to the rules and decrees directly advanced by an organized gov-
ernment directs attention away from the process of ‘governmentality’ whereby in-
dividuals self-impose standards as a means of conforming with an idealized con-
ceptions of ‘normal’ subjectivity.39  
 
While Foucault called for modes of analysis that decentred orthodox conceptions 
of sovereignty, post-Westphalian conceptions of the natural law and its relation to 
                                                        
37 Anderson 2013, 24-29; Teschke has critiqued Anderson’s notion that the Roman law contributed 
by to the rise of capitalism by enabling commercial transactions. For Teschke, such a move to cap-
italism could not arise within the old absolutist structures and this necessitated the formation of the 
modern capitalist state in England, see Teschke 2003, 158-165. However, this critique speaks to a 
larger issue within Teschke’s account where his attempt to account for the specifics material facts 
and distinctions that define capitalist social relations detracts from the ways in which modes of ide-
ological, and especially juridical, modes of abstraction provides answers to the questions he poses, 
see Mieville 2005, 214-224. It is for this reason that the historical sociological analysis of the type 
Teschke undertakes needs to be coupled with an understanding of the specific function of ‘juridical 
thinking’ as a uniquely powerful mode of abstraction.  





territory actively address the close relationship between ‘government’ and ‘govern-
mentality.’ This was especially true in the theories of Emer de Vattel’s chief influ-
ence Christian Wolff (1679-1754), one of the first jurists to theorize the nation as 
an entity distinct from either the individual ruler or state apparatus, through an anal-
ysis strikingly similar Foucault’s.40 For Wolff, the nation’s duties were to perfect 
itself in a manner that required knowledge of the realm’s material existence as a 
necessary condition for the accomplishment of these duties.41 Thus, according to 
Wolff: 
 
It is plainly evident that for this knowledge is required an accurate ge-
ographical map of the whole territory and of the several parts, under 
whatsoever name they may come, an entire natural history of the whole 
territory, perfectly accurate measurement of all the fields, meadows, 
woods, cities, towns, villages, and so on, finally a trustworthy descrip-
tion of the inhabitants of all places and of those which concerns them 
in any manner. When this knowledge of the territory and its inhabitants 
is prepared for the use of the ruler of the state and consequently of those 
whose advice and services he uses in administering the state, statecraft 
will readily tell what can be communicated safely to the public, and 
what ought to be concealed, least it betray the country to others.42     
 
While applications of Wolff’s call to rationally define the social world did not typ-
ically result in the just outcomes he envisioned, we cannot deny the force of the 
new modalities of power that emerged from this rationalist conception of territorial 
administration/authority. Thus, while Wolff anticipated the confluence of ‘govern-
ment’ and ‘governmentality’ to be a virtuous exercise in the mutual recognition of 
universal reason, Foucault had the benefit of centuries of hindsight regarding the 
failure of grandiose schemes when articulating his critical stance towards attempts 
                                                        
40 Craven 2012b, 636. 
41 Ibid. 636-637. 




to unify the will of a population with an all-encompassing scheme of perfection.43 
Moreover, the fact that grand conceptions of a world run according to natural law 
in the form of Wolff’s global republic (civitas maxima) failed to materialize,44 his 
theoretical presumption regarding rationally ordered territorial authority persisted 
as a largely naturalized background assumption (thus concealing the view that such 
rationality is a deliberate project of ordering life through contingent regimes of 
truth).45  
 
The entrenchment this naturalization arguably emanated from Vattel’s rejection of 
civitas maxima in exchange for the view that a no natural justice existed between 
individual nations.46 This was accompanied by an epistemic shift whereby econom-
ics, as opposed to law, ultimately becoming the new medium for determining the 
rules of natural order that harmoniously bound peoples on a global scale.47 With the 
triumph of capitalism and its foundational ideological distinction between ‘public’ 
practices of politics/government and ‘private’ practices of economic accumulation, 
there became minimal incentive to question this assumption.48 This mystification 
was furthered by the eventual emergence of what Paul Kahn identified as a dual-
specialization of the modern state whereby land was simultaneous governed under 
a regime of ‘property’ rationally justified by the rule of law, and a regime of ‘terri-
tory’ whose very existence constitutes an act of a priori justification asserted 
against the rest of the world.49 However, while this discourse of territorialized ra-
tionality is important, to situate its impact within a materialist analysis, we must 
                                                        
43 After all, numerous projects seeking mass-scale social transformation inspired by an ethos of ‘high 
modernity’ have resulted in untold amounts of human suffering, see Scott 1998. 
44 On this concept see Onuf 1994. 
45 See Elden 2013. 
46 Vattel 1852 [1758], xiii. 
47 Koskenniemi 2009, 65-66. 
48 See Rosenberg 1994. 




understand these ideological developments as they were shaped in conjunction with 
prevailing mode of social reproduction. In this context, that meant perpetually shift-
ing patterns of geopolitical accumulation through war.   
 
4.3.3.  Geopolitical Accumulation and Contingent War  
 
In theorizing the ends of the all-pervading turn to rational territorial administration, 
the pre-capitalist practice of warfare-based geopolitical accumulation amongst 
competing dynastic factions forms a vital consideration.50 On this subject of inter-
national law and early modern warfare, a deeply influential account within critical 
international theory is Carl Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth where it is argued 
that the Peace of Westphalia ushered in a ‘Golden Age of War’ amongst European 
sovereigns.51 Here, the absolute prerogative exercised by sovereigns had a limiting 
effect on the duration and brutality of war for the parties mutually respected one 
another as a ‘just enemies’ which in turn limited martial engagements to narrow 
resolvable disputes.52 On Schmitt’s account, this ‘Golden Age’ ended with the in-
troduction of humanitarian considerations into the legal and ethical practices of 
warfare.53 For Schmitt, such normative judgements imperilled the concept of the 
‘just enemy’ by creating a normatively loaded ‘discriminatory concept of war’ 
whereby those who violated humanitarian rules existed outside the protection of 
                                                        
50 As a historical matter, these conflicts were often triggered when established customs surrounding 
dynastic succession either failed to resolve an issue or were otherwise contested within this epis-
temic framework. It is for this reason that so many of the wars that occurred in this immediate led-
up to the French Revolution were ‘wars of succession’ including: the War of Spanish Succession 
(1702-1713/1714), the War of Polish Succession (1733-1738), the War of Austrian Succession 
(1740-1748), and the War of Bavarian Succession (1778-1789), Teschke 2003, 225-227; see also 
Liu 2019, 17-27. 
51 Schmitt 2003.  
52 Ibid. 143-147. 




those rules.54 Once this view gained traction, the traditional constraints on Euro-
pean inter-sovereign war were unmade; enemies now became ‘enemies of humanity’ 
whose absolute destruction was warranted as if they were pirates, criminals, or non-
European ‘savages.’55           
 
However, the problem with Schmitt’s analysis of war, and international legal and 
political theory more generally, is that it is disconnect from the historical sociolog-
ical realities of the events it seeks to explain.56 As such, his portray of ‘Golden Age’ 
warfare is plainly contradicted by the escalating frequency and intensity of fighting 
that occurred within the timeframe he declares to be relatively ‘humane.’57 In seek-
ing an alternative theory better able to account for these realities, a promising start-
ing point is Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton’s endeavour to theorize ‘war’ as a 
centralized object of inquiry.58 For Barkawi and Brighton, the central distinguish-
ing feature of war is its reality of radical contingency given that battlefield condi-
tions exposes its participants to vast range of possibilities and risks that no amount 
of advantage or preparation can entirely eliminate.59  This constructs a concept 
deemed War/Truth whereby the reality of radical contingency makes all claims that 
speculate on the outcome of warfare inherently contestable.60 Thus, authoritative 
proclamations on war are a technology of discursive power that, in and of itself, 
does not possess any inherently natural justification.61 As such, claims about soci-
ety and/or culture bound to practices of war struggle to maintain coherence when 
                                                        
54 Ibid. 142. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See Koskenniemi 2004, 496; Teschke 2011, 182. 
57 Ibid. 203-207. 
58 The argument advanced here is that ‘war’ should be analysed as central concept similar to studies 
of ‘economy,’ ’society,’ or ‘politics,’ Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 130. 
59 Ibid. 138. 
60 Ibid. 140. 




battlefield events fail to conform to established expectations.62 War then acts as a 
catalyst for radical shifts in identity and understanding in a manner rivalled by few 
other human activities.63   
 
In applying this insight to the Westphalian reconfiguration of sovereignty, what the 
1648 settlement did was eliminate the pursuit of an expanding universal Christen-
dom as a justification for war between Europe’s dynastic actors. Thus, the loss of 
transcendent truth as a self-contained justification for war meant a significant 
change to the particular War/Truth paradigm that evolved through centuries of in-
tra-European fighting.64 In this post-Westphalian context, the shift in the War/Truth 
paradigm was intimately connected to the above-discussed rise of rationalized ter-
ritorial authority in service of the a priori perfect nation-state administered by a 
ruler with an obligation to accumulate and maintain knowledge in fulfilment of the 
national ends of self-preservation and self-perfection under the natural law.  
 
It was against this backdrop that warfare became legalized on a widespread scale, 
but not in the contemporary senses of vastly narrowing the justifications for resort-
ing to war (jus ad bellum) or regulating the conduct of hostilities to achieve human-
itarian ends (jus in bello). Rather, warfare in this early modern era became increas-
ingly subject to regimes of jus post bellum, or the ‘Law of Victory,’ that governed 
                                                        
62 Ibid. 
63 See Barkawi 2004. 
64 It was in this shifting context that standardised labelling of hierarchically-ranked European dy-
nastic developed new dimensions of significance. According to Keene’s study of this ‘naming of 
powers’ as a formalisation of early modern diplomacy:  
By bringing several different actors together under a single undifferentiated 
category, terms such as prince and potentate emphasised similar characteristics, 
permitting the analysis at the more general level of their rights or behaviour as 
a group. A likely reason for the growing popularity of such generic terms was 
that they suited a world where the differences between kings and emperors 
were gradually being broken down. 




the distribution of property, rights, and obligations amongst the victors and van-
quished in a capacity mutually recognized as legitimate amongst dynastic actors.65 
As such, it functioned as a renewed legal basis for delineating what was acceptable 
under dynastic practices of geopolitical accumulation. This form of legalization 
functioned to curb the divinity motivated religious animosity that characterized the 
Wars of Religion and their lack of any upward limitation on the escalation of vio-
lence.66 However, this development should not be conflated with a unidirectional 
move towards secularization. Rather, the source of these legal innovations was the 
religious just war tradition that was only formally displaced by modern regimes of 
codification first introduced in the nineteenth century.67 As such, the legalization of 
warfare facilitated the social reproduction of dynastic actors who justified their au-
thority through feudal, personalized, and divine invocations. This explanation is 
eminently consistent with the notion that Westphalia was a consequential shift that 
territorialized divinity, but in no way displaced it.   
 
Thus, such the legal regime governing the disposition of post-conflict rights and 
obligations served to develop, entrench, and transmit the conceptions of rational-
ized territorial authority. In other words, the post-Westphalian War/Truth paradigm 
played in indispensable role in building the emerging Territory/Truth paradigm. 
Against this backdrop, the goal was not to eliminate, or even limit, the radical con-
tingency associated with war, but rather to organize class, authority, and social 
property relations/expectations around this contingency through regimes of legali-
zation. Here, the War/Truth paradigm constructed elaborate identities while simul-
taneously exposing them to the risks of demolishment via the radical contingency 
inherent in war. However, law maintained a synergistic relationship with this para-
digm by providing identities with a basis for continuity and reconstruction regard-
less of how fractured they become as a result of war.  
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This account admittedly overlaps with Schmitt’s theory to the extent that both por-
trayals depict mutually recognizable patterns of order and predictability that 
emerged through interaction between actors unbound by formal constraints beyond 
their self-interest. However, this account moves beyond the Schmitt’s analytically-
limiting monolithic ontology of warfare through its ability to link these intertwined 
practices of war, law, and rationalized territorial authority to larger patterns of so-
cial change. Articulating this link requires an analysis of the practice responsible 
for organizing and administering these perpetual developments; bureaucracy.          
 
4.3.4.  Bureaucracy and Its Contradictions 
 
In executing this undertaking, much insight can be gained from the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu. For Bourdieu social organization forms around discrete ‘fields’ of prac-
tice that contain their own unique manifestations of knowledge and custom. How-
ever, this functional specialization does not render fields autonomous, for they are 
perpetually interacting with other fields and are shaped by the dictates and interests 
of the dominant forces within the greater society.68 Towards this end, fields act as 
the drivers of state authority not just by maintaining the monopoly on physical co-
ercion in the Weberian sense, but also through maintaining a monopoly on symbolic 
legitimation.69 By applying this analytical frame to the context of increasingly ra-
tionalized territorial authority within a system that reproduced itself via personal-
ized, dynastic practices of geopolitical accumulation the bureaucratic field - and the 
related juridical field - faced a growing contradiction when managing increasingly 
divergent justifications for control. 
 
In outlining the anatomy of this contradiction, on the one hand, there was increased 
accumulation of rational knowledge about territories subject to regimes of transfer, 
exchange, and obligation governed by the legal sensibilities designed to insulate the 
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contingencies of increasingly prevalent wars. 70  This privileged depersonalized 
forms of knowledge. After all, without a reliable mechanism for organizing and 
claiming these interests in a relatively coherent capacity, these systems would be 
hamstrung in providing reliable benefits to those deriving power from them. This 
is especially true for the relatively autonomous juridical field, which derives its 
authority from limiting membership to a closed group of individuals who monopo-
lize the ability to dispense legal justification and rationality in a depersonalized ca-
pacity.71 Without these bureaucratic functions, a prince was profoundly limited in 
his ability to provide food, supplies, and wages to the armed forces he needed to 
participate in the warfare demanded of the geopolitical accumulation that formed 
the basis of absolutist social reproduction. Relatedly, without adequate legal justi-
fication a prince was profoundly limited in his ability to articulate the customary 
claims to the spoils of war (especially territory) which provided the primary means 
of accumulating power within this system.  
 
On the other hand, the dynastic princes who relied upon this depersonalized bu-
reaucrat expertise, exercised authority on a personalised basis. As Bourdieu has 
shown, the original model for the princely realm was literally the ‘King’s House.’72 
Given that dynastic power was directly premised on maintaining the purity of a 
bloodline, monarchs endemically feared that the bureaucrats and advisors they re-
lied upon might become entwined within the dynastic reproduction process in a 
literal biological sense. This could lead procreating advisors to subsequently claim 
genealogical lineages of their own in a manner that exponentially increased the 
class of dynastic heirs and diluted the power of those who could claim obedience 
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and material wealth based on dynastic rights.73 As a means of protecting this ruling 
class exclusivity, royal advisors were often individuals who could not engage in the 
physical act of reproduction (at least in a socially validated capacity) including eu-
nuchs, celibate clergy, and foreigners/ethnic minorities without rights or connec-
tions within their realms of operation.74  These practices of personalized loyalty 
maintained a high degree of efficiency in the early feudal era where authority was 
decentralized amongst a nobility where individual lords were limited in their scope 
of authority.  
 
However, the process of absolutist centralization rendered the personalized basis 
for legitimate authority increasingly attenuated while simultaneously producing the 
need for ever-growing ranks of bureaucrats to manage increasingly complex tasks 
of centralized governance.75 While the sharpest edges of this contradiction between 
personalized authority and depersonalized knowledge were alleviated by the devel-
opment of the ‘reason of state’ concept76 (as well as the post-Westphalian reconfig-
uration of divinity that granted a mandate of perfection to territorial sovereigns), 
the real challenge occurred when new governmental forms able to transcend this 
contradiction became consequential political actors. This materialized with the rise 
of political forms directly adapted to a liberal capitalist political economy, first in 
the form of the Seven Dutch Republics, and later, more comprehensively, with Eng-
land’s transition into the first modern state.     
 
 
4.4.  The Provincialisation of Dynastic Power 
 
4.4.1.  Dutch Republican Uprising        
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In analysing de facto authority’s function as an international legal mechanism that 
accommodates revolutionary aspirations in the name of popular will within the na-
tion-state framework, the Dutch Revolt (1566-1648) provides an illuminating study 
of this phenomenon’s prehistory. Here, the Dutch Revolt occurred in the name of 
republican popular will that materially and ideologically opposed the prevailing 
systems of dynastic legitimacy and geopolitical accumulation. However, the lack 
of the modern nation-state concept meant that resistance by the Seven Dutch Re-
publics against the Spanish Monarchy was without a strong legal basis for claiming 
sovereign independence as demonstrated by ‘facts on the ground.’ However, before 
a granting of Dutch independence within the confines of the prevailing dynastic 
system via the Peace of Westphalia’s component Treaty of Munster, the Dutch Re-
volt showed how assertions of popular will are limited if there is no juridical con-
cept of territorial authority available to support them.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the colonial extraction of mineral wealth from 
the New World ended up entrenching Spain within a system of stagnant feudalism 
that allowed the Dutch to reap their ‘privilege of backwardness.’77 It was here that 
the Dutch usage of Spanish plunder to finance an innovative system of overseas 
commerce in the East Indies generated extensive social transformation in the Dutch 
countryside.78 ‘This led to forms of ‘proto-industrial’ development, in which mer-
chant entrepreneurs invested directly in rural industries and peasant production be-
came increasingly geared toward the world market.’79 However, this nascent capi-
talist development, and its deviation from the dominant socio-economic model of 
feudalism, ultimately lead to conflict with the Hapsburg Spanish King Philip II, 
who dynastically inherited the Netherlands in 1556. Here, the Hapsburg Empire’s 
rivalry with the Franco-Ottoman Alliance placed tremendous pressure on the sub-
ordinated Netherlands to provide revenue, manpower and supplies for waging this 
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perpetual dynastic warfare. 80  Yet, this burdensome requisitioning of resources 
eventually led the Dutch to revolt.81 Like so many other conflicts within this general 
timeframe, social competition came to express itself though religious schisms 
whereby the Catholic Spanish Monarchy was pitted against the Protestant Dutch 
republicans.82    
 
In waging the revolt, the Dutch Republics had distinct topographical advantages. 
Flood-prone marshlands created difficulties for invading armies, while access to 
seaports supplied resources generated by the trans-oceanic Dutch mercantile em-
pire.83 Furthermore, the perils of indebtedness and military overreach endemic to 
Spain’s dynastic system prevented a decisive military victory against a highly re-
silient and well-supplied Dutch resistance.84 Directly related to the greater ease of 
acquiring material wealth from colonial ventures, the Dutch also possessed a more 
efficient administrative structures better able to avoid the contradictions of person-
alized bureaucracy discussed above. According to Andrew Fitzmaurice, it is plau-
sible that many of the institutional and organizational techniques developed in the 
context of the Dutch East India Company’s overseas exploits were ultimately im-
plemented in Europe itself.85 Thus, (building on its capitalist advantages) by devel-
oping practices in a colonial setting unconstrained by the strictures of European 
traditions, the Dutch possessed innovations that allowed them to maintain a fight 
with larger European military powers constrained by contradictory bureaucratic or-
gans.  
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Connecting these various points provides a body of explanations as to why the 
Dutch maintained a geopolitical standstill with the Spaniards for more than eight 
decades. However, this lack of quick resolution also highlights the contingent and 
ideological nature of modern international legal standing despite the ethos of time-
lessness that frames the question of ‘objective, de facto territorial authority.’86 In 
this way, the Dutch Revolt was ahead of its time by presenting a situation where 
the assertion of popular will was coupled with the attainment of a strong degree of 
de facto authority generated by independence movement’s opposition of an external 
power. However, the prevalence of dynastic legitimacy upheld a system of inter-
polity juridical relations where ‘facts on the ground’ were not a self-justification 
for sovereign autonomy.87 
 
Unfortunately, the systemic clash between dynastic power and emerging capitalist 
modernity exemplified by the Dutch Revolt is obscured by the reigning Westpha-
lian myth. Under this narrative, the granting of independence to the United Prov-
inces (the Seven Dutch Republics) is incorporated into the resolution of the Thirty 
Years War despite the fact the Dutch Revolt had been raging fifty years before the 
outbreak of that conflict.88 This view is furthered by the Dutch Revolt’s dimension 
of religious antagonism and its contribution to the construction of a reified meta-
narrative of ‘Catholics vs. Protestants.’ Recourse to this frame obscures material 
analysis of how localized, yet interconnected, conflicts emanating from diverging 
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forms of social reproduction that were ultimately expressed through sectarian rhet-
oric.89 Furthermore, the fact that a republican system was validated by the West-
phalia settlement lends credence to the belief that 1648 marked the beginning of a 
genuinely pluralist international order.90     
 
The significance of this event is further concealed by the influence of Hugo Grotius, 
international law’s great founding father figure. As a steadfast advocate for Dutch 
independence, he framed the Revolt in a manner alien to our modern conceptions 
of the nation-state and, correspondingly, the distinction between public and private. 
While such structures are implicitly assumed within contemporary international le-
gal discourse, in the context of the Dutch Revolt, it was their unsettled that nature 
allowed Grotius to construct a legal justification for independence with such great 
creativity. As Keene has detailed, Grotius approached the question of a people’s 
natural right to declare independence from a tyrant with great caution.91 After all, 
advocating the unqualified right to declare sovereign independence as a matter of 
natural law would produce a massive amount of uncertainty regarding whose au-
thority was legitimate. This could easily invited chaotic upheaval capable of under-
mining the Grotian goal of promoting well-ordered relations between sovereigns.  
 
However, in denying the general validity of independence claims, he provides a 
caveat by proclaiming that a people victorious in a just war against their sovereign 
can legitimately force the ruler to divide its sovereignty by conceding governance 
functions to the victorious rebels. In other words, the control over the institutions 
of state administration was a spoil of war that could be maintained after hostilities 
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had ceased.92 Significantly, Grotius’s formulation occurred through a highly flexi-
ble approach to the distinction between public and private. As such, his justification 
for rebels attaining autonomy occurred through to analogy ships and cargo captured 
in wartime that legitimately became the private property of their captors under the 
law of the prize.93 Additionally, this justification was made possible through an un-
derstanding of divisible sovereignty that is exceedingly difficult imagine in con-
temporary international legal terms where the nation-state’s the robust right to ter-
ritorial integrity is based on the presumption that sovereignty is indivisible.94 In 
light of this situation, we must historicize the way in which indivisible sovereignty 
and the modern public/private division became materially entrenched after the 
Dutch Revolt. This entails an account of seventeenth century England’s emergence 
as the first modern sovereign nation-state. 
 
4.4.2.  English Nation-State Modernity  
 
As discussed in the last chapter, through class-based shifts in domestic agricultural 
production combined with innovative colonial practices, England transitioned from 
feudalism to become the first modern capitalist state.95 This modernity took the 
form of a constitutional-parliamentary structure that maintained a stark ideological 
distinction between ‘private’ economic activity and the ‘public’ domain of poli-
tics/government.96 Such ideological innovations gave rise to a truly depersonalized 
bureaucracy where the abstract state operated according to standardized procedures, 
was separated from any dynastically empowered individuals, and was managed by 
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functionaries loyal to the abstraction, and thus severed from the bonds of personal-
ized obligation.97 As a result, England was breaking free of the above-discussed 
contradiction of absolutist bureaucracy where depersonalized knowledge practices 
tensely coexisted alongside personalized modes of authority. To better understand 
the entrenchment of English modernity, and its impact on the rest of the world, we 
must consider the proximate geopolitical pressures placed on England by the con-
tinental dynastic system it was transitioning away from.  
 
In addition to the changing class dynamics that lead to the English Civil War (1642-
1651), the consolidation of the modern English state was driven by numerous con-
flicts (including the Anglo-Dutch Wars and Anglo-French Wars) which prompted 
additional rounds of military-fiscal innovation.98 Furthermore, attempts to reintro-
duce the monarchical absolutism (which could systemically undermine capitalist 
innovation) were finally eliminated by the 1688 ‘Glorious Revolution’ which lead 
to the constitutional-monarchical reign of William of Orange, whose invasion from 
the Netherlands was prompted by a quest for an alliance with England in a war 
against France.99 Thus in both the Netherlands and England, the vestiges of monar-
chical authority, that coexisted alongside emerging forces of modernity, opposed 
absolutism by making usage of the very dynastic practices and traditions that legit-
imized absolutism.  
 
Viewing all of this in the aggregate, we can observe how England’s ‘Administrative 
Revolution’ forged the attributes of nation-state modernity via its construction of a 
depersonalized bureaucracy premised on an ideological distinction between public 
and private.100 In contextualizing how this development furthered the emergence of 
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de facto authority as the default criteria for international legal subjectivity, we must 
account for how the new modern nation-state form exerted pressure on the existing 
order of inter-polity interaction. As Benno Teschke has shown, the English consti-
tutional-parliamentary state constructed a double-track model of external relations 
whereby one approach governed relations between European sovereignty while an-
other dealt with the non-European world. Accordingly: 
 
The ‘Glorious Revolution’ not only rationalised the English state, it also 
occasioned a revolution in British foreign policy. This was character-
ised by a shift from dynastic to parliamentary foreign policy making, 
defined no longer by the whims of dynasticism but by the ‘national in-
terest.’ As a result, Parliament adopted a very distinctive ‘dual foreign-
policy strategy’, based, on the one hand, on active power-balancing ver-
sus its rivals on the continent (a policy driven first and foremost by 
British ‘security interests’), and, on the other hand, on unlimited com-
mercial and colonial expansion - the so-called ‘blue water policy.’101   
 
Regarding the first approach, promoting the balance of power within the continental 
absolutist system encouraged a juridical ethos of tradition, parochialism, and justi-
fied harshness. Here, especially after the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht ending the War of 
Spanish Succession, the focus on statecraft and dynastic rights revolved around a 
treaty-based balance of power system where strategic marriages and alliances 
sought to prevent the rise any all-powerful monarch, namely a union of the French 
and Spanish crowns.102 This development was accompanied by a heightened legal-
ization of warfare where, as discussed above, the primary concern was the post-
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conflict division of rights, property, and obligations between the respective victori-
ous and vanquished parties.103 In this emerging order of diplomatic relations be-
tween absolute sovereigns, the distinction between political discretion and private 
consciousness began to take on a character of profound rigidity.104 As documented 
by Reinhard Koselleck, the post-Thirty Years War era witnessed the rise of the 
‘reason of state’ concept assuming that sovereign acts must occur in an autonomous 
political sphere beyond the moral judgment of individuals.105 This dynamic was 
fundamental for preserve order in a world of irreconcilable interests and beliefs.  
 
While Britain maintained a functional equivalent of ‘reason of state’, in contrast to 
continental absolutism, it was substantively justified through a depersonalized bu-
reaucratic state empowered by the collective will of its people.106 This diverging 
justification related directly to the fact that, in Britain, the separation between public 
discretion and individual morality was accompanied by an additional ideological 
separation between bounded public authority and transcendent economic rights. 
Conversely, Continental Europe continued to reproduce its social order through 
feudal-absolutist modes of geopolitical accumulation that, despite adopting new ju-
ridical sensibilities, continued to lack any all-pervasive distinction between politi-
cal and economic power. Given its development of a new system of social repro-
duction that could nonetheless be impacted by external events, ‘Britain largely 
withdrew from direct military commitments and territorial aspirations on the Con-
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tinent…., yet started to regulate the state-system by means of rapidly changing al-
liances with and monetary subsidies to smaller powers - always to counter any 
emergent continental hegemony.’107 
 
In the second approach regarding extra-European colonisation, the British built 
upon earlier juridical ethos that emphasized innovation, utopian experimentation, 
and universalist proclamations to justify ever-expanding modes of access and pres-
ence.108 By contrast to the emerging gap between private ‘lifeworlds’ and public 
autonomy in Europe, the exemplary sociopolitical form in the second track was the 
chartered company (i.e. the Dutch and later British East India Companies) where 
public governance and the accumulation of profits were generally indistinguisha-
ble.109 However, as shown in the previous chapter, by attaining dominance within 
this world-spanning system of colonial capitalism, the British became victims of 
their own success with regards to their American colonies.  
 
Here, the massive accumulation of overseas territories during the Seven Years War 
(1756-1763), a highly successful execution of the ‘blue-water policy’110 fundamen-
tally threatened the privileged identity of the American settlers who ultimately 
waged a successful war of independence.111 It is worth recalling how the American 
revolutionary deployment of popular will grew out of both Britain’s first approach 
to foreign relations that managed interaction between European sovereigns and its 
second approach that directed the accumulationist project of colonial capitalism. 
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While their society was a by-product of the second approach, due to their relative 
‘backwardness’, American settlers proved capable of importing the rules of state-
craft that animated the first approach while simultaneously being spared from, and 
explicitly disavowing, its constraints. However, although the rigidity of the first 
approach acted as an innovation in the context of second approach, the French Rev-
olution showed how this process could reverse its direction.         
         
4.5.  The Juridical Implosion of Absolutist France 
 
4.5.1.  French Contradictions, French Revolution 
 
In theorizing Britain’s transformation as a contributor to the French Revolution, we 
must account for how this development exerted pressure on France’s existing order. 
Here the attempts to challenge British overseas expansion through the Seven-Years 
War and, later support of the American Revolution, placed a tremendous financial 
burden on the French administrative state.112 While the public/private distinction 
may have been delineated the legitimate participants in European statecraft, in ab-
solutist France, it had yet to translate into material institutions for managing sover-
eign debt as something independent from the personal debt of the monarch.113 As a 
result, the inability of the absolutist system to spare its population from the burdens 
of national indebtedness resulted in a peasantry- bourgeois professional class alli-
ance that ultimately toppled the Ancien Regime.  
 
The need to extract revenue from base-level agricultural producers intruded upon 
the system of peasant subsistence and this contributed to large-scale starvation in 
the late 1780s.114 This deeply eroded the longstanding class alliance between the 
peasantry and the centralizing forces of absolutism against the nobility.115 As for 
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the bourgeoisie, their grievance was prompted by the way in which the crisis of 
indebtedness resulted in a mass sale of noble titles and public offices. According to 
Alexander Anievas: 
 
…Despite the mass of office sales to replenish the state’s ailing finances, 
it was actually becoming more difficult for the bourgeoise to become 
nobles as increases in offices failed to keep pace with the dramatic ex-
pansion of the bourgeoisie over the 18th century. Moreover, intensified 
competition and increased office prices meant that a more aspirant 
bourgeoise than ever were failing to purchase their way up the social 
ladder, consequently fueling bourgeois resentment against the old or-
der.116   
 
Yet, what did this crisis of absolutism in its formative heartland mean for the de-
velopment of the international law? A fitting entry point is Teschke’s theory that 
the rise of the modern English state formed a system so efficient in geopolitical 
competition that all other territorial forms had to either adapt or perish in the face 
of it.117 However, while England’s concerted pressure to intensify the power-bal-
ancing system in Europe contributed to an increased ideological distinction between 
public and private spheres, this ideological shift did not create the material social 
institutions embodying this ideal. This point is clarified when observing the socio-
logical and geopolitical forces that spawned new interpretations of the relationship 
between popular will, territorial authority, and the law of nations in the French rev-
olutionary context. 
 
Foundationally, England’s transition to modern statehood created an entirely new 
dimension of unevenness applicable to its relations with both the absolutist struc-
tures that dominated continental Europe and the locations in the non-European 
world it sought to colonize. Regarding the former, pressure from Britain caused 
Europe’s absolutist dynastic actors to mobilize existing intuitional logics as a means 
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of adapting to external pressures. As such, the dynastic rights and customs sur-
rounding territorial authority and geopolitical accumulation, and their attendant 
contradictions, were intensified by Britain’s indirect influence (while Britain itself 
was being freed from the constraints of this system). The pressures this rivalry 
placed on France, the predominant absolutist power on the European continent, led 
it to double down on dynastic power as the recognizable form of authority that could 
mobilize opposition to Britain, despite the consequences this produced.118 By in-
tensifying this embrace, France was severely stunted in its ability to produce inter-
national legal innovation outside this system’s parochial confines of absolutist dip-
lomatic custom.119 
 
Given the French commitment to an increasingly rigid and outmoded system of 
absolutism, the contradictions tied to its preservation ultimately sealed the fate of 
the Ancien Regime. However, with the outbreak of revolution and overthrow of the 
existing order, a void emerged that could be filled with new juridical innovations. 
As to where these innovations came from, the excesses that accompanied the inten-
sification of absolutism under the reign of King Louis XIV emboldened French 
civil society’s embrace of Enlightenment conceptions of natural rights and limita-
tions on official power.120 Furthermore, there was the anti-British geopolitical pos-
turing that resulted in France’s involvement on the American side during its revo-
lution. This forced King Louis XVI to align with those who believed that, on the 
question of sovereignty, de facto territorial authority was a legitimate competitor to 
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dynastic legitimacy.121 This close working relationship between the architects of 
American independence and their French supporters provided a vector for transmit-
ting the Enlightenment ideal that the legitimacy of popular will demanded recogni-
tion under the law of nations, and ‘facts on the ground’ provided the criteria for 
assessing these claims.122 While support for American independence formed a com-
mon cause amongst different actors in an increasing divided French class system, 
with absolutist forces motivated by geopolitical interests and bourgeois forces mo-
tivated by socio-economic interests, this cooperation would not last. In words of 
Mikulas Fabry: 
 
It would prove a supreme irony of history that in an attempt to consol-
idate US independence, the French ancien regime sowed the seeds of 
its own destruction. But while Louis XVI might have been executed in 
January 1793 as an implacable feudal reactionary, nothing changes the 
fact that he was in effect a founding father of the first country created 
explicitly on the basis of consent of the governed.123   
 
Ultimately, France’s unique position as the vanguard of an unstable absolutist sys-
tem within a changing international context resulted in a massive internal upheaval 
spreading outward at a rapid pace. In a very short amount of time, the leading ex-
pression of absolutism was dramatically replaced by the leading expression of pop-
ular will. The international legal order hosting this rupture would never be the same.      
 
4.5.2.  Natural Rights and Territorial Legitimacy 
 
4.5.2.1.  Theoretical Divergence  
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When accounting for how the French revolutionary invocation of popular will 
changed international law, Emer de Vattel provides an appropriate starting point for 
connecting dynastic tradition to international modernity. As Isaac Nakhimovsky 
has shown, there is a distinct split on how Vattel’s theory explains the French Rev-
olution. On the one hand, for theorists such as Carl Schmitt and Reinhard Koselleck, 
‘…Vattel epitomised the civilizing of war through the successful exclusion of nat-
ural law morality from international law - an achievement that was subsequently 
undermined by Enlightenment critics of absolutism.’124 For Schmitt, Vattel’s great 
achievement was his rejection of ‘just war’ which served as a basis for Schmitt’s 
previously discussed articulation of a golden age of limited war between sovereigns 
recognizing one another as ‘lawful enemies’ as opposed to the ‘unjust enemies’ that 
justified unrestricted total war.125 For Koselleck, the great failure of the Enlighten-
ment, materially expressed through the French Revolution, was its disastrous at-
tempt to invoke incontrovertible moral truth as a means of extinguishing irrecon-
cilable political disagreement as they were acknowledged following the wars of 
religion.126 In this respect Vattel, represented the publicist who was able to subor-
dinate personal convictions to the greater good and accept a world containing such 
harsh political realities.127 Such an interpretation is backed by Vattel’s robust de-
fense of a people’s wide-ranging right to choose its preferred form of government 
despite his personal views on the superiority of republicanism.128  
 
However, recent theorists such as Dan Edelstein and David Bell questioned this 
presumption by claiming that Vattel’s theory directly contributed to the resurgence 
of natural law within international legal reasoning, and this was a key feature of the 
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French revolutionary wars.129 For Edelstein, Vattelian influence is apparent in the 
justifications given for the trial and execution of King Louis XVI as an ‘enemy of 
mankind’ under law of nature and nations.130 Under this account, the legal ordering 
of the revolutionary Terror showcased a system whereby the reigning order of civil 
law is voided and, in its absence, assertions of natural law are the only controlling 
source of juridical authority pending the establishment of a new system of civil 
law.131 This juridical separation and ultimate subordination of the civil law to the 
natural law is contrasted to the American Revolution for, ‘while the preamble to 
Thomas Jefferson’s declaration invokes the “Laws of Nature and Nature’s God” 
the grievances listed beneath stem from a revered constitutional tradition, equally 
if not more important than its jusnaturalist foundation.’132 For Bell, it was this all-
encompassing natural law influence beginning in the context of the French Revo-
lution that lead to the total social mobilization and total war via Napoleon’s wars 
of conquest that involved nearly every nation in Europe, either as exporters or op-
ponents of revolutionary popular will.133 
 
4.5.2.2.  Material Convergence  
 
Viewing this discrepancy through the lens of the modern approach to international 
legal standing (encapsulated within the effective control doctrine) these two inter-
pretations are consistent, to a certain extent. After all, the modern approach is prem-
ised upon the assumption that the project of establishing peace between nations 
necessarily means not intervening in situations of domestic ruthlessness because 
doing so could normalize the delegitimisation of political communities’ rights to 
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define their own destinies and thus incentivize predatory behaviour by the powerful. 
This is the reasoning of the all-important ‘effective control doctrine’ discussed in 
Chapter I. 134 Furthermore, while the above accounts dealt primarily with Vattel’s 
theory of war, we must also consider Vattel’s political theory of domestic authority, 
and its relationship to his theory of international order, discussed in Chapter II.135 
Here we must be recall the vagueness of Vattel’s simultaneous call for a high degree 
of deference to an established sovereign’s authority and the right of a people to 
overthrow a governing entity.136  
 
Despite this indeterminacy, the one guideline Vattel does give entails the duty of 
outside states to refrain from intervention in domestic affairs.137 This links to his 
theory of war where he proclaims that foreign involvement in civil conflicts is ille-
gitimate.138  Reading these considerations together, we are left with a coherent 
proto-articulation of modern determination of international legal standing in situa-
tions of domestic strife where the question of which priority should attach to the 
natural law, the civil law and their degree of interaction can only legitimately be 
answered by the political community itself. In this way, the failure of the French 
Revolution to conform to this notion was not its internal practices of Terror, chaos, 
or regicide, for all these were expressions of a political contestation coming to terms 
with deep internal tensions.139 Rather, the French Revolution’s improprieties was 
militaristic expansion across national borders which involved parties that, when 
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viewed in light of the state-centrism that shapes our consciousness of ‘the interna-
tional’, had no direct stake in France’s intensified social transformation.  
 
Leaving analysis here fails to account for material context. While international legal 
standing via ‘facts on the ground’ is the logical conclusion in a world of bounded 
nation-states represented by governments presumably empowered by the will of 
their people, this was far from the case during the French Revolution. Instead, the 
military expansionism and conquest prompted by this event was undertaken in the 
name of bestowing popular will and national self-determination upon people’s liv-
ing under systems of dynastic legitimacy, the overwhelming norm of the time.140 In 
this way, exporting the French Revolution tested the point of ambiguity in Vattel’s 
treatise as to whether it was legitimate to aid a people asserting their popular will 
in a struggle against tyranny.141 A prototype for future conquests on this basis was 
the 1791 union of Avignon and Comtat Venaissin with France despite the fact that 
these territories had been non-incorporated papal enclaves since the fourteenth cen-
tury.142 By implementing the Union in contravention of the traditional concept of 
legitimacy, in the words of Edward Kolla: ‘French revolutionaries’ idea that the 
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will of the people, instead, was the legitimate basis for politics, precipitated an un-
intended re-evaluation of international legality, just as it was undermining the po-
sition of the king domestically.’143  
 
The abandonment of dynastic legitimacy provided the French revolutionaries with 
a high degree of latitude in advancing novel legal arguments when legitimizing ter-
ritorial imposition in the name of popular will. One such innovation involved inter-
preting the principle of nonintervention to necessarily require a collective security 
alliance to enforce this order.144 Because achieving this scheme required a base-
level homogeneity, it would be legitimate for France to occupy territories and trans-
form their domestic constitutional orders as a means of guaranteeing this collective 
security regime’s conditions of possibility.145 Another innovation, which character-
ized the Union of Avignon, was the usage of plebiscites whereby France retained 
the ultimate authority to draw the boundaries defining what counted as territorial 
unit that could assert self-determination.146  
 
Yet, another innovation was the internationalization of its natural law-justified do-
mestic regicide. This manifested as a ‘governmental illegitimacy’ argument 
whereby the presumption of non-invention did not apply to monarchies. According 
to Grewe’s characterisation of this understanding, waging war against a monar-
chical regime ‘…was not a war of ‘nation against nation’ but the lawful defense of 
a free nation against the illegal aggression of a king.’147  However, these revolu-
tionary challenges forced the defenders of the existing order to clarify their own 
arguments against this new position that ‘called into doubt all territorial claims, and 
all international treaties concluded over the centuries that had not taken into account 
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the will of the people and thus augured the collapse of a diplomatic and legal rela-
tions between states.’148 This formative assertion of localised tradition in face of 
universalist calls for transformation would have far-reaching consequences for the 
evolving relationship between popular will and the international legal order. 
 
4.6.  The Impossible Task of Reversal  
 
4.6.1.  Enter the Concert of Europe 
 
The ultimate defeat of Napoleon led to many questions as to what a settlement could 
possibly look like following such profound challenges to the existing order. Here 
the familiar account is of the rise of the Concert of Europe system where an assem-
blage of victorious powers convened the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to rectify the 
chaos left in the wake of the French revolutionary wars.149 While this system rep-
resented one of the most influential early attempts to create a regime of ‘global 
governance,’150 it has received little systemic attention in critical international legal 
analysis.151 This is arguably due to the Concert’s avowed rejection of the sovereign 
equality ideal in favour of what Gerry Simpson deemed a ‘legalized hegemony’ 
consisting of Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria as a core of great powers that 
reserving special rights and privileges for themselves.152 However, while this is ar-
rangement patently contradicts modern international legal sensibilities, a contextual 
account of the Concert shows that the modern conception of sovereign equality is 
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a relatively recent invention.153 As a result, Westphalian orthodoxy has a distorting 
effect on the analysis of the Concert by striping this system of its juridical implica-
tions through imaging it as an exercise in ‘power politics’ fundamentally contrary 
to the rule of law.154 This distorting effect allows the critics of international law’s 
restraints on intervention to advance misleading arguments concerning the Concert 
of Europe in relation to subsequent models of international organization.155  
 
However, the Concert was not as a rupture in the existing international order, but 
rather as an invaluable milestone in establishing our modern international sys-
tem.156 It was at this point that the particular balancing of sovereignty, autonomy 
and intervention informing our modern approach were entrenched under the auspi-
ces of the Great Powers. Understanding this impact requires an analysis of the Con-
cert Great Powers as differing sociopolitical forms that nonetheless found common 
cause in reconstructing the system ruptured by the French Revolution. In account-
ing for the nature of four major Great Powers, they can be divided between Britain 
as the proponent an emerging liberalism primarily concerned with facilitating cap-
italist social relations and Prussia, Russia, and Austria (collective known as the 
‘Holy Alliance’), the reactionary forces concerned with the preservation of dynastic 
rights.            
 
As a starting point for this analysis, while the two blocs depended on differing 
modes of accumulation to reproduce their respective social orders, French revolu-
tionary innovations posed distinct threats to both of them. While the Holy Alliance 
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members operated according to the logic of dynastic custom-backed geopolitical 
accumulation that was the object of direct repudiation by the French revolutionaries, 
the situation becomes more complex when Britain is considered. For Britain, the 
new mode was that of capital accumulation where surplus had to be continually 
reinvested in pursuit of increased growth as the only means of preventing systemic 
collapse.157  
 
As previously discussed, the British colonization of the New World provided both 
a mechanism for absorbing the social costs of capitalist political economy as well 
as access to the resources that generated further rounds of accumulation. While the 
resulting society ultimately achieved its independence, this loss of territorial control 
via the American Revolution (something that would have been devastating under 
the earlier system of geopolitical accumulation) still allowed many mechanisms 
supporting British interests to remain intact.158 This marked the beginning of a new 
approach to empire-building whereby territorial impositions did not necessarily en-
tail formal political control but rather revolved around the impositions of measures 
to guarantee the conditions of capitalist reproduction. 159  Towards, this end, it 
sought to reproduce the nation-state form, analogous to what developed in Britain, 
where depersonalized public authority actively protected and enforced private prop-
erty interests. 
 
Thus when conceptualizing the threat the Concert of Europe was addressing, we 
must account for is the hybrid form of accumulation that developed through the 
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French Revolutionary challenge.160 While this mode of accumulation occurred in 
the name of liberal’s fundamental trope of ‘liberty,’ it utterly lacked the core struc-
turing features that defined capitalist political economy. Rather, the French Revo-
lutionary rationale for territorial authority was very much in the mode of pre-capi-
talist geopolitical accumulation; only the old basis of dynastic rights and custom 
that shaped this system were roundly rejected and invocations popular will filled 
this void. Thus, the appropriate term for French Revolutionary reproduction would 
be that of ‘Jacobin Accumulation’ that utilized both the dynastic strategy of direct 
territorial appropriation and the capitalist ideal of formal equality of citizens.161  
 
Moreover, the larger system of inter-sovereign relations lead to a direct clash be-
tween these two modes of geopolitical accumulation. For the chaos of revolution 
led the monarchial powers to believe that intervention in France would provide nu-
merous opportunities for geopolitical accumulation of the dynastic variety, while 
conversely, the French revolutionaries viewed the weakness and illegitimacy of the 
prevailing dynastic order as an opportunity for geopolitical accumulation of the 
Jacobin variety.162 While this practice explicitly undermined the Holy Alliance and 
its veneration of dynastic right, Britain had its own reasons for opposing such a 
justification for claiming territorial authority. After all, capitalism’s development 
in England consisted of gradual shifts that the nonetheless preserved the pre-capi-
talist ruling class structures.163 Jacobin accumulation threatened to radically appro-
priate and redistribute these accumulated resources to a mass of citizenry whose 
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entitlement to this wealth was then legitimized on the basis of military service.164 
This threatening reality meant that there was no shortage of British conservative 
argument regarding the dangerously destabilizing impact of the French Revolution 
and what it represented.165          
 
Despite the spirit of conservatism deeply entrenched amongst many of the Con-
cert’s participants, the system established was in no way a return to the pre-Revo-
lutionary order. This was due to the reality that profound changes to the longstand-
ing system of dynastic rights and the balance of power were already underway well 
before the French Revolution. According to Keene: 
 
Challenges to the traditional authorities - the effects of the Reformation 
on papal influence (a major part of the assertion of quasi-imperial 
kingly sovereignty), and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 
the context of violent struggles surrounding the French Revolutionary 
wars - compounded the problem, as did Napoleon’s personal revolu-
tionisation of the dynastic order of Europe, and the fact that the Con-
gress of Vienna deliberately chose not to pursue the fantasy of a perfect 
return to the ancien regime world.166  
 
Against the backdrop, of ongoing tension and an acknowledged impossibility of 
returning to the past, the Concert powers were forced to come to terms with legacies 
of the French Revolution that could not be excised. As a result, the need to imagine 
some place for popular will within the new international order was unavoidable.     
 
4.6.2.  Visions of Future Unity 
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The French Revolution introduced new ideological catalysts for asserting popular 
will, new administrative practices that serve as evidence of ‘objective de facto’ ter-
ritorial authority, and a newfound emphasis on the relationship between these two 
aspects. Regarding the first issue, claims to legitimacy and moral defensibility on 
the basis of de facto authority rest upon the sacrosanct character of popular will and 
its ability to elude value-neutral definition in an ideological plural world.167 Given 
this normative grounding, the importance of the French Revolution and its imme-
diate aftermath in constructing the modern incarnations of these core political con-
cepts is almost impossible to overstate. After all, the French Revolution introduced 
the very possibility of political discourse and engagement under conditions of mo-
dernity via its dialogical designations of ‘Right’ and ‘Left.’168 
 
Moreover, this event introduced a meta-scale reconceptualization of temporality 
itself. As Koselleck famously remarked, the conception of time operating in cycli-
cal patterns gave way to ‘revolutionary time’ whereby the future could, for the first 
time, be imagined as a radical break from the past resulting in entirely new mani-
festations of possibility.169 In this capacity, the French Revolution introduced a 
multitude of unprecedented political ideals and corresponding political conse-
quences. These included: the quintessential proclamation of liberal ideals within a 
secular state via the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen; the Commit-
tee for Public Safety’s ‘Terror’ as the original attempt to radically transcend the 
limits and contradictions of liberalism via ‘Revolutionary Democratic-Dictator-
ship;’170 numerous backlashes by religious, provincial, and conservative social ele-
ments;171 and the conception of grandiose national unity under an all-powerful, yet 
worldly empowered, law-giving leader via Napoleon.  
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Thus, when it comes to articulating the diverse ideological manifestations a people 
could conceivably assert as necessary to achieve popular will, the French Revolu-
tionary experience inexorably widened this ideology spectrum in a very short 
timeframe. Moreover, the assertion of novel forms of popular will and debates over 
the means of accomplishing them against the backdrop of the violent overthrow 
raised difficult ethical dilemmas even amongst some of the most influential theo-
rists of revolution and popular will. For example, in commenting upon the Jacobin’s 
‘Terror,’ Thomas Jefferson lamented the fact that so many were executed without 
the benefit of procedural safeguards, yet, ultimately defended these actions as a 
necessary to excise tyranny.172 In response to these inevitable dilemmas, an ideo-
logically pluralist view of international legal standing provides a mechanism for 
resolution by declaring that difficult issues surrounding popular will can only be 
legitimately decided upon at the level of a bounded sovereign political community. 
 
On the second issue, while the French Revolution prompted acute barrages of ide-
ological innovation, the upheaval generated by these free-ranging assertions lead to 
new forms of rational territorial administration especially after Napoleon took 
power. In the words of Mlada Bukovansky: 
 
The French Revolution…demonstrated the virtues and vices of state 
centralization by achieving an entirely new level of centralization, a 
level which ironically surpassed that achieved by French ‘absolutism.’ 
While the rationalization of administrative structures was already un-
derway in many enlightened monarchies, the revolution and Napole-
onic rule greatly accelerated the process. Centralization was spurred on 
by the eradication of intermediate nobility and clerical bodies, as it be-
came increasingly evident that eroding the power of corporate estates 
could enhance the wealth and power of the state. The French were a 
model to be emulated in this respect, and where they had conquered, 
they left a template on which to base newly-centralized regimes.173      
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It can be argued that these new approaches to territorial administration were grafted 
onto the naturalized understandings that emerged during post-Westphalian consol-
idation of absolutism, whereby a prince’s fulfilment of his duty to acquire actual 
knowledge of his realm was evidence of the territorialized divinity that attached to 
the nation-state form. Only with the French Revolutionary, and later Napoleonic, 
displacement of divinity did this mode of authority became justified as a secular 
myth that derives its power from the rejection of all other myths in the name of an 
impossible standard of rationality. Here, perhaps the single greatest French Revo-
lutionary legacy that linked the practical functions of territorial administration and 
social ordering to the invocation of timeless secular truth was Napoleon’s Civil 
Code. With its rejection of papal and feudal modes of authority, the Code became 
regarded by its adherents ‘…as a unique historical event with no historical past, 
[and] the jurists claimed that the Code was comprehensive, immutable, and gap-
less.’174  
          
This ideal of flawless, rational legality plainly conflates the features of ideological 
contestation and ‘objective de facto’ territorial authority that the modern view of 
international legal standing strives to separate. In the Napoleonic context, despite 
long-standing perceptions otherwise, the act of ‘law-giving’ was not even an artic-
ulation of new juridical concepts and forms derived from the revolutionary experi-
ence but was rather, largely, a rehashing of previously existing French legal princi-
ples.175 As such, this act was not a profound articulation of newfound truth, but 
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rather the compilation of existing juridical practices presented as a means of con-
solidating political power.176 However, Napoleon was motivated by a deeper gran-
diosity in this endeavours and, towards this end, emulated the Byzantine Emperor 
Justinian whose very act of giving the law in the name of a political community 
necessarily implied a higher order of legitimacy capable of imbuing this act with 
universality.177 This notion of a universal law that was both ‘people-made’ yet be-
yond mere ‘politics’ spoke to the many Utopian (albeit irreconcilable) longings that 
characterized the French Revolutionary experience. Thus, both figures, to quote 
Donald Kelley: 
 
inspired not only nostalgic or a reactionary longings for a return to the 
Old Regime but also dreams of social justice and even a ‘socialist’ fu-
ture in which law would be defined not as a political creation or an 
accumulation of individual rights but rather as an expression of social 
needs and ideals by which it should be judged and to which it should 
ultimately be subject.178  
 
In this way, the presentation of an all-encompassing legal order that invites cata-
strophic contestation over whether this law is transcendent truth or parochial poli-
tics can be viewed as a distillation of Koselleck’s proclamation of the Enlighten-
ment’s dark side, i.e. the ability of individuals to articulate universal truth unbur-
dened by the realities of irreducible difference justifies the harshest acts of vio-
lence.179 In relating this back to ‘de facto authority’ as the determinate of interna-
tional legal standing, it is the construction of bounded political communities corre-
sponding to inviolable national borders (however historical unjust these borders 
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may be) that serves to re-inscribe the agonic sensibilities rejected by radical En-
lightenment rationality of the French Revolution.   
 
All of the above-discussed issues of rationality, ideology, and modernity are bound 
together in the ultimate legacy of the French Revolution. This legacy was the intro-
duction of the popular will ideal into the international system in a manner that could 
not be undone despite the concerted actions of the world’s most powerful sover-
eigns. Moreover, this legacy built on the American Revolution where, unlike the 
ultimate restoration of dynastic order that occurred in France, the system it estab-
lished was able to sustain its republican identity and accumulate power and influ-
ence at an exceptional pace.180 This being the case, how long would it take before 
those peripheral to, or controlled by, the Concert’s Great Powers demanded that 
their expressions of popular will be validated?181 How did the precepts constructing 
today’s effective control doctrine emerge to legitimize and consolidate this process? 
How did fundamental disagreement over popular will construct articulations of 
what acceptably fell with the ambit of ‘ideological pluralism’? These questions 
shall be addressed in the next chapter where my focus shifts to the consolidation of 
the modern international order. Here the horizons of popular will were contained 
through a diversity of justifications that entailed the imposition of new forms of 
control. 
 
4.7.  Conclusion  
 
Through this account of the consolidation and rupture of Europe’s Ancien Regime, 
this thesis’s methodological merging of ‘juridical thinking’ and historical sociology 
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has been deployed once again in constructing an account of ‘world-historical con-
text.’ Here I showed how absolutism’s juridical narrative of divinity-rooted, per-
sonalized authority was challenged through the meta-event that was the ‘discovery’ 
of the New World. While this led to a more rationalized reconfiguration of dynastic 
power, changes in material social relations placed a tremendous degree of pressure 
on this particular justification for authority. The result was a series of compounding 
contradictions that manifested themselves in the institutions of war, bureaucracy, 
and lawful authority across a variety of contexts. 
 
Focusing on the leading absolutist power, France, I showed how these contradic-
tions lead an important, yet disproportionately powerful, middle class to advance 
their material interests through a discourse of popular will. Thus, what emerged was 
a new juridical narrative fundamentally incompatible with the prevailing juridical 
narrative justifying absolutism, which became the rallying point for the French Rev-
olution. This lead to a whole-scale uprooting of Europe’s Ancien Regime through a 
series of efforts to both export and contain the Revolution that raised numerous 
questions regarding war, social organization, and the boundaries of political com-
munity. These challenges remained after the defeat of the various French revolu-
tionary incarnations. As such, a new approach to lawful order was needed given the 
impossibility of returning to the pre-revolutionary system both as a matter of mate-









The Containment of Popular Will: The Concert of Europe, 




5.1.  Introduction  
 
This chapter examines how the shards of post-French revolutionary popular will 
and the vestiges of dynastic authority constituted a new international order via the 
Concert of Europe system. Through this process, the French Revolution’s univer-
salistic exportable conception of popular will was replaced by the view that popular 
will was a parochial expression of organic community increasingly conflated with 
the bounded nation-state. This containment process was twofold. In addition to con-
taining popular will within sovereign borders, the very idea that organic popular 
will justified sovereign independence was being increasingly contained within Eu-
rope (and its settler progeny) at the exclusion of the rest of the world. Thus popular 
will’s organic, parochial turn directly facilitated the infamous nineteenth-century 
distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ nations where only the former 
could claim the full protection of international law. 
 
This twofold containment of popular will was immensely beneficial to the consoli-
dation of global capitalism. With the hardening of borders in Europe, the modern 
depersonalized nation-state presumed by international law, and characteristic of 
capitalist social relations, began universalising in a manner that challenged all other 
modes of authority. This process of state consolidation allowed capitalist latecom-
ers in continental Europe to engage in top-down ‘passive revolutions’ as a means 
of ‘catching up’ with the original capitalist powers, namely Britain. Furthermore, 
the juridical exclusion of the rest of the world allowed the popular will-based ‘fam-




excluded societies to enter into capitalist social relations as a precondition for sub-
jectivity. 
 
Part 5.2. situates the process of containment as the pre-history of international law’s 
emergence as an unambiguous discipline and profession in the late nineteenth-cen-
tury. Part 5.3. returns to the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution and 
highlights a distinct tension within the top echelon of the Concert hierarchy between 
a liberal-capitalist Britain and a dynastic-reactionary Holy Alliance. Part 5.4. then 
explores the ideological basis for this synthesis by highlighting contributions from 
Edmund Burke and, by extension, Sir James Mackintosh that produced anti-expan-
sionist theories of popular will suited to an emerging international order where 
bounded territoriality facilitated capital accumulation. Part 5.5. turns to the recep-
tion of this ideal through an examination of how the clashing interests of both Brit-
ain and the Holy Alliance were accommodated through the modern conception of 
sovereign equality as a medium of international coexistence. 
 
Part 5.6. then accounts for the developmental nexus between capitalism, interna-
tional law, and the diffusion of the nation-state form through focusing on changing 
juridical modalities of territorial imposition during the Concert era. This particu-
larly occurred through the decline of ‘title by conquest’ and its replacement with 
‘belligerent occupation’ as a tool for protecting private property that configured this 
presumption as the basis for legitimate sovereignty. In complicating the national-
ism-international law relationship, Part 5.7. examines the status of multi-ethnic em-
pires as international legal subjects as well as compounding contradictions sur-
rounding the question of nationalist ambitions that did not conform to international 
legal boundaries. Finally, Part 5.8. shows how the non-European world was ex-
cluded from the sphere of those who could claim unconditional sovereign authority 
on the basis of popular will. Through their resistance, however, non-European ac-
tors contributed to the presumption that popular will is the universal basis for do-
mestic authority under international law. However, importing this discourse of con-
flation between state sovereignty and popular will meant importing the material 





This sets the stage for Chapter VI’s examination what ‘popular will’, and its socio-
juridical presumptions, could possibly mean in a region on the periphery of the 
emerging global system, Latin America. Following this, Chapter VII returns to the 
legacy of the European containment of popular will and its contribution to the post-
war ‘world of popular will’ embedded in the UN Charter. Here I show how the 
contradictions between border consolidation, the expansion of colonial capitalism, 
and hierarchical organic conceptions of political community eventually imploded 
Europe’s nineteenth-century international order. This occurred through the rise of 
aggressive nationalism (reaching its ultimate expression with fascism) that led to 
an aggravated collapse of the dividing line between intra-European and colonial 
modalities of violence that resulted in hyper-intensive eruptions of war and geno-
cide. While an attempt at rectification occurred through a postwar reorganization 
of world order that venerated popular will, this development entailed a grand ab-
straction of the material social relations that led to this ultimate rupture.  
 
5.2.  Prelude to the Gentle Civilizer  
 
This chapter accounts for how the previously expansionist conceptions of popular 
will were contained to justify the modern European states-system. However, this 
containment of popular will was in no way the containment of capitalism. Rather, 
the making of an exclusionary and bounded state-system in Europe was very much 
a direct adaptation to capitalism’s continued expansion. Bringing these realities to 
our analytical forefront allows for a materialist interpretation of how new under-
standings of international law were constructed from the premise that the consent 
of these popular will-expressing units are this system’s exclusive source of legiti-
macy. In this capacity, I offer a prelude to Martti Koskenniemi’s observation in The 
Gentle Civiliser of Nations that the 1870s represented a watershed in the profes-
sional development of international law through specialist conferences, publica-
tions, and associations.1 While there is much insight in Koskenniemi’s depiction of 
                                                        




this ‘gentle civilizing’ as a meta-effort of European liberals seeking to align their 
interests, this necessarily begs the questions as to what material and ideological 
presumptions framed this project; issues I address in detail in this chapter.2 
 
Against this backdrop of formalized disciplinary consolidation, a key presumption 
was that this multiplicity of nation-states, each representing a unique bounded com-
munity, had no incentive to legally interact with one another if doing so might de-
stroy their local autonomy.3 In historicizing this presumption within its post-Napo-
leonic context, the exporters of the French Revolution who dismantled feudal struc-
tures in the name of liberating national communities were frequently condemned as 
defiling the very communities they purported to liberate.4 Thus, the Great Powers 
seeking to ‘restore order’ could exploit this resentment and invoke a pluralist tradi-
tionalism when opposing the idea that ‘popular will’ could be achieved through 
universal revolution.5  
 
From this counter-revolutionary foundation, as capitalism expanded, the victorious 
enemies of the French Revolution could conflate ideological pluralism (increasing 
expressed as nationalism) with their specific means of maintaining or implementing 
                                                        
2 Koskenniemi was certainly aware of sociological factors that animated the consolidation of inter-
national law in this particular way. As such, my analysis in this chapter entails an unpacking of his 
observation that: 
Men who extolled the spirit of liberalism in the mid-Victorian age were com-
pelled to conclude that the prevailing economic and political conditions by no 
means guaranteed further progress and were positively responsible for the 
presence of that…redoubtable nemesis, revolution. 
Ibid. 12. 
3 On the deeper roots of this positivist orientation towards order between sovereign states, particular 
as developed in the late-eighteenth century by Frederich von Martens (1756-1821), see Koskenniemi 
2008. 
4 According to the Scottish jurist James Lorimer (1818-1890), a major participant in these early 
endeavours to consolidate international law as a science and a profession, the French Revolution 
had ‘…confused and bewildered the generation on which it fell, and arrested all rational inquiry into 
the laws by which social relations are governed.’ Lorimer 1890 [1866], 33 




this form of political economy. Here, state sovereignty constituted the authority to 
implement capitalist reforms and a positivist understanding of international law be-
came the mechanism for ordering this presumption of absolute political sovereignty 
(as opposed economic sovereignty) amongst multiple actors. As a practical matter, 
‘ideological pluralism’ was restricted to liberal or reactionary variants of state-
based nationalism, the choice of which was profoundly influenced by a nation’s 
particular place within the expanding order of global capitalism. More radical and 
egalitarian expressions of popular will appear outside this scope of acceptable po-
litical expression. This was no accident. 
 
However, a striking paradox was presented for international lawyers regarding the 
notion that popular will legitimized domestic authority through the nation-state 
form. While containing previously expansive notions of popular will into the terri-
torially bounded nation-states was a task of profound methodological complexity, 
the turn to international legal positivism was a task of profound methodological 
simplification. On the question of complexity, one need only consider the efforts of 
Casper Johann Bluntschli (1808-1881) whose theory of the sovereign state as a re-
pository of popular will emerged through a dizzying synthesis of:  
 
historical anthropology, historical sociology, stage theories of the econ-
omy, histories of Europe, histories of European legal and political 
though, abstract theories of politics, time-hounoured doctrines concern-
ing form of government, modern class analysis and the legal and con-
stitutional theories of modern representative government.6 
 
However, Bluntschli was an anomaly when it came to rigorously theorizing ‘the 
state’ as a demand of international legal thought, despite it being international law’s 
primary subject matter.  
 
For most international lawyers the deeper questions of ‘what the state is?’ were 
largely irrelevant to the question of ‘what did the state consent to?’ According to 
                                                        




the positivism that asserted itself during this era, the presence of ‘consent’ was the 
reducible essence of what international law actually was.7 On this point, the prob-
lem of state identity was largely solved by the doctrine of constitutive recognition 
whereby an affirmative approval from established sovereigns was required for in-
ternational legal standing regardless of ‘facts on the ground.’8 This view is con-
sistent with the positivist presumption that compelling a state to recognize an entity 
against its will contradicts consent, and hence cannot produce valid law.9 However, 
such an approach diverted efforts away from theorizing how state formation is fa-
cilitated through international law just as much as international legal formation is 
facilitated through the will of states.10 This one-sided understanding is aptly ex-
pressed by Lassa Oppenhiem’s (1858-1919) depiction of a ‘…family of nations 
[that] arose out of different states which were in no way connected with each 
other.’11  
 
While it is now common for international legal histories to highlight how exclu-
sionary applications of recognition justified imperialism and upheld a ‘standards of 
                                                        
7 While positivists often failed on their own terms in this capacity, they still warrant this label to the 
extent that ‘positivism’ was a distinct political project just as much as it was a jurisprudential theory, 
see Garcia-Salmones Rovira 2013; Vec 2017; Pitts 2018.    
8 See Orford 2012, 278. While the difference between ‘declarative’ and ‘constitutive’ theories of 
recognition has produced an endless amount of doctrinal controversy amongst international lawyers 
(see Woster 2009; Parfitt 2016), a historical materialist view of the way different recognition theo-
ries serve different interests brings a great deal of clarity to these debates. This point was plainly 
obvious to jurists in the early Soviet Union. According to Evgeny Pashukanis (1891-1937), declar-
ative theories are, ‘…the reflection of the epoch, when the bourgeoisie struggled for national liberty 
and the formation of national states.’ Quoted in Korovin 1934, 259. In Evgeny Korovin’s (1892-
1964) addendum to Pashukanis’s observation, ‘[o]n the other hand, the theories of constitutional 
[constitutive] recognition reflect the practice of the imperialistic policy of the greater powers.’ Ibid. 
259-260.  
9 Roth 1999, 124. 
10 See Pahuja and Eslava forthcoming. 
11 Oppenheim 1908, 317. On the political goal of international peace that motivated Oppenheim’s 




civilization’, questions remains as to how this situation came about. 12 Despite the 
numerous important works exploring the international law of colonialism late in the 
1800s, considerably less have detailed the first half of this century.13 As such, few 
scholars have focused on how the 1815 Concert of Europe (even more so than the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia) helped to construct an inter-sovereign order that stripped 
the law of nations of its non-European influences and applications.14 Though we 
should not ignore the hierarchies and exclusions justified through the pre-1815 law 
of nature and nations, its proclaimed universality provided political opportunities 
for marginal actors that a state-centric, recognition-based, and unapologetically pa-
rochial legal positivism did not.15 Here, by the late eighteenth century, such dis-
courses had developed into anti-colonial legal universalisms that failed to survive 
international law’s nineteenth century disciplinary consolidation process.16  The 
loss of these discourses is fundamentally linked to the containment of popular will 
within a bounded European state-system that arose in response to a colonization-
hungry expansion of capitalism. A new order of international law was shaped in 
this image.17     
 
5.3.  Concert Tensions and Intervention Questions  
 
As Concert of Europe system emerged through the 1815 Congress of Vienna, its 
core principle was hierarchical domination by Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, 
                                                        
12 For important works in this capacity, see e.g. Grouvogui 1996; Anghie 2004; Mieville 2005; 
Bowden 2005; Obregón 2012. 
13 Pitts 2018, 16. 
14 An exception was CH Alexandrowicz (1902-1975), see Armitage and Pitts 2017, 19. 
15 Keal 2003, 111. 
16 See Pitts 2018, 152.   
17 For an important account of how the discourse of ‘civilisation’ was central to this process of 
transforming the world into an international system of sovereign states geared towards the dynam-




who possessed virtually limitless discretion to redraw borders, install their preferred 
rulers, and conduct interventions.18 As discussed in Chapter IV, the threat of an 
expanded rejection of established of authority in the name of an all-encompassing 
vision of popular will represented by the French Revolution, and later Napoleon, 
was sufficient to create common cause amongst a diverse grouping of great powers. 
Yet, while this common interest may have been enough to establish a centralized 
mechanism, beyond the immediate acts of reordering, there was minimal agreement 
on the nature of this system’s long-term functioning. This was especially true of the 
question of intervention. While the Concert powers reserved this option as a right, 
questions remained as to how frequently it should be applied in light of the aspira-
tions towards popular will that persisted beyond the French revolutionary wars. 
This controversy over whether the persistence of popular will justified an increase 
or a restriction on intervention in the post-Napoeonic order produced two very dif-
ferent responses within the respective liberal and reactionary power blocs. 
 
5.3.1.  Holy Alliance Geopolitical Accumulation 
 
Beginning with the reactionary dynastic bloc, on September 26th, 1815 the Austrian 
Emperor Francis I, the Russian Tsar Alexander I, and the Prussian King Frederick 
William III signed a treaty of Holy Alliance. The text of this agreement revolved 
around the affirmation of Christianity as the one true basis for public authority and 
the three signatories installed themselves as guardians of this order.19 As a practical 
                                                        
18 On the hierarchical dynamics of this system, see Lingelbach 1900; Peterson 1945; Slantchev 2005. 
19 According to Article II of this treaty: 
[T]he sole principle in effect, both between the said Governments and their 
Subjects, shall be that of rendering reciprocal service, and by an unalterable 
good will, to bear witness to the mutual affection with which they ought to be 
inspired, to consider themselves all but as members of one Christian Nation; 
the three Allied Princes looking upon themselves but as delegated by Provi-
dence to govern three branches of the same family, namely, Austria, Prussia, 




matter, this agreement provided a basis for the Holy Alliance powers to uphold their 
preferred rulers against popular will-invoking challenges.20 According to Henry 
Wheaton’s 1841 depiction: 
 
This union was intended to form a perpetual system of intervention 
among European States, adopted to prevent any such change in the in-
ternal forms of their respective governments as might endanger the ex-
istence of the monarchical institutions which had been re-established 
under the legitimate dynasties of their respective reigning houses. The 
general right of interference was sometimes defined as to be applicable 
to every case of popular revolution, where the change in the form of 
government did not proceed from the voluntary concession of the reign-
ing Sovereign.21 
 
This anti-popular will agenda stemmed largely from Austrian Foreign Minister 
Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) who conflated the affirmation of the 
1815 settlement with the interests of a broader European social order that trans-
cended narrow political contestations.22 According to Carsten Holbraad, when fac-
ing the challenge of popular will, Metternich ‘…did not see a number of independ-
ent revolutionary movements, each taking advantage of local conditions, but one 
vast conspiracy against all the governments of Europe.’23 Thus, the Holy Alliance 
represented a shift from politics between sovereigns to one of sovereign unity 
against the demands of local populations ‘since a local revolution constituted a Eu-
ropean emergency.’24 
                                                        
people are a part, has truly no other Sovereign than Him to Whom alone be-
longs the Power. 
Quoted in Hartmann 1969, 7. 
20 Simpson 2004, 247-249.  
21 Quoted in Alexandrowicz 2017 [1958], 370. 
22 Holbraad 1970, 15.  
23 Ibid. 29. 





However, this vision of an interventionist order was almost entirely absent amongst 
the British, who, while not categorically opposed to intervention, disclaimed it as a 
matter of general policy. While justified on differing grounds, this position of non-
intervention was shared amongst British politicians and theorists of all major ideo-
logies. For the Whigs, preserving the territorial status quo complimented the prin-
ciple of opposing dynastic rights. In an inversion of Metternich’s conspiracy, ac-
cording to the Whigs (including Sir James Mackintosh), intervention directed by a 
cabal of dynastic princes represented the institutional undermining of popular will 
expressed through the territorially bounded nation-state form.25 For the Conserva-
tives, while less sympathetic to Whig emphasis on popular will, the Holy Alliance 
regime of intervention was unnecessary given their view that internal politics was 
largely irrelevant to maintaining a stable international system.26 For British radicals, 
their opposition to Continental dynastic powers overcame their opposition to pre-
serving a territorial status quo they believed to be unrepresentative of underlying 
national communities.27 To quote Holbraad:  
 
each of these [British] groups of ideas sprang from aversion to estab-
lished doctrines of [Continental European] conservative thought. Terri-
torial conservatism was advanced as an alternative to the Continental 
theory of dynastic conservatism. The Tory and Whig criticisms were 
directed at the dynastic, the Radical at the territorial version of Euro-
pean conservatism.28   
 
                                                        
25 Ibid. 126-127. 
26 Ibid. 121. 





The complexities informing this divergence between an interventionist Holy Alli-
ance and an non-interventionist Britain furthers Gerry Simpson’s point that, histor-
ically, the production of (non-)interventionist arguments is irreducible to any polit-
ical ideology.29 Yet if ideology alone cannot explain these developments, what can? 
Viewing international legal innovations as inseparable from their material condi-
tions, I argue that the schism between the Holy Alliance and Britain is explainable 
as a divergence between modes of social reproduction. In short, the Holy Alliance 
represented the continuity of pre-capitalist dynastic modes of geopolitical accumu-
lation, while Britain represented capital accumulation at a crossroads. In light of the 
challenges posed to both of these blocs, the rise of a new formulation of capitalist 
expansion able to contain these revolutionary (and reactionary) passions was of 
mutual necessity. However, this demanded a high degree of adaptation from the 
prevailing international legal order.   
 
In theorizing the Holy Alliance’ pre-capitalist mode of social reproduction, the in-
itial process of reordering post-Napoleonic Europe amounted to a variable feeding 
frenzy of geopolitical accumulation. Here the French revolutionary wars’ reset the 
pre-existing ‘balance of power’, and its record compounded territorial rights and 
obligations. 30  This allowed the victorious powers to side-step the historically-
                                                        
29 Simpson 2004, 250. 
30 Vagts and Vagts 1979, 564. The Concert system has long been remarked upon as a classic appli-
cation of the balance of power, see e.g. Kissinger 2013. However, as Paul Schroeder has argued, 
though it formed a narrative understanding amongst the Concert powers, the ‘balance of power’ 
(understood according as a principle of rational political action) cannot explain the dominance of 
Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria within this system given that Britain and Russia’s supreme 
positions of power were fundamentally in Prussia and Austria. Thus, according to Schroeder ‘the 
stable peaceful equilibrium Europe enjoyed from 1815 to 1848 rose not from a balance of power but 
from a mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law, and an overall balance among the 
various actors in terms of rights, security, status, claims, and satisfactions rather than power.’ 
Schroeder 1992, 694. However, the great problem with explanations such as Schroeder’s is strict 
separation of legality from power characteristic of Realist theories of international relations. For an 
account of how materialist theories of international law can produce more concrete depictions of 
international interactions than Realism due to their acknowledgement of constitutive force of legal 




shaped patchwork of layered and divided authority and organize themselves around 
more territorially coherent ‘spheres of influence.’31 In this process, the dynamic of 
absolutist centralization was very much at work in the rapid consolidation of the 
many of the German polities that constituted the old Holy Roman Empire, a con-
federated entity dissolved in 1806 via monarchical abdication.32 Here, following 
the Congress of Vienna, the number of German states shrunk from 350 to 38.33 
Moreover, the class dynamics of centralizing absolutist monarchies opposing a de-
centralized feudal nobility was showcased by the fact that one of the kingdoms left 
unrestored was Poland (a bastion of the nobility’s power) which was previously 
partitioned between the Holy Alliance powers.34  
 
Despite this initial boon, as a long-term issue, how exactly could this system repro-
duce itself? After all, the post-Napoleonic settlement brought to Europe a new po-
litical configuration where the old patchwork of authority, formed and justified 
through historically-developed custom, began to resemble the modern order of 
bounded territoriality.35 This was a direct result of the 1815 settlement and its con-
flation of territorial upheaval with the destabilizing actions of the French revolu-
tionaries.36 However, as Jordan Branch has shown, this was not a unique solution 
as much as it was an innovation transfer given that such practices had originally 
developed through overseas colonialism, where drawing abstract lines to demarcate 
exclusive authority compensated for the lack of actual knowledge of the territories 
                                                        
31 Slantchev 2005, 385. 
32 The purpose of this dissolution by abdication was to prevent the Holy Roman Empire from being 
inherited by the heirs of Napoleon, who by this point had crowned himself Emperor and the thus 
occupied a central place in Europe’s dynastic order. For a multi-layered account, see Forrest and 
Wilson 2008. 
33 Slantchev 2005, 385. 
34 Fabry 2010, 40. 
35 Branch 2010, 289. 




being claimes.37 The Holy Alliance thus faced a profound contradiction. While their 
reproductive process of geopolitical accumulation was adapted to earlier configu-
rations of sovereignty where territorial authority was alterable, post-Napoleonic le-
gitimacy committed them to upholding a settlement where political authority was 
now encapsulated within bounded territorial units.38  
 
In this context, we can understand the material impetus behind the Holy Alliance 
attempt to construct an order based on the interventionist suppression of popular 
will. While upending the 1815 settlement through endlessly territorial conquests 
was not a legitimate option, direct geopolitical appropriation through endless dy-
nastic warfare could be maintained by shifting the concrete reality of territory to 
the abstraction of territorial authority as a justification for intervention. Under this 
envisioned adaptation, it would be the governments claiming control over territories 
(rather than territories themselves) that would justify military imposition. Though 
the Holy Alliance may have reconciled bounded territoriality with dynastic accu-
mulation, this project failed and the story of its failure is vital to the narrative of 
how popular will became the sole basis for domestic authority within international 
law. 
 
5.3.2.  British Imperial Capital Accumulation  
 
Turning to Britain, we can observe how the capitalist configuration of institutions 
and interests lead to a united opposition to the Holy Alliance amongst a diverse 
array of internal factions. This dynamic is encapsulated by Britain’s rejection of the 
                                                        
37 Branch 2010, 290-291. 
38 This dynamic exposed the difficulties of managing the reconstruction in a time of great uncertainty 
where, according to Wilhelm Grewe, the Concert sought: ‘a well-balanced distribution of territories 
that did not submit unconditionally to the demands of the nationality principle but continued undis-
turbed by the dynamics of nationalism to take account of historical, cultural, economic, and strategic 




proposal that it join the Holy Alliance. When approached, despite expressing a de-
gree of sympathy, Prince Regent George declared that acceding to this agreement 
on his own authority would violate the British Constitution.39 This very notion of a 
constitutional constraint on dynastic diplomacy is a massive indicator of how capi-
talist modernity rendered Britain fundamentally different from its reactionary rivals. 
As discussed above, the emergence of capitalist social relations in Britain led to the 
abstraction of popular will through a constitutional-parliamentary state. As a result, 
personalized dynastic diplomacy transformed into a foreign policy based on a de-
personalized ‘national interest.’40 By the time of the Concert, Britain’s entrenched 
mode of social reproduction was one where, in the words of Frederick Dufour:  
 
…the capitalist landed aristocracy gave a national form to its social in-
terests. The internationalization of this social-property regime strength-
ened the conditions of possibility of nationalism in the separation of the 
economic from the political and the emergence of a bourgeois public 
sphere…more than everywhere else on the continent, the agrarian prop-
erty owners identified with the monarch, the state, the nation, and the 
empire.41    
  
We can thus see how Britain’s participating in the Holy Alliance could have locked 
it into a disadvantageous diplomatic position where it would have competed against 
rivals far less constrained by domestic institutions when making sovereign deci-
sions. At a broader level, there was the question of capitalist systemic reproduction. 
Unlike the dynastic mode of direct appropriation, capitalism required an expanding 
system of social relations premised on ever-increasing consumption.42 Towards this 
end, Britain sought to expand its consumer market to the European continent where 
                                                        
39 Boutell 1922, 28. 
40 Teschke 2005, 17; see also Chapter IV, Part 4.4.2. 
41 Dufour 2007, 594. 
42 For the classic study of endless expansion as point of distinction between capitalism and other 




Napoleon had previously banned its imports.43 This narrow interest linked to a 
larger ideological project whereby ‘the ending of war in 1815 had prompted the 
creation of the peace society and its vision of a world without wars was one that 
would cross-fertilize with the secular vision of free trade.’44 Thus, the Holy Alli-
ance’s perpetual war-based entrenchment of pre-capitalist social relations was 
deeply at odds with British interests.45 After all, popular will could be a rallying 
point for assertions of individual liberty deeply consistent with capitalist ideology. 
The pre-emption of these social transformations by reactionary intervention would 
eliminate this possibility. 
 
Moreover, Britain’s ongoing management of an overseas capitalist empire taught it 
the value of accommodating some version of popular will as means of maintaining 
functional legitimacy amongst its white colonial subjects. This was a key lesson of 
the American Revolution where a population of colonial subjects showed how pop-
ular will, evidenced by de facto authority, could successfully result in an assertion 
of sovereign independence under international law.46 Such issues were prominent 
in its settler colonies (i.e. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Southern Africa) where, 
on the question of popular will, ‘[i]nstead of an absolute right to independence one 
spoke, as a compromise, simply of an absolute right to autonomy.’47 We cannot 
overstate importance of accommodating these aspirations given the way settler col-
onization continued to manage Britain’s domestic surplus while expanding the base 
of raw materials production that supplied its engines of industry.   
 
                                                        
43 Wolf 2010, 296. 
44 Howe 2007, 28. 
45 On British opposition to Holy Alliance interventions, see Lingelbach 1900, 12; Grewe 2000, 431. 
46 An example of this could be found in Australia where two policies prompted by the loss of Amer-
ican colonies were a ban on chattel slavery and a denial of treaty-based indigenous land rights, Wolfe 
2016, 31. 




However, especially as it concerned relations between settlers and indigenous com-
munities, a related issue was enhancing the capabilities of imperial structures to 
respond to situations of what Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford have deemed ‘Dominion 
Despotism.’48 Here Britain needed to maintain enough of a colonial presence to 
prevent bellicose settlers pursuits from sparking costly conflicts with indigenous 
populations with whom the Empire maintained various relations. In the aggregate, 
managing these tasks of facilitating empire, appeasing settlers, and providing a 
modicum of protection to natives required further material investment in the various 
imperial institutions.49 This required exploiting every available opportunity for cap-
ital accumulation as a means of financing the required infrastructure to expand its 
so-called ‘self-organizing’ system of free trade.50 Thus, while Britain’s role in the 
Concert placed it in a close working relationship with the reactionary Holy Alliance, 
the entrenchment of an anti-popular will (and by extension pre-capitalist) interven-
tionist order could undermine the this relationship in the long term. 
  
However, ending this problem of diverging modes of dynastic versus capitalist 
modes of social reproduction was possible and popular will formed part of the so-
lution. This would entail the dynastic powers abandoning accumulation based on 
direct appropriation and transitioning to capitalist political economy in a manner 
that vitiated the need for interventions as a matter of course. That said, the forms of 
legitimation by which the dynastic powers would transition to capitalism could by 
no means be a carbon-copy of what had occurred in Britain. After all, Britain, 
                                                        
48 On efforts at constraint, see Benton and Ford 2017, 28-55. On the other side, in this general con-
text, Vattelian justification for settler colonialism that proved so influential in North America was 
frequently invoked in relation to British settlement in New Zealand, Pitts 2018, 134. For an account 
of law and property in relation to the settlement of New Zealand, see Hickford 2006. 
49 For a study imperialism within this context of classical political economy, see Semmel 1970. 
These material demands can also be traced into the realm of ideology as well whereby previously 
anti-imperial interpretations of Enlightenment had to be rebutted by newly formulated liberal justi-
fications for empire. On the rise the liberal case for empire in Britain, see Pitts 2005, 101-162. 
50 For the classical account of this era as constituting Britain’s ‘empire of free trade’ whereby new 
territorial acquisitions were generally limited to regions deemed vital for facilitating ever increasing 




largely by virtue of its possession of a vast overseas empire, was able to achieve a 
relatively ‘bottom-up’ transition to capitalism with only a ‘cheap state.’51 By con-
trast, capitalist latecomers, including the Holy Alliance members, required a decid-
edly more ‘top-down’ transitory process via ‘revolutions from above’ orchestrated 
through the elite management of resource-intensive ‘expensive states.'52  
 
Perhaps the single greatest innovation enabling ‘revolutions from above’ was a var-
iation of popular will expressed through the type of nationalist identity construction 
the French revolutionaries used as a justification for dismantling the Ancien Regime. 
In this context, France itself proved pivotal. Subject to a restoration of the pre-Rev-
olutionary Bourbon dynasty in 1815 Vienna settlement, in 1818 it was formally 
accepted as Great Power with the highest strata of the Concert system.53 Thus, 
France occupied an intermediate position between the Holy Alliance powers and 
Britain in that it was a relative latecomer to capitalism, yet maintained lingering 
liberal ethos of popular will unleashed by the Revolution. Here, the enduring vision 
of France as a unified collective of the equal citizens comprising its population, in 
contrast to the British ideal of a minimalist state placing primacy on individual lib-
erty, formed the basis for the filling of the institutional and administrative voids left 
by the Revolution’s dismantling of the Ancien Regime.54 This alternative justifica-
tion provided grounding for the French transition to capitalist political economy in 
the latter half of the nineteenth-century in response to increased British competi-
tion/geopolitical pressure.55  
                                                        
51 Wolf 2010, 309. On Britain’s settlement-capitalism feedback loop during this timeframe, see Pi-
terberg and Vercini 2013.  
52 Wolf 2010, 309. Originally termed by Antonio Gramsci, this theory of elite-directed ‘Revolution 
from Above’ or ‘Passive Revolution’ raises numerous questions regarding the formation of the mod-
ern international order. For studies, see Morton 2007; Bruff 2010; Hesketh 2017.  
53 Peterson 1945, 538. For the treaty text detailing this invitation and response, see Hertslet 1875, 
564-574. 
54 Dufour 2007, 595-596. 





On a broader scale, this nationalist legitimation of the transition to capitalism via 
‘revolutions from above’ in the name of collective popular will was ultimately em-
braced by numerous reactionary actors, despite their previously opposition to pop-
ular will. In the words of Barry Buzan and George Lawson:  
 
many absolutist regimes sought to ally gradual democratisation with a 
form of elite nationalism, seeing these concessions as a prophylactic 
against more radical uprisings. For both absolutist regimes and their 
bourgeois challengers, nationalism proved to be a powerful vehicle of 
mobilisation.56 
 
This being the case, it is vital to account for how this newfound nationalist senti-
ment came to inform the very core of domestic legitimacy under international law. 
Here I identify such a configuration where classical conceptions of international 
law and statehood were re-adapted to host conceptions of organic community that 
limited the expansive expressions of natural rights. This development played a vital, 
yet under-acknowledged, role in allowing popular will to meet the material and 
ideological demands of the post-Napoleonic order.  
 
5.4.  Organic Community as Natural Right’s Limitation 
 
What exactly was the ideological foundation of the international legal order that 
enabled liberals, nationalists, and the vestiges of reactionary monarchies to coexist 
in the building of an expanding system of capitalism? Relatedly, how did this theory 
determine which political formations failed to qualify as legitimate expressions of 
popular will in the post-Napoleonic international legal order? In addressing these 
questions, a vital issue is Emer de Vattel’s formative vision of international law 
emanating from a world of self-perfecting sovereign nation-states legitimized by 
the popular will. As the previous chapter has shown, applying Vattel’s theory of 
                                                        




popular will to the events of the French Revolution reveals a profound indetermi-
nacy. It could either be as a shield for preserving local autonomy, or as a sword for 
aiding populations being denied the exercise of popular will.  
 
In addressing these issues, this section focuses on how the Vattelian vision of the 
world faced critique by Edmund Burke’s (1729-1797) proclamation that the bounds 
of organic community constituted an inherent limitation on the exercise of natural 
rights. From this basis, it was the Scottish jurist Sir James Mackintosh (1765-1832) 
who effectively synthesized Vattel’s state-centric framework at the level of form 
with Burke’s organicist conservatism at the level of substance. What emerged was 
the first ever theorization of international law as a distinct historical development, 
as opposed to a timeless order of transcendent morality, that also placed Europeans 
in a position of superiority over all other peoples.57 On the question of receptivity, 
Mackintosh’s proto-formulation of the infamous ‘Standard of Civilization’ was of 
the utmost ideological value in both his own nation and its geopolitical rivals. Thus, 
this development forms an indispensable episode when accounting for the interna-
tional legal creation of a world premised on a pluralist, but deeply limited, concep-
tion of popular will. 
 
5.4.1.  Edmund Burke’s Anti-Jacobin Law of Nations 
 
Beginning with Burke, despite profound influences elsewhere, his theories have 
received minimal attention within international law.58 However, despite this lack, 
when thinking through popular will as the basis for domestic authority his influence 
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is difficult to overemphasis. After all, Burke’s thorough engagement with Vattel’s 
The Law of Nations on the questions of sovereign legitimacy and (non-)intervention 
in the context of the French Revolution deeply advanced discussions on the mean-
ing of popular will within an ideologically diverse world. Here Burke was forced 
to confront the reality that while Vattel was the leading authority on sovereign le-
gitimacy, his theory nonetheless left open the possibility that intervention to assist 
a people struggling to achieve popular sovereignty was justified as a matter of nat-
ural right.59 For Burke, viewing the Vattelian conception of sovereignty as ration-
ally deducible through natural philosophy was entirely too similar to the justifica-
tions of the French revolutionaries who violently destroyed societies by severing 
the unique communal bonds that had developed over centuries.60 
 
However, unlike other figures within this general timeframe, including the Holy 
Alliance’s champions, Burke’s condemnation was not a general disavowal of pop-
ular uprising. Rather it was motivated by the view that the French Revolution in-
troduced an all-consuming dogma unprecedented in its desire to overturn all estab-
lished authority and this exceeded any existing political justification.61 This distinc-
tion between unjustifiable dogmatic instability and justifiable political change was 
demonstrated by Burke’s early support for the American Revolution.62 After all, 
the notion that the American Revolution was waged to complete a long developed 
political project while the French Revolution sought to destroy existing order with 
no outward limit is easily conceivable in Burkean terms.63 In this sense, Burke’s 
views can be observed within the current international legal order’s stance that a 
sovereign political community’s expression of popular will is, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, impossible to substantially judge from an external perspective. It 
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is only when the impetus for internal change becomes a rationale for external inter-
vention that certain political expressions can be explicitly condemned through in-
ternational legal discourse.  
 
An early critic of the French Revolution, Burke’s initial pleas for British interven-
tion were largely rebuked by a general non-interventionist attitude.64 Yet, as desta-
bilizing events unfolded and Britain became an active participant in the French rev-
olutionary/Napoleonic wars, Burke was provided with a substantial platform for his 
views.65 This occurred most famously through in his 1796 ‘Letters on the Regicide 
Peace’ where his proposed solution for pre-empting future revolutionary disorder 
was the formation of a new polity deemed the Commonwealth of Europe that de-
rived its identity as a collective distillation of Europe’s shared sense of manners, 
tradition, and duty.66  For Burke, the introduction of disorder at the level of the 
French Revolution, made the proposed Commonwealth’s empowerment as a source 
of restorationist intervention a strong moral necessity.67 According to Burke, with-
out this preventative mechanism, the only choices left were unacceptably harsh. 
Here, with the Jacobins’ ‘…violent breach of the community of Europe, we must 
conclude to have been made…either to force mankind into an adoption of their 
system, or to live in perpetual enmity with a community the most potent we have 
ever known.’68 However, this portrayed destruction of virtuous organic community 
by pathological revolutionary force certainly appealed to the conservative senti-
ments empowered after Napoleon’s defeat, Burke’s Commonwealth as a project of 
supra-national institution-building was never substantively embraced. 
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Understanding the non-implementation of this Commonwealth project requires fur-
ther inquiry into the consolidating anarchic system of sovereign states that Burke’s 
views were limited in their ability to account for. After all, while Burke provided 
an answer regarding Vattel’s open-ended conception of invoking natural rights to 
demolish existing orders, by being deliberately pro-interventionist, his Common-
wealth scheme completely dispensed with other aspects of the Vattelian framework 
that had already proven their utility, namely letting ‘facts on the ground’ define 
popular will. In an intimately related-capacity, Burke’s non-statecentric approach 
to organic community also was deeply at odds with the harshest aspects of coloni-
alism that would increasingly be justified through nineteenth-century international 
law. Towards this end, he famous lead the prosecution of the British East India 
Company governor Warren Hastings for acts of cruelty against local populations.69 
For Burke, the reality that Indians had an ancient culture with extensively devel-
oped hierarchical customs and traditions invalidated claims that cruelty was justi-
fied as a means of ‘civilizing’ a ‘barbarous’ people.70 Crucially in Burke’s thought, 
the fact that Indians were not politically organized along similar lines to the Euro-
pean state could not justify their exclusion from the reciprocal legal relations given 
that the existence of a plurality of organic communities produced an ethical imper-
ative to recognize a ‘…multiplicity of legal orders within and among states.’71 Thus, 
the Commonwealth of Europe was highly consistent with his view of organic com-
munity as something that neither required, nor could be perfectly expressed by, the 
sovereign nation-state form. As such, albeit in very different contexts, both the Jac-
obins and the East India Company represented distinct threats to the natural devel-
opment of the social institutions Burke advocated.  
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5.4.2.  Sir James Mackintosh’s Nation-Statist Anthropology  
 
If Burke’s views on organic community derived from acknowledging the limits of 
state-centrism, why did these ideas ultimately inform the deeply state-centric ethos 
central to popular will’s legitimation of domestic authority under international law? 
In confronting this paradox, a key figure is the Scottish jurist, parliamentarian, and 
former colonial judge Sir James Mackintosh who, ironically enough, gained fame 
as a defender of the French Revolution and critic of Burke.72 Despite these early 
differences, ultimately, Mackintosh effectively merged Vattel’s state-centrism with 
Burke’s organic community concept (as well as his presentation of ‘Europe’ as a 
unique civilizational entity). On the question of state authority, Mackintosh begins 
from the first principle that ‘[a]lmost all of the relative duties of human life…arise 
out of the two great institutions of property and marriage’ and their protection by 
the distinct state-entity is necessary for civilizational progress.73 In this way, his 
approach to political community (similar to Burke) is far more focused upon the 
vicissitudes of everyday life than earlier Enlightenment figures (including Vattel) 
whose justifications for authority were derived from intangible abstractions.74 From 
these premises, he highlights the sacrosanct need for local discretion in choosing a 
system of authority for ‘[s]uch a body of political laws must in all countries arise 
out of the character and situation of a people; they must grow with its progress, be 
adapted to its peculiarities, change with its changes, and be incorporated into its 
habits.’75 
 
However, despite such broad proclamations regarding the synergy between local 
character and legitimate authority, Mackintosh presents a conundrum as to which 
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communities fall under this banner of organicist justification. On the one hand, he 
speaks of universally discernible principles of governmental authority ‘…recog-
nized and revered (with few and slight exceptions) by every nation on earth, and 
uniformly taught (with exceptions still fewer) by a succession of wise men from the 
first dawn of speculation to the present moment.’76 Yet on the other hand, working 
from the premise that ‘[h]istory…is now a vast museum, in which specimens of the 
variety of human nature may be studied’, his description of the presumably ‘few 
and slight exceptions’ to the acceptance of universal principles for proper social 
organization appear to encompass nearly the entire world beyond Europe.77 Ac-
cording to Mackintosh’s appraisal: 
 
We may be said to stand at the confluence of the greatest number of 
streams of knowledge flowing from the most distant sources, that ever 
met at one point…We can bring before us man in a lower and more 
abject condition than any in which he was ever seen before…We can 
make human societies pass in review before our mind, from the brutal 
and helpless barbarism of Terra del Fuego, and in the mild and volup-
tuous savages of Otaheite; to the tame, but ancient and immovable civ-
ilization of China, which bestows its own arts on every successive race 
of conquoerors; to the meek and servile natives of Hindostan, who pre-
serve their ingenuity, their skills and their science, through a long series 
of ages, under the yoke of foreign tyrants; to the gross and incorrigible 
rudeness of the Ottomans, incapable of improvement, and extinguish-
ing the remains of civilization among their unhappy subjects, once the 
most ingenious nations of the earth.78 
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Through this ‘Burke-Vattel synthesis’, Mackintosh provided Britain with an inter-
national legal argument that forced the dynastic powers to confront their contradic-
tions and consequentially hasten their transitions to capital accumulating forms. 
This was illustrated in an 1815 Parliamentary speech on the legality and legitimacy 
of intervention in Genoa where Mackintosh harshly condemned the Holy Alliance’s 
practices as the functional equivalent of the pro-revolutionary invasions of the 
French revolutionary wars. For Mackintosh, if this hierarchical interventionism was 
legitimate, the return of sovereignty to conquered territories would be illusory for 
‘…it is all by grants from …lords paramount [for]…[t]heir will is the sole title to 
dominion…’ and ‘[a] single acre granted on such a principle is, in truth, the signal 
of a monstrous revolution in the system of Europe.’79  
 
In explicating the ‘true’ nature of the relationship between national independence 
and sovereign autonomy in the face of the Holy Alliance’s hierarchical interven-
tionism, Mackintosh interpreted Burkean notions of organic community as encap-
sulated within the Vattelian ontology of multiple juridically equal sovereign states 
in what Iain Hampsher-Monk deems a ‘curious synthesis.’80 The result was Mack-
intosh starkly demonstrating his statist anthropological hierarchy by conflating the 
Peace of Westphalia with the establishment of the modern international order, a 
development he venerates as an ‘… ancient system of national independence and 
balanced power, which gradually raised the nations of Europe to the first rank of 
the human race.’81 However, while this framework of formal equality and inherent 
autonomy exposes the pretences of liberal political philosophy embedded within 
the structure of modern international legal argument. Thus, according to Hampsher-
Monk, in the context of Mackintosh’s claim: 
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these principles of were not…asserted as a popular or abstract and ab-
solute rights (in many cases Mackintosh was defending virtually unlim-
ited monarchies). Such autonomies and identities are instead now por-
trayed as grounded in the same considerations that Burke had advanced 
for intervening in France. That is to say as part of an inherited and cus-
tomary international system, crucial to the very ‘existence of social or-
der’, in defence of which all Europe – republics and monarchies alike – 
had, rightly and in defence of justice, joined against revolutionary 
France for ‘the re-establishment of that ancient system, and of those 
wise principles under which it had become great and prosperous.’82 
 
In lodging this claim, Mackintosh counterfactually asserted one of the first articu-
lations of the Westphalian orthodoxy that ultimately dominated mainstream under-
standings of international legal and political order. While this narrative is difficult 
to sustain as a material historic reality, in the context of the long post-Napoleonic 
re-ordering process, it provided a highly convenient theoretical basis for accommo-
dating a diverse array of political positions at a superficial level while nonetheless 
furthering an all-encompassing capitalist logic. For Britain, this veneration of the 
sovereign state naturalized the ideological public/private dichotomy that character-
ized an order of international anarchy structurally linked to capital accumulation. 
This in turn, allowed the British to deflect claims from the dynastic actors that their 
attempts to implement liberal commercial regimes in the name of capitalist political 
economy were dangerous destabilizers of the traditional order.83 After all, incorpo-
ration of Burkean organic community into this liberal nation-statist argumentative 
structure via Mackintosh allowed such invocations of ‘tradition’ by dynastic legit-
imacy proponents to be dismissed as hypocritical. This defensive mechanism was 
readily apparent in Mackintosh’s account of the intervention in Genoa where, much 
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like in Vattel’s framing, it was Britain who defended the autonomy of small states 
against the conquest-mad forces of dynastic reaction; forces who were ultimately 
no different from the same French revolutionary elements they condemned.84  
 
Beyond the narrow furthering of British interests, Mackintosh’s formulation spoke 
directly to emerging debates, especially in the German-speaking world. Such dis-
courses revolved around the nature of lawful authority as abstract rationality was 
pitted against historically-developed particularity as two mutually excluding foun-
dations.85 While unanswerable in any metaphysical sense, this dispute (driven by 
the mechanics of legal indeterminacy) helped generate the presumption that only 
the unique ‘will’ of a given people (however justified) could legitimately define the 
nature of its collective juridical personality.86 The emergence of this newfound ju-
ridical consciousness, and the styles of argument that expressed it, directly under-
mined the longstanding legitimacies garnered by hierarchical paternalist arrange-
ments (i.e. the Holy Alliance), at least in the formalized domains of government 
and commerce.87  
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When faced with the Vattel-Burke synthesis, reactionary actors were forced to con-
front how their own agendas could be popularly legitimized. This opened the door 
to the possibility of elite-led top-down reforms that allied monarchical actors with 
bourgeois forces with popular nationalist ethos.88 Approaching this situation in its 
totality, state sovereignty was the authority to undertake these reforms, popular will 
its legitimation, international law the means of external coordination, and capitalist 
transition the means of financing it all. Thus, while Duncan Kennedy is correct in 
his assertion that changing legal sensibilities in this timeframe resulted in ‘…the 
eventual universalization…of a single Classical system of public international 
law…based on the conceptual innovations…of sovereignty as a territorial (not per-
sonal) power absolute within its sphere’, the precise mechanics of this process need 
to be accounted for.89  
 
5.5.  Making Modern Sovereign Equality 
 
5.5.1.  The Emptiness of Great Power Treaties 
 
While the right of bounded political communities to their preferred manifestation 
of popular will was a contested point as the Great Powers deliberated upon the fate 
of Europe’s small polities, the seeds of resolution already existed within the upper 
strata of the Concert system. This was due to the reality that, despite the Concert’s 
overarching hierarchy, the five Great Powers treated one another equals. According 
to Gerry Simpson’s assessment, ‘paradoxically, legalized hegemony between the 
Great Powers and the rest, in order to work effectively, requires a formalistic com-
mitment to sovereign equality among the Great Powers themselves.’ 90  Thus, 
through its inclusion of both liberal-capitalist Britain and the reactionary-dynastic 
Holy Alliance, the highest rung of the Concert hierarchy was a milestone in the 
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development of the modern international legal order. This was nothing short of the 
first modern instance where sovereign entities, who possessed different forms of 
social reproduction and political legitimation, coexisted as formal equals within an 
overarching juridical order while also engaging in intensive interactions with one 
another. While the Concert’s imposition of a ‘legalized hegemony’ has typically 
been understood as a suspension of the existing equality-based order, this is prem-
ised on the assumption that the modern sovereign equality actually emerged 
through the 1648 Peace of Westphalia settlement. 
 
To situate this development, we must revisit Teschke’s alternative to the Westpha-
lian myth. Here, in contrast to any horizontal, equality-based order, the competition 
between dynastic actors aspiring to the status of the one true universal monarch 
resulted in a situation where ‘…polities into coexisting sovereign monarchies did 
not eo ipso imply the general acceptability of formal parity…after the Westphalia 
settlement….Clashes over precedence in diplomatic negotiations were sympto-
matic of the persistence of hierarchical conceptions of inter-state organization.’91 
This resulted from an arrangement where the existing social-reproductive order was 
premised on geopolitical competition over which dynastic sovereign could best 
claim the mantle of ‘universal monarch.’92 As such, parties to this system were fun-
damentally unequal by virtue of their ever-shifting status in relation to this end.93 
Such formalized inequality was directly reflected in the ‘ranking of powers’ that 
formed the basis for diplomatic practice against this backdrop.94  
 
However, one can claim that this early modern international order did possess a 
form of equality in that it allowed all (European) sovereigns to pursue the agenda 
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of claiming universal monarchy by any means in a capacity where all actors were 
mutually unanswerable to one another.95 Yet, the sovereignty within this scheme 
was vested in the bodies of individual dynastic actors as opposed to underlying 
political communities thus side-stepping the question of popular will as a legitimat-
ing abstraction. Additionally, even if we conceptualize this basic premise of non-
judgement as the prelude to modern juridical equality, there remains the issue that 
practices falling under this rubric were all imbricated within a common mode of 
social reproduction premised on pre-capitalist geopolitical accumulation via end-
less wars of conquest (that were fundamentally linked to personalized sover-
eignty).96 By contrast, the Concert’s Great Powers did not initially share a common 
mode of social reproduction (or a legitimizing conception sovereign of authority), 
yet their cooperation was required to preserve this order. Consequently, they were 
forced to cooperate in a system stripped of the common conventions that grounded 
earlier modes of diplomacy. However, if a common mode of social reproduction 
cannot explain a functioning sovereign equality-based international legal system 
with the Concert’s highest rung, what can?  
 
In answering this question, a phenomenon of great importance was the early nine-
teenth century ‘treaty-making revolution’ where, as Edward Keene’s empirical in-
vestigation has demonstrated, the number of new treaties exploded in the post-Na-
poleonic era.97 This development further exposes the non-Westphalian origins of 
modern sovereign equality. According Keene, if Westphalia introduced the medium 
of the treaty as a means of ordering relations between diverse actors, then this 
should have led to a steady increase in treaty-making from this point onwards.98 
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However, if anything, treaty-making had actually declined in the eighteenth cen-
tury.99 Applying Keene’s observation, I claim that this dramatically quick develop-
ment of a treaty-based international legal order resulted from the unprecedented 
ability of the treaty-form to act as a common medium of interaction between Britain 
liberalism and the Holy Alliance conservatism, despite the substantive irreconcila-
bility of these two mode of political authority. While the underlying legitimation of 
treaty-making itself differed immensely between the liberal-capitalist and reaction-
ary-dynastic power blocs, it nonetheless enabled coexistence. Here, divergent legit-
imizing rationales (including questions of popular will), at least in the short-term, 
could be separated from the handling of basic day-to-day affairs.  
 
For Britain, the value of the treaty can be located in its embodiment of the funda-
mentally capitalist presumption of free-exchange between juridically equal units 
without any need to account for the deeper systemic realities shaping these transac-
tions. Recourse to such justification was deeply enabled by the fact that Vattel was 
the single most influential international legal source in early nineteenth-century 
Britain.100 In this capacity, British international lawyers could base the ontological 
grounding of treaty-making on the Vattelian premise of a world of bounded sover-
eign equals even when this rendering of abstract equality did not reflect the actual 
position of their treaty partners.101  
 
For the Holy Alliance powers and their allies, the value of the treaty its affirmed 
dynastic diplomacy that grounded authority in adherence to tradition (and by ex-
tension opposition to popular will). This treaty-tradition-authority nexus was made 
apparent by the practice of ‘treaty collecting’ whereby the rise of the Concert sys-
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tem lead many Continental diplomats to bring forth an accumulated corpus of cen-
turies-old treaties as a means of articulating a positivistic grounding for the post-
Napoleonic international legal system.102 Regarding the question of popular will, 
the great significance of this treaty-based ordering was that it created a functionally 
narrow conception of ‘will’, restricted to consent to the specific terms of a given 
treaty.103 On this basis, it was fundamentally ambivalent to whether the broader 
sovereign authority that enabled this consent was ‘popular’, ‘dynastic’, or otherwise. 
 
In the absence of any effectual consensus against it, popular will as the grounding 
for domestic authority in this treaty-based poly-reproductive international legal sys-
tem was able to continually assert itself. Here, an especially pertinent issue sur-
rounded what would happen if one of the Concert’s Great Powers internally rejected 
the dynastic order installed by the 1815 Congress of Vienna in the name of popular 
will. This is precisely what happened in France with the 1830 July Revolution 
where the Concert-imposed Bourbon monarchy was popularly overthrown and re-
placed by an exceeding more liberal constitutional monarchy.104 It is telling here 
that the Holy Alliance powers did not reinstall, attempt to reinstall, or even seri-
ously consider reinstalling its preferred ruler despite its self-appointed status as en-
forcer of the Vienna settlement.105 This failure exposed the limits to which one sov-
ereign equal could impose its will upon another in a world where idea of popular 
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will as the basis for domestic authority enjoyed widespread, if not universal, legit-
imacy. 
 
5.5.2.  Modernizing Recognition  
 
As sovereign equality became entrenched as a safeguard for local popular will there 
emerged subsequent questions of how, and under what circumstances, this protec-
tion could be extended beyond the core grouping of Great Powers? Thus, the need 
to navigate this shifting understanding of sovereignty brought with it the question 
of recognition as a necessary corollary.106 This provided the British with an oppor-
tunity to advance a theory of international legal membership directly aligned with 
their goal of building a capitalist system where integration in the transcendent do-
main of economics bolstered a general policy of nonintervention in the bounded 
domain of politics. Such a view that rejected Holy Alliance interventionism and 
explicitly embraced the insights of Mackintosh was articulated by the barrister 
Frederick Eden in his 1823 piece An Historical Sketch of the International Policy 
of Modern Europe as Connected with the Principles of the Law of Nature and Na-
tions Concluding with Some Remarks on the Holy Alliance.107 Embracing popular 
will in a manner deeply in-line with Mackintosh, under Eden’s theory, recognition 
on the basis of dynastic legitimacy:  
 
was contrary to the ‘imprescriptible right’ of all nations to select their 
own constitutions, the changes to which would not prevent states from 
maintaining ‘usual relations of peace and amity’ or the ‘ancient federal 
maxims of the European Commonwealth’ that preserved independence 
regardless of national strength.108   
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As a means of further justification, for Eden, acknowledging the changing circum-
stances of interstate coexistence meant recognition of international legal standing 
must be now acknowledged based on ‘facts on the ground’ out respect for local 
popular will over the judgments of outsiders. That said, according to Eden: ‘…the 
constant communication among the European states, has not only given every Na-
tion a clearer insight into her real interests, but has introduced a new principle in 
politics, unknown to ancient times, in the salutary and effectual controul [sic] which 
Public Opinion has long exercised even over the most ambitious and enterprises 
Princes.’109 On this basis, his formulation harmoniously weaved together the im-
possibility of reversing the captivating influence of popular will, the inevitable 
march of linear progress, the premise that ‘effective control’ is the only basis for 
legitimate external judgment, and the belief that national borders properly consoli-
dated unique bounded political communities. In other words, it grounded an inter-
national legal ordering perfectly suited to a system of capitalist reproduction where 
the transcendent expansion of economic relations is contingent upon the domestic 
containment of political expression.110 
 
5.6.  Popular Will and Territorial Imposition  
 
5.6.1.  The Scandal of Title by Conquest 
 
The Concert of Europe system, albeit in a paradoxically hierarchical way, played a 
key role in entrenching the Vattelian counterfactual of a sovereign equality-based 
international order. However, this was largely an abstraction given ongoing realities 
of domination. In moving beyond ideological consolidation, what demands atten-
tion are the material effects the discourse of ‘popular will as the legitimate basis 
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domestic authority’ had for communities asserting this right while being subject to 
the control of outsiders. A highly noteworthy development was the declining legit-
imacy of attaining title by conquest whereby military force provided the central 
justification of a state’s acquisition of territory under international law.111 As pre-
viously discussed, the experiences of the French revolutionary wars left much of 
Europe with negative attitudes towards foreign domination, and this was readily 
reflected in the widespread rejection of the Holy Alliance. Moving beyond these 
timeframe-specific events, there remained the deeper relationship between con-
quest and popular will.  
 
While the ability to attain good title by conquest was essential to the old dynastic 
order premised on endless wars of geopolitical accumulation, the introduction of 
popular will presented multiple challenges to this dynamic.112 As an initial matter, 
how could domestic authority legitimized through unique manifestations of popular 
will be meaningful if external military force could arbitrarily destroy local institu-
tions?113 According to Sharon Korman’s appraisal: 
 
…if the doctrine of the self-determination of peoples was now emerg-
ing as the new principle of legitimacy in international relations in place 
of the old dynastic principle, which had placed the rights of rulers above 
the rights of the nation or the people, then the logical corollary was the 
right of conquest, by means of which the conqueror had the right to rule 
the inhabitants of the conquered territory, could itself no longer be part 
of international law. For if the principle of self-determination applies, 
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then a victor cannot have a right to rule by virtue of conquest, but only 
by virtue of the people’s consent.114  
 
However, the risk of conquest in a popular will-based international order did not 
only concern local political communities but extended to would-be conquerors as 
well. As James Whitman has shown, the ability of military victory to effect orderly 
territorial transfers amongst dynastic actors was premised on the willingness of con-
quered populations to accept their new rulers.115 In a system where sovereignty was 
layered and divided amongst complex dynastic hierarchies and lineages, such 
changes in authority were distanced from the daily life of most individuals.116 Yet, 
as the nineteenth century progressed, and sovereign authority became increasingly 
bounded and exclusive, nationalist movements within subjugated territories 
mounted concerted campaigns of resistance against invading forces regardless of 
what their vanquished leaders had agreed to.117 The entrenchment of popular will 
thus consigned a once reliable means of territorial acquisition to the status of pro-
found uncertainty and exposure to violence. 
 
Moreover, when considering how the discourse of popular will set the conditions 
for increased capital accumulation, larger questions are raised concerning the rela-
tionship between conquest and capitalism. Here, licensing conquerors to violently 
disrupt existing social relations via direct appropriation of territory could easily 
contradict the entrenchment of the social relations/expectations needed to sustain 
capital accumulation. After all, this is nothing short of a fundamental contradiction 
                                                        
114 Korman 1996, 37 (emphasis in original). 
115 Whitman 2013, see also Chapter IV, Part 4.3.3.  
116 On the place of nationalism in facilitating transitions to capitalism, particularly amongst capitalist 
latecomers, see Dufour 2007. 
117 Here Whitman shows how nineteenth century nationalism’s ability to undo previous traditions 
was made evident by the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War where the battlefield 
success of regular armed forces was not sufficient to quell popular resistance from below by guerrilla 




between a mode of social reproduction with an inextricable hierarchical component 
(i.e. a conquered population is formally subordinated to its conqueror) and a mode 
of social reproduction that revolves around exchange on the abstract basis of formal 
equality.118 As discussed above, this dynamic provides key insights into why a cap-
italist Britain was adamant in its advocacy for a general presumption of noninter-
vention in the face of a dynastic intervention-demanding Holy Alliance.  
 
However, the solution to title by conquest’s intertwined threats to both popular will 
and capital accumulation was not to ban it outright. Thus, as international law's 
consolidated into a bounded disciplinary field, conquest remained a recognized ba-
sis for territorial acquisition in numerous nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
treatises.119 This persistence continued despite deep internal controversies over the 
nature and status of title by conquest, and external controversies regarding this doc-
trine’s incompatibility with a consolidating international legal order premised on 
popular will, bounded territoriality, and capital accumulation.120 In reconciling this 
apparent paradox, we must consider the rise of new doctrinal innovations that were 
better suited to the changing material and ideological conditions of the post-Napo-
leonic aftermath. While these innovations limited applications of title by conquest 
in both the European and non-European worlds, they did so in profoundly different 
ways, and thus, contributed immensely to the construction of an unapologetically 
                                                        
118 When it came to the certainties demanded by capitalist social relations, the continued legal status 
of title by conquest proved a persistent challenge. This included the profound uncertainty of private 
property rights in conquered territories, where unlike temporary occupation, a conqueror’s acquisi-
tion of sovereignty vested absolute power that could not be contested by outsiders. Thus, if a con-
queror ‘…declares that the private property in which it succeeds is not to be respected, the judges 
can only leave its conduct to the indignation of mankind.’ see Westlake 1901, 394-395. Additionally, 
substantial controversy existed as to whether a conquer acquired the sovereign debt of a conquered 
territory, Bentwich 1907, 67.    
119 For a listing of the treatises in this era that acknowledged title by conquest, see McMahon 1940, 
69.   
120 Here it can be said that conquest had a great degree of overlap with other recognized modes of 
territorial acquisition under international law, especially cession by treaty, prescription on the basis 




Eurocentric international legal order aligned with Mackintosh’s hierarchical vi-
sion.121 Against this backdrop, the continued existence of title by conquest can be 
attributed to its offering of an argument of last resort in face of anomalous situations 
where other categories of territorial acquisition failed.122 While this did nothing to 
resolve the title by conquest-popular will contradiction, the increasing rarity of this 
situation diverted attention away from this reality as the nineteenth century pro-
gressed. 
 
5.6.2.  Belligerent Occupation’s Property   
 
In accounting for the post-conquest juridical innovations that emerged during the 
extended post-Napoleonic settlement process, key amongst them was the doctrine 
of belligerent occupation. Distinct from conquest, occupation posited a legal regime 
of territorial imposition where the sovereignty did not vest in the occupier who was 
now duty bound to conserve the territorial status quo to the extent needed to main-
tain order.123 The introduction of this innovation can be viewed as a point of recon-
ciliation between the ability of Concert powers to conduct hierarchical interventions 
and the acknowledgement of widespread resentment to the intrusive impositions 
that characterized the French revolutionary wars.124  
 
                                                        
121 With this turn to explicit hierarchy in international law, conquest could be understood as an egal-
itarian relic, see Lindley 1926, 160 (‘[c]onquest, as a title to territory, assumes the absence of any 
formal transfer on the part of the previous sovereign, whether that sovereign be an advanced state 
or a native political society.’). 
122 An example being the 1900 British conquests of the Boer Republics in Southern Africa, see Stirk 
2016, 255-256. For an analysis of the uncertain sovereign status of the Boer Republics from this 
timeframe, see Westlake 1899. 
123 For the most recent large-scale effort to theorize military occupation’s international legal dimen-
sions, see Gross 2017.  
124 In Peter Stirk’s appraisal, while ‘the presence of troops, especially Great Power troops, on foreign 
territory could not readily and openly be justified in the language of conquest…it could be justified 




This framing necessarily demands scrutiny into the way shifting understandings of 
‘order’ conditioned the scope of what institutions warranted conservation under this 
regime. In tracing this conservationist ethos, proto-formulations existed in earlier 
depictions of conquest where, despite the presumption that a conquering sovereign 
maintaining complete discretion over annexed territory, preserving existing struc-
tures could nonetheless be a wise policy option. For example, after their 1763 an-
nexation of Quebec, the British preserved most of the French colonial institu-
tions.125 Beyond administrative discretion, one of the first attempts to legally limit 
this power was found in Vattel’s treatise where, in calling for the protection of pri-
vate property, he claimed that ‘[t]he conqueror seizes on the possessions of the state, 
the public property, while private individuals are permitted to retain theirs.’126 This 
preservation of property interests carried no reciprocal obligation for a conqueror 
to uphold local governmental structures. Rather, Vattel expressly recommended 
against it for ‘…this method is dangerous: it produces no real union of strength; it 
weakens the conquered country, without making any considerable addition to the 
power of the victorious state.’127  
 
At first glance, this anxiety over the preservation of an existing governmental order 
may seem irrelevant to the doctrine of belligerent occupation given its intended 
operation as a temporary measure as opposed to a permanent conquest. However, a 
variation on this Vattelian disparity between the conservation of private property 
                                                        
125 Interestingly enough, in the debates surrounding the Quebec Act that proclaimed this preserva-
tion of existing laws, one of the examples cited of positive practice in this domain is the Ottoman 
Empire and its impositions in Wallachia and Moldavia. Here, Member of Parliament Alexander 
Wedderburn raised this point while nonetheless proclaiming the Ottomans to be ‘the worst of all 
conquerors.’ Quoted in Korman 1996, 34. 
126 Vattel, 1758[1852] Book III, Chapter XIII, § 200. 
127 Ibid. § 202. Despite the conquest-popular will paradox discussed above, this position could none-
theless be reconciled with Vattel’s theory of popular will in that conquest simply enlarged the size 
of a sovereign political community tasked with the duty of self-perfection. However, this view was 
exceedingly similar to the Jacobin justifications for exporting the Revolution through direct territo-
rial imposition. As such, it was incompatible with the Concert-era view of popular will as grounded 




versus public government manifested in the early applications of this regime. In this 
context, while protecting property interests was of paramount importance, procla-
mations of the right of occupying powers to transform existing constitutional orders 
only began declining around 1848.128 Thus, the rise of belligerent occupation is a 
quintessential case study in the way international law entrenched the protection of 
private property as a priori qualifier of acceptable of public authority, even though 
the discourse of popular will justified presumptively limitless political possibilities 
 
In accounting for why belligerent occupation functioned as a mechanism for prop-
erty protection prior to governmental protection, we must revisit the contention be-
tween liberal-capitalist Britain and the reactionary-dynastic Holy Alliance. Here, 
despite the core differences between these two blocs, a shared presumption was 
opposing the modes of redistribution practiced by the Jacobins.129 Importantly, 
property protection was in the interests of both the Holy Alliance’s drive to preserve 
feudal holdings as the source of legitimate hierarchy and Britain’s drive to protect 
the certainty of property interests/expectations necessary for functional market-ex-
change amongst formal equals. On this basis, belligerent occupation forged an axi-
omatic point of unity between two rival systems. 
 
Interestingly, much of the theoretical groundwork for belligerent occupation is 
traceable to earlier French jurists who, strangely enough, wrote in support of the 
French revolutionary project of top-down implementation of popular will the Con-
cert was formed to oppose. Here the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the 
rights of individuals to be free from the impact of inter-sovereign wars was further 
refined by figures including Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis and Charles Talleyrand to 
produce the ‘Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine’ dedicated to civilian protection in war, 
including property protection.130 While these doctrines were developed to facilitate 
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129 See Chapter IV, Part 4.6.1. 
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the anti-dynastic, top-down French revolutionary export of popular will, the Con-
cert powers successfully extracted the principle of property protection from its 
formative context for their own ends. Thus, in an ironic development, the compo-
nent of the larger revolutionary project to achieve both formal and substantive 
equality ultimately legitimized the formal inequality of dynastic reaction and, more 
enduringly, the substantive inequality of capitalism.  
 
Yet, what does this joint Holy Alliance-British interest in property protection reveal 
about the continued acceptability of an occupier’s prerogative to dismantle local 
constitutional orders? When considering the Holy Alliance, given its stated agenda 
of suppressing revolutionary movements along with its reliance upon a feudal ab-
solutism that lacked any modern distinction between political and economic power, 
the answer is rather self-evident. This was precisely the legitimation the reactionary 
Great Powers needed to bar the formation of any popular will based government 
threatening to export revolution.131 However, when considering capitalist Britain, 
while its assertions were far less explicit, this toleration of the defence of private 
property prior to the protection of political expression is nonetheless deeply reveal-
ing. For this disparity in what the law of occupation originally conserved is illus-
trative of the capitalist presumption that any political form is acceptable, on the 
condition that it designates ‘private’ matters of property and economic transaction 
as decidedly ‘apolitical’ features that only become ‘politicized’ when there is an 
attempt to place them in the service of a collective purpose.132  
 
On this basis, belligerent occupation’s great advantage over conquest was that, as a 
temporary regime, it enhanced an occupier’s accountability on the question of prop-
erty protection. On this point, despite assertions that conquerors did not acquire the 
                                                        
131 With this objective in mind ‘[b]y enjoining the occupant from changing the political order of the 
occupied territory, and by interdicting the legal transfer of sovereignty until the state of war was 
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of territorial and constitutional change.’ Bhuta 2005, 732. 




private property of their new subjects, since conquerors attained sovereign power, 
outsiders were left with no real means of enforcing this standard.133 By contrast, 
with the rise of belligerent occupation there emerged novel procedures for individ-
uals to claim compensation for property requisitioned by occupying forces that 
were unthinkable in earlier times when conquest brought with it the prospect of 
limitless plunder.134 This exacerbated the difficulties of allowing title by conquest 
to exist in an international legal order legitimized by the popular will that presumed 
capitalist social relations as its foundation. As the nineteenth century progressed, 
belligerent occupation’s function in upholding private property as a precondition of 
political legitimacy became increasingly entrenched. A striking example can be lo-
cated in French assertions during the Franco-Prussian War proclaiming that the law 
of occupation’s virtue was upholding of the sanctity of private property against the 
internal threat of anarchists and socialists just as much as against the external threat 
of German invaders.135 
 
5.7.  Nationalism and the Fate of the Holy Alliance  
 
5.7.1.  The Question of Multi-Ethnic Empires 
 
Why did governmental forms ever became objects of protection under the law of 
occupation at all? Addressing this seemingly narrow question turns our attention to 
the much larger issue of how entrenchments of nationalism ended dynastic reaction 
against popular will while introducing new contradictions. In identifying the even-
tual embrace of nationalism through an effective synthesis of popular will with dy-
nastic power, a starting point is the disagreement between Metternich and Russia’s 
Tsar Alexander I. While Metternich was opposed to any invocation of popular will 
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on the grounds that it had no place within dynastic politics, Alexander articulated a 
vision where a political order acknowledging multiple national/cultural identities 
was not only tolerated, but something to be embraced.136 Thus, Alexander’s views 
were similar to Mackintosh’s in that they elevated the immutability of organic com-
munity above earlier Enlightenment ideals of reason and consent as the grounding 
of political order. However, they differed in that Alexander’s organicism did not 
justify sovereign independence, but instead presented a pluralist configuration 
where the ability to balance and arbitrate varied cultural expressions was a hallmark 
of legitimate monarchical leadership.137  
 
This internal monarchical legitimation of nationalism received major external mo-
tivation as struggles for popular will ignited a series of uprisings throughout conti-
nental Europe in 1848.138 While reactionary forces forcibly suppressed challengers, 
this was only a temporary answer to threats of popular mobilization that increas-
ingly strained traditional structures of authority. When devising long-term solutions, 
dynastic powers could insulate themselves from radical popular demands by allying 
with nationalist expressions that transmuted popular will into parochial ethos of 
shared history, culture, and identity as opposed to any universalist reinvention of 
the relationship between an authority and its subjects.139 With these intertwined de-
velopments, popular will embodied through a discrete local governmental configu-
ration became an institution worth upholding, even when under belligerent occupa-
tion.140  
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Validating Mackintosh’s critique, the Holy Alliance attempt to build an interven-
tionist order was exposed as incompatible with the forms of nationalist expression 
that were fast emerging as a new vessel for popular reactionary captivation. This 
transformation of the reactionary Great Powers was profoundly emblematic of how 
the contradictions of material historical change is susceptible to concealment 
through sweeping juridical abstraction.141 Here, the ascription of ‘ancient traditions’ 
to nationalist expression as opposed to dynastic diplomacy was able to avoid any 
serious reckoning with the fact that anti-nationalist reaction (embodied by Metter-
nich) and nationalist reaction (advocated by Alexander) constituted profoundly dif-
ferent modes of sovereign authority. For the former, an all-pervading hierarchy 
blurred the boundaries between internal and external sovereignty, while the later 
could accept external equality by consigning hierarchy to a purely internal matter 
shielded from outside judgment.142 
  
Leaving the question of Prussia to the side, this embrace of nationalism reveals a 
great deal as to how Austria (later the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and Russia came 
to function as counterintuitive, but nonetheless uncontroversial subjects in an inter-
national legal order where popular will formed the basis for domestic authority.143 
In these manifestations, ‘popular will’, at least for the purposes of international le-
gal standing, did not need to reside in a common identity amongst citizens repre-
sented through liberal and/or republican institutions as was the case in Britain, 
France, and the US. Rather it could be located in the ability of an overarching mo-
narchical entity to accommodate a diverse array of subjects increasing expressing 
                                                        
141 See Orford 2013.  
142 On the role of multi-ethnic empires in entrenching a divide between sovereignty and nationalist 
ambitions in the context of nineteenth century international law, see Bunk and Fowler 2002, 39. 
143 Especially in Russia following the its defeat to Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire in the 
Crimean War (1853-1856), Russia became a major proponent of the discourse of ‘civilisation’ that 
defined international law in this era, see Myles 2002. This development should not be underesti-
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serving peace’ as key legitimizing end of international law. On place of Henry Maine as a pivotal 




themselves in nationalist terms.144 This would seem to demonstrate just how robust 
the international law’s tolerance of pluralism actually was given that its emerging 
subject, the ‘ideologically neutral’ nation-state, could include both constitutional 
democracies and multi-ethnic dynastic empires as juridical equals.145  
 
Coexistence amongst such entities under the banner of ideological pluralism is still 
consistent with the notion that capitalism limits the expression of popular will under 
international law. While the persistence of dynastic institutions may have slowed 
(but did not completely block) the expansion of capitalist social relations, so long 
as these multi-ethnic empires more or less commitment themselves to respecting 
sovereign borders, the threat to capital accumulation posed by pro-dynastic inter-
ventionism was stemmed. After all, from the perspective of capital accumulation, 
the great problem with the Holy Alliance agenda was its interventionist entrench-
ment of feudal pre-capitalist social relations. The reactionary embrace of popular 
will via the accommodation of nationalist claims largely solved this problem.146 
Here, in contrast to earlier crusades against popular will, for former Holy Alliance 
members, the new sovereign statist, and nationalism-focused, ordering of dynastic 
multi-ethnic empires enabled elite-lead incorporations of capitalist practices ( ‘Rev-
olutions from Above’) in varying measures.147  
 
5.7.2.  Challenges to Actually-Existing Borders 
 
                                                        
144 On the changing manifestations of nationalism within the Austro-Hungarian, see Lyons 2006, 
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145 Ironically, while the Ottoman Empire’s multicultural composition was increasing viewed as alien 
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Aksakal 2004), its millet system for managing ethnic diversity was highly influential in the Russian 
and Austro-Hungarian Empires, Tzouvala, 2018, 1153; see also Barkey and Gavrilis 2016, 29. 
146 Grewe 2000, 484-485. 
147 For studies industrial modernisation in the respective Austro-Hungarian and Russian contexts, 




While nationalism may have solved the problem of dynastic interventionism, it in-
troduced new problems in its wake. Namely, what was to be done when nationalist 
aspirations did not correspond to the internationally recognized borders that in-
creasingly delineated the acceptable boundaries of political expression? While 
much important work has detailed the responses by international lawyers to this 
situation following the First World War, we must also account for how the seeds of 
these eventual developments were planted nearly a century beforehand.148 As ag-
gressive dynastic legitimacy receded and a pluralist statist conception of popular 
will became the juridical core presumption of the European state-system, the na-
tionalist challenge to this particular configuration was twofold.  
 
On the one hand, there were entities who claimed that their distinct national char-
acter, particularly in relation to alien rulers, warranted sovereign independence un-
der international law even when ‘facts on the ground’ could not support this claim. 
This was especially pressing in cases of territorial annexations where local refusals 
of consent raised the issue of whether a would-be conquest was actually an occu-
pation and, as such, a temporary regime regardless of the occupier’s intention. On 
the other hand, there were questions of whether engaging in the process of unifying 
a national community under one sovereign authority was a legitimate effort, even 
if it forcibly redrew international law’s recognized borders. While the emergence 
of popular will levied a sharp critique against dynastic conquest on the grounds of 
consent, could projects of national unification side-step this issue by presuming the 
consent of the populations it sought to incorporate on the basis of national identity? 
On one level, these two challenges were in profound contradiction in that one de-
clared conquest anathema while the other validated it under a new banner. However, 
on another level, both of these challenges were bound together through the under-
standing that popular will was the sole basis for domestic legitimacy, and interna-
tional law had to address this truth despite its shortcomings. 
 
                                                        




5.7.2.1.  Can Legal Personality Survive Conquest?  
 
On the first challenge, the preeminent illustration was the question of Poland, which, 
in an infamous illustration of dynastic geopolitical accumulation, was extinguished 
through a series of partitions orchestrated by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Follow-
ing the loss of a third of its territory and population through the First Partition in 
1772, the Kingdom of Poland sought allies by applying the scandalously novel rhet-
oric of popular will to their predicament.149 Towards this end, prominent Poles ar-
ticulated novel narratives of national victimhood and advocated for the popular 
will-based causes of others, especially the Americans seeking independence from 
the British Empire.150 However, surrounded by hostile neighbours, this participa-
tion in the politics of the revolutionary Enlightenment sealed Poland’s fate. As the 
French Revolution broke out, fears of destabilizing popular will-based Polish sym-
pathies led Russia, Prussia, and Austria to extinguish the Kingdom entirely through 
the Second and Third Partitions of 1793 and 1795.151  
 
As popular will moved from the margins to encompass an increasingly broad array 
of political expressions, the partitions of Poland were increasingly condemned as 
an unjustifiable subordination of principle to raw power. This chorus of condemna-
tion consisted of fervent supporters of the French Revolution including Thomas 
Jefferson and Charles Talleyrand (Napoleon’s onetime Foreign Minister), as well 
as ardent critics of the French Revolution including Edmund Burke and the Prussian 
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conservative Frederich Gentz.152 Despite much argument as to what popular will 
actually was, by providing consensus amongst liberal and reactionary theorists of 
this concept, Poland demonstrated what popular will’s denial looked like in practice. 
Once again, it was James Mackintosh who placed this event its broader interna-
tional legal context. For Mackintosh, the partitions illustrated the presumption that: 
 
Conquest and extensive empire are among the greatest evils, and the 
division of mankind into independent communities is among the great-
est advantages, which fall to the lot of men….To destroy the independ-
ence of a people, is to annihilate a great assemblage of intellectual and 
moral qualities, forming the character of a nation and distinguishing it 
from other communities.153 
 
Moreover, while Mackintosh was deeply critical of Poland’s government, he disa-
vowed this perceived maladministration as a justification for conquest. According 
to Mackintosh: ‘[t]he greater number of nations live under governments which are 
indisputably bad; but it is less an evil that they should be gathered under a single 
conqueror, even with a chance of improvement in their internal administration.’154 
Subsequent nineteenth century publicists, often in treatises justifying war and colo-
nialism on the basis of absolute sovereign prerogative, agreed that the Partitions of 
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Poland were a quintessential case in illegal and unjust conduct under international 
law.155 However, despite acknowledging this wrong, the approach to international 
law in this timeframe was hamstrung in offering a remedy to the Poles given its 
general adoption of a rigid state-centrism that denied the juridical personality of 
stateless nations. 156 Thus, the ethos of the Polish question persistently left some-
thing more to be desired from international law. This, combined with a relevance 
continuously renewed by Polish uprisings, proved vital in shaping the liberal and 
radical conceptualizations of self-determination that transformed the international 
system after the First World War.157 
 
5.7.2.2.  Can National Unification Justify Conquest? 
 
On the second challenge, this process of national unification had two key examples, 
the creation of modern Italy finalized in 1871 and the creation of modern Germany 
finalized in 1873. Regarding  Italy, this case forms a quintessential study of how a 
nationalistic conception of popular will prevailed over recalcitrant forces of pre-
modern reaction. Here the heartland of the Italian unification project was in the 
northern regions where nationalistic sentiments fuelled by the experience of Aus-
tria’s earlier pro-dynastic interventions were exported to the central and southern 
regions.158 Here, archaic forms of political organization, including the Papal States 
and the Two Kingdoms of Sicily, were ill-equipped to survive popular will-based 
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challenges.159 While Italian unification entailed interventions and territorial acqui-
sitions in a manner comparable to the French revolutionaries, its limited nationalist 
justifications precluded the threat of greater revolutionary export.160 Additionally, 
it is difficult to say that Italian unification amounted to a denial of popular will 
given that many of the pre-modern polities it absorbed rejected the very legitimacy 
of this concept.161  
 
However, in the overall scheme of popular will’s entrenchment within the European 
states-system, German unification was far less straightforward. This had much to 
do with the fact that the main object of Pan-Germanic incorporation, the German 
Confederation (that arose after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire and end of 
Napoleon’s occupation), was neither a modern nation-state form nor a pre-modern 
dynastic one. Rather, according to Peter Haldén, it was a non-sovereign ‘composite 
republic’ that balanced centralized authority with localized autonomy in order to 
prevent the consolidation of either a singular sovereign state or a system of multiple 
sovereign states.162 While viewed by many of its adherents as a unique solution to 
the questions of German political organization,163 the issue remained of how the 
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namely to various Slavic groups, its applicability was limited given the very different social and 
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Confederation would fare in light of the growing rivalry between its two most pow-
erful members, Prussia and Austria.164 Here, the Confederation’s fate was sealed 
by Prussia’s military victory over Austria in 1866.165 This led to a systemic break-
down of this composite republican form and, by extension, the alternative to a state 
sovereignty-based international system that it represented. In filling void, Prussia 
directed a militaristic top-down capitalist state-building project where an all-en-
compassing understanding of nationalism forcibly harmonized a multitude of Ger-
man social schisms.166  
 
To account for this outcome, a particular manifestation of popular will must be un-
derstood as it applied to post-Holy Alliance Prussia, which, in contrast to the Aus-
trian and Russian projects of multi-ethnic empire, was laying the foundations for a 
pan-ethnic empire. When pursuing this project, in contravention of the view that 
popular will is undermined by conquest, an understanding emerged in Prussia 
whereby it was the ability to successfully resist a would-be conqueror that demon-
strated popular will.167 As such, a right of conquest was not only legitimate, but also 
essential. Put differently, it provided the one true mechanism for determining 
whether claims of popular will were genuine or fictitious. A concise summation of 
this view was expressed in 1844 by the Prussian philosopher Constantin Roessler: 
‘As soon as a nation presents symptoms of an incurable weakness, in its internal or 
external life, its stronger neighbours must take away its independence, until either 
its dormant strength awakens to liberation or it disappears, spiritually as well as 
politically, from the ranks of living nations.’168 This justification was well-suited 
                                                        
164 Ibid. 287-288, 297. 
165 Ibid. 296. 
166 See Dufour 2007, 597-599. 
167 A rather surprising articulator of this sensibility was the Prussian general Karl von Clausewitz, 
the author of the famous text On War. While largely known today as a theorist of struggle between 
great powers, Clausewitz was especially fond of the notion of grassroots civilian resistance against 
invading forces in ‘small wars’, see Scheipers 2017.   




for the process of German unification in that conquest was not a denial of popular 
will, but rather its fulfilment.169 
 
A grave challenge presented by Prussian-led German unification was that, unlike 
Italian unification, it entailed expansion at the expense of entities that could very 
well be understood as justified on the basis of popular will.170 Here, a vital devel-
opment that shaped the future trajectory of German unification occurred through 
Prussia’s 1865 forceful separation of the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein from the 
Kingdom of Denmark.171 While under a regime of joint Danish-German Confeder-
ation rule formalized in the 1852 Treaty of London following an earlier Danish-
Prussian conflict concluded in 1848, Denmark’s King Frederick VII issued an 1863 
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justifying national unification resonated with notions of European superiority over non-Europeans. 
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…a manful and vigourous if not a very scrupulous effort, by the more energetic 
and progressive portion of a great people, broken up by historical accidents, 
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speech, to assert for themselves by political union that place in the counsels of 
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not readily claim a violation of popular will, this did not present the same issues of clashing inter-
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decree banishing German influence from this region followed by an attempt to im-
plement a liberal constitution.172 In militarily responding to this development by 
invoking the plight of ethnic Germans whose nationalist ambitions would be mar-
ginalized, Prussia’s intervention represented one understanding of popular will 
(pan-ethnic empire) being mobilized to forcefully contest another (liberal constitu-
tionalism). Moreover, this development exposed the contradictory realities within 
the existing international order where dynastic hierarchy remained, but was being 
transformed by emerging manifestations of popular will (of both the liberal and 
reactionary variety). In furthering its German unification project, Prussia took full 
advantage of this situation.  
 
As a foundational matter, there was the issue of how Prussian expansion could dis-
rupt a settlement attached to the larger Concert project whereby upholding the in-
tegrity of Denmark was, according to the Treaty of London (of which Prussia was 
a signatory), ‘…connected with the general interests of the Balance of Power in 
Europe is of high importance with the preservation of Peace.’173 As Stacey Goddard 
has shown, by setting a series of ‘rhetorical traps’ against a range of potential critics, 
‘…Prussia’s legitimation strategy appealed to both conservative rationales—trea-
ties and dynastic norms—and nationalist concerns simultaneously.’174 Thus, in its 
interactions with the dynastic Great Powers of Russia and Austria, Prussia claimed 
its actions were necessary responses to Danish violations of the Treaty of London 
and thus essential to fulfilling the mission of the Concert and its positive juridical 
regime.175 Alternatively, in its interactions with liberal Britain, republican France, 
and the German Confederation’s nationalists, Prussia invoked the language of pop-
ular will.176   
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Through this process of dual-legitimation, Prussia masterfully forced those who 
might impede its endeavours to confront their own contradictions. These issues 
stemmed directly from the challenges posed by the increasing prevalence of popular 
will as international law’s basis for domestic authority. An example can be found 
in how Prussia’s actions disarmed any attempt by Austria to lead a rival project of 
unifying German nationalism by revealing how taking such a path would under-
mine its ability to maintain legitimacy in ruling its multi-ethnic empire.177 In the 
Austrian diplomat Bernard von Rechberg’s assessment of this dilemma ‘…the Hun-
garians, the south Slavs, the Poles, and the Italians would unite in the dictum that 
they would reject any policy that requires sacrifices of money and blood for Ger-
many.’178  
 
Another demonstration the potency of Prussia’s challenge involved Britain, where 
a general stance of support for Denmark against Prussian expansion was under-
mined from two different directions: Queen Victoria’s pro-German sentiments and 
the belief amongst British radicals that unification could furnish a great ally in the 
form of a liberal German nation-state.179 Regarding Victoria, this demonstrated that 
despite Britain’s development of constitutional-parliamentary defined ‘national in-
terest’ separate from personalized dynastic politics, the persistence of monarchical 
institutions could still impede unified action on this basis.180 Regarding the radical 
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the lesser of the two Empire States of Germany has swallowed up several of the minor subdivisions 
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liberals, their motivation rested on an assumption (foundational to a not yet univer-
salised liberal international legal sensibility) that state entities and their governmen-
tal apparatuses were separate structures. This view was largely alien to many pro-
ponents of Prussian-led German unification where state consolidation and ethno-
nationalist rule were inseparable (and thus a liberal united Germany was anath-
ema).181 Taking all of this into account, and considering the subsequent legitimation 
provided by the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars, it is difficult to over-
state how the greater Schleswig-Holstein question enabled a reactionary German 
unification. In the process, it showcased the possibilities of mobilizing contradic-
tions within international legal order where popular will was increasingly conflated 
with actually-existing borders. 
 
5.8.  The Exclusion of the Non-European World 
 
5.8.1  Defining the Mediterranean Edges 
 
As nineteenth century international law solidified, while it became increasingly dif-
ficult to define what popular will actually was, it became increasingly easy to pro-
claim what popular will was not. Since the Concert of Europe was premised on the 
separation of Europe from the rest of the world, the question of what constituted 
popular will was inseparable from the question of where popular will did or did not 
exist. However, by this moment in history Europeans had already maintained a vast 
a degree of connections with societies throughout the globe, and delineating the 
juridical-geography of popular will was not straight-forward. On the one hand, 
much of the formative violence and repression that forged these connections was 
justified through the law of nations.182 On the other hand, by the late eighteenth 
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century, elaborate critiques of these justifications had emerged calling for an un-
precedented degree of equality between diverse societies.183  
 
To understand why these inclusionary critiques failed at the same time popular will 
increasingly justified domestic authority, a pivotal role was played by the particular 
historicist-evolutionary view of international law first expounded by Mackintosh. 
In the hierarchical scheme that emerged on this basis, in the words of Jennifer Pitts:  
 
…the European law of nations was a global legal system in em-
bryo,…other nations were lawless in so far as they failed to participate 
in the European system, and…a key task of European jurists was to 
construct a process by which these others might be granted admission 
to the European global legal community.184  
 
Through this conflation of European parochialism with universality, to quote Peter 
Stirk, questions of sovereign legitimacy were conditioned according to ‘[a] kind of 
doctrinal apartheid [that] helped to maintain the contrast between a world of sover-
eign states and a world of colonies, protectorates and terra nullius.’185 In defining 
the contours of this separation, the Mediterranean region proved to be a pivotal site. 
Here, analogous invocations of popular will in Greece and Algiers produced dra-
matically different international legal results. 
 
5.8.1.1.  The Success of Greece 
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A formative event in setting the international legal boundaries of popular will was 
the 1820s intervention by Britain, France, and Russia on behalf of the Greek strug-
gle for independence from the Ottoman Empire.186 Materially, the Greek movement 
for independence is easily identifiable as a contributor to capital accumulation. As 
the Ottoman Empire struggled to adapt to new modes of distribution and exchange, 
Greek merchant activity throughout Europe and the Mediterranean generated vast 
amounts of wealth that stood to be expanded if the Greeks could break their Otto-
man bonds.187 Moreover, Greek merchants active in Europe’s major commercial 
and cultural hubs were well positioned to learn of revolutionary developments else-
where and became skilled in applying the justificatory rhetoric of popular will to 
their cause.188  
 
On an intimately related note, the Greek independence movement was aided im-
mensely by the emergence of the homogenous nation-state as the ideal: vessel for 
popular will, mode of capitalist modernity, and subject of international law. In 
meeting this ideal, ‘…the bulk of ethnic Greek settlement lied in the southernmost 
tip of the [Balkan] peninsula where the Greek nation-state was ultimately instituted 
– an advantage which subsequent secessionist nationalisms in either the Balkans 
themselves or in Asia Minor did not always enjoy.’189 In a manner deeply conse-
quential for subsequent claims for ethnic autonomy, this Greek uniqueness resulted 
in a major international legal innovation. Here, unlike the Americas and elsewhere 
in Europe where the reconfiguration of borders in response to popular will some-
what corresponded (in varying degrees) to earlier patterns of recognised authority, 
the borders of the newly independent Greece were recognized on an exclusively 
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entho-linguistic basis.190 As a result, Greek independence was a milestone in forg-
ing the nexus between ‘immutable’ ethnic identity and the boundaries of sover-
eignty, a premise future international lawyers would return to time and time 
again.191 
 
For the European observers of the day, Ottoman opposition to the Greek uprising 
was eminently observable as the pitting of the archetype of civilizational foundation 
against the archetype of ‘oriental despotism.’192 As such, calls for intervention on 
behalf of the Greeks were influentially phrased in the language of promoting ‘hu-
manity’ in the face of Ottoman ‘barbarism.’193 What is truly interesting about this 
discourse is the way it formed a common cause amongst interveners who adhered 
to very different conceptions of ‘humanity’ as the vindication of an independent 
Greece.194 For the British and French, promoting ‘humanity’ bolstered the right of 
a society to organize itself through a liberal nationalist form free of ‘barbarian’ rule; 
and this complimented their existing discourses of popular legitimation.195 By con-
trast, for the Russians, their continued commitment to dynastic legitimacy made 
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193 On use of Greece as an example of intervention on behalf of ‘humanity’ in the nineteenth century, 
see Wheaton 1836. 128-130. On humanitarian justifications for European intervention in the Otto-
man Empire, see Rodogno 2011; see also Rodogno 2016. 
194 This encapsulation of a plurality of justifications contributed immensely to popular will’s pre-
sumptive universality. 
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them weary of nationalist independence movements. 196  However, in a manner 
deeply in-line with Alexander I’s view of paternalist nationalism, intervention 
could be justified in Greece given Russia’s self-styled perception as the protector 
of Orthodox Christians living under Muslim rule.197  
 
This seemingly pluralistic coordination of bringing about national autonomy in the 
name of popular will was deeply consistent with the expansion of colonial capital-
ism. As an immediate matter, in addition to the lofty rhetoric conflating national 
independence with ‘humanity’, disruption caused by Greek-Ottoman clashes 
proved advantageous for pirates whose pillaging of trade routes was something the 
Great Powers had an interest in suppressing.198 In a deeper capacity, Greek inde-
pendence stood for the proposition that modern nation-states breaking away from 
pre-modern empires furthered ‘civilization’ development.199 It thus feed into the 
consolidating view that assigning racially differentiating qualities to territories and 
peoples could justify practices of capitalist accumulation in certain locations that 
would be unacceptable elsewhere given the universal demands of international 
law.200 
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5.8.1.2.  The Failure of Algeirs 
 
This ability of ‘civilizational’ discourse to vastly restrict the scope of what could 
be accomplished through claims invoking popular will was made starkly apparent 
by France’s 1830 invasion of Algiers.201 As a response, Hamdan Khoja, the Otto-
man Emir of Algiers, delivered an impassioned articulation of Algiers’ status as a 
sovereign equal whose difference from France provided opportunity for mutual 
learning between Western and Islamic perspectives.202 In his 1833 French-language 
publication Le Mirror, Khoja explicitly invoked Vattel’s The Law and Nations and 
its emphasis on pluralism.203 In further making his case, Khoja’s argument included 
a direct comparison between the plight of the Algerians and the plight of the Poles 
and the Greeks. Here, he posed the question of why his nation’s struggle had not 
been elevated to iconic status comparable to the Polish and Greek situations.204 
However, Khoja’s claims were roundly rejected by the French who invoked their 
ethnographic studies claiming that diversity amongst the region’s tribes precluded 
the existence of unified Algerian nation, let alone one entitled to sovereign auton-
omy.205 Algiers was thus a formative application of the emerging hierarchical his-
toricist-evolutionist view that the popular will needed to justify international legal 
personality only manifested in modes of social organization analogous to the Euro-
pean nation-state form.  
 
Relatedly, this situation was also highly revealing as it concerned the emerging re-
straints on territorial imposition. After all, this situation demonstrated how law of 
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belligerent occupation and its imperative of preserving the local status quo did not 
automatically apply outside Europe.206  This was abundantly evident in Algiers 
given the massive degree of coordinated plunder and despoliation attributable to 
the invading French forces.207 Nevertheless, this disparity was deeply consistent 
with the logic that informed the development of the law of occupation given its 
prerogative of protecting very specific modes of property ownership. Thus, in a 
capacity linked to the overarching rhetoric of civilizational superiority, the types of 
property-based social relations that justified preservation under a conservationist 
legal regime in Europe were largely absent in North Africa.208 However, despite the 
fate of Algiers, as the nineteenth-century progressed, the practice of attaining title 
by conquest declined precipitously as a means of justifying European imposition in 
the non-European world. While conquest’s threat to popular will was generally ir-
relevant to colonizers, conquest’ threat to capital accumulation remained fully in-
tact.209 
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5.8.2.  Conquest After Conquest  
 
On this point, the nineteenth century witnessed a cascade of justifications that ful-
filled the traditional function of conquest in a manner compatible with capital ac-
cumulation. This included reassertions of the doctrine of prescription whereby con-
tinuous possession of a territory over a sufficient passage of time furnished owner-
ship regardless of how this possession occurred.210 In light of its temporal prioriti-
zation of ‘facts on the ground’ over morality, prescription was frequently applied 
to solidify European claims within regions subject to violent domination over the 
preceding centuries.211 As an additional alternative, there was the doctrine of occu-
pation (not to be confused with belligerent occupation) where the ‘actual possession’ 
of territory created rights of ownership.212 Unlike conquest and its ethos of time-
lessness, occupation (and its focus on ‘improvement’ as a basis for ownership), was 
consistent with a linear progressive view of historical development.213  
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Perhaps the most prominent practice of acquiring non-European lands was cession 
by treaty. Such practices were able to manifest in increasingly novel forms given 
that (as Concert Great Powers interaction had shown) a shared presumption of pop-
ular will, and by extension substantive legitimacy, was unnecessary for treaty con-
sent.214 As a result, this formalistic process of enforcing the validity of dubiously 
made agreements for territorial concessions completely up-ended any mutual sense 
of substantive equality underlying treaties existing between Europeans and non-
Europeans in previous centuries.215 Eventually, the emphasis on form over sub-
stance became so great that, in numerous locations throughout the world, treaty-
making capacity by non-Europeans was often recognized for the sole purpose of 
transferring territory to European hands.216 Aiding this process immensely was the 
fact that, unlike the domestic law of contract, fraud and coercion were almost never 
recognized as grounds for treaty abrogation in this timeframe.217 Against this back-
drop, the more vast swaths of the globe became subject to increasingly invasive 
regimes of external imposition, the less relevant doctrines of conquest, traditionally 
understood, would actually become.218 In a grand irony of history, by marginalizing 
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title by conquest and its validation of explicitly suppressing popular will through 
force, what emerged was a complex maze of legal justification that culminated in 
almost the entire world being placed under some form of Western colonial domi-
nation. The sheer scale and depth of control effected in this manner likely exceeded 
anything that could have been effected through forcible conquest alone.  
 
With the spread of these impositions, and their inability to genuinely incorporate 
non-European influences (while nonetheless positing a pluralist notion of popular 
will), resistance itself contributed to universalizing capitalism, international law, 
and the nation-state form.219 Indispensable sites of this process were the regions 
identifiable as a ‘semi-periphery’ (the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan, Siam, Persia, 
etc.220) where international recognition was tied to the acceptance of capitulations, 
unequal treaties, and the extraterritorial imposition of European laws.221  When 
seeking freedom from these impositions, non-Europeans often asserted their long-
standing histories of inter-societal interaction to claim subjectivity within the ex-
panding international legal order emanating from Europe.222 Through this confla-
tion of premodern interactions between peoples with modern interactions between 
states (once again demonstrating law’s genealogical detachment from the rigidity 
of historical context), semi-peripheral actors deeply contributed to the universali-
zation of sovereign equality and, by extension, its presumptions of popular will and 
the nation-state form.223 Here the deep interconnection between capitalism and the 
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international legal construction of popular will was displayed yet again given that 
the most successful societies were those best able to accommodate capitalism, Ja-
pan being the preeminent case.224  
 
However, the question remains as to what this ability to pursue any governmental 
system in the name of popular will actually meant for those marginalized by the 
geopolitics and distributional mechanisms produced by the same capitalist order 
responsible for globalizing popular will. While these limits were demonstrated on 
a worldwide scale with the postwar movement towards decolonization, a key prel-
ude can be located nearly a century and half beforehand with the independence of 
Latin America. I detail this development in the following chapter. 
 
5.9.  Conclusion  
 
By showing how an organicist conception of popular will justified the consolidation 
of borders within Europe and the hierarchy between Europeans and non-Europeans 
after Napoleon, this chapter further demonstrated the explanatory possibilities of 
my methodology of ‘world-historical context’, and its merging of ‘juridical think-
ing’ with historical sociology. Following the French Revolution, it became clear 
that the ostensibly aligned victorious Great Powers harboured consequential differ-
ences in the domains of material social relations, authority justifications, and geo-
political interests. Managing these tensions necessitated a new formulation of ju-
ridical authority capable of providing a medium of coexistence against this uneven 
international backdrop. As a result, this context staged the reception for influential 
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publicists who framed an international legal order whereby popular will was unique 
to discrete, bounded political communities as a matter of fundamental historical 
truth. 
 
This facilitated coexistence amongst differently situated European sovereigns set 
the stage for an international legal order able to contain the radical invocations of 
popular will that characterized the French Revolution. Additionally, this consoli-
dating order was highly adept at facilitating capitalist social relations. Here bounded 
sovereignty allowed capitalism’s latecomers to make their transition through ‘rev-
olutions from above.’ Accompanying this process were new class formations 
whereby the vestiges of absolutism increasingly aligned with nationalistic forces to 
justify expressions of popular will. The confluence of the nation-state form and an 
increasingly reactionary discourse of organic community (that justified bounded 
sovereignty) was the lynchpin of this alliance.  
 
Thus, what emerged was modern European states-system where the same organic 
community-based reasoning that justified rigid national boundaries in Europe also 
justified European superiority over all other peoples. Furthermore, the colonial en-
deavours enabled on this basis were indispensable for capitalist expansion. Taken 
as a whole, a reconfigured juridical narrative of popular will justifying inviolable 
sovereign borders within Europe, in conjunction with a European sense of civiliza-
tion supremacy, developed to reproduce the particular array of social relations de-







The Periphery of Popular Will: Latin American Independence 




6.1.  Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I return to the Western Hemisphere to explore the place of Latin 
American independence in the transforming contexts of capitalism, international 
law, and political authority that stemmed from the American and French Revolu-
tions, and their aftermaths. Far from simply being a seamless continuation of Euro-
pean and US American trends, the emergence of new states in Latin America offers 
a unique exercise in showing how societies can both transform the idea of popular 
will and be transformed by it. This uniqueness was twofold. On the one hand, form-
ative assertions of Latin American popular will presumed a configuration of sover-
eignty very different from the modern nation-state form. One the other hand, given 
its marginalized geopolitical and geoeconomic position, Latin America was com-
paratively constrained in accessing the riches of colonial capitalism that provided 
the US and much of Europe with the material base to transform their societies in 
the name of popular will.  
 
Situated against a backdrop of structural coercion, Latin American states invoked 
popular will, expressed through the discourse of international law, as resistance to 
external interventions. Paradoxically, the more Latin America raised this shield of 
popular will, the more it had to conform its institutions to the European and US 
American ideal of the nation-state form. Thus, when placed in its international con-
texts, the manifestation of popular will in Latin America shielded it from the harsh-
est effects of capitalist predation while simultaneously entangling itself within a 





In moving forward, Part 6.2. examines contemporary discourse on Latin America 
within the international legal order as a region whose particular position stemmed 
from its place as being neither conclusively ‘Western’ nor ‘non-Western.’ Part 6.3. 
then historicises Latin American uniqueness during the age of revolutions and 
shows how its distinct merger of feudal and indigenous institutions presented deep 
questions regarding its future as its Spanish (and Portuguese) rulers could no longer 
maintain traditional modes of authority. Following this, Part 6.4. places the question 
of Latin America in the context of the post-French revolutionary reassertion of dy-
nastic legitimacy and examines the questions faced by Europe’s monarchical pow-
ers regarding their support for the Spanish Crown against its rebelling colonies. 
Correspondingly, Part 6.5. scrutinizes British and US American support for Latin 
American independence in accordance with the popular will-based view that de 
facto authority warrants international recognition. For both of these powers, inde-
pendence in Latin American would serve their capitalists interest to a far greater 
degree than if dynastic authority prevailed in the region. Finally, Part 6.6. explores 
how the intertwined processes of capitalist proliferation and international legal ar-
gument entrenched the modern nation-state form in Latin America. While this de-
velopment provided a modicum of leverage in the face of predation, on a deeper 
level, it eliminated the possibility of any alternative conception of ‘popular will’ 
unmeasured against a European or US American ideal. 
 
As Chapter VII then shows, Latin America’s contradictory experience with popular 
will as a source of both hope and constraint extended far beyond the region itself. 
With the postwar rise of the ‘world of popular will’ through the UN Charter-based 
international order, and increasing failure of racial/cultural inferiority arguments as 
denials of sovereign independence, to what extent could Latin America provide a 
template for decolonizing Asia and Africa. While new states were provided oppor-
tunities to embrace the discourses developed in Latin America over more than a 
century, this also meant that the unresolved contradictions defining Latin American 
engagement with the international order now manifested across a completely new 
range of contexts. Thus, the exponential reproduction of key portions of the Latin 




the nation-state form remains profoundly limited when no means exist to confront 
the enduring structures of colonial capitalism and its compounding legacies. 
 
6.2.  A Continent Apart  
 
Paying attention to Latin America’s contributions to the contemporary international 
law opens the door to numerous subversions of conventional narratives. As a sig-
nificant upsurge in critical scholarship has shown, Latin America’s existence on the 
margins of global power, and its unique position of being neither conclusively 
‘Western’ or ‘non-Western’, has produced a history of international legal engage-
ments that forces us to re-evaluate standard categories.1 Here, if the modern inter-
national legal order emerged through a separation between the Western  ‘family of 
nations’ and the ‘un-civilized’ world beyond it, Latin America’s precarious position 
deeply complicates this binary despite its frequent association with the ‘Third 
World project’, broadly understood.2 In historicizing this complication, we must 
remember that ‘only after the independence of Africa and Asia following the Sec-
ond World War does Latin America…[become]…incorporated into Third World 
discourse and politics. Prior to that it is treated as a somewhat aberrant Western 
adjunct.’3  
 
Despite, and in many ways because of, this uniqueness, Latin America has deeply 
contributed to the contemporary international legal order and, in this capacity, its 
particular articulations of the relationship between and domestic authority and pop-
ular will has been vital. After all, given its disadvantaged position within global 
                                                        
1 See Obregón 2008; Becker Lorca 2015; Scarfi 2017. This new approach to the critical study of 
Latin America has in no way been confined to the field of international law. For recent contributions 
from the fields of history and political theory, see Sanders 2014; Simon 2017; Del Castillo 2018; 
Sabato 2018. 
2 On the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana as a major watershed in marking Latin Amer-
ica’s involvement with the Afro-Asian radical Third World project, see Barcia 2009. 




orders, robust arguments for absolute, unqualified understandings of sovereign 
equality and non-intervention were viewed as essential for affirming autonomy in 
the face of external predation.4 Thus, Latin America proved indispensable for de-
lineating the extent to which the popular will of weak states could be free from 
foreign interference as a matter of international law. 
 
In this context, the general Latin American approach to the concept of popular will 
has frequently been cast as an alternative to that of its northern neighbour, the 
United States, which, as discussed in Chapter III, was vital in introducing popular 
will as the basis for modern international legal standing. Broadly speaking, while 
the US American conception of popular will viewed the liberty of the individual as 
coextensive with the liberty of the state, the Latin American conception viewed the 
liberty of state as necessitating the authority to undertake transformative social pro-
jects, even when they prioritized collective uplift over private individual interests.5 
While ideological pluralism in relation to the domestic boundaries of popular will 
emerged to facilitate peaceful relations between diverse modes of social reproduc-
tion amongst the core great powers of Europe (which remained intact until the First 
World War), in the Americas, clashes over differing conceptions of ‘popular will’ 
and its associated liberties proved far more contentious. This was especially true 
when Latin American efforts to realize popular will through state-led social trans-
formations interfered with outside efforts to guarantee individual interests regard-
ing private property/commercial enterprises located in Latin America.6 
 
A brief historical overview of Latin American contributions to international law 
reveals the influence of how impassioned juridical proclamations were intended to 
safeguard (peripheral) sovereign autonomy in a hostile world. Famously, the late-
                                                        
4 For account of Latin American contributions to international law in this capacity, see Dawson 1981. 
5 See Grandin 2012. 
6 For a study of the development of international responsibility for foreign property in Latin America 




nineteenth and early-twentieth century Calvo Clause and Drago Doctrine sought to 
limit the coercive options foreign creditors could use to collect sovereign debts.7 
Additionally within this timeframe, the Brazilian delegate Ruy Barbosa called for 
highly robust conception of sovereign equality at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference 
as means of promoting the interests of weak states.8 Such counter-hegemonic jurid-
ical tactics informed moves to towards Pan-Americanism in the early twentieth cen-
tury, where institutionalized cooperation was explicitly asserted to uphold sover-
eignty, despite the common presumption that the former erodes the later.9  
 
Additionally, throughout the entirety of their history, Latin American actors were 
acutely aware of how foreign declarations of recognition could devastate domestic 
political stability. This culminated in Mexico’s 1930 ‘Estrada Doctrine’ where Sec-
retary of Foreign Affairs Genaro Estrada pledged to automatically accept the results 
of local political contestations without question, thus disavowing formal declara-
tions of recognition as a legitimate practice.10 Such a move was widely believed to 
be necessary to preserve the sovereignty of weak states from the judgments of the 
powerful.11 These commitments received a newfound impetus during the proxy in-
terventions of the Cold War.12 It was against this backdrop that the International 
Court of Justice delivered its iconic 1986 pronouncement that US efforts to under-
                                                        
7 For an early study, see Hershey 1907. 
8 Simpson 2004, 141-144. 
9 See Scarfi 2014. 
10 For an important account of the Estrada Doctrine from timeframe, see Jessup 1931. 
11 In this context: ‘[t]aking a position on recognition—especially of a government claiming power 
through the use of force—could be considered an act of intervention either by extending or with-
holding approval.’ Esquirol 2012, 568. 





mine Nicaragua’s Sandinista regime grossly violated of a sovereign state’s funda-
mental right to choose its system of government.13 Such an ethos carried into the 
ideologically narrow post-Cold War era in the form of the Bolivarian Alliance led 
by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. In direct contravention of liberal interna-
tional legalist understandings of institutional integration, economic governance, 
and ‘human rights’, the Alliance resurrected visions of popular will associated with 
projects of state socialism and Third Worldism that many believed were progres-
sively surpassed.14    
 
Building on this minimalist sketch of a vast history, the purpose of this chapter is 
to account for a foundational consideration that has yet to be theorized in detail. 
While there has been much work on Latin American states as international legal 
subjects in the global context, the international legal dimensions of Latin American 
independence in the early nineteenth century is comparatively under-explored.15 
Critically confronting this issue of origin has profound implications for how we 
conceptualize popular will as an international legal ideal. While many important 
Latin American contributions to international law have ardently defended the na-
tion-state on the grounds of its function as a vessel for popular will, a missing line 
of inquiry is whether the sovereign state is the only, or indeed even the best, means 
of realizing popular will.16 This question is particularly pertinent in the context of 
Latin America given that, in contrast to the US and Europe, the successful assertion 
of popular will in this region did not at all correlate to the same accumulation of 
material wealth and influence. Raising this issue is in no way a pejorative judgment 
of all those who invoked the powers of state sovereignty to attain a modicum of 
                                                        
13 ICJ Nicargua Case 1986, p. 263. 
14 Lean and Roth 2015, 222. 
15 Much of this focus has been attributed to the development of an understanding of ‘Latin American 
International Law’ as a distinct consciousness of the field as proclaimed by the Chilean jurist, and 
later judge at the International Court of Justice, Alejandro Álvarez (1868-1960). For his defining 
study, see Álvarez 1909. For a studies of Álvarez’s contexts and influences, see Obregón 2006; 
Becker Lorca 2006; Esquirol 2006. 




leverage in a dramatically unequal world. Rather it is to highlight the contingent 
ways in which broader historically-constituted structures have shaped our concep-
tion of popular will and what it can be. Such a need for critical inquiry is exposed 
by the reality that despite a tireless history of international legal advocacy, in Latin 
America, the material results have perpetually fallen short of what generations of 
advocates had hoped for.   
 
A preliminary inquiry that contextualizes this perpetual disappointment must also 
confront how exactly we imagine the emergence of Latin American states as inter-
national legal subjects. Towards this end, a standard presumption is that the inde-
pendence of Latin American states from Spain was more or less analogous to US 
independence from Britain.17 Such a comparison fits neatly into narratives, such as 
the one presented by Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, that by the late-
eighteenth/early-nineteenth centuries the dissemination of new modes of print-
based communications gave rise to widely dispersed nationalist consciousness that 
could no longer abide imperial rule.18 However, Anderson’s theory presents stark 
limitations when applied to the Latin American context,19 one of which being the 
very different substantive theories of popular will when compared to the US. Keep-
ing in mind the broader history of popular will that I have presented in the previous 
chapters, an alternative account of the divergence between the US’s broadly indi-
vidualist and Latin America's broadly collectivist conceptions of popular will must 
show how the sociological and geopolitical contexts of Latin American independ-
ence were radically different from US independence. While cognizant of the risk of 
the homogenizing and context-eliding effects of the larger international legal order, 
                                                        
17 This can be largely be attributed to the fact that, like the US, the formative histories of Latin 
American independence were fixed on the heroic deeds of founding father figures who were pre-
sumed to embody the entirety of national consciousness and purpose. According to one prominent 
historian: ‘The cult of the founding fathers—which was always accepting of their flaws, and got a 
great deal of narrative mileage from their tragic traits—has been an enduring strain of Latin Amer-
ican historiography about independence.’ Adelman 2010, 155. 
18 Anderson 2016. 
19 For an insightful collection of contestations of Anderson’s work as it concerns Latin America, see 




such a move allows Latin America to be evaluated in light of its world-historical 
position. 
 
6.3. Latin America the Age of Revolutions  
 
6.3.1. Layered and Divided Sovereignty 
 
As discussed in Chapter III, the US’s emergence as an international legal entity was 
inseparably connected to Britain’s simultaneous development as both a capitalist 
state form and an overseas empire. Here, the fact that English-speaking settler pop-
ulations were excluded from the full panoply of rights enjoyed by the British 
metropole’s spatially-bounded political community lead to the adaptation of British 
modes of law and government. This ultimately coalesced into a novel, yet recog-
nisable, form of popular will that eventually led to demands of sovereign autonomy 
placing the US on equal footing with the British imperial metropole. This forcible 
achievement of popular will via the establishment of ‘facts on the ground’ as a self-
justifying basis for sovereign legitimacy opened the door for occurrences such as 
Latin American independence. Yet, despite this relationship, Spanish rule was 
channelled through sociopolitical forms fundamentally different from British rule.  
 
Here the British imperial structure, and the system of free-trade anarchy it was fa-
cilitating, centred on consolidating modern nation-state forms where authority was 
depersonalized, formal equality was the ideal, and territorially-bounded ‘public’ 
authority was ideologically separated from the territorially-transcendent ‘private’ 
economic activity. Against this presumption, the accumulation of overseas colonial 
possessions were defined by exceptions to the idealized presumptions of the mod-
ern British constitutional-parliamentary state. By contrast, the Spanish crown did 




claims to universal authority were personalized, hierarchical, maintained no dis-
tinction between political and economic power, and recognized no inherent spatial 
boundaries.20  
 
This being the case, New World ‘Spanish Americans considered their patrias (lands) 
to be kingdoms in the worldwide Spanish Monarchy, and not colonies.’21 Thus 
while Britain represented a model of colonial modernity where empire and the mod-
ern state existed as separate yet intertwined modes of political organization, the 
Spanish universal monarchy could not be divided along this axis and as such could 
not be called a ‘Spanish Empire’ in the modern sense.22 That said, unlike the Amer-
ican Revolution, the emergence of Latin American nations as sovereign subjects 
under international law was not the breaking away of colonies from an imperial 
metropole, but rather the result of the breakdown of a universal monarchy. Viewed 
through this lens, in addition to the new nations of Latin America, another modern 
state that emerged from this breakdown was Spain itself.23 In taking this alternative 
framing seriously, how are we to account for the emergence of new states who 
eventually challenged the international legal order by demanding that it clarify the 
extent of this system’s ability to uphold the popular will of its weakest members?  
 
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that the transition from premodern forms 
of divided and layered sovereignty to modern statehood in the Western Hemisphere 
did not automatically occur the moment universal monarchy broke down, but rather 
                                                        
20 Rodriguez 2000, 133; While its boundaries of authority were ever shifting in the context of per-
petual inter-dynastic warfare, ’[a]t its height, the Spanish crown claimed the entire Iberian Peninsula, 
Sicily, parts of Italy, France, and the Germanies, Flanders and the Netherlands, parts of North Africa, 
islands in the Mediterranean and off the west coast of Africa, as well as the Americas, islands in the 
Pacific, the Philippines, and parts of India.’ Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 136. 
22 Pagden 2012, 30. 




was a far more drawn out process.24 Such a phenomenon may appear counter-intu-
itive given that the practice of drawing cartographic lines to demarcate exclusive 
authority over a territory prior to actual knowledge of it was developed in the con-
text of European colonization of the Western Hemisphere.25 In a manner contem-
poraneous with Latin American independence in the early-nineteenth century, this 
colonial innovation of bounded territoriality was being practiced in Europe as a 
means of consolidating the modern state-system in the wake of Napoleon.26 The 
colonial character of territorial-demarcation in Europe was especially prescient in 
the partitions of Poland where, in remarking upon the harshness of this imposition, 
an Austrian official reported that: ‘I don’t believe that even among the Iroquois and 
Hottentots such ridiculous things occur.’27 
 
Given that the consolidation of indivisible sovereignty was occurring in Europe 
within the same timeframe of Latin American independence, it would be easy to 
make broad, sweeping statements that the entrenchment of the territorially-bounded 
sovereign state had come full-circle. Yet, in contrast to any claim that the original 
practice of bounded territoriality automatically translated into indivisible sover-
eignty in the New World, what persisted were forms of ‘layered sovereignty’ 
whereby the authority of multiple actors overlapped and shifted across a variety of 
spatial and temporal contexts.28 Such configurations stand in stark contrast to our 
present dominant conception of sovereignty, where authority is both bounded in the 
domain of space and infinite in the domain of time.29 Thus, an account of how 
bounded sovereignty emerged in Latin America must begin from the premise that 
                                                        
24 Mulich 2017. 
25 Branch 2010, 283-285. 
26 Ibid. 290. 
27 Quoted in Ibid. 289. 
28 Mulich 2017, 190. 




‘[t]he principle of layered sovereignty was built into the constitutions…’ of the re-
publican successors to the Spanish colonies.30 Here, to quote Jeppe Mulich, ‘[c]ities 
and provinces such as Buenos Aires…Santa Fe…Bogota and Quito…were auton-
omous or semiautonomous political units in their own right, enjoying a degree of 
sovereign control layered below the overarching sovereignty of the political feder-
ations to which they belonged.’31 
 
 How then did Latin American states become not just adherents to, but also cham-
pions of, the absolute character of permanent invisible state sovereignty? Answer-
ing this question requires mapping interconnected social and geopolitical forces 
within this early nineteenth-century timeframe. In this context, international law 
must be understood as an active shaper and implementer of its own preferred mode 
of socio-political organization, the modern sovereign nation-state. The operation of 
a consolidating international legal order against this backdrop cannot be understood 
as restricted to popular will-based claims and rebuttals lodged between the Spanish 
crown and its rebellious New World subjects. Rather, when placed on a larger scale, 
beyond just the direct parties to the collapse of the Spanish universal monarchy, the 
Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia, Austria), France, Britain, and the US were all en-
tangled in the Latin American question. Their contrasting economic, geopolitical, 
and ideological agendas were expressed through diverging visions of international 
law. The very concealment of this vast scheme of global politics through its reduc-
tion to a limited popular will-based controversy between the Spanish crown and its 
subjects was itself directly produced by the specific manifestation of international 
legalism that happened to prevail. Such a bounding of contestation is vital to our 
modern conception of popular will under international law where third party at-
tempts to influence local political challenges are believed to undermine a people’s 
right to establish the political system of its choice on its own terms. 
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6.3.2.  The Spanish World’s Breakup  
 
In contextualizing Latin American independence, while the former Spanish posses-
sions of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Para-
guay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela emerged as independent between 1810 and 
1830,32 this does not cover the entirety of this meta-event. There were also the cases 
of Haitian independence from France in 1804 and Brazilian independence from 
Portugal in 1822. In the former situation, Haiti’s successful slave uprising repre-
sented a rejection of white rule and material inequality that introduced an unprece-
dentedly radical contestations that carried deep consequences for international 
law.33 In the later situation, Brazil’s breakaway from Portugal resulted in the estab-
lishment of a new monarchical order that was not exclusively based on popular will 
in the generally invoked liberal or republican sense of the term.34  
 
Through their own distinct ways, Haiti and Brazil each problematize any linear pro-
gress narrative of the Enlightenment revolutions and their formation of the modern 
world. After all, the rise of liberal/republican popular will as a basis for sovereign 
autonomy in the context of Spanish America was ideologically flanked from both 
sides by diverging radical and conservative expressions. That said, this develop-
ment can be portrayed as a reasonable accommodation of competing interests that 
is easily absorbable into international law’s overarching narrative of progress 
through rational solution-making. However, this was in no way preordained and a 
closer analysis of this situation in its global context exposes the many contingencies 
that informed this outcome.     
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To establish this context, the events that ultimately led to Latin American independ-
ence were rooted in the Napoleonic Wars. Here the Napoleonic conquest of the 
Iberian Peninsula led to drastic changes with far-reaching consequences. In Portu-
gal, having been stripped its territorial authority in Europe, the royal family relo-
cated to Brazil thus transferring the seat of the Portuguese Empire from Lisbon to 
Rio de Janeiro in 1808.35 With Spain, the situation was more complex in that re-
sistance to Napoleon’s installation of his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne lead 
to liberal forces rallying behind the legitimacy of King Ferdinand VII through the 
formation of the Junta Central in Seville, a body that commanded the loyalty of 
Spanish America.36 When this entity broke down, a variety of New World juntas 
emerged in a manner ‘….justified by a tenet in Spanish medieval law, according to 
which in the absence of the monarch, government reverted directly to the people.’37 
That said, these ‘…provisional governments repudiated the existing overseas au-
thorities composed of peninsular officials as illegitimate’ and, as such ‘they invited 
conflict over who was the rightful government of the crown in the American terri-
tories.’38      
 
When considering the strained relationship between the Spanish metropole and its 
New World subjects, it is tempting to view the rebellion and emergence of new 
states as the inevitable outcome of this contestation over authority. However, such 
a view ignores the efforts to preserve the Spanish world in a capacity that sought to 
mutually reinforce the persistence of monarchical authority and the accommodation 
of local popular will. Chief amongst these attempts was the Constitution of 1812 
that sought to vastly enhance the representation of American subjects (including 
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indigenous communities) with Spain’s monarchical authority structure.39 However, 
following his 1814 restoration, King Ferdinand ended attempts at accommodation 
by harshly suppressing rebellious subjects, and this, along with the persistence of 
the juntas, intensified the division between Latin America’s republican and loyalist 
factions.40  
 
Through the destabilization of this delicate political situation, ‘[r]epression by the 
crown prompted decisive action by the minority of Spanish America’s politically 
active population that favored independence.’41 In this context, ‘self-proclaimed 
generals, such as Simon Bolivar, and former professional soldiers, such as Jose de 
San Martin, gained immense power and prestige as the leaders of the bloody strug-
gle to gain independence.’ 42  Yet, given the above-discussed persistence of di-
vided/layered sovereignty forms following the disavowal of European monarchical 
authority in the New World, ‘independence’ alone does not explain the entrench-
ment of the nation-state and its presumption of indivisible sovereignty. Resolving 
this discrepancy requires close attention to the broader geopolitical context these 
events unfolded within. 
 
As it became apparent that peninsular Spain (weakened by years of Napoleonic 
occupation and internal political contestation) could not conclusively assert control 
over the New World, the Concert of Europe had to address questions of mediation 
and recognition. Here, diverging responses regarding the legality and legitimacy of 
Latin American independence reflected deep tensions amongst the Concert’s Great 
Powers: Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and later France. As discussed in Chapter 
V, while the Concert operated under the unifying banner of reconstructing Europe 
following Napoleon, there was a schism between liberal Britain and the reactionary 
Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. While Britain sought to entrench a 
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system of rules that enabled market-based capital accumulation, the Holy Alliance 
sought to resurrect hierarchical absolutist authority that demonised popular will. 
While the temporary accommodation of these differences through bounded territo-
riality and ideological pluralism may have succeeded in Europe, the question of 
Latin America revealed just how different the two blocs actually were in their vi-
sions of international legal order. 
 
6.4.  Independence and Dynastic Legitimacy  
 
With the 1818 formation of the Holy Alliance at Aix-de-Chappel, the great powers 
of Russia, Prussia, and Austria committed themselves to affirming the dynastic sta-
tus quo established in 1815 by legitimizing external intervention against popular 
uprisings.43 While primarily focused on Europe, the question of upholding the 
Spanish crown’s authority over its overseas possessions forced the Holy Alliance 
to articulate the scope and extent of its commitment to dynastic legitimacy. On this 
question, Austria and Russia were preeminent. For Austria’s arch-dynastic foreign 
minister Prince Klemens von Metternich, there could be no legitimate recognition 
of independence in Latin America unless the Spanish monarchy explicitly relin-
quished its sovereign claims. According to Metternich’s characterization of these 
independence movements: 
 
If the political systems upon which these declarations are founded 
should be generally approved in Europe, it is evident that henceforth 
the most illegal and audacious enterprises will be judged only by their 
material success, that any revolt would be sanctioned by the mere fact 
that the results existed de facto, and finally there would no longer pre-
vail among men any other right than that of force or any other bonds 
than those imposed by the victorious usurpation of a particular mo-
ment—bonds which might be dissolved the following moment.44 
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Furthermore, Metternich’s fear of sovereign autonomy on the basis of popular will 
evidenced by ‘facts on the ground’ was intimately linked to his knowledge of Latin 
America’s deeply unequal social hierarchy. Here, when the Portuguese monarchy 
returned to Lisbon, yet remaining factions sought to declare a separate Brazilian 
Empire,45 Metternich commended the fact that this essentially monarchical order 
was tempered by elements of liberal constitutionalism. According to Metternich’s 
appraisal, ‘[a]bove all, the dogma of the sovereignty of the people…is extremely 
dangerous everywhere and most dangerous in a land full of slaves.’46   
 
While Metternich’s articulation of dynastic legitimacy was certainly influential, this 
overarching image is complicated when we considers the role of Russia under the 
rule of Tsar Alexander I, a figure often at ideological odds with Metternich.47 Alt-
hough Russia was committed to dynastic legitimacy, and made frequent appeals to 
Spain on this basis,48 its approach to Latin America was also guided by geopolitical 
considerations that differentiated it from Austria.49 As Europe’s greatest land power, 
Russian interests were predominantly directed against Britain, the greatest maritime 
power.50 However, in pursuing its rivalry with liberal capitalist Britain, Russia was 
constrained by a need to appease the dynastic orthodoxies of both the Spanish 
crown and Metternich. This dual source of frustration provides context for Alexan-
der’s lament that:  
 
the deplorable situation of the Iberian Peninsula…[and]…the moral and 
the material causes of its ills could not be remedied so long as the for-
tunes of its colonies were subject, on the one hand to the mediaeval 
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49 For an extensive study of Russian interests in this context, see Bartly 1978. 




methods of Cadiz and Madrid and, on the other hand to the commercial 
activities of the merchants of London.51    
 
In its Western Hemispheric context, Russia’s strategy involved developing close 
relations with the US whose anti-British resentment was still fresh from the War of 
1812.52 The drive for this relationship was so strong that Russia even unsuccess-
fully attempted have the US become a member of the Holy Alliance.53 However, 
such efforts ultimately meant accommodating US proclamations against future Eu-
ropean imperial claims in the Western Hemisphere. This damaged the overarching 
status of dynastic legitimacy as a basis for preventing Latin American independence. 
Due to its accommodation of US assertions, Russia embraced a neutral, non-inter-
ventionist stance towards the contestations between the Spanish monarchy’s Old 
World rulers and New World subjects.54 Ironically, this attempt to oppose Britain 
ultimately rendered the Russian position on Latin American independence the func-
tional equivalent of the British position. 
 
France presented yet another complicating influence on the Latin American ques-
tion. For France, which was already asserting its dynastic influence over a chaotic 
political situation in Spain, the prospect of Latin American independence from the 
Spanish crown on the basis of de facto territorial authority was deeply troubling.55 
Remarking on this situation, in January 1824 the influential French journal L’Etoile 
stated that: ‘[s]uch a maxim would shake the political system of all Europe and 
might even expose those professing it to terrible consequences.’56 However, as op-
posed to the Holy Alliance commitments to upholding the existing rights of the 
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52 See Blaufarb 2007, 750. 
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54 Ibid. 211-215. 
55 For a study of the French positon regarding Latin American independence, see Robertson 1939. 




Spanish monarchy against secessionist Latin American claims, France presented an 
alternative formulation of dynastic legitimacy. According to the French agenda, 
Latin American states should emerge as independent entities under the rulership of 
a leader from the Bourbon dynasty.57 That said, ‘[e]ven as it publicly supported 
Ferdinand VII’s sovereignty over Spanish America, the French government was 
involved in secret projects to transfer sovereignty to Bourbon princes—preferably 
of the French line’58 
 
6.5.  Anglo-America’s De Facto Authority 
 
Given the interests in maintaining the Spanish crown’s claims to authority against 
rebellious forces in Latin American, how exactly did popular will, sovereign state-
hood, and de facto authority as legitimate independence come to prevail. Here, our 
attention turns to the role of Britain and the US whose responses to the Latin Amer-
ican revolutions were a milestone in the co-consolidation of international law, cap-
italist social relations, and the presumption that the nation-state form is the natural 
vessel of popular will.59 Superficially, the two nations harboured great distrust and 
differed immensely in terms of many of their immediate interests in this 
timeframe.60 However, on a deeper level, they were united by their common history 
and ongoing commitments to the intertwined disseminations of liberal ideology and 
capitalist political economy. As such, while their respective solutions emerged be-
cause of their different positions, the long-term objectives of both Britain and the 
US were united under the broad rubric of the ‘Angloworld.’ Thus, Anglo-American 
divergence was not a fatal flaw but rather bolstered a trans-continental crucible of 
                                                        
57 Blaufarb 2007, 749.  
58 Ibid.  
59 For an important study contextually detailing the policies of the UK and US in response to wars 
of liberation and independence claims in Latin America, see Paxson 1903. 




innovation production and knowledge transfers that produced a unified systemic 
logic exerting unavoidable pressure on all other social and ideological forms.61 
 
6.5.1.  Britain’s Modernization of Recognition  
 
The great British interest in Latin America centred on the ways in which independ-
ence might open up new opportunities for its expanding free trade empire. Thus, as 
the initial rebellion broke out, Britain hoped that this might break Spain’s trade 
monopoly over its New World possessions and, towards this end, it sought to me-
diate a settlement that would guarantee British access to this commercial sphere.62 
This tactic was supported by many of Latin America’s rebelling creoles elites who 
sought the lucrative opportunities that would accompany integration into Britain’s 
commercial networks.63 However, such a possibility was threatened by the Spanish 
monarchy’s appeal to the Holy Alliance who were inclined to reaffirm the Spain-
New World trade monopoly as an extension of upholding the legitimacy of the 
Spanish crown.64 Considering how the Concert of Europe system demanded unity 
amongst the great powers despite their tensions, to quote Rafe Blaufarb:   
 
[t]he British sought to prevent clear resolution of the Spanish American 
conflict while preserving the insurgents’ goodwill and avoiding the Eu-
ropean peace. Having emerged triumphant from the Napoleonic wars, 
Britain was happy with the status quo—which allowed it to trade with 
Latin America without repudiating the principle of legitimacy.65 
 
However, maintaining this state of frustrated uncertainty was not a long-term solu-
tion. To permanently ground its desired outcome, Britain had to articulate a distinct 
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international legal approach to recognition as it applied to Latin America. In this 
capacity, Britain was aided by the fact that the consolidating post-Napoleonic state 
system hosted a stark tension between the entrenchment of a positivist legal order 
on the one hand, and the interventionist discretion of great powers on the other hand. 
While both features were asserted as hallmarks of legitimacy within the Concert 
system, the tension was that positivism was intended to guarantee order and pre-
dictability, yet, the prospect of forcible intervention was a persistent source of in-
stability. On the question of recognizing international legal subjects, by this point 
in history, theorists increasingly aspired to a positivist ideal that distanced itself 
from justifications for force that explicitly furthered discrete modes of political le-
gitimacy.66 As discussed in Chapter V, Britain was already taking advantage of this 
tension, namely through its claims that the pro-dynastic interventions of its Holy 
Alliance rivals furthered the very instability these reactionaries professed to op-
pose.67 In the context of Latin American independence, Britain seized its oppor-
tunity to elevate this line of argument to an entirely new level. 
 
According to Inge Van Hulle’s extensive analysis, Britain’s overarching claim was 
that factually acknowledging the decisive results of a struggle between a people and 
its ruler was distinguishable from an act of intervention in a sovereign’s internal 
affairs.68 This stood in contrast to the dynastic legitimist view, whereby any recog-
nition by a third power of a new political entity that came into being without the 
express consent of the original sovereign was a grave violation.69 Such an approach 
placed Britain in an difficult position for, as discussed in Chapter III, when its North 
American colonies revolted against the British Crown, French support of the Amer-
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ican rebels was regarded as an unjustifiable interference in a dispute between a sov-
ereign and its subjects.70 While France’s involvement was based on American de 
facto authority (demonstrated through the 1778 victory at the Battle of Saratoga), 
for the British, this was not enough to furnish revolting settlers with the requisite 
legitimacy to invite the external support of a third power.71 However, Britain’s ar-
gument for recognizing Latin American independence over the continued objection 
of the Spanish crown was based on the ability of ‘facts on the ground’ to overcome 
the claims of the incumbent sovereign. Why then was Latin America a situation 
where de facto authority alone justified the recognition of a new international legal 
subject over the rejection of an established sovereign authority? Precision on this 
question was essential for distinguishing the contrasting legitimacies of US Amer-
ican versus Latin American independence under a coherent system of international 
legality.  
 
For the British, the pivotal difference was one of timing in that France’s third party 
recognition occurred in the midst of an ongoing conflict where the imperial 
metropole was actively contesting the rebellion.72 This remained the case even after 
the defeat at Saratoga. By contrast, with Latin America, the British claimed its 
recognition could not amount to an intervention because by the time it undertook 
this act, the Spanish crown provided no reasonable evidence that it could reassert 
its authority in the Western Hemisphere.73 After all, Britain formally declared its 
recognition of Latin American states in 1825, and by 1826, no soldiers fighting to 
uphold Spanish title remained (even though Spain did not formally relinquish its 
claims until 1836).74 In formulating this standard, the leading expounder was none 
other than Sir James Mackintosh who, as discussed in Chapter V, played a pivotal 
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role in developing arguments that allowed Britain to contest the Holy Alliance’s 
pro-dynastic European interventions by exposing the contradictions within its self-
professed logic.75 In an 1824 speech in Parliament on the recognition of Latin 
American sovereignty, according to Mackintosh: ‘the tacit recognition of a new 
state, which alone I am now concerned, not being a judgment for a new government, 
or against the old, is not a deviation form perfect neutrality, or a cause of just of-
fence to the dispossessed ruler.’76  
 
Mackintosh’s statements through his role as a Member of Parliament were undeni-
ably political in nature and he himself was deeply embedded in commercial circles 
with strong interests in the Latin America question being resolved in Britain’s fa-
vour.77 However, expressing the recognition of Latin America states in this context 
was nonetheless deeply consistent with his theoretical innovations regarding the 
law of nations. In recalling Chapter V, for Mackintosh, the nation-state emerged 
not through first principles-based philosophical abstraction, but through the reali-
ties of organic community. On this basis, outside interference was unjustified in 
that it would undermine the popular will that emerged in a unique organic context. 
As such, an outsider was in no position to substantively define what popular will 
should mean in relation to a foreign political community (so long as it was orga-
nized in a manner analogous to a European state).78 Thus, in stark contrast to views 
such as those of the French revolutionary Jacobins, Mackintosh’s popular will-
based condemnation of intervention was not limited to liberal and/or republican 
systems of government, and extended even to absolute monarchies.79 
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However, while claims to dynastic authority could be legitimate in Europe (pro-
vided they were portrayed as emerging through the organic manifestation of a 
bounded community’s popular will), using such dynastic claims to justify overseas 
territorial authority was an entirely different matter. Such a distinction was espe-
cially true in Latin America where, unlike the US American claims of settler and 
metropolitan political communities being rooted in a common ‘Anglo-Saxon’ iden-
tity, those seeking sovereign autonomy placed a strong emphasis on how their in-
digenous heritage collectively rendered them distinct from Europeans.80 Given this 
issue of differentiated origins, how could any claim of monarchical rulership as a 
localized organic development justify authority over multiple organic communities?  
 
Despite such a formulation, rejection of Spanish authority over Latin America 
should not be conflated with any general anti-colonialism on the part of Mackintosh. 
After all, Mackintosh venerated the form of the European state as essential for pro-
tecting the fundamental social institution of property.81 Additionally, he was ex-
plicit that a clear hierarchy existed between those societies that were organized on 
this basis and those that were not.82 Taking his theory as a whole, it logically fol-
lows that outside impositions made to protect European property in the non-Euro-
pean world, where such protections were otherwise nonexistent, would be emi-
nently legitimate. Under this scheme, while popular will may have been sacrosanct, 
certainly property-based social relations were a precondition to its very existence. 
Thus, Mackintosh’s theory in relation to Latin America can be understood as part 
of a turning point between two modes of domination: a classical form that placed 
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primacy on direct territorial appropriation and a modern form that placed primacy 
on specific property regimes and dealt with territorial sovereignty accordingly.83  
 
Against this backdrop, British arguments that were comparatively limited and prag-
matic in scope merged into the broader tapestry of theoretical justification for this 
transforming international legal order. This was especially true regarding the ques-
tion of rebelling forces maintaining a limited degree of international legal standing 
on the basis of de facto territorial authority via the standard of belligerency recog-
nition, a concept that first emerged in the context of Latin American independ-
ence.84 It was on this basis that Britain could maintain commercial relations with 
Latin American rebels while remaining formally committed to neutrality and non-
intervention in the face of Spain’s handling of the revolt by its subjects. Relatedly, 
there was the anti-pirate strategy articulated George Canning, Britain’s Foreign 
Minister, which in Van Hulle’s description, was: 
 
…employed in pushing towards recognition…by consistently com-
plaining of piracy in the Atlantic seas and the lack of personality the 
Spanish American states had to suppress it as long as they remained 
unrecognised….Canning therefore stressed that any co-operation with 
the Spanish American states to stop piracy would necessarily ‘lead to 
some further recognition of the existence de facto of some or more of 
these self-created governments.’85  
 
Thus, by acceding to a ready-made solution offered by the British as a reasonable 
response to pressing issues such as belligerency or piracy, an actor would become 
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implicitly committed to an emerging ontology of de facto international legal legiti-
macy that vastly limited the scope of dynastic legitimacy.86  These innovations 
prompted by Latin American independence became a standard for the doctrine of 
recognition as portrayed in the treatises, especially those by British and American 
authors, which defined the theory and practice of nineteenth century international 
law.87 
 
6.5.2.  The US’s Monroe Doctrine 
 
While Britain’s justifications for recognition played a vital role in dismantling dy-
nastic legitimacy claims, this does not fully explain the entrenchment of the modern 
nation-state form as the expression of popular will in Latin America. Our attention 
here must turn to the US’s Monroe Doctrine. Announced in an 1823 Congressional 
speech by US President James Monroe, this doctrine asserted that European powers 
could not recover any lost colonial possessions, nor could they claim any new col-
onies in the Western Hemisphere (although existing colonial relations would be 
respected).88 This development can be viewed as expanding upon Britain’s princi-
ples of recognition and international legal standing by introducing the question of 
popular will. After all, the great coherence of British recognition innovations was 
their ability to further Britain’s interest as a maritime, commercial power seeking 
perpetual opportunities for capital accumulation. That said, whether the new Latin 
American entities embodied popular will was a secondary consideration at best and 
Canning held hopes that monarchical systems would prevail. According to him, 
‘monarchy in Mexico, and monarchy in Brazil would cure the evils of universal 
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democracy…’89 However, the Monroe Doctrine, and its embodiment of popular 
will, manifested in a distinctly Western Hemispheric context to delegitimize such 
discourses.  
 
This interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine requires confronting its longstanding 
infamy as a justification for the US’s assertion of dominance over Latin America. 
Amongst critical international legal scholars, perhaps the most influential formula-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine is Carl Schmitt’s argument that this proclamation was 
a US American assertion of influence over a ‘greater space’ beyond its own sover-
eign territory.90 For Schmitt, such a move was emblematic of the new forms of po-
litical authority that necessarily had to emerge in a world where traditional absolute 
sovereignty no longer maintained its original force. 91  However, like most of 
Schmitt’s international legal and political theory, this interpretation displays a char-
acteristic fetishization of sovereign authority and geopolitics blind to historically 
varied social relations.92 While Schmitt’s characterization reflected his historical 
backdrop, a more contextual account of this doctrine’s origins allows us to re-im-
agine its place within the development of an international order where popular will 
ended up forming the basis of domestic authority.     
 
In the immediate context of the Monroe Doctrine, in contrast to any sweeping in-
ternational realignment suggested by the Schmitt, the actual American interests it 
served were relatively limited. Regarding territorial gains in the wake of Latin 
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American independence, the US’s primary concern was limited to Florida as a val-
uable geopolitical anchor in the Caribbean that it purchased from Spain in 1821.93 
Another theatre of the Monroe Doctrine’s application involved containing Russian 
claims in the Northwest Pacific coast stretching from Alaska to Northern Califor-
nia.94 Given that Russia sought the US as an ally in its rivalry with Britain, it was 
not in the strongest position to object to this proclaimed barrier to its expansion on 
this front. On top of all of this, the only two European powers, Britain and France, 
who could possibly have mounted a full-scale effort to recolonize the Western 
Hemisphere, had declined to do so thus leaving the US largely free to proclaim 
Monroe Doctrine without consequence.95  Furthermore, on the question of eco-
nomic motivations, while there were certainly growing American commercial in-
terests who would benefit from a free trading Latin America, their scale and influ-
ence was nothing close to Britain. At this time, the primary site of US American 
accumulation was not overseas trade but rather its settler frontier where land was 
rapidly being converted into private property holdings thus expanding its capitalist 
social base.96  
 
With the absence of any overwhelmingly reason for the Monroe Doctrine within 
the domains of orthodox geopolitics or economics, what explains its original im-
perative? In answering this question, the Monroe Doctrine can be interpreted as the 
embodiment of the US’s self-legitimation as an international legal subject where 
popular will, stripped of any vestige of monarchical authority, forms the basis for 
sovereign autonomy. However, in the context of the consolidating US, this legiti-
mation manifested against a very specific arrangement of capitalist social relations 
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that ideologically separated public sovereignty from private economic rights. On 
this basis, a veneration of pure constitutional independence went hand-in-hand with 
increased commercial linkages throughout the world. 97  After all, impassioned 
American condemnations of the old European political order coexisted alongside a 
reality where ‘[c]ommerce…was an area where the appearance of isolation from 
Europe obscured a deeper reality of convergence and integration’ for ‘…Americans 
were more fully integrated into the Atlantic (and global) economy at the time of 
Monroe’s inauguration then they had ever been…’98  
 
Against this backdrop, the particular image of US sovereign autonomy received a 
massive boon with the revolutions in Latin America as it began recognizing the 
independence of rebelling forces in 1822.99 This was a profound opportunity to rep-
licate the Jeffersonian justification for its own independence by proclaiming that 
substantive judgement by outsiders was illegitimate and, as such, the results of do-
mestic political contestation can only be externally judged on the basis of ‘facts on 
the ground.’100 Here Jefferson himself remained consistent in his position and sup-
ported Latin America’s de facto authority-based sovereignty, despite his numerous 
substantive judgments of the region’s society and culture.101  
 
While British and US American positions on Latin American independence may 
have differed, ultimately, the British justification via Mackintosh and the American 
justification via Jefferson presented a profound degree of ideological overlap. Here, 
under the framework of public/private division, the success of political contestation 
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through attaining de facto control configured property rights as pre-political reali-
ties (i.e. ideologically neutral ‘facts on the ground’) that had to be established before 
any judgment of popular will could be made. Thus, Latin America provided a key 
milestone in the dissemination of the modern nation-state form developed through 
a mode of capitalist juridical ordering that emanated from the expansion of the ‘An-
gloworld.’ While popular will under this standard could be any system in theory, in 
reality, the substance of what could be achieved through this assertion of popular 
will was fundamentally constrained by its conformity with this larger process of 
capital accumulation. The case of Latin American independence furthered this 
transformation immensely by undermining the ability of personalized, hierarchal 
dynastic authority claims to impede upon the expansion of depersonalized, formal 
equality-based capitalist social relations.  
 
6.6.  Making Modern Latin American Statehood 
 
6.6.1.  Consolidation and Adaptation 
 
6.6.1.2.  Frontiers of Juridical Imagination  
 
As the above-discussed geopolitical backdrop shows, the attempt to re-entrench dy-
nastic legitimacy in the post-French revolutionary/post-Napoleonic era led to a se-
ries of interferences and destabilisations that ultimately proved intolerable in Latin 
America despite centuries of Spanish rule. This ultimately created a tumultuous 
situation where armed uprising occurred because distant dynastic intrigue and lo-
calized popular will proved to be incompatible. A clear expression of this can be 
found in the 1811 Venezuelan Declaration of Independence’s statement that:  
 
America was called into a new existence, since she could, and ought, to 
take upon herself the charge of her own fate and preservation; as Spain 
might acknowledge, or not, the rights of a King, who had preferred his 
own existence to the dignity of the Nation over which he governed. All 
the Bourbons concurred to the invalid stipulations of Bayona, abandon-




disdained, and trampled on the scared duty they had contracted with the 
Spaniards of both Worlds, when with their blood and treasure they had 
placed them on the Throne, in despite of the House of Austria. By such 
conduct, they were left disqualified and incapable of governing a Free 
People, whom they had delivered up like a flock of Slaves.102      
 
This independence was able to occur because, amongst other reasons, claims of 
dynastic legitimacy failed to overcome a new understanding of international law 
where domestic authority was ‘now’ based on popular will. The resulted was a great 
paradox. On the one hand, colonial Latin America was shaped by institutions where 
sovereignty was divided and hierarchical with no rigid ideological distinction be-
tween political and economic power.103 Simply severing the bonds of the formal 
colonizers was not enough to extinguish these institutional structures and practices 
in an independent Latin America. On the other hand, the entities most responsible 
for recognizing Latin American independence expressed a view where sovereignty 
was indivisible and horizontal with a strict ideological divide existing between pub-
lic sovereignty and private economic rights. Thus, in Latin America, maintaining 
the advantages of an international legal system where popular will served as the 
basis for domestic authority meant committing to an ideal of modern nation-state-
hood that developed in very different material and historical contexts. In short, the 
original emancipatory hopes expressed in the language of popular will were frus-
trated, constrained, and reconfigured in light of this implementation process.   
 
This situation became apparent with the reception of the Monroe Doctrine by rev-
olutionary actors in Latin America. While many leaders were initially elated at this 
commitment to the justice of their cause and intention to render their freedom per-
manent,104 disappointing results ensued. For instance, there were claims that the 
                                                        
102 Venezuelan Declaration of Independence (July 5, 1811), quoted in Armitage 2007, 201. 
103 On this development in the context of Spanish colonization, see Chapter III, Part 3.3.3. 




Monroe Doctrine should be invoked against the independent monarchy in Brazil on 
the grounds that its personalized connections to dynasties in Europe amounted to 
Old World recolonization in the Western Hemisphere and warranted opposition as 
such.105 Additionally, there was the proposal that the independence should be so-
lidified though a hierarchical ‘Concert of America’ akin to the Concert of Europe 
as a means of guaranteeing independence and obligation in the transformed New 
World.106 Neither of these materialized. While the US rejection of such proposals 
is unsurprising given its conceptualization of sovereignty as the exclusive domain 
of political communities encapsulated in separate nation-states, this view was not 
universal. For the Latin Americans accustomed to modes of divided and layered-
sovereignty, formulations such as a ‘Concert of America’ were perfectly consistent 
with long-standing political structures. Why then did Latin America consolidate as 
a system of bounded sovereign states, each being the exclusive vessel for popular 
will, despite the unplanned nature of this outcome? 
 
Here, perhaps the single most important international legal principle is uti posside-
tis juris, whereby former colonial borders dictate the borders of the new sovereign 
state emerging from decolonization. While Latin American independence was the 
first modern application of this originally Roman concept,107 uti possidetis in this 
context was not perfectly analogous to the decolonization of Asia and Africa more 
than a century later where the colony-to-state jurisdictional issue of border identi-
fication was relatively straight-forward, albeit socially disastrous, in most cases.108 
Given the realities of divided and layered sovereignty whereby ‘Spain distinguished 
between colonial jurisdictions of the higher type (viceroyalties) and lower type 
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(captaincies-general, presidencias, audiencias, and provinces)’ and there was no 
clear rubric for determining who was entitled to sovereignty.109 This further refined 
the principle that sovereign autonomy under international law was only legitimately 
determined through ‘facts on the ground’ as evidence of popular will. Thus, accord-
ing to Mikulas Fabry’s account of state boundary consolidation in Latin America: 
 
[u]ti possidetis did not determine which units were eligible for sover-
eign status, but it did determine that once they established themselves 
as de facto states, they were to inherit whatever borders they had under 
colonial law and were not entitled to territory beyond them. Uti possi-
detis juris was thus expressly tied and subordinated to the de facto prin-
ciple.110 
 
Remarkably, Latin American jurists quickly adapted to this transformation by in-
voking and engaging with texts on the law of nations that associated indivisible 
sovereignty with popular will.111 A prominent example was the Chilean jurist An-
dreas Bello (1781-1865) whose articulation of the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between sovereign equality, non-intervention, and ideological pluralism drew 
strongly on Vattel and the Anglo-American publicists he influenced including: 
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James Kent (1763-1847), Joseph Chitty (1776-1841), and Henry Wheaton (1785-
1848).112 Moreover, Bello read these international legal conceptualizations that 
merged popular will, de facto authority and sovereign legitimacy into the historical 
process by which Latin American states became independent. On this basis, he 
stated that:   
 
If a new state appears as a result of the colonization of a recently dis-
covered country, or of the dismemberment of an old state, the other 
states need only discover whether the new association is in fact inde-
pendent and has established an authority that rules its members, repre-
sents them, and up to a point is responsible for their conduct to the 
world. And if this is the case, they cannot in justice refuse to recognise 
it as a member of the society of nations…In cases of violent separation 
from an old nation, where one or more provinces that comprised it es-
tablished themselves as independent states [outsiders are obliged to] re-
spect the rights of the original nation regarding the separated provinces 
as rebellious and refusing to deal with them…[O]nce the new state or 
states are in possession of power, no principle forbids the other states 
to recognise them as states, for in this regard they are merely recognis-
ing a fact.113 
 
From this initial stance on state creation, Bello goes on to present a larger concep-
tual architecture of international law asserted with the explicit purpose of guaran-
teeing the survival of weak states in a hostile world.114 This included a robust gen-
eral rejection of the justifications for military intervention that were being formu-
lated and applied in early nineteenth century Europe.115 However, despite his state-
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centric emphasis on indivisible sovereignty, Bello promoted institutionalized of co-
operation between Latin American nations on the basis that this could help over-
come shared weaknesses inherited from colonial rule.116   
 
6.6.2.2.  Realities of Economic Geography 
 
While these juridical adaptations garnered much hope, consideration of larger 
global systems helps to explain why embracing a state-centric conception of popu-
lar will was profoundly limited in Latin America. As an initial matter, newly inde-
pendent states were deeply concerned with continued interference by former colo-
nial rulers and their dynastic allies. Towards this end, they were drawn into the orbit 
of the powers that had done the most to entrench external recognition, the UK and 
US (who ideologically separated bounded sovereignty from transcendent economic 
interests). Dealing with Anglo-American forces on this basis lead to a flood of cap-
ital penetration and indebtedness that proved highly consequential in reformulating 
a Latin American conception of popular will that did not adhere to this strict pub-
lic/private distinction.117 According to Frank Griffith Dawson’s account of Anglo-
American capital accumulation in post-independence Latin America: 
 
Shielding economic interests from foreign penetration was of second-
ary concern to the nation-builders. Indeed, foreign loans, investment, 
and immigration were eagerly sought by the new states. To encourage 
alien interest, the new constitutions promised foreigners equality of 
treatment with nationals…Between 1824-25, British investors placed 
over £17,000,000 in Latin American governmental bonds. In the same 
period at least 46 joint stock companies with a total capitalization of 
£35,000,000 were formed in England to carry out operations in Latin 
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America. Mining engineers from Birmingham and New York flocked 
to the newly liberated states and colonisation companies began negoti-
ations with various Latin American governments. Unfortunately, it was 
soon apparent that despite the good intentions of the new states, enthu-
siasm alone was insufficient to remedy the inability of their political, 
economic and social infrastructures to generate sufficient income or in-
ternal security to satisfy European expectations.118   
 
The vast difficulties faced by the states subject to such conditions serves to high-
light the very different material conditions in Latin America compared to the other 
cradles of revolutionary popular will, the US and Western Europe. With the US, the 
idea of popular will that justified revolutionary independence proved durable in that 
‘Lockean notions of domination [furthered] the drive…West and consolidated no-
tions of property rights, while Madisonian ideas of federal expansion were offered 
as a way to dilute the factional passions that arise from a civil society founded on 
these property rights.’119 In Western Europe, the post-Napoleonic move to a system 
of bounded territorial nation-states was accompanied by further expansions of the 
industrial revolution from its British heartlands. Here, a merger of nationalist legit-
imation, colonial expansion, and elite-led ‘revolutions from above’ allowed many 
of these locations to become key sites of production.120  
 
When considering Latin America against these backdrops, to begin with the US 
(and the British Dominions), the basic topographical features supporting its small-
holding, arable land-based frontier settlement where extraordinary different from 
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Latin America’s mountains and rainforests.121 This was coupled with the fact that 
while the US’s industry-fuelling expansion reached into Western regions where Eu-
ropean powers maintained controversial and attenuated territorial claims, Latin 
American expansions were subject to uti posidetis juris. As such, while US Amer-
icans could raise flexible legal arguments in navigating its frontier settlement,122 in 
Latin America, similar expansionist moves directly intruded upon the sovereignty 
of another nation thus resulting in potentially devastating border disputes.123 Addi-
tionally, these topographic and territorial realities were intertwined with a centu-
ries-long colonial social history where the Spanish imposition of the feudal enco-
mienda system resulted in massive agricultural/extraction-based landholdings that 
operated according to complex racial hierarchies.124  
 
Thus, in contrast to the industrialization that defined Western Europe and the US, 
Latin America’s function in the nineteenth-century’s consolidating global economy 
was that of a raw materials producer dependent on the demands of the industrial 
powers.125 While Latin America’s formal sovereignty distinguished it from other 
locations in the non-industrializing world, post-independence indebtedness to for-
eign powers willing to use force was a persistent barrier to developing any alterna-
                                                        
121 The only Latin American location that facilitated the type of settler colonialism was South Amer-
ica’s Southern Cone region (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Southern Brazil), see Crosby 2004.  
122 On the law of conflicting colonial claims in North American, see Fitzmaurice 2014, 203-214.  
123 Fisch 2015, 78-80. As Chapter V (Part 5.6.1.) has shown, while title by conquest lost its popu-
larity amongst Europe as popular will and capitalism became increasing important, it remained an 
acceptable legal basis for territorial acquisition. This raises the question of who first developed the 
idea that conquest was not simply unfashionable, but unlawful? In light of this question, owing to 
the imperatives of both safeguarding peripheral popular will and preventing war on the basis of 
border disputes, it was in Latin American jurists and statesmen who were the first to proclaim that 
attaining title by conquest was categorically illegal, MacMahon 1940, 121. 
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tive system that might further affect its already frustrated debt repayment abili-
ties.126 In sum, the material conditions of Latin America completely subverted so 
many of the narratives of the self-mastering, property-owning subject so central to 
the theories of popular will forged in the North Atlantic world.127 
  
6.6.2.  Sovereignty, Dependency, and Anti-Imperial Imperialism   
 
6.6.2.1.  Whose Developmental State? 
 
However, Latin America’s non-conformity to the North Atlantic ideal opened the 
door to a new manifestation of popular will that turned away from mythologized 
individualism and centred the sovereign state form as a mechanism for achieving 
what was later deemed ‘development.’ As Luis Eslava argues, Latin America 
served as the original template for the ‘developmental state’ that, more than a cen-
tury later, inspired hopes of achieving popular will amongst nations emerging from 
colonialism.128 However, given the historical consolidation of the sovereign state 
through the process of European-led colonial capitalism, this ‘development’ was 
measured by a deeply Eurocentric standard.129 According to Eslava’s appraisal of 
this situation, ‘Latin American states emerged…with a modernising impetus built 
into them, yet one that was reinforced by an assumed distance between their post-
colonial realities and those of their counterparts in Europe.’130 This simultaneous 
emulation of, and distinction from, Europe in the name of ‘development’ was rooted 
in the ideal of the sovereign state as a vessel for popular will, yet the attempt to 
consolidate the uniqueness of Latin American societies through this medium led to 
a cascade of contradictions.  
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These contradictions involved the violent potentialities presented by the sovereign 
state’s premise of absolute autonomy, especially in relation to the facilitation of 
capital accumulation necessitated by the demands of ‘development.’ Moreover, as 
Liliana Obregon makes clear, this logic had a distinct racial/cultural supremacy 
component in that Latin America’s state-building Creole elites were, albeit in a 
unique way, venerating European civilization ‘despite the reality of a majority pop-
ulation in the continent still consisting of indigenous peoples and descendants of 
African slaves.’ 131  What emerged was a form of ‘anti-imperialist imperialism’ 
where invocations of sovereign equality and nonintervention opposed European/US 
impositions by regimes simultaneously legitimizing the internal repression of in-
digenous and African communities.132 In Greg Grandin’s assessment of these real-
ities:  
 
many of the Latin American jurists who in the late nineteenth century 
would weave together diverse legal arguments into an overarching the-
ory of absolute sovereignty—used to contest what was described as an 
expansionist, Indian-killing, warmongering United States—were citi-
zens of governments doing the exact same thing.133  
 
When theorizing this outcome, we must consider the way in which this violence 
and exclusion fuelled the intertwined operation of international law, the sovereign 
nation-state, and capitalist political economy within the Latin American context. 
As discussed above, these institutional structures were largely alien to Latin Amer-
ican sensibilities and their impositions resulted from the external exigencies of ge-
opolitical competition and protean juridical argument as opposed to any natural lin-
ear progression. This raises the question of what other modernities may have been 
possible in Latin America had its local institutions not been replaced by indivisible 
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sovereign statehood and a capitalist European ideal of ‘development.’ If the repro-
duction of private property-based capitalist social relations had been successfully 
resisted, could there have been an enduring conception, or conceptions, of popular 
will more reflective of Latin America’s distinct racial/cultural diversity and mate-
rial environment? Given that independence-era Latin America played host to theo-
ries of inclusive republicanism, and their conditions of achievement, far more so-
phisticated than those existing in other formative cradles of modern popular will 
(especially the US), this possibility cannot be causally dismissed.134 Latin America 
thus provides us with a vital rubric for theorizing the alternatives that were lost in 
the process of constructing a world according to a highly-specific understanding of 
international law where domestic authority is legitimized through a highly-specific 
understanding of popular will. 
 
6.6.2.2.  Haiti’s Long Shadow  
 
On this question of lost alternatives, we must remember how Latin American states 
existed in the shadow of a radical assertion of popular will that was crushed by 
powerful states upholding a racialized order of capital accumulation. This was none 
other than Haiti. Here, through a 1791-1804 revolution, a population consisting 
largely of black slaves overthrew France’s colonial authorities and plantation own-
ers and established a sovereign order based on an unprecedented conception of in-
clusion.135 Long understood as challenging linear notions of progressive modernity, 
the Haitian Revolution’s ruptures are exemplified when this event is placed within 
the genealogy of popular will’s emergence as the basis for domestic authority under 
international law.136 After all, harmonious narratives regarding the co-evolution of 
domestic orders based on popular legitimacy alongside an international order based 
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on pluralist sovereign autonomy scarcely apply to Haiti.137 In direct contrast to the 
earlier US American conjoining of domestic interest with normative appeals to the 
international order, Haiti’s assertion of independence situated the nation’s popular 
will in opposition to prevailing international standards and ideals.138 Given the dis-
ruption of transnational wealth accumulation patterns occasioned by this revolt, 
namely those tied to slavery, this antagonism is unsurprising.139 
 
This oppositionist stance should not be conflated with crude isolation on Haiti’s 
part. Rather it engaged in a politics of trans-boundary engagement prominently dis-
played in its support for latter independence campaigns in Latin America.140 How-
ever, once these states attained independence this support was largely unreturned 
and the particular fate of Haiti within the international order provides us with in-
sights as to why. On one front, there was a lack of recognition by the US, which 
was in the process of expanding its practices of race-based plantation slavery along 
its Southeastern frontier and was deeply fearful of experiencing a slave-revolt of its 
own.141 Against this backdrop, furnishing diplomatic recognition upon a black head 
of state representing a nation forcefully formed on the basis of slavery-rejecting 
black popular will would undermine the very social fabric of the consolidating 
American Federal Union.142  
 
                                                        
137 This contradiction was illustrated by Thomas Jefferson who, despite expressing a degree of sym-
pathy for the Haitians, declined to extend recognition out a fear of domestic political consequences, 
see Mathewson 1996. 
138 See Armitage 2007, 115-116. 
139 For study of the international reactions to the Haitian Revolution, see Baur 1970. 
140 See Obregón 2013. 
141 Matthewson 1996, 25-26. This provides context as to why Haiti was an exception to the Monroe 
Doctrine’s condemnation of European efforts to recover lost colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 
see Shiliam 2008, 800.  




On the other front, there was the question of Haiti’s recognition by the European 
powers of Britain and France who, compared to the US, were far closer to abolish-
ing slavery within their spheres of colonial authority. However, as a condition of 
Haiti’s international recognition, there remained the issue of its liability for debts 
incurred by the revolution, which included French colonists’ loss of value from the 
emancipation of the slaves that now formed Haiti’s political community.143 Under 
pressure from subjects who lost property in the revolution, France demanded a 
harsh indemnity repayment that required Haitian procurement of loans from French 
banks that then resulted in compounded layers of indebtedness.144 Given this mul-
titude of constraints, Haiti was derailed in its assertion of popular will as a means 
of overcoming hierarchal categories that bolstered a transnationally-constituted 
scheme of capitalist social relations.145 Through a broader lens, this episode demon-
strated how, within a capitalist order, racial discourses could be deployed to over-
come international law’s ostensibly ‘universal’ protections when the prerogative of 
accumulation demands an exception to the very rules that sustain this system.146  
 
When theorizing Latin American attempts to avoid the fate of Haiti, we must con-
sider these new states’ overwhelming interest in avoiding interventions from exter-
nal powers who associated the region’s racial/cultural diversity with its precarious 
status as ‘civilized.’147 This is to say nothing of elite fears, especially in slave states, 
where the threat of revolt from below was coupled with the threat of intervention 
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146 According to Robert Knox’s summation of Haiti’s experience as an international legal subject: 
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from above.148 Against this backdrop, a multi-faceted solution embraced by many 
Latin American elites was to ‘whiten’ their societies through policies of facilitating 
immigration from Europe.149 Through these ‘whitening’ projects, not only did elites 
demonstrate their commitment to Western ideals of ‘civilization’, but they also al-
lowed certain regions, namely the Southern Cone, to engage in settler colonization 
projects analogous to those in North America, Australasia, and Southern Africa.150 
Faced with a world of hostile imperial powers, this process offered the fundamen-
tally intertwined advantages of settlement-based economic enrichment and con-
formity with the ideal of a white frontier society that, through the earlier American 
Revolution, formed the modern template domestic sovereignty being justified 
through popular will.151 With these co-constituting structures of international pres-
sure and domestic internalization, at least at the level of the nation-state, experi-
ments in radical Haitian-type expressions of popular will were thoroughly con-
signed to the margins in nineteenth century Latin America.   
 
6.7.  Conclusion  
 
To conclude this chapter on Latin America, and its lessons, revisiting my analysis 
reveals an application of my methodology. Long acknowledged as a site of juridical 
innovation in the domains of sovereign equality and nonintervention, this Latin 
American narrative is expanded when we consider the region’s formative social 
                                                        
148 This included the US consideration of seizing Cuba in the name of preventing an uprising anal-
ogous to the Haitian Revolution, Ibid. 850. This issue of intervention was especially relevant given 
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‘slave empire’, see Karp 2016. 
149 Schulz 2014, 852; see also Gott 2007. 
150 See Belich 2009, 518-540.  
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structures as an alternative to the nation-state form that consolidated in the US and 
Europe. Distinct in their synthesis of feudal and indigenous traditions, these insti-
tutions persisted even as Latin America proclaimed its popular will and challenged 
metropolitan Spain’s beleaguered monarchical order. Thus, rather than any simple 
conflation of popular will with the bounded nation-state form, Latin America rep-
resented the possibility of an alternative juridical formulation of popular will that, 
despite the persistence of colonial legacies, could have been far more representative 
of locally-rooted social relations. In accounting for the eclipse of this possibility, I 
focused on Latin America’s place against the broader backdrop of inter-imperial 
rivalries that emerged in the protracted aftermath of the French and US American 
Revolutions. 
  
Here, continued support for Spanish dynastic authority from the Holy Alliance of 
Prussia, Russia, and Austria (and France in a different capacity) was contested by 
British and US American assertions that the de facto authority of Latin American 
revolutionaries warranted recognition under international law. However advanta-
geous it may have appeared to local actors, recognition by these colonial capitalist 
entities came at a price in that they expected Latin American polities to conform to 
the standards of bounded sovereign states. This expectation, compounded by post-
revolutionary indebtedness and enmeshment with the capitalist world system, left 
Latin Americans with little choice but to gradually implement these institutional 
features of modern sovereign statehood. However, Latin America was not in a ma-
terial position to engage in the same forms of capitalist empire-building that accom-
panied nation-state consolidation in the US and much of Europe. Relatedly, through 
survival based invocations of sovereign equality and nonintervention (as well as 
plans for creating ‘developmental states’) Latin America further committed itself 
to the nation-state form despite its harsh incongruities with local conditions. Thus, 
the Latin American experience reveals the limits of what the juridical discourse of 






A World of Popular Will: The Historical and Ideological Pre-




7.1.  Introduction  
 
Based on the preceding world-historical inquiry in Chapters III-VI, we are now in 
a position to revisit the entrenchment of the seemingly intractable difficulties stem-
ming from the status of popular will within contemporary international legal doc-
trine presented in Chapter I. Since the ‘effective control doctrine’ is the logical out-
come of consistently and holistically upholding Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 2(7) of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the world-historical formation of this document de-
mands our attention.1 This requires going above and beyond narrow diplomatic his-
tories that ascribe agency to the drafters, and immediate interests they served, and 
instead focusing on the greater forces that underpinned this process.2 Here, I claim 
numerous materially-shaped strands of meaning explored in this this thesis con-
verged at this juncture to create a ‘world of popular will.’ In other words, while 
colonialism persisted, this moment of 1945 sparked a global vision of unqualified 
popular will, expressed through a plurality of sovereign nation-states, as the sole 
basis for legitimate authority. Such a vision was shared by an unprecedented array 
of actors despite the deep ideological differences that persisted amongst them.3 This 
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raises the question of why this particular vision of popular will was able to holisti-
cally manage seemingly insurmountable tensions on a planetary scale at this partic-
ular moment. 
 
Part I provides a high-altitude account of what the world of popular will was created 
to replace. Postwar, it became clear that sustaining ‘global order’ required rejecting 
the preceding century where political subjectivity and international legal personal-
ity were formally defined through an exclusionist race-hierarchy. This prompted 
the mobilization of an earlier, Enlightenment era ethos of universality nonetheless 
conditioned by the weight of subsequent historical developments. In substantiating 
my claim that the world of popular will was formulated on this basis, following an 
overview of failed attempts to hierarchically manage localized political expressions 
through a century of varied juridical innovations, I turn to the legacies and out-
growths of the events detailed in Chapters III-VI. 
 
Part 2 turns to Chapter III’s forging of a colonial capitalism-popular will nexus by 
examining the co-expansion of the British and American empires, and its profound 
material and ideological impacts. This provided the world of popular will with a 
foundational liberal internationalism while abstracting it from the material condi-
tions of its formation. Part 3 turns to Chapter IV’s depiction of transformative up-
rising in the face of systemic contradictions by examining Marxist challenges to the 
existing international order as the inheritance of the French Revolution. This pro-
vided the world of popular will with a means of acknowledging radical demands 
while legitimizing the bounded structure that constrained them. Part 4 turns to 
Chapter V’s account of the chauvinist containment of popular will within organi-
cally-legitimized European borders and shows how fascist aggression was the ulti-
mate result of this process. This provided the world of popular will with a condem-
nation of the harshest expressions of racialized violence while allowing it to insulate 
itself from the contradictions that produce this result. Finally, Part 5 turns to Chap-
ter VI’s exploration of postcolonial statehood in Latin America and shows how 
analogous situations presented themselves in the postwar decolonization of Asia 




hope of peripheral actors while conjoining it with narrow ideologies of progress 
and responsibility that preclude alternatives. 
 
7.2.  The Return of Popular Will as ‘All or Nothing’ 
 
Accounting for the ultimately global embrace of state-centric, ‘unqualified’ popular 
will requires a depiction of what exactly ‘qualified’ popular will looked like, and 
why it was rejected. In framing this leap from the mid-nineteenth century, when 
this thesis’s predominant historical narrative concludes, to the post-Second World 
War moment of the UN Charter, when popular will was consolidated in both its 
doctrinal formulation and progressive trajectory, the roughly one hundred year 
space between constituted a ‘racial century.’ 4  According to Dirk Moses, this 
timeframe was one where increasingly violent and exclusionary measures practiced 
by Europeans against non-Europeans under the banner of ‘scientific’ racism ulti-
mately returned to Europe itself in the form of the Nazi Holocaust.5 This repre-
sented a dramatic shift regarding the concept of popular will as a product of En-
lightenment universalism. In the Enlightenment, popular will can be interpreted as 
a reason-grounded first principle whose Others (be they dynastic monarchs, reli-
gious reactionaries, or indigenous communities) were deemed ‘primitive’ by virtue 
of having yet to conform to its dictates. 
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justification about what they are doing.’ Moses 2010, 34. 
5 Through this ‘racial century’ concept, we are provided with ‘….an account of European modernity 
that links nation-building, imperial competition and international and intra-national racial struggle 




However with this mid-nineteenth century turn, race was now the first principle and 
its Others lacked popular will because they were ‘primitive.’6 Moreover, this de-
velopment deeply exposes the intersection of international law, racialization, and 
capital accumulation. As Robert Knox has shown, this dynamic concerns the ability 
to juridically proclaim the variable inferiority of peoples and territories to justify 
appropriations that change as the demands of capital changes.7 Thus, the race-based 
relativization of once ostensibly universal understandings of popular will justified 
far more direct access to the resources needed to fuel a vast expansion of industrial 
capitalism as the nineteenth century world-system consolidated.8  
 
As popular will increasing challenged dynastic legitimacy, a key technology that 
emerged was the broad array of practices deemed ‘indirect rule.’ At its most basic, 
this was a regime of governance whereby the local autonomy was accepted in de-
fined certain spheres of activity, largely justified according to narratives of ‘tradi-
tion’, while denied as overarching matter.9 While traceable to medieval European 
regimes of divided sovereignty being increasing imposed in colonial settings (yet 
increasingly rejected in Europe itself), it was the nineteenth century’s setting of 
rigid boundaries between ‘Europe’ and ‘non-Europe’ that perfected this process.10  
 
                                                        
6 Perhaps the quintessential international legal expression of this view came from the Scottish jurist 
James Lorimer who depicted humanity as exiting upon an immutable hierarchy of ‘civilised’, ‘bar-
barian’, and ‘savage’ variants, see Lorimer 1883, 100-101; see also Koskenniemi 2016c; Clark 2018, 
31-38. For an account of how ‘primitivism’ occupied a central place in nineteenth century jurispru-
dence, see Kirby 2018.  
7 Knox 2016b, 112. 
8 On these mutually-reinforcing regimes of inequality within this timeframe, see Buzan and Lawson 
2015, 171-196.  
9 While many proponents and implementers of these processes fixated on ‘traditional’ practices 
amongst subject populations, technologies of ‘indirect rule’ would create a vast multitude of new 
identities that this justificatory fixation could not readily account for, see Mamdani 1996; Eslava 
2018.  




Applied in this imperial context, ‘indirect rule’ consolidated the triumph of the ‘so-
cial’ over the ‘political.’ Through this turn, a given people’s ‘popular will’ was now 
a depoliticized scientific articulation justifying paternalistic intervention as op-
posed to an inherent quality of self-rule that justified the ability to contest outside 
interference.11 Generally less intrusive, another popular will-qualifying develop-
ment within this timeframe occurred in Europe’s south-eastern periphery where the 
conditional recognition of new states (including the largely autonomous Ottoman 
regions of Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia in 1878) was premised on conformity 
with externally imposed standards, namely property reform and minority protec-
tion.12  
 
Both indirect rule and conditional recognition became unavoidable objects of inter-
national concern following the end of the First World War and the rise of the League 
of Nations system. Against this backdrop, the placement of former German and 
Ottoman colonial possessions in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific under in-
ternationally supervised trusteeship via the Mandate system provided new staging 
grounds for evolving techniques of indirect rule.13 Beyond its individual sites of 
application, the Mandate system changed ‘…the structure of international political 
and legal order by introducing a new form of global regulation to govern the prac-
tice of colonialism, essentially making the promotion of civilization a concern of 
international society as a whole, rather than exclusively the responsibility of the 
relevant imperial power.’14  
 
Relatedly, there was the creation of new states from the collapsed German, Russian, 
and Austro-Hungarian Empires that sought, with limited success, to encapsulate 
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13 For a definitive study, see Pedersen 2015. 




popular will through a coordination of sovereign borders with ethnic identity.15 
Building on previous practices of conditional recognition, this interwar meta-pro-
ject was accompanied by a two-front qualifying of the state though the provision of 
unprecedented rights for nationalities and minorities from below, and the enforce-
ment of these rights through novel international judicial and administrative mecha-
nisms from above.16 Such developments garnered overwhelming enthusiasm on the 
part of the international lawyers; a move that is unsurprising given that the evasion 
of stateless nationalism was a persistent point of international legal inadequacy re-
garding popular will as reality as opposed to an ideal.17 How then did this prolifer-
ating plurality of international legal subjectivities with varying degrees of sover-
eignty (and consequently different manifestations of popular will) give way to a 
world where absolute sovereign discretion to pursue any system of authority within 
national borders became the sole legitimate expression of popular will? 18  This shift 
speaks to the very distinction between the League of Nations and the United Na-
tions where, in the words of Edward Keene: 
 
the United Nations was envisioned as, or quite rapidly became, an or-
ganization of all the world’s peoples, with universal participation in the 
project of preserving peace and developing global civilization; whereas 
                                                        
15 On the Austro-Hungarian Empire in this capacity, see Wheatley 2018, 482. 
16 Berman 1992, 355. 
17 Writing in 1925, for the French author René Johannet the this newfound nationalist turn in inter-
national politics sought ‘not only to do without the principles of high diplomacy elaborated for cen-
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ship, see Anghie 2006, 452-455. On the new modes of international legal personality that arose in 
this era, see Wheatley 2017. For an excellent recent connection of the unifying ends sought by the 
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the League had, above all, been an organization of civilized nations, 
working collectively for all the world’s people.19 
 
According to a commonly invoked narrative, the globalization of universal sover-
eignty was the teleological fulfilment of the international order’s ‘natural’ state, 
even if it took the world uniting against a genocidal Nazi aggressor to bring this 
about.20 Yet, to accept this narrative is to ignore the deeper material forces that con-
structed this moment and how they re-manifested to further the systemic logics of 
capital expansion and nation-state universalization despite the mid-twentieth cen-
tury rupture. However, it must be remembered that this vision of a ‘world of states’ 
offered an alternative to the previously foundational ontology of a ‘world of races’ 
that had been largely discredited by the horrors of Nazism.21  
 
In accounting for the political success of this ontological displacement, we can ob-
serve how the more inclusive narratives of popular will that developed before the 
‘racial century’ proved indispensable when providing the building blocks for a new 
order. This was the case for both those seeking to contest the ‘racial century’s’ leg-
acies and those wishing to preserve the material gains and institutional practices it 
generated. That said, by observing the trajectories of the developments detailed in 
Chapters III-VI, we are presented with a unifying view of how the formation of a 
world of popular will was possible and, correspondingly, how it was limited. As 
such, the return of universal popular will was a core aspect of the unique global 
moment of 1945 that Sundhya Pahuja has aptly depicted as profound for simulta-
neously being both deeply emancipatory and deeply counter-emancipatory.22   
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sions of this ‘crisis of civilisation’ in the justification of international order, see Mazower 2006. 




7.3.  The Triumph(s) of Anglo-American Liberalism 
 
As discussed in Chapter III, it was the expansion of colonial capitalism, that culmi-
nated in the outbreak of the American Revolution, which led in turn to the first great 
conflation of internal popular will, de facto authority, and international law. With 
the US’s independence from the British metropole, the ability of popular will as-
sertions to achieve ‘facts on the ground’ sufficient to alter existing configurations 
of sovereignty became something that no existing power in the world could causally 
dismiss.23 In exemplifying capitalist modernity’s division between bounded politics 
and transcendent economics (the dynamic that spawned the American Revolution 
in the first instance), the separation of the US and Britain in the domain of public 
authority went hand-in-hand with their increased integration when it came to pri-
vate interests.24 As a political matter, the partition of British and American sover-
eignty certainly led to a rivalry where war was an available means of dispute reso-
lution.25 However, despite the contentions of statesmen, in the parallel order of 
transcendent economic interconnection (and its base-level juridical ordering), Brit-
ons and Americans engaged in many lucrative joint-ventures facilitated by the com-
monalities of culture, language, and, above all, a commitment to capitalist modes 
of social reproduction.26  
 
                                                        
23 On the influence of the American Revolution on jurists whose theories of recognition deeply in-
fluenced the international legal publicists of the latter half of the nineteenth century, see Ale-
xandrowicz 2017 [1958], 359-360. 
24 Gould 2012a, 213. 
25 This was demonstrated most prominently through the War of 1812 (1812-1814). On this conflict 
see e.g. Borneman 2004; Hickey 2012. 
26 Here, according to Daniel Hulsebosch’s recent study, the particular structuring of the American 
Constitution was instrumental in allowing British capital to finance American frontier development, 
see Hulsebosch 2018b. For more on the ideology of transcendent economic right’s shaping of con-
stitutional sovereignty in this context, see Hulsebosch 2016. Moreover, when considering the global 
impact of the Anglo-American constitutionalism that proliferated in this context, studies of their 
conjoined nature have been rare given the traditions of ‘exceptionalism’ in both American and Brit-




In an intimately linked capacity, this sovereignty division constituted a competitive 
dual-metropolitan structure fuelled by rival projects of settler colonization in the 
respective American West and ‘British West’ (Australia, Canada, South Africa, 
New Zealand).27 While this dual expansion was a source of tension between the 
two powers, particularly at the immediate intersection of claims of territorial sov-
ereignty (namely the disputed Canada-Oregon Territory boundary line28), it was 
also a transcontinental system of innovation transfer.29 As the nineteenth century 
progressed, animosities faded and gave way to grandiose visions of ‘perpetual 
peace’ based on racial and cultural solidarity through a shared ‘Anglo-Saxon’ iden-
tity.30 In addition to the ‘Greater Britain’ project of unifying the United Kingdom 
and its settler dominions as one vast sovereign entity, such visions even extended 
to proposals for Anglo-American political reunification within this frame.31 Prom-
inent formulation were, in varying capacities, developed by a diverse array of high 
profile figures including: leading theorist of the English Constitution Albert Dicey 
(1835-1922), Scottish-born American industrialist and influential promoter of lib-
eral internationalism Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919), and renown British novelist 
and social critic HG Wells (1866-1946).32   
 
                                                        
27 Belich 2009, 70.  
28 On this dispute, see Fitzmaurice 2014, 203-214. For an important account of this situation from a 
leading international lawyer working in this timeframe, see Twiss 1846.  
29 Belich 2009, 120-126. To give just one example of innovation transfer in this capacity, there was 
the way in which white settler governments in Australasia sought to invoke their own version of the 
‘Monroe Doctrine’ that condemned territorial claims by European powers in the Western Pacific 
region. For an important study of this ‘Australasian Monroe Doctrine’ see Tate 1961. For an im-
portant study Australasia as a site of ‘sub-imperialism’, see Storr 2019.   
30 See Bell 2014a. On the way in which this rapprochement was, and continues to be, based on a 
presumption of a shared racialized that defies theories mainstream theories of international conflict 
and competition, see Vucetic 2011. 
31 Bell 2007, 254-259. 




Beyond the Americans, the British, and the indigenous peoples who resisted them, 
the external pressures generated by the rise of this ‘Angloworld’ had far-reaching 
consequences when it came to globalising a specific understanding of popular will. 
As shown in Chapter VI, a shared liberal commitment to expanding capitalist social 
relations had profound influences in both the recognition of Latin American inde-
pendence and the subsequent consolidation of the nation-state form in the region. 
This came at the expense of both the continental dynastic powers and local Latin 
American attempts to build popular will-embodying institutions on their own terms.  
 
Moreover, this mode of expansionism, particularly with the American frontier, was 
a persistent source of competition-based anxiety in continental Europe leading to 
visions of Africa as the inevitable frontier of European expansion.33 The facilitation 
of colonialism in accordance to such visions was inseparable from conception of 
popular will that had emerged as a nationalist basis for domestic authority whereby 
many national projects justified through top-down capitalist implementation also 
sought overseas colonies.34 Faced with the pressure of an ‘American Danger’, a 
continental European response could have occurred through either an intra-Euro-
pean integration process that undermined nationalist popular will, or an extra-Eu-
ropean colonization process that bolstered nationalist popular will through the in-
tertwined projects of external empire-building and internal state-consolidation.35 
As discussed Chapter V, since the ‘organic’ conception of popular will within Eu-
rope corresponded to the denial of sovereignty (and popular will) outside Europe, 
this triumph of colonization over integration is entirely unsurprising.  
 
As for the ideological innovations that developed in this material context, there was 
a unique synergy between British and American thought: the British had a far more 
robust international theory of a world of the formally equal sovereign states; the 
                                                        
33 Beckert 2017, 1143-1144, 
34 Ince 2015, 389. 




Americans had a far more robust theory of nationhood. In beginning with British 
international theory, their experiences in both European rivalries and imperial man-
agement led them to consistently adhere to an understanding of formal juridical 
equality set against the backdrop of a sovereign versus non-sovereign binary.36 Re-
garding European rivalry, from the early-modern era onwards, Britain’s general up-
holding of sovereign equality stemmed from its furthering of capital accumulation 
in opposition to continental modes geopolitical accumulation. This, as demon-
strated in the earlier analyses of Emer de Vattel and James Mackintosh,37 motivated 
a default British defence of the small European states for whom asserting interna-
tional legal personality was a matter of basic survival.38  
 
Regarding imperial management, in response to universalistic invocations from nat-
ural law treatises (especially Vattel’s) by those on the receiving end of imperial 
impositions, British jurists increasingly expounded upon the ‘civilizationally’ re-
stricted nature of ‘positive’ international law.39 From these premises, previously 
horizontal relations between rulers in the non-European world were increasingly 
                                                        
36 On the larger British debate on the question of small nations in this era, see Varouxakis 2007. On 
the efforts of British international lawyers in this timeframe, see Sylvest 2004.  
37 See Chapter II, Part 2.6.3. and Chapter V, Part 5.4.2. 
38 Here, the small European states such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland who sought 
to compensate for their territorially vulnerability by becoming leading proponents of international 
law were also major sites of finance capital, see Grewe 2000, 435. Assertions by these small Euro-
pean states where especially prevalent during conferences on the codification of the laws of war 
where a bloc was formed to oppose the expansive view of belligerent occupier’s rights put forth by 
the large land-based powers. Nabulsi, 119, 17. Perhaps the supreme example of Britain’s commit-
ment to upholding the sovereignty of Europe’s small states came through its entry into the First 
World War in response to the German violation of Belgian neutrality, see Hull 2014, 33-41.    
39 For a comprehensive study of the development of Victorian international law along these lines, 




transfigured into vertical relations of imperial constitutionalism.40 With this varia-
ble grey zone between the laws governing inter-sovereign relations and the laws 
governing a liberal domestic system, British jurists were highly adept in construct-
ing legal orders applicable to the colonized populations who, in varying degrees, 
were neither sovereign nor equal.41 Creative contributions towards this end sprang 
from a diverse array of publicists ranging from Dicey to Henry Maine (1822-1888) 
to Travers Twiss (1809-1897).42  
 
This stood in contrast to an American exceptionalist view. Here, in addition to the 
dichotomy between sovereign versus non-sovereign, the US long operated accord-
ing to alternative conception of ‘civilization’ where it arguably placed itself in a 
normative category above the formally equal ‘family of nations.’43 This was espe-
cially true in relation to Latin America where fear of abandoning Monroe Doctrine-
                                                        
40 The problem of ‘quasi-sovereignty’ that emerged in this context ‘…could to some extent be 
avoided by imagining empires as composite nation-states…Rather than charactering empires as ob-
jects for international law, jurists represented them as particular variants of municipal law.’ Benton 
2008, 598. 
41 Through this flexibility in the legal management of peoples categorized as fundamentally different 
from themselves, the British largely avoided the contrasting dogmatic rigidities that frequently ac-
companied the colonial endeavours of their French and German counterparts. By emphasizing the 
universality of their culture, French colonizers were prone to fixating on the assimilation their sub-
jects. By emphasizing the exclusivity of their culture, German colonizers were prone to fixating on 
the annihilation of their subjects. For a comparison of these diametrically opposed French and Ger-
man ideologies and methods in this context, see Shahabuddin 2016, 62-97.  
42 While most famous for his highly influential writing on the English Constitution, Dicey’s work 
was deeply enmeshed in his imperial context and this is only now gaining serious scholarly attention, 
see Lino 2016; Lino 2018. Regarding Maine, his writings on popular sovereignty and his writings 
on colonial law and governance, can be viewed as merged through his theory of ‘Ancient Law’ and 
its distinction between peoples who ‘progressed’ and peoples who did not, see Maine 1861. For 
studies of Maine in the context of Victorian imperialism, see Mantena 2010; Kirby 2012. For a study 
of how Maine’s general approach to jurisprudence influenced his theory of international law, see 
Landauer 2002. Regarding Twiss, he is noteworthy for his break from the Vattelian conflation of 
national identity with absolute sovereignty, Clark 2018b, 20; see Twiss 1861, 20-21. This provided 
Twiss with great latitude in justifying a wide-ranging of international legal personalities subject to 
various externally imposed conditions, see e.g. Twiss 1876; see also Fitzmaurice 2018.     




based justifications for intervention had long frustrated American attempts to de-
velop a foreign policy premised on sovereign equality.44 This very quality of ex-
ceptionalism allowed the US to develop a conception of universal, and exportable, 
nationhood far more coherent than anything the British had produced.45 This devel-
opment largely came about with the closing of the American frontier in the late-
nineteenth/early-twentieth century which resulted in the replacement of an explic-
itly exclusionist settler nationalism (discussed in Chapter III) with an ostensibly 
more inclusive, albeit deeply paternalistic, civic nationalism.46  
 
In addition to raising questions of race and national belonging, the closure of the 
Western frontier inexorably altered American political economy. After all, without 
a lack of new lands to settle ended the ideal of the private property based self-sus-
tenance (premised on endless expansion) that was so crucial to ideal of the sover-
eign American republic. 47  This, coupled with assertions of radical populism, 
opened the door to an unprecedented proliferation of moderate state-led social im-
provement programs during the so-called ‘Progressive Era.’48 Moreover, these de-
velopments were intimately tied to the rise of a US overseas empire (distinct from 
the eariler project of Settler Empire) through its acquisitions of Hawaii (1893), the 
                                                        
44 Wertheim 2012, 217, 229.  
45 According to a treatise by the jurist, historian, and British Ambassador to the US, James Bryce, 
the institutions of American law and government:  
….are, or are supposed to be, institutions of a new type. They form, or are 
supposed to form, a symmetrical whole, capable of being studied and judged 
all together more profitably than the less perfectly harmonized institutions of 
older countries…[and] are believed to disclose and display the type of institu-
tions towards which, as by a law of fate, the rest of civilized mankind are forced 
to move, some with swifter, others with slower, but all with unresting feet.’  
Bryce 1995 [1888], 1. 
46 For a study of how this development as resulting from the defeat of more radically inclusive op-
tions, see Rana 2010, 176-235; see also Gourevitch 2015. 
47 See Chapter III, Parts 3.4.4., 3.5.1., 3.6.1., and 3.6.2. 




Philippines (1898), Guam (1898), Cuba (1898), and Puerto Rico (1898).49 Thus, 
many viewed American colonial endeavours as an extension of a national mandate 
to fulfil the promises of popular will, and this differentiated them from European 
imperialism.50 Deriving legitimacy through such posturing was absent in Britain 
given its explicitly imperial structure and self-definition against the nationalism of 
its continental European rivals.51   
 
However, the British view of the international and the American view of the nation 
came together during the Second World War to lay the ideological framework for 
the ‘world of popular will.’ An emblematic development was the 1941 Atlantic 
Charter convened between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill expressing a 
‘…desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned…[and]…respect [for] the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live’; base assumptions later 
codified within the UN Charter.52 While there is ample room to doubt the scope of 
the Atlantic Charter’s intended universality in a world still largely defined by colo-
nialism, its universalistic ethos could nonetheless be persistently invoked by anti-
colonial challengers.53   
 
In a manner that would have a profound impact on these anti-colonial challengers, 
true to form, the Atlantic Charter embodied an implicit separation between bounded 
                                                        
49 For a fascinating interpretative history highlighting the way in which accounting for overseas 
territorial acquisition and management transforms our very understanding of what the US actually 
is as socio-political entity, see Immerwahr 2019. 
50 See e.g. Potter 1921. On the American approach to international law in this timeframe, see Coates 
2016. 
51 In this sense the idea of a distinctly British ‘national’ project (as opposed to the imperial project 
that preceded it or European integrationist project that followed it) can be restricted to the 1940s-
1970s, see Edgerton 2018. 
52 Atlantic Charter 1941. 




sovereignty and transcendent economics. The assumption of local discretion in the 
former category produced no consensus on its applicability to the later. Textually, 
it sought: ‘to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, 
of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which 
are needed for their economic prosperity.’54 However, the Atlantic Charter was 
made in a context where economic reordering was not intended to be an open plu-
ralistic affair (even if political sovereignty was), but rather a highly specific agenda. 
Here, according to Adam Tooze and Jamie Martin, ‘the tools of national govern-
ance…would be reconciled with the disciplined cooperation of the restored inter-
national economy.’55 
 
Moreover, any response to the demands of those seeking freedom from colonialism 
invoked the reality that Nazi atrocities had vastly discredited explicitly racialized 
formulations of ‘Civilization’, and the legitimacy of Anglo-American leadership 
hinged on their status as the vanquishers of Nazi evil.56 This had profound conse-
quences for international law, as some of the first authoritative texts on recognition 
began denying the validity of any criteria that drew any distinction between ‘Civi-
lized’ versus ‘Uncivilized’ nations.57 Caught between anti-colonial demands and an 
inability to invoke the old rhetoric of colonial justification, ‘Civilization’ was 
stripped of its explicitly racial references and re-emerged as a neutral emphasis on 
                                                        
54 Atlantic Charter 1941. 
55 Tooze and Martin 2015, 52.  
56 Keene 2002, 136-138. This success of this rhetorical tactic is premised on downplaying the myriad 
of ways in which Anglo-American conceptions of race and empire were profoundly important 
sources of Nazi emulation and justification, see Mazower 2008, 581-590; Snyder 2015, 12-22; Whit-
man 2017. 
57 This was especially prominent in Hersh Lauterpacht’s highly influential treatise on recognition. 
Here it is noteworthy that it is the theory of James Lorimer that Lauterpacht singles out for the basis 




liberty, individual rights, and peaceful dispute resolution.58 Thus, liberalism be-
came enshrined as a normative presumption that could navigate the question of 
popular will within an international order premised on pluralism in the realm of 
political authority and uniformity in the realm of economic governance.  
 
What emerged against this backdrop of Anglo-American influence in this brave 
new world of popular will was a general ethos of American optimism coupled with 
British pessimism. Having seized its moment for global leadership during the 
War,59 the US drew upon its revolutionary heritage, its history of progressive pa-
ternalism, and its disdain for old European empires (including the British) to ac-
tively promote projects aimed at making every person on earth identify as a member 
of a sovereign political community.60 In Britain, faced with the reality of losing the 
Empire due to war debt, influential attitudes characterized the violence and disorder 
of ensuing independence struggles as solely attributable to colonized populations 
who asserted popular will without the adequate preparation, or even inherent qual-
ities, to do so.61 This included claims by prominent figures, including the influential 
British international relations theorist Martin Wight (1913-1972), that anti-colonial 
liberation movements were analogous to Nazism given their mutual disdain for the 
liberal order.62  
                                                        
58 Keene 2002, 138-139. 
59 See Wertheim 2019. 
60 On these projects, see Kelly and Kaplan 2001. This was supported by a vast degree of effort to 
export liberal constitutionalism throughout the global, largely as a bulwark against Soviet influence, 
see Bâli and Rana 2018, 271-272. 
61 See Hall 2011. 
62 Ibid. 48-51. According to Wight:  
The Bandung powers are moved correspondingly by the contrast between their 
poverty and our wealth . . . At its best this is expressed in the demand for 
equality, and clothes itself in Wilsonian language of natural rights, liberty, and 
self-determination. But it would be an error to suppose that this language 





In locating this optimism-pessimism complex within an international order that al-
lows political communities’ to express popular will by any means, the continuous 
influence of Anglo-American liberal imperial sensibilities is readily apparent. On 
the one hand, benevolent (yet ideologically-loaded) external assistance is readily 
available to those who voluntarily accept it.63 On the other hand, any harsh outcome 
is completely a matter of local responsibility. Thus, there exists a persistent dis-
course of blamelessness regarding the legacies (and continuities) of Anglo-Ameri-
can imperial expansion in relation to the violence that frequently accompanies at-
tempts by the marginalized to assert popular will as a point of resistance to liberal 
capitalism.64 The continued frustration of this connection is a testament to ways in 
which the presumptive ‘ideological neutrality’ of popular will, international law, 
and the nation-state form continues to benefit imperialism-rooted Anglo-American 
interests by insulating them from materialist critique and historical responsibility. 
 
7.4.  Systemic Contradiction and Revolutionary Transformation  
 
In revisiting Chapter IV’s account of how feudal absolutism led to a popular will-
based rupture via the French Revolution, how might we identify the inheritor of this 
                                                        
are totally different from ours as it does to us. Hitler, too, employed it with 
consummate effect. 
Quoted in Ibid. 49. 
63 Much of this has been associated with American ‘modernization theory’ and its positing of elab-
orate technical models of stage-based development that was used as a basis for implementing tech-
nical assistance schemes throughout the ‘developing’ world. For a leading text of this movement see 
e.g. Rostow 1991 [1960]. For an important contemporary account of ‘modernization theory’ and its 
legacy, see Gilman 2003. However, it must be noted that in addition to these mega-projects, there 
was a great material and ideological effort exerted to promote small-scale ‘community development’ 
as well within this context, see Immerwahr 2015. 
64 For an excellent study of Anglo-American ‘deflections’ of imperialist accusations as they have 




revolutionary ethos that influenced the ‘world of popular will’? If we wish to ac-
count for this second great attempt to pursue a politics of emancipatory transfor-
mation in light of contradictory material realities, we must move beyond France 
itself.65 This entails turning to Karl Marx and his critique of capitalist political econ-
omy as bearers of influence from this ‘Age of Revolutions’ that began in 1789 and 
extended to 1848.66 While Marx fashioned the popular will of a transnational pro-
letarian labour as a ‘Sixth Great Power’ destined to challenge the Court of Europe’s 
five Great Powers, understanding the trajectory of this development requires cen-
tring ‘the state’, and the international legalism that upholds it, as a contingent mode 
of social relations.67  
 
This entails distinguishing the effect of the French Revolution on the international 
system from the effects of subsequent revolutionary challenges taken up under the 
banner of Marx’s ideas. What the French revolution amounted to was a fundamental 
undoing of the existing absolutist political order from which it sprung. Through this 
event, the Ancien Regime was destroyed, its transformative challenger ultimately 
exhausted itself, and what emerged was a new order via the European states-system 
that consolidated internally through assertions of nationalist particularity and exter-
nally through the expansion of colonial capitalism. By contrast, later Marxist revo-
lutions, despite ambitions otherwise, failed to completely demolish the existing or-
der. Moreover, their impact paradoxically bolstered the international legal order’s 
ability to ostensibly accommodate ideological pluralism while retaining its struc-
tural affinity towards capital accumulation. What explains this discrepancy? 
 
                                                        
65 Here France emerged as an imperial power rivalled only Britain and international law was of great 
importance in this capacity. For an comprehensive overview of the French empire, see Quinn 2000. 
For an account of international legal development in this context, see Jouannet 2009. 
66 On this periodisation, see Hobsbawm 1962. On Marx’s theory as a response to his contexts, see 
Comninel 2000; Shilliam 2006; Roberts 2016. 
67 On the deficiency of state theory in the analysis of revolution as an internationally-constituted 




Much of this confusion stemmed from debates amongst Marxist revolutionaries 
over the extent to which the nation-state form (and its associated international legal 
order) could be substantively retooled for revolutionary purposes, or whether the 
creation of entirely new institutions was essential.68 Such debates were especially 
prevalent in the lead up and aftermath of 1917 Bolshevik Revolution where the 
overthrow of Russia’s Tsarist regime represented the first successful assumption of 
state power by Marxists. One such illumination that represents a road not taken 
within international law was Rosa Luxemberg’s theory of popular will and its rela-
tionship with the modalities of transnational class solidarity.69 For Luxemberg, in 
her critique of the nation-state form as a hopelessly reactionary entity, efforts to 
forge emancipatory connections across borders could be derailed if national inde-
pendence became the objective of movements for self-determination.70 From this 
premise, shared by the Austro-Marxists, leaving the old multi-ethnic empires intact 
                                                        
68 It is worth noting that this debate was deeply linked to the colonial and settler colonial contexts 
that shaped the relationship between popular will and international law. Here a dimension of Marx’s 
critique of Hegel can be read as confronting the way Hegel viewed colonial settlement as an oppor-
tunity to build virtuous political communities. For Marx, this idealism was delusional given the 
reality that capitalist social relations could easily reproduce themselves in these new contexts, while 
also expanding the overarching sphere of capital accumulation as a global force, Paquette 2012, 314-
315 
69 According to Luxemberg’s account of the contradiction national independence and anti-capitalist 
struggle using the example of her native Poland (a major flashpoint regarding the question of popular 
will and inadequacies of actually-existing international law, see Chapter V, Part ): 
In order to win independence for Poland, the Polish proletariat would not only 
have to break the grip of the three most powerful governments in Europe, but 
would also have to be strong enough to overcome the material conditions of 
existence of its own bourgeoisie. In other words, despite its position as an en-
slaved class, it would have to take the position of a ruling class at the same 
time and to use its rule to create a new class state, which, in turn, would be the 
instrument of its further oppression. 
Quoted in Whitehall 2015, 727 




and furthering regimes of cultural autonomy (that would not progress into national 
independence) could be harnessed for revolutionary purposes.71  
 
However, this formulation was hotly contested by Vladimir Lenin who viewed na-
tional independence as a revolutionary imperative and thus furthered the idea that 
nation-state was essential for achieving popular will, even if it could never fully 
encapsulate it.72 For Lenin, this stemmed from his theory of imperialism whereby 
the ‘super-profits’ generated from capitalist exploitation outside the national sphere 
allowed the national ruling class to ‘…economically bribe the upper strata of ‘its’ 
workers…’ and divide the proletariat thus causing it to abandon revolutionary am-
bitions.73 However, if regions subject to external domination could attain independ-
ence, the working classes would no longer be divided by this imperialism-funded 
buy-off process and be able to unite in revolution.74 On this basis, national self-
determination was imperative for forging necessary alliances between the workers 
of oppressed and oppressor nations.75 Far from empty rhetoric, once the Bolsheviks 
attained power, Lenin viewed the Russian Empire as no exception to this axiomatic 
demand and oversaw the making of an independent Finland, Baltic states, and, less 
successfully, Ukraine and Armenia.76  
 
As the Soviet Union consolidated following the death of Lenin, contestation over 
the nation-state occurred yet again in the form of Leon Trotsky’s call to export 
                                                        
71 Ibid. 720; Wheatley 2018, 489-493. 
72 Lenin was clear that national independence alone was insufficiently revolutionary, Lenin 1964 
[1916a], 145.  
73 Lenin 1964 [1916b], 115. For his broader theory of imperialism, see Lenin 1996 [1917]. 
74 Writing in the context of the First World War, Lenin viewed national liberation having the poten-
tial to ‘transform the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism.’ Lenin 1964 [1917], 269. 
75 Lenin 1964 [1915], 409. 




popular will in the form of ‘Permanent Revolution’ versus Joseph Stalin’s commit-
ment to building ‘Socialism in One Country.’77 According to Trotsky’s theory, the 
outbreak of revolution in comparatively ‘backwards’ Russia was, contra Marx, the 
result of contradictions within capitalism’s global dynamics where highly advanced 
pockets of bourgeois exploitation and radical resistance were able to emerge in a 
predominantly feudal society without the need for the transitional stages experi-
enced elsewhere.78 For Trotsky, this very ‘backwardness’ that propelled Russia into 
revolution also meant that it lacked the material capabilities needed to sustain such 
a transformative endeavour. This necessitated the expansion of the revolution into 
Germany for the purposes of capturing the most advanced infrastructure of indus-
trial production.79  
 
However, this strategy lost to Stalin’s infamous agenda of pursuing nationalist mod-
ernization as a precondition to promoting the revolution abroad. Though rarely 
acknowledged, the triumph of ‘Socialism in One Country’ was actively enabled by 
international law and the presumption of popular will as the basis for domestic au-
thority had everything to do with it. As the early Soviet Union faced numerous 
denials of recognition, many prominent Western international lawyers condemned 
this as a breach of the popular will-based notion that the international standing of 
the government of a ‘Civilized’ nation, even a revolutionary one, must be deter-
mined by ‘facts on the ground’, not the normative judgment of outsiders.80 Thus, 
tolerance of ‘Socialism in One Country’ within the ambit of acceptable pluralism 
could ultimately be viewed as compatible with the core presumptions of sovereign 
equality and nonintervention. Consequently, this entrenchment of a regime so re-
pugnant to the world’s ruling classes could stand for the presumption that interna-
tional law was truly ‘ideologically neutral.’ However, the limits of this ‘ideological 
                                                        
77 On this debate, see Anderson 1983. 
78 Anievas 2014, 96; see Trotsky 2017 [1932], 3-12. 
79 Rosenberg 1997, 10. 




neutrality’ discourse were exposed by the inability of international law to accom-
modate Trotsky’s revolutionary export and its critique of state-centrism.81  
 
Despite the divisive force of these schisms, in much of its practice, the Soviet ap-
proach to furthering revolutionary popular will, while navigating existing rules and 
institutions, embraced both state-alternative and state-centric positions. In the do-
main of state-alternatives, despite Lenin’s earlier critiques of Luxemberg and the 
Austro-Marxists on ethnic accommodation, this is precisely what Soviet policy to-
wards national minorities came to resemble.82 This was true especially in the Cau-
cuses and Central Asia, which hosted extensive projects of unifying cultural diver-
sity with Soviet policy while contesting racialized imperialism and fascism.83 Yet, 
in the domain of state-centrism, while attempts to respect national independence 
resulted in stark reversals in Finland and the Baltic states, from the onset, the Sovi-
ets were nonetheless persistently call for the independence of European colonies in 
Asia and Africa in a capacity that radically rejected the distinction between ‘Civi-
lized’ and ‘Uncivilized’ nations.84  
 
                                                        
81 The failure of serious engagement with this point within Soviet theory is understandable given 
the context of extreme repressions against all things associated with Trotsky. This suppression of 
the Trotskyites ultimately had a substantial international legal effect that manifested in the Soviet 
Union’s role in developing an international legal basis for holding individuals criminally liable for 
planning and waging aggressive war as it was applied at Nuremberg. Here, according to the Soviets, 
ascribing individual liability to an entire ideology was driven, in part, by an analogy between the 
elimination of the Nazi and the earlier elimination of the Trotskyites, Sellars 2013, 56. For a broad 
account of why the Soviet agenda at Nuremberg failed to gain influence within postwar international 
legal sensibilities, thus rendering points such as this one obscure, see Hirsch 2008. 
82 For a comprehensive study of how ethnographic knowledge was mobilised for the purposes of 
building a state premised on a distinct interplay of revolutionary unity and cultural diversity, see 
Hirsch 2008. 
83 An under-analysed facet of were efforts emanating from this region to synthesize Marxism, anti-
colonialism, and Islam, see Hamzić 2016. On the larger geopolitical backdrop that informed Soviet 
efforts in this broad diverse region deemed the ‘Eurasian borderlands’, see Rieber 2015. 




As the world of popular will arose after the Second World War, the Soviets, ele-
vated to the position of one the ‘Big Three’ victors alongside the US and Britain, 
seized their opportunity to use the transformation of international institutions as a 
platform for promoting their vision.85 Equally weary of theories that emphasized 
strict sovereign equality as well as cosmopolitan theories seeking to transcend sov-
ereignty, the Soviets embraced the paradoxical structure of the UN system commit-
ted to equality at the level of the General Assembly and Great Power hegemony at 
the level of the Security Council.86 For the Soviets, such an order was warranted 
due to their extraordinary sacrifices during the War and that their history of pursu-
ing nationalist emancipation made them indispensable to the UN’s task of justly 
resolving the question of colonialism.87  
 
While the UN Charter system may have emerged as the means through which the 
Soviets hoped to manage their compounded contradictions regarding international 
law, the nation-state, and the pursuit of revolutionary popular will, this was to be 
short-lived. In 1949, a new would-be contender for leadership over the world rev-
olution emerged in the form of the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) resulting 
from a communist overthrow of Chang Ki-Shek’s nationalist regime.88 Excluded 
from the UN (including a permeant seat on the Security Council) due to the contin-
ued recognition of the nationalist Republic of China, despite its effective presence 
being limited to the island of Taiwan,89 the PRC could fashion itself as more radical 
option than the Soviets, especially for those waging anticolonial struggles.90 This 
issue came to the fore with the 1956 Soviet announcement of a policy of ‘peaceful 
                                                        
85 On the Soviet role in the development of the UN, see Roberts 2019. 
86 Korovin 1946, 746-748. On the UN equality-hierarchy paradox, see Simpson 2004, 192-193. 
87 Korovin 1946, 751. 
88 On this situation generally, see Wright 1955. 
89 On the ways in which the question of Chinese representation at the UN was hamstrung through 
various procedural arguments, see Schick 1963. 




coexistence’ with the West whereby armed struggle would be displaced into the 
realm of competing development models; a move the Chinese called out as a be-
trayal of anticolonial liberation in the name of rapprochement with the West.91  
 
What followed was a contentious Sino-Soviet spilt where the PRC was well-posi-
tioned to portray the Soviets as ‘white colonizers’ who, despite their revolutionary 
posturing, were fundamentally limited in understanding the aspirations of popular 
will within the decolonizing and postcolonial world(s).92 Through these compound-
ing contractions, the project of revolutionarily transforming popular will was left 
divided and international law’s traditional structuring doctrines of sovereign equal-
ity and nonintervention could claim stabilizing coherence in the face of this conten-
tious maelstrom.93 This process of international legal stabilization became mono-
lithic after the PRC’s 1971 entry into the mainstream international order where it 
replaced the Republic of China as China’s UN representative and began a process 
of rapprochement with the West.94 With this inclusion came an abandoning of more 
radical theories of the relationship between popular will, international law, and the 
structures of global political economy that were developed by Chinese jurists.95 In-
clusion within the international legal order once again foreclosed radical conceptu-
alization of popular will.  
 
                                                        
91 Ibid. 39-40. On the matter of development as medium of competition with the West it must be 
remembered that:  
[a]lthough the Soviet Union was not nearly as wealthy as the United States, it offered 
a clear example….of an impoverished state that had rapidly industrialized. Indeed, 
this example better approximated the particular circumstances across war-torn Europe 
and postcolonial Asia and Africa than did American economic and political history.  
Bâli and Rana 2018, 272. 
92 Friedman 2015, 55-56. 
93 See Roth 2012, 32-33. 
94 See Kim 1973. 




7.5.  Justifications for War and the Fate of European Reaction  
 
In Chapter V, we observed how the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe system 
contributed to the modern order through its accommodation of both liberal and re-
actionary variants of popular will within the bounded nation-states against the back-
drop of entrenching capitalism, colonialism, and racialization. While this context 
lead to the self-conscious rise of modern international law as a tool for peace from 
the 1870s onwards, this sensibility in no way displaced the contradictions embed-
ded within the core structuring processes of colonial capitalist expansion and na-
tionalist containment. A central blind spot in this turn to increased international 
legal rhetoric concerned the relationship between war, capital accumulation, and 
the nation-state form. While there was no centralized ban on war during the nine-
teenth century, this should not be conflated with an international order where states 
felt free to use military force without any legal justification or excuse.96  
 
When accounting for the material grounding of legal argument in this historical and 
political context, Jochem von Bernstorff recent analysis is immensely helpful. For 
von Bernstorff, there were two identifiable, if not always categorically distinct, jus-
tifications for the use of force that became prominent in this context. On the one 
hand, there were ‘order-related’ justifications that primarily concerned the enforce-
ment of obligations and the guarantee of interests emerging from varied interactions 
within the international sphere.97 On the other hand, there were ‘ontological’ justi-
fications where using force eliminated actual or perceived threats to state survival 
and could range from self-defence to territorial conquest as a means of doing so.98  
 
                                                        
96 To say that states where understood as completely free to resort to force for any reason in this era 
is largely unsupported by state practice. Here there is an extensive record showcasing the way resorts 
to war were condemned and/or justified in fundamentally legal rhetoric. For a study of these dis-
courses see, Simon 2018. 





Regarding ‘order-related’ justifications, these resorts to force could be viewed as 
enforcers of capitalist social relations when voluntary agreement failed within an 
international system that lacked a centralized enforcement mechanism. These typi-
cally entailed actions that were coercive, but limited, and frequently deemed 
‘measures short of war.’99 While presented in neutral terms, in actual practice, the 
scope, intensity, and duration of these ‘measures short of war’ largely corresponded 
to a given nation’s position within the stratified international legal order organized 
according to a variable ‘civilizational’ hierarchy.100 Thus, an uncontested member 
of the ‘family of nations’ rarely faced the degree of force regularly visited upon 
‘semi-sovereigns’, let alone ‘non-sovereigns.’101 As previously discussed, it is not 
difficult to see how resistance to these impositions in ‘semi-peripheral’ regions 
through the discourse of sovereign equality (and by extension popular will) did 
much to expand Western international legal presumptions beyond the West.102 Thus, 
the great success of ‘order-based’ justifications was their disciplining function in 
the entrenchment of capitalist social relations.103 As such, they were no longer nec-
essary when those on the receiving end of forcible interventions implemented the 
standards sought by the coercive party. 
 
When facing the question of ‘ontological’ justifications, the question of what ex-
actly these were was intimately connected to who was invoking them. That said, 
such resorts where largely found within the domain of latecomers to the modern 
state-based colonial capitalist order who had to forcibly dismantle alternative polit-
                                                        
99 This included reprisals, blockades, or occupations that cease when as an obligation was met or an 
interest guaranteed. For an account of these practices, see Neff 2003, 215-249.  
100 On ‘stratification’ as a means of understanding the patterns of juridical division and hierarchy 
that pervaded the nineteenth century international order, see Keene 2014  
101 See von Bernstorff 2018, 248-254 
102 See Chapter 5.8.2. 




ical configurations to build their identity as unified nations, namely Italy and Ger-
many.104 Both of these nations proved adept when invoking the discourse of popu-
lar will to further novel ‘ontological’ justifications that ultimately devastated the 
larger system they operated within. For Germany and Italy, this general strategy 
extended ‘ontological’ justifications into the colonial/semi-peripheral context 
where ‘order-related’ justifications largely predominated.105  
 
Beginning with Germany, feeling marginalized by its latecomer status, ontological 
justification was apparent in its demand for a settler colony in Southwest Africa to 
accommodate its expanding population. The result was a notorious extermination 
campaign against indigenous populations as a means of securing space for settle-
ment.106 Moving to Italy, ontological justification took the form of its conquest of 
the Ottoman territory of Libya where Italy’s actions occurred in explicit rejection 
of a highly generous treaty-based regime of extraterritorial jurisdiction/protection 
in this region.107 What is extraordinary here is that Italy’s desire for an African col-
ony as a matter of national prestige represented an ‘ontological’ justification pre-
vailing over the ends sought by ‘order-related’ justifications. This demonstrates a 
                                                        
104 von Bernstorff 2018, 236. 
105 For a study on the ways in which colonialism came to occupy a prominent place in the works of 
unification-era Italian jurists, see De Napoli 2013. For a study on Germany’s recourse to treaty-
based acquisition arguments to justify its colonies in Africa, see Alexandrowicz 2017 [1980]. More-
over, Germany’s African colonies became an interesting hybrid site in the production of technolo-
gies of indirect rule through its incorporation of racialized patterns of agricultural labour and admin-
istration originally developed in the post-Civil War American South, see Zimmerman 2010. 
106 On the connection between this outcome and German thought on international law in this context, 
see Shahabuddin 2013; see also Hull 2004. However, it must also be noted that efforts to exception-
alise the violence of German Southwest Africa (especially when depicting it as a model for the Nazi 
Holocaust) often fail to acknowledge how it was remarkably similar to other colonial wars within 
this same timeframe, see Gerwarth and Malinowski 2009. For instance, the death rates attributable 
to American actions in the Philippines vastly exceeded German actions in Southwest Africa. Ibid. 
279-300. For an account of legal justifications in the context of American counterinsurgency in the 
Philippines, see Smiley 2018.      
107 von Bernstorff 2018, 253-254. On the Italian seizure of Libya as a ‘conquest’, as opposed to any 




contradiction whereby perpetual latecomers within the capitalist order who felt an 
overwhelming need to consolidate a precarious sense of popular will no longer felt 
the need to refrain from (or even euphemize) territorial conquest, traditionally un-
derstood.108 
 
The transformation of international law after the First World War did not prevent 
Italy and Germany from finding new ways to justify force through expansionist 
conceptions of popular will. Rather, they were both profoundly enabled by interwar 
developments. Beginning with Italy, despite being one of the victorious powers, 
economic difficulties and widespread perceptions of marginalization, especially re-
garding colonies, would fuel the rise of Benito Mussolini and animate views of 
international law emphasizing a state’s fundamental right to expansion.109 In addi-
tion to intensifying colonial efforts in Libya and claiming border regions from the 
collapsed Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italian ambitions for conquest as a means of 
self-perceived survival infamously turned to Ethiopia.110 While long characterized 
as a lawless act in progressive international legal narratives, as Rose Parfitt as has 
shown, Italy’s colonial effort included a highly legalistic case before the League of 
                                                        
108 This can be attributed back to the ways in which the unifications of Germany and Italy raised 
questions as to whether the assembly of a national community within sovereign borders could justify 
modes of conquest that had otherwise fallen out of favour in an international order premised on 
capital accumulation and popular will-based sovereignty, see Chapter V, Part 5.7.2.2.  
109 Parfitt 2017, 117-118; According to Mussolini: 
For Fascism, the growth of empire, that is to say the expansion of the nation, 
is an essential manifestation of vitality, and its opposite a sign of decadence. 
Peoples which are rising, or rising again after a period of decadence, are always 
imperialist; any renunciation is a sign of decay and of death. Fascism is the 
doctrine best adapted to represent the tendencies and the aspirations of a people, 
like the people of Italy, who are rising again after many centuries of abasement 
and foreign servitude. 
Mussolini 1934, 16. 
110 For a study of the interconnection between Mussolini’s efforts to construct a distinct ‘nation-
empire’ through conquest and domination set simultaneously in both Europe and Africa, see Pergher 




Nations arguing that its actions were justified rectifications of Ethiopia’s failure to 
meet the conditions of its League membership (conditions uniquely placed on Ethi-
opia due to widespread uncertainty over its ‘Civilizational’ development).111 Un-
dermining our widespread perception of an incompatibility between fascism and 
international law, Italy had once again transfigured an ‘ontological’ justification 
into an ‘order-related’ one.112 An international legal order that still affirmed racial-
ized imperial rule was in a limited position to deny them. 113 
 
As for Germany, its militaristic consolidation led to multiple tensions regarding the 
scope and nature of international law’s ability to constrain war when the will of the 
nation demanded it.114 This was especially pronounced in the interwar period, as 
the impositions placed on it as a result of the 1919 Versailles settlement were con-
tested as an unprecedented violation of the German nation and international legal 
arguments were mobilised on this basis.115 Thus, as the Nazis seized power they: 
claimed Versailles lacked juridical force due to its undermining of the fundamental 
minimum core of German sovereignty,116 formalistically condemned the transfer of 
                                                        
111 Parfitt 2019, 327-334; In addition to the justifications for using force, similar arguments were 
made regarding the laws governing the conduct of hostilities as they applied to Italy’s war against 
Ethiopia. For an account of how discourses of race and civilization were used to justify what would 
otherwise be grave breaches of the laws of war in this context, see Perugini and Gordon 2019. 
112 For more on how international law’s inability to successfully contest such applications reveals 
its fundamental complicity with fascism, even after the supposed defeat of fascism, see Parfitt 2017a. 
113 Here it was even suggested by leading interwar era international lawyer Nicolas Politis that Ethi-
opia surrender its sovereignty and become a sub-sovereign League of Nations mandate to avoid 
destruction at the hands of Italy, Parfitt 2019, 315-316. 
114 On the debates amongst German international lawyers in this context, see Stirk 2005. On the 
connection between German ambivalence towards international law and German conduct during the 
First World War, see Hull 2014. 
115 On the terms of the Versailles Settlement in relation to Germany, see Parfitt 2019, 174-177 




Germany’s colonies,117 and invoked the degradation of ‘Civilization’ in relation to 
the use of Francophone African troops in the Versailles-mandated occupation of 
the Rhineland.118  
 
However, the interwar international legal innovation that truly allowed the Nazis to 
go on the offensive was the introduction of nationalities/minorities as legal persons 
with rights that could qualify the sovereignty of states. This doctrinal development 
was deeply synergistic with Nazi legal theories that posited organic community-
based visions of popular will so extreme they rejected the legitimacy of any legal 
form not in perfect alignment with ‘ethic reality’ as a Jewish conspiracy.119 With 
this justification, and the fact that it could not be casually dismissed by the Western 
powers committed to ‘ethnic peace’, gave credence to Nazis’ ‘ontology-based’ jus-
tifications where the object of survival was fashioned as the German race as a 
whole.120 This enabled Hitler to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland 
region, and use the question of the League-administered Free City of Danzig as a 
pretext for invading Poland thus setting off the Second World War.121  
 
What impact did this intensification of reactionary conquest-justifying applications 
of popular will have on the world of popular will that gained its moment in 1945? 
                                                        
117 Lange 2017, 355-356. Moreover, it warrants mention Mussolini’s conquest and colonization 
where viewed by Hitler as a successful model of how such actions could be undertaken by a fascist 
system, see Bernhard 2013.  
118 On the Rhineland Occupation in relation to conceptions of race and the laws of war within this 
timeframe, see Giladi 2017. 
119 In a manner inseparable from his Jewish heritage, attacks on Hans Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’ 
were particularly prevalent in this capacity, Diner 2000, 56-58. Moreover, it was even asserted that 
the attempt to universal juridical principle through the Roman law was itself an elaborate Jewish 
conspiracy that dated back to Jewish schemes and manipulations within the ancient Roman Empire, 
Preuss 1934, 273-274.   
120 Wheatley 2018, 493-494. For general accounts of Nazi international law from this era, see e.g. 
Preuss 1935; Gott 1938; Herz 1939. 




On one level, the result was obvious. This was nothing short of a fundamental de-
nouncement of conquest as the logical outcome between respect for popular will on 
the one hand and the general ban on the use of force on the other.122 As such, in 
stark contrast to the ambivalence present in the nineteenth century, the clash be-
tween any formulation of popular will seeking to justify conquest and any compet-
ing formulation opposing conquest would be definitively decided in favour of the 
later.123 This being the case, individual self-defence was the sole legitimate ‘ontol-
ogy-based’ justification for using force that survived this process.124 Bolstering this 
view was the position that invasion and plunder by Axis powers did not result in 
any transfer of title by conquest.125 Rather, subjugated states were temporarily oc-
cupied and their would-be conquerors were gross violators of the law of occupa-
tion.126  
 
With this transformed sensibility, popular will justified the juridical persistence of 
sovereign personality even when all state institutions were completely destroyed as 
                                                        
122 See Korman 1996, 135-178. 
123 It bears noting here that conquest by the Axis powers was incoherent even by their own under-
standing. A case in point in Carl Schmitt’s conception of the ‘Reich’ as a ‘greater spatial ordering’ 
that left tremendous ambiguities as to how the populations of these territories would actually be 
ruled, see Stirk 1999. 
124 von Bernstroff 2018, 237. 
125 See Atlantic Charter 1941. On this basis, governments-in-exile retained international legal stand-
ing despite being stripped of effective control of their territories. For a study from this era, see Op-
penheimer 1942. 
126 This point was made explicit in the 1943 Inter-Allied Declaration in which the Allied Powers 
issued ‘a formal warning’ that they ‘…reserve all their rights to declare invalid any transfers of or 
dealings with property, rights, and interests of any description whatsoever which are or, have been, 
situated in the territories which have come under the occupation or control, direct or indirect, of the 




factual matter.127 This marked the end of the doctrine of deballatio whereby com-
plete institutional collapse could cause a state to cease to exist as a subject of inter-
national law.128 Ironically enough, post-defeat Germany was itself a great benefi-
ciary of this development. With its unconditional surrender and placement under an 
all-pervasive regime of Allied-occupation, prominent legal scholars, namely Hans 
Kelsen, argued that Germany’s complete subjugation to external powers could ex-
tinguish its international legal personality as an undeniable matter of fact.129 How-
ever, in maintaining their view that war was an illegitimate basis for territorial ac-
quisition, the Allied leadership made the decision to leave Germany almost entirely 
free of annexation (albeit divided in a manner reflecting the East/West division 
characterizing the Cold War).130 
 
While the ban on conquest has been heralded as a tangible illustration of progress 
through international law, this should not divert attention from the deeper systemic 
logic informing this development. Unlike the early-nineteenth century where con-
quest became unfashionable but retained legal validity (albeit with much attendant 
controversy), in this new world of popular will all full international legal subjects 
were either present or future states whose sovereignty was inextinguishable absent 
                                                        
127 Simpson 2016, 568. On the way the modern understanding of the popular will-international law 
relationship displaces the older Kelsenian view that collapse of a foundational constitutional order 
destroys a states, see Roth 1999, 54-55. 
128 While the nineteenth century law of occupation reduced the instances of deballatio, it did not 
render it illegal, Arai-Takahashi 2012, 57. 
129 Kelsen 1945; Kelsen 1947. This theory is consistent with Kelsen’s larger view that once a state 
losses an essential attribute of statehood (such an effective government) other states are no longer 
under a duty to continue recognising it, see Kelsen 1941. For a more uncertain account of Germany’s 
postwar legal status from one of Kelsen’s former students, see Kunz 1950. For a wide-ranging ac-
count of the governance of Allied occupied Germany, see Friedmann 1947. 
130 See Korman 1996, 177. Given that the 1989 reunification of East and West Germany resulted in 
a near complete restoration of the pre-division status quo, this can hardly be viewed as supporting 
the continued status of deballatio. On the legal dimension of German reunification, see von der Dunk 
and Kooijmans 1991. On the portions of Germany that were annexed in the adjustment of postwar 




voluntary consent. In this particular ordering of the world, the globalization of the 
nation-state inexorably served capitalism by rendering its distinction between 
bounded political authorities and transcendent economic interests universal. 
Against this backdrop, there remained little usage for legal doctrine that legitimized 
the forcible destruction of the alternative polities that might impede this now-com-
pleted universalization process.131 As such, the door remained open for new tech-
nologies of control to advance the ends once accomplished through conquest while 
appearing to be fundamentally distinct in their juridical operation.132 
 
Moreover, while this ban on conquest seemingly fulfilled the promise that a people 
could pursue any system in the name of popular will without fear of external coer-
cion, the reality was more complex. At this very moment the world of popular will 
gave the nation-state universal monopoly on political legitimacy (and in the process 
solidified the narrative of Westphalia as an uncontroversial presumption133), simul-
taneous discourses began declaring the nation-state to be an archaic relic in the pro-
cess of being replaced by emerging forms of international organization and govern-
ance.134 This discourse brought with it an ethos of limiting ideological pluralism in 
the name of global community and, towards this end, invoked the Axis powers as 
                                                        
131 Perhaps the most famous articulator of this sentiment was Carl Schmitt who viewed the fixing of 
territorial status quos to be extensions of the interest of those who created these spatial orders for 
their own purposes, see Schmitt 2003.  
132 Of particular importance here was the discourse of ‘development’ as a project of international 
morality that acted as a pretext, see Pahuja 2011. On the way in which this ‘development’ discourse 
additionally mobilised far more ancient understanding that stretch back to early Christianity, see 
Beard 2007.  
133 For a highly influential piece in shaping this presumption, see Gross 1948. 
134 For an early account articulating this ‘decline of the sovereign state’ in a world of international 
institutions narrative, see Herz 1957. This line of argument can be viewed as the forerunner to de-




an illustration of how unconstrained sovereignty undermined the international or-
der.135  
 
Furthermore, the qualification of sovereignty was bolstered by the normative dis-
course of universal human rights within the international order, a move that persis-
tently generates paradoxes within the sovereign state-centric world of popular 
will.136 Towards this end, devising the proper configuration of state sovereignty, 
international cooperation, and individual rights were discussed in increasingly ‘civ-
ilizational’ terms.137 Such a turn deeply resonated with emerging ideologies, largely 
Swiss, Austrian, and German in origin, that viewed any state-based efforts towards 
collective improvement as dangerous delusions and, as such, the facilitation of in-
dividual will was the only legitimate end of the state.138 These theories, that today 
fall under the banner of ‘neoliberalism’, envisioned an elaborate architecture of in-
ternational institutions that constrain the ability of states, especially new ones, to 
undertake transformative experiments in the name of popular will.139 However, by 
                                                        
135 According to the influential theorist of international law and international relations, Quincy 
Wright, in addition to forcing individual submission to the and refusing any limitations on the con-
duct of war, a hallmark of totalitarianism was rejection of the international regimes governing prop-
erty trade and investment. For Wright this drive towards economic autarky went hand-in-hand with 
aggression and conquest for ‘[i]f the totalitarian states have not sufficient resources to achieve this 
end within their existing territory, this policy has induced efforts to expand their frontiers.’ Wright 
1941, 741; This line of reasoning vastly enabled Western liberal opposition to the Soviets, whose 
challenge to the international order could now between conflated with fascism under the broad rubric 
of ‘totalitarianism’ in a manner that elided substantive analysis of the differences between the two 
ideologies. For an early application of this ‘totalitarian’ rubric in international legal terms, see Herz 
and Florin 1938. 
136 Keene 2002, 141. 
137 On the project of postwar European integration as emblematic of this development, see Keene 
2013c. 
138 For the study this excellent recent study of this theory and implementation of international insti-
tutionalism as means of removing private wealth from the domain of acceptable political contesta-
tion, see Slobodian 2018. 
139 The original model for many of these thinkers was the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire fol-




positing inequality as natural and beyond political rectification, these theories were 
at odds with many of the social welfare oriented projects that informed the early 
UN system.140  
 
Yet, when considering the cataclysmically violent rupture of European reaction, the 
seeds for neoliberalism’s ideological ascension had already been planted. An im-
portant site in this capacity was the 1945 Nuremberg Trials of Nazi military and 
political leadership where the Western Allies used this opportunity to promote a 
peaceful capitalist order based on trade versus a warlike capitalist order based on 
aggression and plunder.141 Such a characterization thus concealed the links between 
capitalism, war, international law, and human categorization that led the post-Na-
poleonic reactionary order to ultimately cannibalize itself. This opened space in the 
postwar era for the nineteenth century to be portrayed, not as a compounding array 
of contradictions, but as a golden age of liberalism undone by the rise of collectivist 
agendas, on both the right and left, that ultimately manifested as aggressive nation-
alism in the twentieth century.142 As a result, this characterization placed a barrier 
between the ends of the world of popular will and a material account of why its 
emergence was desirable in the first place. 
 
7.6.  Latin America’s Third World   
 
In Chapter VI, we observed how international recognition and the consolidation of 
the nation-state form in Latin America blocked alternative formulations of popular 
                                                        
this imperial collapse to pursue independent economic policy and this necessitated international in-
stitutions to fulfil the role previously played by the Vienna-centred Empire, Ibid. 105-106.   
140 To name just one prominent individual seeking out such ends, there was Gunnar Myrdal (1898-
1987), a Swedish economist who served as Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission 
for Europe and extensively theorized the possibility of how international institutions could provide 
basic welfare standards on a global scale, see Myrdal 1957. 
141 Priemel 2013, 104-107. 




will while intertwining the region within expanding orders of capitalism. As the 
nineteenth century progressed, the more globally enmeshed Latin America became, 
the more it stressed the inseparability of nonintervention, territorial integrity, and 
popular will as a matter of basic survival. This need was made apparent when the 
US, despite its earlier support for Latin American independence under international 
law, later used this same line of international legal argument to justify devastating 
impositions in the region.143 A formative turn in this capacity was the 1836 recog-
nition of an independent Texas as having established the ‘facts on the ground’ that 
later justified an 1845 annexation over Mexican protest.144 Following this was a 
series of American demands for Mexican debt repayment that led to the Mexican-
American War culminating in US acquisition of nearly half of Mexico’s territory 
through the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.145  
 
Moreover, schemes for influence by European aristocracy in the region would con-
tinue long after independence. A prime example was the French-backed bid for 
Ferdinand Maximillian Joseph, the younger brother of the Austrian Emperor Franz 
Joseph I, to establish himself as Emperor Maximillian I of Mexico while the US 
was distracted by its Civil War.146 Yet, US assertion of hemispheric dominance 
continued in force, especially after the 1898 Spanish-American War elevated the 
US to the status of a world power.  In this context, a key development was the 1904 
                                                        
143 For a history of US intervention in Latin American focusing on resistance by those on the receiv-
ing end of these interventions, see McPherson 2014. 
144 For an account of Texas’s recognition by the US, see Rather 1910. On this event within the US’s 
larger annexationist strategy, see Pletcher 1973.  
145 This lost Mexican territory later became the American states of New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, 
Utah, Colorado, and California. On the Mexican-American War within the context of US expan-
sionism, see Weeks 1996, 113-139; see also Henderson 2007; Hahn 2017. 





Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine where President Theodore Roosevelt 
proclaimed that all Latin American foreign debt was to be collected by US forces.147  
 
Against this backdrop of multiple pressures, in Latin America, any qualification of 
popular will as something exclusively determined by locally-generated de facto au-
thority could serve as a pretext for external interferences.148 Moreover, Latin Amer-
ican states found that even attempts to qualify rigid adherence to the de facto au-
thority standard, despite their utility in upholding conservative governments, would 
be rejected if they impaired external capitalist interests. This was demonstrated by 
the attempt to constrain coup regimes through the 1907 Tobar Doctrine whereby 
the governments of Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua agreed to the mutual non-recognition of regimes that assumed power in 
violation of an existing constitutional order.149 The limits of such a governmental 
legitimacy regime in the face of conflict with Anglo-American capitalism was 
starkly expressed through the 1923 Tinoco arbitration. In this case, Costa Rica’s 
claim of non-liability for the debts of an unconstitutional coup regime was rejected 
on the grounds that obligations to British creditors were incurred by a holder of 
effective control (who by extension represented ‘popular will’ for international le-
gal purposes).150 According to the arbiter, who happened to be the Chief Justice of 
the US Supreme Court and former US president William Howard Taft:  
 
It is obvious that the obligations of a restored government for the acts 
of the usurping de facto government it succeeds cannot, from the inter-
national standpoint, be prejudiced by a constitution which, though re-
stored to life, is for purposes of this discussion, exactly as if it were new 
legislation which was not in force when the obligations arose. Nor is it 
                                                        
147 Álvarez 1924, 18. 
148 On the specific approach to international law that developed in this context, see Thomas and 
Thomas 1956.  
149 On the Tobar Doctrine, see Stanisfer 1967. 




an answer to this, to suggest that….the restored constitution may be 
construed not to prevent the Costa Rican courts from giving effect to 
the principles of international law…151  
 
Thus, the Tobar Doctrine’s non-recognition of extra-constitutional regimes pro-
vided no basis for debt discharge.152  
 
Within the same timeframe of Tinoco’s affirmation of ‘effective control’, the rela-
tionship between international law, external economic interests, and the domestic 
political expression of a marginalized state reached an entirely new level with the 
1910 Mexican Revolution.153 Unlike previous extra-constitutional assumptions of 
power in Latin America that were largely intra-ruling class in character, the Mexi-
can Revolution represented a truly radical endeavour towards uplifting the material 
conditions of the impoverished many and entailed vast expropriations of alien-
owned property.154 This event showed how the political dimensions of economic 
interests are only truly exposed under capitalism when they are captured for public 
purposes.155  The Mexican Revolution thus forced international law to confront this 
dynamic by raising questions of how state obligations to protect foreign-owned 
property could limit local expressions of popular will that were otherwise within 
                                                        
151 Ibid. 386. 
152 As such, the Tinoco decision was the undoing of the Tobar Doctrine, Stanisfer 1967, 271-272. 
153 For contextual accounts of Revolution from the perspectives of actors involved with the revolu-
tionary government, see Cabrera, et. al. 1916. On the broader social context of the Mexican Revo-
lution, see Wolf 1999, 3-50. 
154 Dawson 1981, 60-61. On subsequent reference to expropriations of foreign-owned property as 
‘Mexicanization’, see Creel 1968. 
155 Rosenberg 1994, 127-129. For a case study on how the influence of businessmen shaped Amer-
ican policy in the context of the Mexican Revolution, thus subverting assumed knowledge of the 




the purview of unquestionable sovereign autonomy.156 In light of this context, Mex-
ico proclaimed an even more radical approach for respecting national sovereignty 
in the form of the 1930 Estrada Doctrine whereby local political outcomes would 
be accepted automatically and unconditionally.157 Under the view presented by the 
Estrada Doctrine, even formal declarations of recognition or inquiry into the 
(non)existence of ‘effective control’, however ‘objective’ or ‘ideologically-neutral’, 
constituted an undue external imposition against local popular will.158    
 
In the face of these mounting contentions centred on the international law, domestic 
political authority, and private property nexus, there emerged a progressive devel-
opment in US-Latin American relations that carried profound consequences in con-
structing the world of popular will. Announced in his inaugural address in 1933, 
US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ constrained 
pro-capitalist interventionism with: 
 
…a blueprint for a revived globalism’ centered on: An acceptance of 
national sovereignty; a way of managing that acceptance through a new 
array of multilateral institutions and agreements; the recognition of so-
cial rights, including the right of developing countries to regulate for-
eign investment and property….and a regional alliance system.159  
 
While this move was deeply in line with the domestic-focused American Progres-
sive era’s reigning-in of the harshest excesses of capitalism that became Roose-
velt’s ‘New Deal’, its enduring effects on the larger international legal and political 
                                                        
156 For confrontations of these issues, particularly as they were entrenched in the 1917 Mexican 
Constitution, see Bullington 1927; Williams 1927; Dunn 1928; Kunz 1940. 
157 See Jessup 1931. 
158 Irizarry y Puente 1954, 325-326. 




order are difficult to over-state. In recalling the Anglo-American agenda of legiti-
mating its world leadership despite its practices of colonial domination, a great per-
formance of its commitments to transcending this past (and present) occurred at the 
Nuremberg trial of Nazi leadership. Faced with the defensive challenge that Nazi 
actions in Eastern Europe were functionally similar to US actions in Latin America, 
the US response was that the ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ progressively rendered such 
practices irrelevant.160   
 
Beyond this self-legitimizing US co-option, it cannot be forgotten just how vital 
Latin American agency and experience was in confronting the contradictions that 
faced those attempting to build the ‘world of popular will.’ As discussed above, the 
liberal Anglo-Americans, (post-)reactionary continental Europeans, and Marxist 
revolutionaries were, despite their vastly different agendas and ideologies, united 
by their perpetual struggles to articulate the proper relationship between the sover-
eign state and international order. By contrast, Latin Americas came to the table 
with experience in building international organizations that sought, not just to ‘bal-
ance’ sovereignty autonomy with trans-boundary solidarity as opposing values, but 
also to mutually reinforce these two ends.161  Moreover, between so much of the 
world still being colonized on the one hand, and the large-scale exclusion of the 
non-‘peace-loving’ states on the other, Latin America contributed a strong portion 
of representatives in the deliberations regarding the postwar order and, as such, their 
views could not be ignored.162  
                                                        
160 Thus when the Third Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop drew an analogy between 
Nazi expansionism and the Monroe Doctrine, the response by the US Under Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles, a leading architect of Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbor Policy’, was that ‘the Minster 
was laboring under a misapprehension as to the nature of that policy…At this moment, I was glad 
to say, a new relationship existed in the Western Hemisphere.’ Quoted in Hathaway and Shapiro 
2017, 243. 
161 On Pan-American efforts to build sovereignty-affirming international organization in the early 
twentieth century, see Scarfi 2014. 
162 On the role of Latin American delegates in including strong provisions on sovereign equality and 





The Latin American experience of navigating the relationship between sovereignty 
and international cooperation in this world of popular will had much to offer to 
African and Asian efforts to navigate these issues in various measures. As a starting 
point, for the nations consigned to the status of ‘semi-sovereign’ in the nineteenth 
century, their campaigns centred on proclaiming absolute sovereignty had to adapt 
to the proliferation of constraints placed on such proclamations by the twentieth 
century’s new institutionalist sensibilities.163 Against this transforming backdrop, 
as African and Asian actors embarked upon independence in an increasingly for-
mally equal world, Latin America offered guidance as a region whose formative 
marginalization in conforming to externally-imposed international legal standards 
prompted many innovations.164 In addition to arguments regarding sovereign equal-
ity and nonintervention, this also included lessons from experiments with regional 
organization and state-led development projects.165 
                                                        
163 See Becker-Lorca 2015, 202-203. This was readily reflected in the interwar experience of the 
three states governed by those of African origin (Haiti, Liberia, and Ethiopia) where many autonomy 
claims available in an era of absolute sovereignty were pre-empted by a paternalism emanating from 
League of Nations’ sensibilities, see Younis 2018. On this point, while there has been a common 
discourse that post-Second World War decolonization on the basis of self-determination was the 
universalization of Western modes of political authority, as Adom Getachew has recently shown, 
this view fails to account for how so many figures within the West contested self-determination’s 
universal and unconditional applicability, Getachew 2019, 75-76. To provide just one example of 
such a figure from Getachew, there was the international lawyer Clyde Eagleton who, while ex-
pressing a degree of sympathy, saw no future for self-determination if anticolonial liberation move-
ments continued ‘….to make the extravagant, impractical and irresponsible claims….which do not 
at all consider the needs of the community of nations, or even the welfare of the peoples concerned.’ 
Eagleton 1953, 603. 
164 See Eslava forthcoming. 
165 Ibid. The influence of Latin America on postwar decolonization was important not just for what 
it accomplished, but also for what it failed to accomplish. For influential Anglophone African and 
Caribbean scholar-statesmen such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Eric Williams of Trinidad, the 
answer for their societies lie in the building of multi-state federations. For them, the model was the 
US, which they claimed, by organizing itself as a federation, avoided the fate of Latin America (as 
well as post-First World War Eastern Europe) where independence did not extinguish weakness and 
predation. However, as Getachew has made clear, the flaw in this line of thinking was its failure to 
consider how US American success was driven by the intertwined dynamics of race hierarchy, set-





The broad embrace of this ethos was apparent in the overarching spirit of the 1955 
Bandung Conference, the world’s first large scale summit of Asian and African 
leaders asserting their place in this new world of popular will.166 An optimistic 
standpoint articulated in this Cold War context was that the new Asian and African 
states were the true responsible subjects of international law for, out of an appreci-
ation for their hard-won sovereignty, they were the ones positioned to oppose the 
reckless nuclear militarism of the American and Soviet superpowers.167 A key fore-
runner to this sensibility was the Chilean jurist Alejandro Álvarez (1868-1960) who, 
in the interwar period, claimed that the influence of a distinctly ‘Latin American 
International Law’ was needed to prevent a recurrence of the violence of the First 
World War.168  However, following the Second World War the very idea of any 
deliberately ‘regional’ articulation of international legal order became associated 
with fascist justifications for conquest within proclaimed ‘spheres of influence.’169 
As such, they were discredited in a West that viewed universal standards as the sole 
grounding for peaceful order.170 Ironically, a key development within ‘Latin Amer-
ican International Law’ was an unprecedented condemnation of attaining title by 
conquest at a time when it was still considered valid within most US American and 
European treatises.171  
 
                                                        
former colony to have triumphed over the postcolonial predicament not because it had federated, 
but because it was an imperial federation.’ Getachew 2019, 119. 
166 On this ‘Spirit of Bandung’, see Eslava, Fakhri, and Nesiah 2017. 
167 Parfitt 2017b, 60-62. 
168 Álvarez 1940, 323; see also Álvarez 1929. 
169 Becker-Lorca 2012, 1039. On Carty Schmitt as the exemplar in this regard, see Carty 2001. 
170 For an important illustration of the critique of regionalist international legalism in the name of 
universalism, see Lauterpacht 1931. 





Recognizing this simultaneous production of hope and difficulties through interna-
tional law provides a tremendous degree of insight into why the world of popular 
will proved so disappointing for so many Third World actors in Latin America and 
beyond. Immediately after the Second World War, numerous Latin American states 
were drawn into close security and defence treaty-relations with the US.172 Here, 
the latter’s escalating fear of Soviet influence impeded Latin American participa-
tion in the burgeoning Afro-Asian movement and justified increased interven-
tion.173 While many Latin Americans ultimately participated in the radical Third 
World movement, especially after the 1961 Cuban Revolution,174 this broad coali-
tion faced serious divisions regarding the relationship between popular will and 
intervention. While the Latin American experience revealed that any justification 
for intervention would be fully exploited (thus necessitating unconditional ap-
proaches to nonintervention), decolonizing locations, especially in Africa, debated 
the development of flexible use of force arguments as necessary anti-colonial tac-
tics.175 After all, in the decolonization setting, popular will, in a narrow range of 
cases, could now be represented by anti-colonial liberation movements whose goals 
were not actively facilitated by state-centric conceptions of international law.176  
This stood in contrast to Latin America, where popular will and the nation-state had 
become fundamentally intertwined.   
 
As these issues surrounding armed struggle and decolonization winded down in the 
1970s, the Third World struggle shifted to the arena of economic production.177 
Here a new unifying project arose in the form of the New International Economic 
                                                        
172 Obregón 2017, 233-235. 
173 Ibid. 235-237. 
174 See Ibid. 242-245. 
175 For an study of these arguments for expanding the use of force to include anti-colonial struggle, 
particularly as they were developed by the Organization for African Unity, see Dugard 1967. 
176 On representation of popular will through anti-colonial movements, see Roth 1999, 227-234. 




Order (NIEO) that sought to re-configure institutional economics to provide the 
material conditions for allowing the Third World to truly achieve popular will.178 
This project drew heavily on the ideas of Dependency Theory pioneered through 
studies on Latin America claiming that the operation of the global system as a whole 
prevented state-centric policies from providing sufficient material uplift.179 Thus, 
an international solution was required.180 As such, the NIEO represented one of the 
single greatest illustrations of economic issues being politicized for a collective 
purpose. However, this action fundamentally impinged upon capitalist political 
economy’s foundational understanding that the economy is ‘apolitical.’181 In the 
process of undertaking this risky move, and in light of numerous contentions, both 
the Soviet and Chinese would-be leaders of the Third World revolution each proved 
unreliable backers of this project.182  
 
Given such widespread division amongst the proponents of systemic transformation, 
the West was in position to assert its now highly refined neoliberal standpoint that 
was explicit in its agenda of safeguarding private wealth from collective public pur-
poses.183 Under this view, the NEIO was an abomination that threated the axiomatic 
demands of the ‘natural order.’184 Here, any state that invoked sovereign autonomy 
under international law to pursue economic independence only had itself to blame 
when their radical project proved incompatible with larger systemic forces, and 
                                                        
178 For an influential study from this era, see Bedjaoui 1979. 
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180 On the influence of Latin America, and in particular Mexico, on the NIEO, see Thornton 2018. 
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produced chaotic violence as a result. In other words, with the political triumph of 
a depoliticized economy, the systemic forces above the bounded sphere of the na-
tion-state were categorically beyond reproach. This being the case, the exceedingly 
difficult issues regarding the domestic expression of popular will and the values of 
the international legal order discussed in Chapter I are fundamentally inseparable 
from the destruction of these historical alternatives. After all, the proponents of 
these alternatives directly confronted the material grounding of popular will in a 




By operating on a broader temporal and spatial scale than my previous analyses, 
this penultimate chapter integrated the ‘world-historical context’ unearthed by the 
interwoven accounts of ‘juridical thinking’ and historical sociology that occurred 
throughout this thesis. With the formation of the UN system following the Second 
World War, the world of popular will, and its presumption that all human beings 
are members of current or future sovereign political communities, arose as perhaps 
the single greatest juridical narrative since sovereignty itself. While profound in its 
sweeping abstraction of the world from its actual-existing material conditions, this 
narrative forged connections that may otherwise have never existed. Thus, it formed 
a base consensus amongst actors across an unparalleled range of conflicting ideo-
logies. In highlighting the events of the previous four chapters, and their subsequent 
development, I showed how various contradicting assertions eventually coalesced 
into the world of popular will that acted as a variable repository of redemption, 
transformative hope, and the protection of accumulated interests. 
 
However, simply acknowledging this grand juridical synthesis makes little sense if 
left abstracted from the material interests and ideologies that gave rise to it. The 
basis of this formation was an order of capitalist social relations that expanded 
throughout the world and manifested in radically different ways across a great va-
riety of contexts. In the face of this uneven and combined transmission, arguments 
invoking categories of popular will, state sovereignty, and international law became 




of abstraction. Carving exceptions to the universal applicability of these categories 
in the interests of acquiring greater opportunities for capital accumulation resulted 
in a hierarchy of human division upheld through a new juridical discourse broadly 
deemed the ‘Standard of Civilization.’ This reconfiguration produced contradic-
tions that ultimately rendered this order unsustainable and, as such, the return to a 
more universal juridical narrative was required. Through this turn, a ‘racial century’ 
gave way to a ‘world of popular will.’  
 
However, this did not transcend the contradictions inherent in capital accumulation, 
but merely shifted them into different forms as this new juridical narrative con-
structed new identities in a manner rife with new material consequences. The vio-
lent reality of this arrangement is readily observable in the durability of the effective 
control doctrine, whereby the current international legal order is compelled to posit 
domestic political authority as a matter of local agency, and, correspondingly, local 
responsibility. In this way, the consciousness of international law remains stunted 
in its characterization of the violence of domestic political contestation. After all, 
seriously considering the world-historical legacies of sovereign identity construc-
tion, persistent inequalities, and the elision of alternatives risks undermining the 
very juridical narrative that is the world of popular will so dutifully upheld by the 
UN system. In other words, the ‘effective control doctrine’ is the accumulated mass 










In this thesis, I explored popular will and why it became the sole basis for domestic 
authority under international law. Here I exposed the material and ideological pre-
sumptions that legitimize ‘popular will’ as an expression of possibility limited only 
by the imaginations of discrete sovereign political communities. To offer a conclu-
sion, it is my claim that this very ethos of openness and contingency conceals the 
ways in which the discourse of popular will is itself complicit in the construction 
and maintenance of a very specific type of world. While alternative paths might 
have been taken, the popular will embedded in today’s international legal order is 
none other than a core legitimation of a globalized system of capitalism that cannot 
abide alternative social relations. This is the result of the fact that international law’s 
sole vessel of popular will, the modern sovereign nation-state, is an entity premised 
on the separation of a bounded sphere of politics and a transcendent sphere of eco-
nomics. In a world where the nation-state is the only form of complete political 
subjectivity, nothing can exist outside capitalism’s integral distinction between 
‘public’ sovereignty and the ‘private’ economy where the former stabilises the latter 
 
In reaching this conclusion, my method has emerged as a view of a world produced 
through intersecting accounts of the historical sociology of international relations 
on the one hand, and the function of ‘juridical thinking’ as an embodiment of inter-
national legal consciousness on the other. Taken together, an analysis of ‘world-
historical context’ is possible. While historical sociology reveals the material forces 
that shape our modern international order, and offers insight into why some legal 
arguments succeed whereas others fail, ‘juridical thinking’ provides a uniquely 
powerful means of constructing narratives unbound by material constraints. After 
all, for ‘juridical thinking’ what truly matters is the encapsulation of timeless prin-




be retooled accordingly. Through this ability to portray narratives as timeless, ju-
ridical thinking can justify the creation of new material realities and social relations 
in ways that are otherwise impossible.  
 
The ultimate globalization of popular will began with such a narrative. As this thesis 
has shown, today’s default metric for determining of popular will, the ‘effective 
control doctrine’, originated in the Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel’s 1758 treatise The 
Law of Nations. Often mistaken for a pragmatic depiction of the existing political 
and diplomatic order, in reality, this treatise’s foundational ontology of a world of 
formally equal sovereign states was a counterfactual based on natural law first prin-
ciples. In other words, Vattel’s treatise is an ought with a profound history of being 
mistaken for an is. When accounting for the current international legal order in this 
light, we are left with an all-important puzzle: if the world depicted in Vattel’s trea-
tise was not the world actually inhabited by Vattel, why is our world the world 
depicted in Vattel’s treatise? 
 
In confronting this question, Chapter I provided an overview of the contemporary 
international legal order where ‘effective control’ serves as the best available evi-
dence of a sovereign political community’s popular will. Attempts to transcend (or, 
more modestly, qualify) its harshness only seem to end up affirming it. Moving to 
Chapter II, the task of locating where and when exactly this justificatory formula-
tion first emerged in the classical cannons of international law led us to Vattel’s 
treatise. As a matter of context, it was shown how the Vattelian view of the world 
was tailored to the interests of his small eighteenth century Swiss Canton fearful of 
extinction amidst powerful neighbouring kingdoms. Historicizing this theory’s 
great moment of reception, Chapter III examined how the intertwined process of 
European colonial expansion and the consolidation of the first modern capitalist 
state in England led to a situation where its North American settlers ultimately 
sought, and won, independence. Here Vattel’s arguments proved invaluable when 
waging a campaign for sovereign autonomy in that it was legible within an estab-
lished tradition, yet, could nonetheless support a dramatically unprecedented polit-





Chapter VI accounted for how the popular will born of colonial capitalist expansion 
migrated from the peripheries to the very European core these expansions radiated 
from. Here I showed how the compounding contradictions of absolutist centraliza-
tion in continental Europe eventually erupted into the French Revolution which, 
despite ultimately exhausting itself, left the aspiration of popular will as a lasting 
challenge that absolutism never recovered from. Chapter V then showed how, in an 
alliance against the radicalism of the French Revolutionaries, and in the context of 
tensions between the expansion of capitalism and vestiges of absolutism, there 
emerged a new order of bounded sovereign states. Here an organicist conception of 
‘ideological pluralism’ enabled the coexistence of liberal and reactionary national-
isms. Set against the expansion of colonial capitalism, treaty-making proliferated, 
belligerent occupation largely replaced conquest, the non-European world was in-
creasingly excluded, and the asymmetry between national borders and nationalist 
ambitions was a persistent source of volatility.  
 
Returning to the Western Hemisphere in Chapter VI, the question of Latin Ameri-
can independence pit Europe’s reactionary powers, who sought to uphold the dy-
nastic legitimacy of the Spanish Crown, against Britain and the US, whose interests 
supported recognition on a de facto basis. While this de facto authority ultimately 
vindicated independence, it stunted the development of uniquely Latin American 
conceptions of popular will. While capitalism, the nation-state form, and interna-
tional law brought about this result, increased of assertion of, and identification 
with, these institutions became essential for basic survival of fragile Latin American 
sovereigns. Finally, Chapter VII looked at the future trajectories the events of Chap-
ters III-VI and showed how their overarching manifestation lead to a ‘world of pop-
ular will’ whereby the nation-state form, within the confines of the UN system, 
formed a common point of agreement for so many diverse actors. However, the 
durability of the effective control doctrine was the price to be paid for this outcome. 
 
Having established this account of the emergence and eventual domination of pop-
ular will, what questions are left open regarding popular will as international law’s 
basis for domestic authority? As a preliminary matter, a key showing of this thesis 




nation-state form, and the structure of international law that organizes its multiplic-
ity, is just one such mode. Here, while it is a reflexive trope of the international 
legal imagination to contrast an anarchic world of sovereigns against a utopian 
world unified under a common authority, we must remember just how recent and 
how contingent our exclusive world of nation-states actually is. More importantly, 
there was never a system of political economy capable of providing the most basic 
sustenance to, let alone accommodating the deepest aspirations of, a world where 
the nation-state form is the sole unit of sovereign political expression and unique 
destinies can be pursued without the endemic risk of fatal destruction. 
 
The key question raised by this thesis concerns then, what popular will – as some-
thing constrained only by the imagination – might truly look like given the inade-
quacy of the existing order to live up to its promises. What would this look like as 
a matter of political economy? How would it appear as a matter of political repre-
sentation? As a matter of transcendent regimes of legality? Given that my conclu-
sion was reached through an in-depth materialist history, it would make little sense 
to answer these questions with the same type of abstract idealization that dominates 
the current debate on the relationship between popular will and international law. 
For those braver than me who wish to theorize a world where the deepest aspirations 
of popular will harmoniously align with their concrete circumstances of possibility, 
finding a place to begin can emerge from any number of points and for any number 
of reasons. To those who pursue this path, I offer one piece of guidance: A coun-
terfactual assertion made in the narrow interests of a small Swiss Canton can, under 
the right material conditions, conqueror the world so completely it would appear in 
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